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Introduction. Identity, mobile media, and play
i. Identity and the mobile phone: in search of another mediation
Identities are wrought with paradox. We think of ourselves as individuals with unique 
personalities and characters, and also as belonging to groups of people. We want to  
shape ourselves according to our tastes and choices, yet keep phrasing identities as 
higher  order  impositions:  innate  and ours  by  birth,  by  blood,  by  vocation.  We are 
constantly developing ourselves and feel reluctant to use fixed terms that suggest a 
standstill,  yet we long for authenticity and the lasting.  We have liberated ourselves 
from stable and sometimes oppressive identity categories, yet we want to feel attached 
both in time and space to larger entities. We have become highly self-reflective and 
have lost belief in claims to truths and essences, yet we want to believe in the real and 
the profound. We consider identity an end in itself, but we also employ it as a strategic 
means in order to reach some external  goal.  Despite,  or  perhaps because of  these 
ambivalences, we tenaciously cling to the idea of ‘having an identity’. Thinking about  
ourselves as beings with an identity appears to be a deep psychological necessity. As 
soon as we talk about identity something is at stake. Identity matters. 
What is this elusive notion of identity? Let’s start with some initial thoughts. The 
word identity can be used for individual people. A police spokeswoman in front of the  
camera may proudly  declare that  “after two months of  intensive investigations the 
identity of the robber has been established”. The police woman uses the word identity 
in the sense of  identification. Being identifiable as one and the same person - even 
after  many  decades  and  losing  all  one’s  hair  and  teeth  -  is  often  called  ‘forensic  
identity’.  Now  suppose  that  the  robber,  after  serving  time  in  prison,  wants  to 
completely overturn his life. He breaks with all his criminal friends, moves to another 
city, and finds a job. Is he still the same person as he was before? Only when he thinks 
of himself as a self, can he still see himself as the same person. Sameness is not only a  
biological given but must also be approached via self-interpretation. Sameness then is 
but one aspect of identity. But what is this ‘self’ who is looking and asking in the first  
place? The robber likely will not understand himself in term of attributes like name, 
age, posture, fingerprints, and DNA samples. He may sum up a number of properties,  
values, behaviors, and so on that he deems typical of himself. This process necessarily  
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involves  stepping  outside  of  himself,  to  look  at  himself  as  a  self.  The  robber’s 
understanding of himself as a self is a different understanding of identity than mere 
sameness. In this question, the who prevails over the what. Moreover, the robber may 
have friends and family who, blissfully unaware of his criminal career, know him from 
other circumstances. They know him as the funny and generous guy who always pays 
for a round of drinks in the bar, or as the attentive son who often surprises his mum 
with flowers. These people too recognize him as the same person, and regard him as a  
self. But how does this ‘self’ come into being? How can we think of ourselves as selves? 
And  how  can  we  remain  the  same  even  when  our  selves  change  over  time,  and 
between different spatial and social contexts?
The word identity is not only used for individuals but also for groups of people 
who feel alike on the basis of a perceived similarity. Most people feel they belong to 
multiple  groups.  Some  groups  consist  of  people  one  regularly  interacts  with,  for 
instance friends and work colleagues. Despite their individual differences, people in 
such groups often develop similar speech and shared rules for behavior. This is social 
identity. Groups also consist of people who may never interact with each other (and 
are oblivious of each other’s existence), yet still feel connected to each other based on 
a  perceived  common  ancestry  and  history,  territory,  norm  and  values,  language, 
symbols, and so on. This “imagined community” of people shares a cultural identity 1. 
But what constitutes this ‘feeling alike’ of groups, and the sense of belonging? And how 
does this  similarity relate to individual differences within groups, and to differences 
between groups?
Furthermore, the word identity is even used for the non-human world that is 
composed  of  spatiotemporal  environments,  objects  and  events.  We  may  attribute 
identity  to  places  (Paris,  city  of  love),  to  temporal  eras  or  moments  (the  Roaring 
Twenties),  and  to  material  artifacts  (Apple’s  ‘brand  identity’).  If  we talk  about  the 
identity of the non-living world, we say it consists of qualities that distinguish things in  
it and provide us with informational cues how to interact with them. Obviously this is  
not  the  same  kind  of  identity  as  human  beings  have.  Environments,  events,  and 
artifacts cannot think about themselves as selves 2. It is people who imbue them with 
character.  The point  is  that  the non-living world too has  forces  of  its  own and the  
potential to act upon us. We are more romantically inclined when in Paris, we sense 
anxiety in a dark alley at night, we experience pleasure from holding a well-designed 
object in our hand and feel invited to tinker with it. Our interactions with the non-living  
1 The term ‘imagined community’ is coined by Benedict Anderson in his study about nationalism (Anderson,  
1991).
2 The animal world takes up a middle ground. Some animals have been proved to possess a sense of self-
awareness. Elephants with a white dot painted on their forehead will touch themselves with their trunks  
when they see their own image in a mirror. It remains the question how they think of themselves as selves.
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world are not simply matters of free choice. The world also imposes its logic on us and 
shapes us in what and who we are. In many preindustrial societies it was taken for 
granted that places, times and artifacts have characters and the power to act. Sacred or 
taboo areas in the forest, special moments for ritual, totems and masks imbued with 
magic; the world as acting upon humans was central to their worldview and sense of  
who they  are.  In  modern ‘disenchanted’  societies  these views  became deliberately 
muffled  3.  Environments, objects and events in the world became inert matter over 
which  humans  could  exert  control.  More  recently,  the view that  the  lifeless  world 
indeed has agency has regained ground (as we will see in the next chapter when we 
talk about technologies). The question arises to what extent we shape the world and to 
what extent it shapes us.
From the above we can distill some initial findings. First, individuals and groups engage  
in multiple relations (I will limit myself to human identities). Identity thus is a relational 
notion. These relations are self and self; self and other people, and self and the world.  
Self-self relations involve how the I relates to the me, and how the we relates to the us. 
Self-other relations involve how  I or  we  relate to other people, either in the second 
person (you) or in the third person (he/she/they). Self-world relations involve how the 
self  relates  to  ‘the  world’,  which  I  take  as  a  broad  category  that  consists  of  
spatiotemporal dimensions and instances (places, events, actions), and of objects as 
artifacts and media 4. A second finding is that these relations are not naturally given or 
self-evident.  They  must  be interpreted and reapplied  to the self.  Identity  thus  is  a  
reflexive notion. Reflexivity means that which takes itself into account. When applied 
to persons it  is  “the turning-back of the experience of the individual upon himself”  
(and, I add, of groups upon themselves) (Mead, 1934: 134). Identity then both involves 
how we understand ourselves and how we understand the concept of self as it pertains 
to ourselves. In order to do so we need a medium to think with. Identity is a mediated 
concept, as we will see further on. Third, we have seen that these relations are not 
stable and fixed but give rise to several tensions. Identity thus is a paradoxical notion 5. 
I phrase what I see as three main overarching tensions as: sameness versus selfhood, 
difference versus similarity, and freedom versus force 6.
3 Economist Karl Marx for instance sought to get rid of the ‘fetish-like’ qualities of commodities, since they 
were standing in between people.
4 For a large part of humanity a fourth relation exists, and that is their relation with God(s). Being the atheist 
that I am, I leave this relation out, although in chapter 3 we will see more about religious identities as part of  
cultural struggles in Indonesia.
5 The word paradox means an apparent contradiction. However, I shall use the term according to common 
parlance as the equivalent of a tension that may or may not be resolved.
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Sameness versus selfhood involves the issue how we can retain permanence as 
the same person across different spatial contexts and throughout life, while we move 
between multiple settings and develop over time 7. Neither in space nor in time are we 
constant. We act and feel differently in various situations, as evident from the case of  
the robber who is also a friend and a good son. And we change over time. The robber 
can  become  an  ex-robber.  For  identity  at  the  group  level,  the  question  is  how 
permanence of identity can be maintained despite changing membership and changing 
group definitions. As a metaphor, the circulation of individual members in a group is 
like  the human body  that  changes  most  of  its  cells  several  times  in  a  lifetime yet 
remains the same body 8. 
Difference versus similarity involves the difficulty how we can remain unique 
individuals in our relations with others as similar beings. As soon as we acknowledge  
that we are like others we give up on being different. The paradox occurs too between 
groups: how can a nation for instance see itself as different when there is always the 
overarching concept of nationalism? How can true difference exist when we use similar 
‘codes’ (language, behavior, cultural symbols) to speak, act and think with? These are 
ontological questions about what constitutes actual difference, when there is always 
an overarching concept (Deleuze, 2004: xiii, 13-17). Inversely, the paradox involves the  
fundamental problem of communication. How can our unique thoughts and feelings be 
shared in terms that  others  understand (see Peters,  1999b: 4-5)? This  paradox has  
socio-cultural,  psychological  and  political  implications.  How  do we cope  with  living 
among strangers in the city? To what extent do we accept fundamental differences to  
exist within an overarching coherent structure, like the nation-state or even the self? 
Freedom versus force involves the contradiction that we are free to shape our  
own lives at will, yet at the same time we are being shaped by worldly or heavenly  
forces over which we often have no control, the ‘fateful moments’ that happen to us 9. 
In fact, it is a double paradox. It is composed of what may be called the ‘burden of 
freedom’ and the ‘shackles of liberation’. We are forcibly free, we must choose our own 
6 My  colleague  Jeroen  Timmermans  has  phrased  three  paradoxes  of  late  modern  identities  in  roughly 
corresponding terms (although with different accents): fixity versus mobility; individuality versus collectivity; 
autonomy versus heteronomy (living by another’s laws) (Timmermans, 2010: chapter 3).
7 As we will see in section 1.2, this coincides with what philosopher Paul Ricoeur calls idem (sameness) and 
ipse identity (selfhood) (Ricoeur, 1992).
8 There is some danger in this metaphor. It suggests members of a group are subservient to cooperating 
towards a common goal of the whole. It may induce groups to categorically shut out others, and regard 
others ‘within them’ as invasive alien viruses. 
9 This is a term used by Anthony Giddens (Giddens, 1991: 131).
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life  path.  We  can  choose  to  free  ourselves  from  circumstances  that  we  feel  are 
confining us, only to find ourselves trapped in new situations and realizing that our so-
called liberation has in fact been a reaction propelled by these circumstances. 
While I have introduced these paradoxes as each arising from one of the three 
relations,  they  are  interlocking.  Freedom  versus  force  also  occurs  in  our  self-self 
relations. People voluntarily submit to self-imposed rules in trying to achieve some goal 
for themselves. It also occurs in self-other relations, as we are being shaped by the 
ascriptions of other people. A gay adolescent who finds herself attracted to the same 
sex, but lives in a society that is intolerant to homosexuality, may choose to break free 
from the shackles. She could move to the big city where life is more anonymous and 
open. Still,  living a life of secrecy with a same-sex partner becomes subject to new 
restrictions.  Difference versus  similarity  occurs  in  self-self  relations too.  The robber 
after his time in jail may attempt to become a different person, yet keeps running into 
familiar dispositions. The paradox also occurs in self-world relations, for instance when 
we collectively buy mass-produced consumer goods in order to distinguish ourselves. 
The paradox of sameness versus selfhood necessarily involves self-other and self-world 
relations,  when we accept  that  the self  is  never  defined in isolation but  always  in 
interaction. We may say that identity as a relational notion describes being a self as the 
departing situation we humans are thrown in. Identity as a reflexive notion describes  
having a  self,  as  we  distance  ourselves  from our  selves  and  become an object  to 
ourselves, and engage in the interpretation of this self (and even may decide to not be 
this self). And identity as a paradoxical notion describes  becoming a self, as we must 
continuously navigate these tensions and assume temporary or permanent positions.  
Being, having, and becoming are modalities of the self that shape each other in circular  
movement. 
The attentive reader may object that I have not yet given a satisfactory answer to what  
is  identity? I  merely  diverted  this  problem  to  the  question  what  is  selfhood? 
Furthermore,  I  appear to pretend that  identity  and its  paradoxes are universal  and 
unchanging.  Third,  I  seem to forego the  problem of  identity  as  a source of  various 
conflicts. These criticisms are absolutely justified and need to be addressed. First, what 
are  we  talking  about  when  we  speak  about  a  ‘self’?  Two opposite  views  can  be 
discerned. In one, the self is some inherent core property. We bring this self along to 
different situations and moments that we move in and between throughout life. In the 
other, the self emerges from interactions between people in social situations. People 
perform different roles in social  interactions. Through impression management they 
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present an image of themselves  10. These opposing views locate this ‘self’ differently. 
One sees the self as something that resides in us; the other as something that emerges 
only in interactions between us. They also have a different spatial view of the self. One 
sees the self as coherent if not unified; the other as multiple if not fragmented. They 
further differ in their temporal view of selfhood. One sees the self as rather stable,  
even permanent; the other as varying and always adapting to new contexts. Finally,  
they describe a different movement of interpreting the self. In the first view, the self is 
an unchanging core essence that we must find inside us and then may expose to the  
outside world. In the second view, the self emerges as the sum of theatrical roles we 
adopt in our interactions, which we then may internalize to become our ‘self’. If the self 
is  something inside us,  how does it  get  there? Is  it  a  pre-given essential  core  that  
slumbers inside us, waiting to be found through introspection? My colleague Jeroen 
Timmermans well phrases the time- and place-dependent origin of this idea: “a lot of  
Westerners nowadays live with the Romantic idea that somewhere deep concealed in 
them there is a metal box containing their true identity, turning their lives into the 
quest  of  the proper key to open this  magic box and discover who they really  are”  
(Timmermans, 2010: 14). Or is it something that we put there, something we more or 
less purposively  construct  from elements  at  our disposal,  and then call  our self?  A 
constructionist view bridges the gap between the essence view and the role-playing 
view. In this perspective, the self is a dynamic and artificial creation, but one that has  
real consequences for one’s sense of coherence. Further down we discuss one of the 
most  powerful  constructionist  perspectives:  narrative  identity  theory.  The  problem 
remains  who is searching,  who internalizes,  who is constructing? It presupposes that 
we posses a space inside, an ‘inner depth’, in which this self can be put. This idea is a 
western  historical  construction as  well,  as  philosopher  Charles  Taylor  shows  in  his 
brilliant genealogy of western identity Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern  
Identity (Taylor, 1989). Taylor traces the origins of what he calls ‘inwardness’ back to  
Greco-Christian  roots.  He  shows  that  inwardness  evolved  from  ‘radical  reflexivity’  
towards knowledge. Only when we became reflexively aware of our awareness could 
we focus on how the world is  for us, and see ourselves as persons with inner depths 
(ibid: 130-131). 
We naturally run into the second criticism. Up to now identity has been treated 
as a general concept. But identity is always a particular. When we talk about individual  
and group identities, it means speaking about this particular person and that particular 
group. What makes me me? What makes us us? As particulars, identities are tied to the 
spatiotemporal contexts in which this me or us exists, is expressed and interpreted. An 
10 This view is commonly associated with sociologist Erving Goffman (Goffman, 1959). More about this in  
section 1.3.
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answer may consist of concrete values and ideals, expressions and utterances, postures 
and actions, etcetera, that we identify with, that is, consider to belong to me (personal 
identity), or to us (social and cultural identities). Not only are the actual expressions of  
identity time- and place-dependent, so too is the concept of identity as the medium by 
which we reflexively think about ourselves, and the paradoxical landmarks on which we 
orient  ourselves  in  life.  Any  inquiry  into  (changes  in)  identity  must  take  these 
spatiotemporal dynamics into account. 
The third issue is the problem of identity. Identities give meaning, value, and a 
sense of coherence and direction to life. But identities can also give rise to internal and  
external conflicts and struggles. Especially for adolescents, identity can be a confusing 
matter that  turns  all  certainties  upside down.  A  considerable number of  people  at  
some point in their lives experience an identity crisis. Taylor describes this as “an acute  
form of disorientation, which people often express in terms of not knowing who they  
are, but which can also be seen as a radical uncertainty of where they stand” (ibid: 27).  
In the example of a young homosexual person in a gay-unfriendly society, her personal,  
social and cultural identities may be incongruent. She may find it difficult to feel part of 
a cultural community that is intolerant towards homosexuality. In the city she moved 
to, her preferences may be acceptable in some social circles, but perhaps not in the 
village community she is from. She may also go through a prolonged period of internal 
struggle whether to accept her sexual  preference or not (perhaps after questioning 
‘sexuality’ itself as nature or nurture). Others may ascribe stereotypical characteristics 
to her, based on how they see ‘people like her’. What makes her her is then narrowed 
to a simplified view of what makes them them. At some point, she may decide to join 
an advocate group for the rights of ‘sexual minorities’. She uses her self-defining sexual 
preference  as  a  means  to  achieve  recognition  and  status  as  a  group,  in  what  is  
frequently  called  ‘identity  politics’  (Hall,  2000:  118;  Heyes,  2009).  Identity  then 
becomes  an instrument  in  politicized struggles.  Manuel  Castells  argues  that  in  the  
global  ‘network  society’  the  construction  of  identities  at  the  group  level  is  always 
characterized  by  power  relationships  (Castells,  1997:  7).  Over  and  against  the 
‘legitimizing identity’ introduced by the dominant institutions of society, he sees the 
rise of a ‘resistance identity’ by marginalized groups. Eventually, when people redefine 
themselves  from  negative  terms  (anti-)  into  positive  terms  (pro-),  they  develop  a 
‘project  identity’ (ibid: 8).  Castells  sees identity struggles in terms of an opposition 
between  communities  and  institutions.  More  recently  we  are  witnessing  the 
resurgence of struggles between communities. These are often political clashes under 
the moniker of religion (in chapter 3 we examine how identities become instruments in 
agonistic struggles). Even if people do not experience deep identity crises, do not have 
to cope with stereotyping, or do not explicitly politicize their identities, identity still can  
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be troublesome. Coping with the three modalities of the self - being, having, becoming 
-  is  problematic  enough.  People  may  be  ‘thrown’  into  bodies,  minds,  sexual  
preferences,  socio-cultural  circumstances,  and  so,  with  which  they  feel  very 
uncomfortable. Many also take reflexivity to the extreme, instantly applying everything 
that  happens  to  themselves.  This  can  lead  to  perpetuous  self-doubt  or  defensive 
attitudes. And navigating the identity paradoxes can lead to the paralyzing feeling that  
every choice narrows the pathway to future choices. 
We are getting closer to a view of identity as it exists today. Taylor phrases this  
issue as follows:
[T]he question is often spontaneously phrased by people in the form: Who am I? 
But this can’t necessarily be answered by giving name and genealogy. What does 
answer this question for us is an understanding of what is of crucial importance  
to us. To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My identity is  
defined  by  the  commitments  and  identifications  which  provide  the  frame or 
horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or 
valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other words, 
it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand. ... 
What  this  brings  to  light  is  the essential  link  between identity  and a  kind of 
orientation. To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in  
which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what 
not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and secondary.
(Taylor, 1989: 27, 28)
What I like about this formulation is Taylor’s use of ‘orientation’ as a spatial metaphor. 
As I will argue later on, this spatial view is sorely missing in Paul Ricoeur’s formulation  
of  narrative  identity, because  of  his  exclusive  attention  for  maintaining  temporal 
permanence.  What  I  like  less  is  the  strong  moral  imperative  speaking  from  this  
passage. If we are less concerned with or not sure of the ought, does that mean we 
cannot have an identity? (By the way, I am aware that this is a value judgment too). 
What I am not certain of is whether identity means “knowing where I stand”. It seems a 
rather  fixed  notion  of  identity.  I  do  not  believe  that  not knowing  where  I  stand 
immediately leads to identity crisis (lucky for me that is a stance too). Could it be that 
identities emerge from the ongoing search for positions - trying to find out where I am 
going - rather than taking a fixed stance? In this thesis I try to bring in a more ‘mobile’  
view of identity.
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In fact, it is precisely the uncertainty of this knowledge that sociologist Anthony  
Giddens sees as a defining feature of our present age of ‘high modernity’ (Giddens,  
1991: 21) 11. Giddens sees contemporary life as permeated with risks and dangers. We 
live  in  an  ongoing  crisis  that  “intrudes  deeply  into  the  heart  of  self-identity  and 
personal feelings” (ibid: 12). Modern social life and (western) identities are shaped by 
‘institutional  reflexivity’  and  ‘radical  doubt’.  We  organize  our  lives  by  applying 
knowledge accumulated via various media, instead of via traditional expert knowledge 
systems  in  which  our  trust  has  waned.  At  the  same  time,  we  apply  the  scientific 
rational principle of radical doubt to this knowledge, thereby undermining its certainty 
(ibid: 3, 21). Giddens sketches the contours of identity as follows:
In the post-traditional order of modernity, and against the backdrop of new forms 
of mediated experience, self-identity becomes a reflexively organised endeavour. 
The reflexive project of the self, which consists in the sustaining of coherent, yet 
continuously  revised,  biographical  narratives,  takes  place  in  the  context  of 
multiple choices as filtered through abstract systems. In the modern social life, 
the notion of lifestyle takes on a particular significance. The more tradition loses 
its  hold,  and  the  more  daily  life  is  reconstituted  in  terms  of  the  dialectical 
interplay of the local and the global, the more individuals are forced to negotiate 
lifestyle choices among a diversity of options. 
(ibid: 5, my emphasis) 
Several points stand out. Giddens highlights the tension between force and choice as 
typical of the modern condition of identity construction. He also mentions the dialectic 
between the local and the global, an issue to which we return in chapter 3. Further, he  
sees present-day identities as shaped by media technologies, which is the key focus of  
this  dissertation.  Third,  he  regards  identity  as  a  reflexive  project  that  is  organized 
through narratives.  We have reached what is  perhaps the most powerful  theory of  
identity: narrative identity. 
Narrative  identity  has  been  most  elaborately  theorized  by  philosopher  Paul 
Ricoeur  (Ricoeur,  1984,  1985,  1988,  1991a,  1991b,  1992).  According  to  Ricoeur,  
(personal)  identity  involves  self-interpretation (Ricoeur,  1992:  114 fn1).  In  order  to 
interpret  oneself  one  needs  a  medium,  and  narrative  is  the  privileged  form  of 
mediation, he says (ibid). Narrative fiction mediates between the three relations we 
already encountered: between man and himself, between man and man, and between 
man and the world  (Ricoeur,  1991a:  27).  Narrative  mediation has  three  moments.  
People implicitly pre-understand their lives as being composed of narrative elements 
11 High  modernity  is  the  late  stage  of  modernity  characterized  by  the  rise  of  mass printed  media  and  
electronic communication (ibid: 25).
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(mimesis1);  they  actively  construct  stories  about  their  lives  and  those  of  others 
(mimesis2);  and  they  reflexively  understand  and  shape  their  lives  as  narratives 
(mimesis3) (Ricoeur, 1984: ch.3). For now this explanantion suffices. Narrative identity 
is discussed in finer detail in section 1.2, and revisited in the concluding chapter.  In 
Ricoeur’s  view, identity  is  always mediated by a dominant medium, in his  case the 
narrative.  Now,  what  happens  when  different  media  rise  to  the  fore?  Media  that, 
perhaps,  do  not  (only)  have  narrative  qualities.  Media  that,  perhaps,  reshape  the 
narrative character of the relations that make up our selves, the way we reflexively 
interpret ourselves, and the paradoxes of the self. Media that, certainly, have rapidly 
become so ubiquitous and dominant that it is hard to ignore them 12. 
The central hypothesis of this dissertation is that the spread of mobile media 
technologies  calls  for  a  new  mediation  of  identity.  What  then  should  this  new 
mediation be? Let us take a preliminary look at some qualities of the mobile phone.  
Mobile phones are objects in the world. They are portable technologies that we take 
with us everywhere we go. As artifacts, they elicit us to explore their possibilities, and 
to tinker with them as toys. Further, they are symbolic items for the expressive display  
of  identity  (Fortunati,  Katz,  &  Riccini,  2003:  1-11).  Mobile  phones  are  wireless 
technologies that enable us to communicate and access information and being on the 
move. As information- and communications technologies, mobile phones reconfigure 
our relations with physical and digital places and situations, the ways we organize our 
social relations, and how we present ourselves. Mobile phones make it much easier to 
rapidly  switch  between  different  settings  in  order  to  interact  with  other  people 
elsewhere. This switching exposes the fact that we all, to some extent, engage in role-
playing  performances  (Geser,  2004).  Mobile  phones  are  part  of  a  range  of  media 
technologies that together form media spaces. These media spaces are both separate 
and connected to everyday life. They open up room for experimentation with different 
aspects of identity, but also for leisurely consumption and creation of media content. 
At the same time, the boundaries between media spaces and everyday life are porous. 
We introduce media  experiences  into  our  everyday  lives  and  vice  versa.  This  brief  
glance suggests we are looking for a concept that understands mobile media as toys 
and communication devices  in  expressive identity  performances;  that  allows for  an 
interactionist perspective of identity construction as playing roles; and that accounts 
for a spatial view of media as identity settings that are both apart and connected, both 
real  and  make-belief,  both  potential  and  actual,  both  serious  and  enjoyable.  This  
concept, I suggest, following De Mul, Frissen, and Raessens, is play (De Mul, 2005; De 
Mul, Frissen, & Raessens, 2005). 
12 According to the International Telecommunication Union, in December 2008 the number of mobile phone 
subscribers passed the 4 billion mark, from 1 billion in 2001 (ITU, 2009: 3). 
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ii. Research question, arguments, and aims
The main research question is as follows:
How can the  notion of  play  be  employed to shed light  on  the  ways  mobile  media  
technologies shape identities? 
This  question has  three clauses,  or  sub-questions.  What is  the influence of  mobile 
media  technologies  on  present-day  identities?  What  is  typical  of  present-day 
technologically mediated identities that is not properly captured in existing theories of 
identity, specifically the influential theory of narrative identity? How can the notion of 
play  be  employed  to  acquire  a  better  understanding  of  how  mobile  media  shape 
identities? These questions permeate this thesis. The main argument is  that mobile 
media shape identities in playful ways, and that play is a better medium to describe  
this  mediation.  This  argument  is  both  an  empirical  one  (describing  actual  identity  
mediations), and a constructive one (prescribing a fruitful approach to understanding 
mediated identities through the lens of play). A second argument is that mobile media  
practices  in  ‘mobile’  urban  societies  foreground  spatial  dimensions  of  identity 
construction,  not  just  the  temporal  dimensions  of  which  narrative  theory  speaks. 
Nevertheless, despite some serious flaws narrative identity as a whole should not be 
thrown out with the bathwater. Instead it should be modified into a theory of playful  
identities.  The  aim  of  this  study  is  to  work  towards  this  to-be  ‘theory  of  playful 
identities’ that accounts for the shaping of identities by mobile media technologies. I 
do not pretend to develop a full-blown theory here. Instead I present the outlines of 
what such a theory might look like. The second aim is to show the power of play for 
media  studies.  To this  end a  play heuristics  is  developed that  is  applicable  beyond 
mobile media, and sheds new light on how media technologies ‘work’ in the mediation 
of identity. 
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iii. Approach and outline
How do we set about the challenge ahead? In storytelling all coherence is constructed 
artificially, Ricoeur teaches. That certainly applies to this study. Research done for this  
study includes a two-month ethnographic fieldwork in Jakarta, Indonesia; an ongoing 
investigation of the interplay between new media and urban culture 13; a funded Arts 
and Science collaboration about  GPS-based mapping  of  mobilities  and identities  in 
Nigeria 14; and literature studies of play, mobile media, urbanism, Indonesia, mobility, 
and identity. Discordance looms large. I choose to structure the argument inductively. 
In  chapter  1 we  begin  by  preparing  our  set  of  instruments  in  order  to  make  the 
argument that the mobile phone shapes identity construction in playful ways. The key 
terms  of  the  research  question  are  conceptualized:  mobile  media  technologies, 
narrative identity, and play. In order to understand this ‘shaping’ of identities, we look  
into  various  approaches  of  the  relation  between  mobile  media  technologies  and 
society/identity, and what is ‘mobile’ about moble media technologies (section 1.1). In 
order to claim that mobile media challenge narrative identity on a number of points, 
this theory is discussed in finer detail (section 1.2). In order to make the argument that 
play  is  more  applicable  to  technologically  mediated  identities  than  narrative,  we 
investigate the play concept in its various guises, and make an initial assessment of its  
usefulness (section 1.3). The use of play in media studies is not entirely new. In order to 
hook into existing work on play for studying the media, earlier research is reviewed. 
Some further accents are added that I consider typical of how mobile media shape the 
playful construction of identities (section 1.4). A structuring ‘play’ framework is set up 
to be applied later. Part of this framework consists of distinguishing four play levels: 
play on the mobile, play with the mobile, play through the mobile, and play by the  
mobile (section 1.5). 
As said, identity is always a particular. Therefore, in the ensuing two chapters 
empirical evidence is presented of mobile media practices in Jakarta, the capital city of 
Indonesia. This shows how mobile media and identities shape each other, and what is  
playful  about  this.  In  section 2.1  of  chapter  2 the  stakes  are  set.  Key  notions  are 
introduced to understand how mobile media shape identity construction in Jakarta: 
modernity, mobility, and the terms gengsi (prestige) and bergaul (modern socializing). 
In sections 2.2 and 2.3 a circle is  drawn around the spatiotemporal  identity setting  
13 The  project  The  Mobile  City  is  an  ongoing  collaboration  with  Martijn  de  Waal.  See 
http://www.themobilecity.nl (see also De Waal & De Lange, 2008;De Lange & De Waal, 2009).
14 The project NomadicMILK involved a temporary collaboration with locative media artist Esther Polak. See 
http://co-ops.nl/site/co-ops/english,  http://nomadicmilk.net,  and  (De  Lange  &  Polak,  2007).  GPS  means 
global positioning system: satellite navigation.
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under investigation. Section 2.2 outlines how the notion of modernity has developed,  
by looking at the physical domain of spatial and cultural changes in Jakarta. Section 2.3  
looks  at  the  Indonesian  media  domain,  and  explores  how  changes  in  the  media 
landscape combined with political upheaval prepared the ground for the reception and 
appropriation  of  the  mobile  phone  as  constitutive  of  new  ‘modern  identities’.  In 
section 2.4 the ball enters the game, when we discuss the production of mobile media 
as one part of the production/consumption cycle. In chapter 3 we step inside the circle 
by shifting the perspective to users and specific mobile phone practices. In section 3.1  
the two notions  gengsi (prestige) and  bergaul (modern socializing) are presented to 
understand how the mobile phone enables people to play with identities. In section 3.2  
we  see  how  the  mobile  phone  shapes  three  types  of  mobility:  corporeal,  socio-
economic, and imaginary mobility. Section 3.3 zooms out to identities at group levels. It  
shows  how  identities  becomes  objects  of  struggles  that  take  place  in  the  media 
domain, and how digital media technologies are focal points in these struggles. Media 
technologies  accentuate  the  tension  between  difference  and  similarity  but  also 
alleviate this. In chapter 4 a shift is made from the particular context of Indonesia to a 
more conceptual perspective of mobile media and identity, yet also within a specific  
setting  (albeit  broad),  namely  the  urban context.  In  section  4.1  we  discuss  recent 
technological  developments  whereby  portable  devices,  location-based  technologies 
and  information  networks  are  integrated.  These  developents  give  rise  to  ‘locative 
media’  practices  across multiple domains.  In  section 4.2 urbanism and the relation 
between the city and media technologies is discussed. In section 4.3 a mobile location-
based  playground  features  as  a  case  of  ‘play  on  the  mobile’.  We  see  how  this  
playground shapes our relations to the urban environment, to other people, and to 
ourselves. Particular attention is given to the tension between sameness and selfhood. 
In  chapter 5 the playful qualities of mobile media are analyzed in finer detail on the 
four play levels proposed in the play framework of section 1.5. In section 5.1 we look at  
two other kinds of play on the mobile. In section 5.2 play with the mobile is analyzed, 
and several play types are identified that tie mobile media to identity. In section 5.3 the 
argument is made that mobile phone communication resembles traditional gift circles,  
as known from classic studies in ethnography. Playful practices in gift exchanges are a 
case of play through the mobile. In section 5.4, shifts in the tension between freedom 
and force rise to the fore, when we analyze (mobile) media technologies as play by the 
mobile. In the concluding chapter 6 we revisit narrative identity theory, and attempt to 
outline a theory of playful identities. Section 6.1 is a frontal attack on narrative identity  
theory’s shortcomings from a play perspective, both as a general theory of identity and 
in its applicability to technologically mediated identities. A number of propositions are 
formulated along the way for the to-be developed theory of playful identities. Section 
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6.2  involves  a  ‘rereading’  of  narrative  identity  theory  through  the  eyes  of  mobile  
media’s playful qualities and practices. It seeks to integrate narrative and play into a  
theory of playful identities. 
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1. Setting the stage: mobile media, narrative identity, and play
1.1 Understanding mobile media technologies
1.1.1 Four dimensions of mobile media
In the introductory chapter we formulated the main research question:  how can the 
notion of play be employed to shed light on the ways mobile media technologies shape  
identities? If we dissect this question, one of the sub-questions is: what is the influence 
of mobile media technologies on present-day identities? To pose this question is to ask: 
which  properties  of  mobile  media  technologies  distinguish  them  from  other  (pre-
existing) technologies? This  implies that  we should start by defining what is  typical 
about mobile media technologies, before we attempt to ‘single out’ its influence on 
identity. This raises a few issues. The first caveat is  that it  is  hard to single out any  
permanent and defining properties  of  the mobile  phone.  The mobile  phone is  -  in 
marketing speak - so much more than just a phone without a wire. It develops in all 
kinds of directions, and is used in unpredictable ways. People use mobile devices for 
instance as music players and platforms to play games. A noticeable development is  
that  mobile  phones  and  networks,  and  desktop  computers  are  growing  together. 
Mobile phones become mobile computers. Positioning technologies are integrated in 
the device. As a result, mobile devices are used as interfaces to relate to physical places  
in  a  development  called  locative  media.  Following  the  approach  of  among  others 
Gerard Goggin, I prefer to use ‘mobile media’ as a broader and more flexible term than 
‘mobile phone’ (Goggin, 2006: 5-6). The second caveat is that mobile phones are not  
isolated  from  other  media  technologies  that  make  up  people’s  habitual  media 
landscape. With the concept of ‘media convergence’, Henry Jenkins has pointed out  
that digital information and communication technologies (ICTs) are intertwined with 
old media (Jenkins, 2006). Not just as technologies but also in the media practices of  
active  users  or  consumers.  Throughout  this  thesis  mobile  phones  are  examined  in 
interaction with other media.  Mobile media in my approach are composed of  four 
dimensions. (1) They are platforms on which we play games, and interfaces on which 
we play with the physical environment. (2) They are cultural artifacts that matter as 
material  objects.  (3)  They obviously  are  communication technologies,  and with the 
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mobile  internet  increasingly  also  information  technologies.  (4)  They  are  part  of  a  
broader ‘convergent’  media  culture that  increasingly  shapes our  lives.  This  fourfold 
view of mobile media recurs  throughout this  thesis,  and corresponds with the four 
‘play levels’ proposed in section 1.5: play on, play with, play through, and play by the 
mobile. As a third caveat, the above question implies that mobile media technologies  
‘influence’ or ‘shape’ identities in some way or ways. But how does this relation work? 
We  need  to  take  a  brief  look  at  some  well-known  approaches  to  technology  and 
society/identity. After that, I highlight one of the defining qualities of mobile media: 
that they are ‘mobile’.  The concept ‘mobility’ is  briefly  introduced, followed by the 
question what actually is ‘mobile’ about the mobile phone. 
1.1.2 Approaches to the relation between technology and identity
‘Technological determinism’ posits that changes in society and history are driven and 
caused by technologies (see Fischer, 1992; Flichy, 2002: 136; Webster, 1995). This view 
sees  technology  and  the  human  domain  as  two  separate  spheres.  It  attributes 
technologies  with  inherent  properties  that  cause  certain  effects.  Although  such 
reasoning is widespread in popular opinion, this reductionist view is no longer held in 
high esteem by  researchers  in  the field  of  technology.  They are sure  to raise  their 
eyebrows when they hear “technology X causes ...” or “the influence of technology Y 
on...  (identity/society/culture/etc.)”.  Phrases  like  these  suggest  technology  impacts 
society with a force of its own, instead of being part of society and in a way created by  
it.  Sometimes technological  determinism is  cloaked in more elaborate formulations. 
Media theorist Marshall McLuhan for instance says that media technologies become 
‘cultures’: press culture, mechanical culture, electric media culture. Via this detour he  
claims that each ‘culture’ brings about its own type of human and society (McLuhan, 
1994). 
The opposite of  technological  determinism is  ‘social  constructivism’,  or social 
determinism, as its critics would say (Bijker & Law, 1992). In this  view technologies  
have no inherent  properties.  It  is  the user who completely  ‘fills  in’  their  uses  and 
meanings.  Such  a  perspective  naturally  highlights  differences  between  and  within 
technologies. A hammer can be a tool for driving nails into wood, or a murder weapon. 
The problem of this approach is that technologies are seen as blank slates devoid of 
any  intrinsic  qualities.  Social  constructivism  is  just  as  reductionist  as  technological  
determinism. 
A dialectical two-way approach is often called ‘mutual shaping’ (Frissen, 1994). 
It implies we cannot just talk about “the influence of the mobile phone on identity”,  
since it also works the other way around: people’s identity practices shape how the 
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mobile  phone  is  being  constructed.  But  where  lies  the  border?  Moreover,  this 
approach still conceptually separates technology from the human realm. The tension 
between  ‘are  we  shaped  by  the  mobile  phone?’, and  ‘are  we  shaping  the  mobile 
phone?’ is a recurrent one in this thesis. We encounter this tension in the two chapters  
about the mobile phone in Indonesia (chapter 2 and 3). Its forceful implications are 
addressed specifically under the heading ‘play by the mobile’ in section 5.4. There I  
advance  the  side-argument  that  the  notion  of  play  can  be  employed  to  less 
categorically oppose the technological realm and the human realm. 
The ‘affordance’ approach takes a middle position between technological and 
social  determinism,  although  it  departs  from  medium-specific  qualities  (Norman, 
1988). According to this approach, technologies have inherent properties that invite  
people to make use of them in a certain way. For instance, a ball invites people to kick  
it  in  order  to  make  it  roll.  I  argue  that  mobile  media  technologies  have  playful 
affordances,  which  after  Kücklich  I  call  their  ‘playability’  (Kücklich,  2004).  Still,  this 
approach runs the risk of being a tautological way of reasoning. Because people use a  
technology in a certain way, it must have this type of use inherently built in. There is no  
possibility for deviant  uses  or understandings  of  these technologies,  since anything 
goes (Ling, 2004: 26). 
‘Domestication’ is an approach that sees the adoption of new items into the 
household as an uncertain process rather then a predetermined given. Igor Kopytoff,  
one of the inspirers of the domestication approach, says that commodities, like people,  
have a biography (Kopytoff, 1986: 66-68). Domestication originally was but one side of 
the  design/domestication  pair  proposed  by  Silverstone  and  Haddon  (Silverstone  & 
Haddon,  1996).  Silverstone  and Haddon take design  broadly  as  composed of  three 
interrelated dimensions: creating the artifact (the functional and aesthetic design of a 
product; this is design in a narrow sense), constructing the user (creating objects with 
certain people in mind), and catching the consumer (how products are marketed) (ibid:  
45). Domestication also involves three steps in the adoption cycle of commodification 
(how objects and technologies emerge in the marketplace), appropriation (how people 
take these products home and familiarize themselves with them), and conversion (how 
people signal their active participation in consumption and innovation to other people) 
(ibid: 45-46)  15. These are not necessarily sequential steps. They feed back into each 
other. In what is called ‘double articulation’,  technologies are both artifacts charged 
with symbolic meanings and media that carry messages (ibid: 62). We will  see how 
these  stages  each  elicit  their  own  form  of  play.  Often,  in  studies  about  media 
15 Confusingly,  some  authors  speak  of  four  steps:  appropriation,  objectification,  incorporation,  and 
conversion (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003: 14). Yet others even mention five steps: imagination, appropriation,  
objectification, incorporation, and conversion (Ling, 2004: 28).
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technologies the domestication perspective is taken on its own, without looking at the 
design process. Domestication alone solely focuses on the user side. It tends to neglect 
how technologies are produced, and strictly separates production from consumption. 
For instance, Kopytoff contrasts the homogenizing force of the economy with culture 
and the individual (Kopytoff, 1986: 87). In chapter 2 we see that the production of the 
mobile phone too is ‘cultural’, and infused with values and preconceptions. 
This cultural  view of  design exists in the view that looks  at  the ‘scripting’  of 
products (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003: 7-11). This perspective focuses on the production 
side of technologies to account for the ways that uses and meanings are pre-inscribed. 
The textbook example is the gendered design of shaving apparatuses. Male shavers are 
black with shiny metal lining, have multiple knobs and handles to tweak settings, and 
look ‘sharp’. Female shavers are pink or white, have only one button (on/off), and a 
curved ‘cute’  animal-like or anthropomorphic shape. This  view takes the process of  
design and production as a human and cultural phenomenon too. Production is not 
one-dimensionally  imagined  as  either  evil  capitalism  at  its  worst,  or  perfectly 
rationalized and aimed at maximizing profit (and therefore not worth studying). 
‘Actor-network  theory’  takes  the  idea  that  humans  and  things  are  not  so 
different  and  both  have  agency  to  a  radical  new  height  (Latour,  1998).  Its  basic  
assumption is that actor-networks like “society, organisations, agents and machines are 
all effects generated in patterned networks of diverse (not simply human) materials” 
(Law, 1992: 2). For instance, complex networks (a government) often come to look like 
single actors, while individual actors are often composed of so many different strands 
that in fact they can be seen as networks (Law, 1992: 2). In this view, technology and 
society are not static and diametrically opposed entities but coexist as dynamic and 
contingent  ‘actor-networks’  (Goggin,  2006:  11).  Applying  this  to the mobile  phone, 
Steve  Woolgar  rejects  a  static  essentialist  notion  of  ‘the  technology’.  Instead,  he 
emphasizes  contingency  in  constructing  uses  and  meanings  with  the  term 
‘interpretative flexibility’ (Woolgar, 2005: 27). By this he means that “the technology 
could  be  otherwise”  (ibid).  This  is  interesting  terrain  for  our  to-be-developed  play 
perspective  on  media  technologies  and  identities.  Woolgar’s  view  suggests  that 
technologies (also) exist in the subjunctive modality of the as if. Roger Silverstone well-
captures this, when he speaks about media in general:
The media experience is, in some significant and general sense... subjunctive. To 
be in  the world but  not of  it.  To be of  it  but not  in  it.  To see the media as  
providing  a  frame  for  experience,  but  also  to  see  the  media  themselves  as 
transformed by experience.... To acknowledge that so much much of culture, our 
culture, our media culture, consists in the acceptance of the ‘as-if-ness’ of the 
world
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(Silverstone, 1999: 59)
This  subjunctive  mode  invites  a  playful  stance  towards  the  media.  We  return  to 
Silverstone’s groundbreaking explorations of play and media in section 1.4. 
‘Media convergence’ refers both to the integration of technologies and services,  
and to changing user practices that span multiple media platforms. As early as 1983,  
Ithiel de Sola Pool writes about changes in the traditional mass media industries. These 
were  forming  new  business  ties  with  “the  electrical  industry”  (Pool,  1983:  23). 
According to Pool, “[a] process called the ‘convergence of modes’ is blurring the lines 
between  media,  even  between  point-to-point  communications,  such  as  the  post,  
telephone, and telegraph, and mass communications,  such as the press,  radio,  and 
television” (ibid).  This leads him to conclude that  “the one-to-one relationship that 
used to exist between a medium and its use is eroding” (ibid). This point is taken up by  
Henry Jenkins and applied to developments in digital media (Jenkins, 2006). Jenkins  
argues that new digital technologies do not replace ‘old’ mass media, as often claimed.  
Instead, “the emerging convergence paradigm assumes that old and new media will  
interact  in  ever more  complex ways”  (ibid:  6).  Convergence does  not  mean simply 
stuffing more and more functions into a single apparatus 16. At the device level there is 
just as much divergence. Convergence is a cultural phenomenon. Other than the time 
of electronic media about which De Sola Pool writes, convergence in the digital age 
does not consist solely of relationships between big media conglomerates but is user-
centered.  “Convergence  doesn’t  just  involve  commercially  produced  materials  and 
services traveling along well-regulated and predictable circuits. [...] It also occurs when 
people take media in their own hands. Entertainment content isn’t the only thing that  
flows across multiple media platforms. Our lives, relationships, fantasies, desires also 
flow across media channels. Being a lover or a mommy or a teacher occurs on multiple  
platforms” (ibid: 17). In this converged world, the boundaries between various media, 
and between media and everyday life, have been blurred.
My approach to mobile media is not a strict version of either of these. Instead, 
for  each  of  the  four  dimensions  of  mobile  media  -  interfaces,  cultural  artifacts,  
information- and communication technologies, part of media culture - I  take what I  
deem the most applicable perspective. The design/domestication approach is  useful 
for understanding artifacts and media, the convergence approach to mobile media as 
interfaces and as media culture. Overall, I assume a mutual shaping perspective. Some 
elements of other approaches recur as well (and I shall explain why, when we reach 
those points). 
16 With some irony Jenkins notes that as an early adopter his home is filled with ever more black boxes 
(Jenkins, 2006: 15).
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1.1.3 What is ‘mobile’ about mobile media?
Mobile media are ‘mobile’. But what is ‘mobility’? Tim Cresswell defines mobility as  
“meaningful movement” (Cresswell, 2006: 2-3). Instead of being a mere displacement 
between point A and point B (and therefore wasted time), mobility itself is meaningful.  
Movement is the dynamic equivalent of location, a position in abstract space, while  
mobility  is  the  dynamic  equivalent  of  place,  a  location  imbued  with  meaning  and 
power (ibid: 2-3; Sheller & Urry, 2006). The question turns to what is ‘meaningful’, and 
to  whom?  Cresswell  argues  that  mobility  has  become  a  root  metaphor  for  our 
contemporary understanding of culture and society. Two opposing views of mobility 
exist:  a ‘sedentary metaphysics’  and a ‘nomadic  metaphysics’  (Cresswell,  2006: 26). 
Sedentary metaphysics involves an outlook on the world that takes fixed existence as  
the norm. It sees sedentary life as rooted, stable, safe, orderly, and rational. Mobility 
and  nomadic  people  -  gypsies,  wanderers,  and  vagabonds  -  symbolize  chaos, 
disruption, fear, and a threat to society’s order. By contrast, a ‘nomadic metaphysics’  
attaches  many  positive  connotations  to  mobility.  Mobility  is  progressive,  exciting,  
contemporary, and anti-establishment. Rootedness, and all things static and bounded 
possess negative connotations, like being reactionary, dull, and of the past. Cresswell’s  
emphasis on the rhetorical power of ‘mobility’ is a healthy antidote to entrapment in 
either  celebratory  or  dismissive  views  of  contemporary  life  as  mobile  17.  Another 
theorist of mobility, John Urry, distinguishes five types of travel (Urry, 2007: 47). These  
are  corporeal  travel  of  people,  physical  movement  of  objects,  imaginative  travel  of 
images via various media, virtual travel through real-time media, and communicative 
travel via interpersonal messages (ibid: 47). In chapter 3 we will see how the mobile  
phone  shapes  several  types  of  mobilities.  In  chapter  4  we  see  how  ‘meaningful’  
mobilities occur on a location-based playground. Another notion forwarded by Urry is  
that  of  ‘mobility  systems’  (ibid:  13).  These  are  complex  constellations  of  both 
technologies  that  enable  mobility,  and  fixed  infrastructures  on  which  this  mobility  
relies. Mobility systems enable and constrain movement, permitting “predictable and 
relatively  risk-free  repetition  of  the  movements  in  question”  (ibid:  13).  Mobility 
systems increasingly rely  on software code. Mobile media make up such a mobility 
system.  For  instance,  they  depend  on  coded  operating  systems,  communication 
infrastructures, networks of production and logistics, distribution and repair, a pool of 
consumer outlets and information channels, third party service and content providers, 
and so on. Mobile media exist in and as a network of interdependencies (as described 
by actor-network theory). Mobile media then are characterized by flow as much as by 
fixity.
17 Examples of such extremes are Braidotti’s praise of ‘nomadic subjectivity’, versus Bauman’s mourning over  
the loss of stability in the age of ‘liquid modernity’ (Bauman, 2000; Braidotti, 1998).
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What’s in a name? Consider for a moment a number of terms for the mobile  
phone. In several countries, the common name for mobile phones is  handphone. In 
Indonesia (the locus of chapters 2 and 3) this word is often abbreviated as hape or HP. 
In  other  countries  derivatives  like  the  German  handy are  in  use.  These  terms 
foreground the relation between the device and the personal body. Handphones are 
portable, wearable and tactile instruments. They are small and lightweight, and easy to 
carry  along  when  on  the  move.  Handphones  are  wearable  since  they  are  taken 
anywhere and are often close to the body. Handphones are haptic devices that are 
grasped and interacted with by using particular gestures (see Hjorth, 2009: 248). This 
gives rise to new public postures and bodily positions centered around the object  18. 
The word handphone suggests the device is always ‘ready-to-hand’ and useful to its  
individual carrier (Heidegger, 1967: 98; see also Nyíri, 2003a; Urry, 2007: 31). A second  
term used frequently is cellphone, a contraction of cellular telephone. In Indonesia, this 
word  is  commonly  used  alongside  handphone (as  ponsel: pon for  phone,  sel for 
sellular). This term stresses the relation to the infrastructure, and its untethering from 
fixed locations. Cellphones are wireless technologies that operate in a mesh network.  
Cellphone users are not tied to fixed locations but can roam around. With cellphones, 
online personalized services and environments can be accessed at any time and from 
anywhere 19. At the same time, cellphones depend on the availability of networks and 
issues like signal strength, price plans for roaming, connection to and integration with 
other networks, data plans. The word cellphone underlines the dependency of mobile 
communication on fixed infrastructures and institutions, as part of mobility systems.  
The most common term is  mobile phone. This word emphasizes the potential to use 
the phone on the go. People can access information,  communicate, maintain social  
relations, consume and produce content while on the move. We can remain ‘in touch’ 
with others even while corporeally traveling. 
Handphone, cellphone, and mobile phone emphasize different aspects of what 
is ‘mobile’ in mobile media: portability and wearability; its relation to the fixed network  
and the potential for accessing personalized services from anywhere; and maintaining 
(intimate) connections during corporeal travel. Whatever name is given, mobile media 
reconfigure  how  we  relate  to  places,  how  we  move,  how  we  organize  our  social 
relations  and  our  own  life.  Moving  away  from  this  semantic  understanding,  what 
actual mobility practices are sustained by mobile media? Mobile media are ‘mobile’ 
because they enable people to be mobile in various ways. Both in actual practice and 
18 They might even contribute to new types of physical illnesses like RSI (repetitive strain injury) as a result of  
typing  on  tiny  keyboards.  See  “RSI  danger  from  excessive  texting” 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/5063364.stm.
19 Services that are able to relay and distribute data are often called ‘cloud computing’. Individual devices are  
merely ‘cells’ in a larger body or ‘cloud’ from which services can be accessed on demand.
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because of  their mobility  potential  (see Urry, 2007: 38-39).  Before the rise of early 
modern  transport  and  electronic  communication  technologies,  physical  travel  and 
communication went hand in hand. If you wanted to talk to someone elsewhere you 
had to corporeally move 20. Modern ‘space and time transcending’ technologies caused 
a rift between corporeal travel and communication. These were turned into separate  
realms. People corporeally traveling would be largely incommunicado. And people who 
were  communicating  did  so  at  a  specific  place  while  physically  at  rest.  With  the  
development  of  wireless  radio  it  became  possible  for  ships  and  trains  to  have 
communication on board. But costs were prohibitive. Moreover, travelers still had to go 
to a specific place aboard, the communication room, and remained in position while  
communicating. These two mobilities thus obeyed separate laws of  nature: physical 
mobility fell under the laws of gravity and acceleration, and communication under the 
laws  of  electronics.  Initially,  digital  media  technologies  took  this  separation  even 
further. Computer-mediated communication took place ‘immobilized’ behind a screen. 
Initially on centralized mainframes, and later on personal computers (PCs) behind a 
desktop. In the early days of the internet, ‘cyberspace’ was considered a realm apart 
from everyday reality. Later, internet research focused on relations between the online 
and physical world (Hampton & Wellman, 1999; Miller & Slater, 2000; Wellman, 2001).  
For example, people who were more active online also tended to be more active in 
their neighborhoods. The internet was seen increasingly not as a substitute of everyday 
life, but as complementary (see Urry, 2007: 164-165).
What makes mobile media unique, then, is that individual people - and physical  
objects  -  can  now  physically  move,  while  at  the  same  time  they  are  able  to 
communicate. They carry their own individual communication hub with them, without  
the need to sit still at a particular location. As a consequence, the domains of physical  
transport and ‘virtual’ communication edge towards each other, intersect, and merge. 
Mobile communication acquires physical dimensions. First, the materiality of mobile 
phones as artifacts matters. Their small form-factor makes it possible to use them in an  
unobtrusive,  casual  manner  (Kato,  2005:  105-6),  or  even  quasi-illicitly  by  students 
during class (Ling & Yttri, 2002: 162). They are objects that by their looks and tactile  
properties  convey  symbolic  meanings  to,  and  about  its  carrier.  By  virtue  of  their 
material presence and visibility, phones can be used to claim personal space during 
20 Multiple technologies existed in pre-modern times to communicate without traveling: visual signals (e.g. 
smoke signals, light signals), sound (e.g. drumming, horn blowing). Additionally, techniques were invented in 
non-literate societies to overcome the temporal impermanence of face-to-face communication by ‘recording’ 
information, for instance incising tree bark, stacking stones, knotting cords, and so on. Other senses besides  
the eyes and ears are involved in communication, often on a more unconscious level, like smell and touch. 
Moreover, many cultures had (and have) some kind of belief in telepathy, visions, revelations, and so on, as  
forms of communication over large distances and/or in time without actual corporeal travel.
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travel,  or  to engage in “stage-phoning”:  pretending to make a call  in  public  (Plant, 
2001: 49). Second, the embodiment of the person carrying the phone matters. Mobile  
communication technologies are worn close to the body (Fortunati, 2002a). Not some 
fixed physical location but the human body is now the hub where flows of information 
and communication intersect. Wearability and fashionability matter, as mobile phones 
become part  of  the body’s dress-up,  postures, performances,  and sense of  security 
(Fortunati, et al., 2003; Ling, 2008: 133-134; Ling & Yttri, 2002: 164). Moreover, mobile 
media  are  not  only  carried  by  people  but  also  embedded  in  traveling  objects,  for 
instance as RFID (radio frequency identification) tags. These are already widely used in 
logistics,  and  now  start  to  appear  more  and  more  in  everyday  objects  like  public 
transport  cards  and  (car)  keys  (Sterling,  2005).  Third,  physical  contexts  in  which 
communication takes place matter. Mobile media are not used in a void, or in a single 
physical  place  (work,  home).  People  make mobile  phone  calls  in  a  wide variety  of  
spatiotemporal contexts, or ‘social situations’. The physical element of these situations 
tends to seep through in communication. For instance, background noises turn mobile 
phone calls into guessing games of “where are you?”. And events happening in physical  
space  are  immediately  captured,  described,  and  commented  upon  via  mobile 
communication devices and networks. The question “where are you?” has in fact taken  
over the former “how are you?”. In chapter 4 we look at new developments that tie the  
exchange of information and communication to physical locations. With location-based 
technologies, ‘place’ is integrated even more into mobile media interactions. 
1.2 The storytelling self: narrative identity
Numerous philosophers  -  both Anglo-American and European - have forwarded the 
idea  that  identity  can  be  understood  as  narrative  21.  Certainly  the  most  elaborate 
theoretical framework has been set up by Paul Ricoeur (Ricoeur,  1984, 1985, 1988, 
1991a, 1991b, 1992). In Oneself as Another Paul Ricoeur aims to overcome problematic 
aspects of earlier conceptions of selfhood (Ricoeur, 1992: 4-16). Descartes posited the  
21 Philosophers who have written about narrative identity include Alasdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre, 1984: ch. 
15),  Charles Taylor (Taylor,  1989),  Daniel Dennett (Dennett,  1992),  and Marya Schechtman (Schechtman, 
1996).  Narrative  has  also  been  embraced  by  sociologists  (Giddens,  1991),  psychologists  (Bruner,  1991; 
Gergen, 1998, 2000),  and anthropologists  (Fabian,  1983, 1991; Geertz,  1975b) to talk about culture and 
identities.
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doubting ego cogito that was sure of one thing: it is I who doubts, and therefore I exist. 
But this  cogito bears no relation to other people and is devoid of historical context.  
Nietzsche shattered this  idea of  ego.  He argued that  subjectivity  is  nothing but  an 
illusion brought  about  by  rhetorics.  More recent  attempts  to solve the problem of  
identity - mostly in the Anglo-American analytic tradition - in the end all get stuck in 
conceptualizing sameness but not selfhood. Ricoeur’s answer is a hermeneutics of the 
self. The self can only be understood indirectly by means of interpretation (verstehen 
instead of  erklären).  Self-interpretation is mediated by narrative. Narrative mediates 
three dialectics of personal identity. How can we reflexively talk about ourselves in the 
third person, that is, how does the I relate to the self? How does sameness over time 
and being identical to oneself (idem) relate to the experience of selfhood (ipse) and the 
potential for change? And how does the self relate to other people (ibid: 18, 21)? Since 
I  take  identity  not  only  as  personal  but  also  as  group  identity,  I  have  combined 
Ricoeur’s first two dialectics in  sameness versus  selfhood, phrased his third in other 
terms as difference versus similarity, and added another one that I see as particularly 
urgent in technologically mediated identities: freedom versus force. 
Elsewhere, Ricoeur writes that narrative mediates between three relations that 
make  up our  identity.  “[Literary  text]  is  a  mediation between man and the  world,  
between man and man, between man and himself; the mediation between man and 
the world is what we call referentiality; the mediation between men, communicability; 
the  mediation between man and  himself,  self-understanding”  (Ricoeur,  1991a:  27). 
These three relations inform my relational view of identity. However, I argue that the 
relation between man and the world is not one of mere referentiality (this is discussed 
at length in section 6.1). We not only speak about the world in referential terms, or 
think  about  it  in  representational  symbols.  We  also  interact  with  the  world  and 
actualize it, and ourselves, in the doing 22. This constitutes one of my main arguments: 
our relation to the world and other people is not one of mere narrative referentiality to 
action  but  is  better  captured  as  playful  interaction,  in  an  oscillating  movement 
between play and being played. 
In true hermeneutic vein Ricoeur approaches his hard to catch prey by means of 
a complex detour. The first step in Ricoeur’s movement involves analyzing the capacity 
of language for identification, or more precisely individualization  23. Individualization 
means  being  able  to  refer  to  one  specific  thing  among  others.  Its  inverse  is 
22 This neglect of acting in the world is all the more odd since Ricoeur does pay attention to speech act  
theories by J.L. Austin and Searle. Ricoeur asserts all speech is action. True, but not all action is referential or 
representational speech.
23 The word  identification  is  ambiguous.  It  refers  to  the process  of  singling  out  the specific  among the 
number  (“that  tall  man  with  the  blue  jacket  stole  my  wallet”),  which  is  meant  here,  but  also  to  the  
experience of belonging based on perceived similarity (“I am a Dutchman”).
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classification,  which  subsumes  the  singular  (this  girl)  under  a  generalizing  concept  
(women, people, etc.). Individualization occurs through the “individualizing operators” 
of  language.  Among  these  are  definite  descriptions  (the  first  man  to  walk  on  the 
moon), proper names (Socrates),  and identifying references (I,  you, this, here, now) 
(Ricoeur, 1992: 27-28). It means answering the question which (which person are you 
talking about?), and even precedes the questions  what and who. Individualization by 
means  of  semantics  does  not  yet  make a  distinction between things  and  persons.  
Moreover, it emphasizes sameness but not yet selfhood. How do we get from here to a 
notion of identity as  selfhood that is unique of persons, Ricoeur asks?  Ascription of 
actions to persons offers a passageway. Identifying references attribute actions to an 
agent. They thereby designate a unique being in the world, someone with a specific 
body and mental events that belong to him (and not to someone else). In order to 
combine  this  third  person  perspective  (the  person  as  the  object  of  identifying 
references)  with  a  first  and second  person perspective  (I  and you as  agents  of  an 
action), Ricoeur brings in the pragmatics of speech act theory and theory of action. 
Saying is always acting (Ricoeur means doing, not play-acting). When I say “the cat is on 
the mat” I am actually performing the statement “I affirm to you that the cat is on the 
mat”. In saying this, it is I as a speaker who is directing an utterance at you as a listener.  
Uttering necessarily implies an other. Both I and you are implicated as acting subjects  
in speech acts. As soon as someone makes an utterance, the generic I (which could 
designate anyone) shifts to a specific I (the one who is speaking here and now). By 
(self-)ascription of  actions through utterances, I  can separate  me and  you from the 
world (ibid: 43, 49). The person as the semantic object of identifying reference in the 
world  (third  person)  is  now  joined  with  the  pragmatic  subject  as  the  world-limit 
(first/second person). “What ... distinguishes ascription from the simple attribution of a 
predicate to a logical subject is the agent’s power to designate herself by designating 
her other” (ibid: 111). 
1.2.1 Idem and ipse identity
This still leaves open the temporal dimension of the self as an agent with a history.  
How does the capacity to designate ourselves in signifying the world affect and change 
us? How can a sequence of actions be connected to an entire life? With this difficult  
issue of resolving permanence in time, the problem of personal identity is rephrased as 
the confrontation between sameness (idem identity) and selfhood (ipse identity). Idem 
points  to  sameness  over  time.  Idem means  being  one  and  the  same  person 
quantitatively,  being  an  indivisible  person,  and  qualitatively,  being  consistent  as  a 
character. Ipse points to the experience we have of being a unified person, and to the 
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capacity  we  have  of  taking  initiatives.  These two conceptions  of  self  combine two 
orders in which people live: the physical order of causality ( idem) and the intentional 
order of  motives for action (ipse).  These two orders  recur at various stages in this 
thesis, as I argue that the play concept focuses on a third order, the conditional order, 
that  becomes  ever  more  crucial  in  identity  mediations  via  media  technologies.  
Sameness  (idem)  is  a  relational  concept,  a  “relation  of  relations”  (ibid:  116).  It 
compares two or more items (X is the same as Y). Sameness consists of a numerical  
component (quantitatively being one and the same), a qualitative component (extreme 
resemblance,  e.g.  two exact  same suits  that  are  interchangeable),  a  component  of 
uninterrupted continuity  (the sameness  of  a person’s  changing body and face over 
time), and finally permanence in time (the organization of a combinatory system into a 
structure) (ibid: 116-117). To illustrate Ricoeur’s rather abstract formulation of this last 
point, we may (again) point out that even though most of the cells in the human body  
change every seven years, someone retains a sense of permanence in time as being  
and having one and the same body. This last element, permanence in time, opens up 
the door for identity as selfhood (ipse identity). How can a form of permanence in time 
be established that is irreducible to the question “What am I?” (a substratum like body 
cells, or substance like the cogito), but is a reply to the question “Who am I”? To this 
question Ricoeur forwards the theory of narrative identity. 
In his earlier  Time and Narrative, Ricoeur already introduces narrative identity 
as a specific mode of temporal being (Ricoeur, 1988: 244-249). Narrative constitutes a 
‘third-time’  that  connects  cosmological  time  (objective  calendar  time)  and 
phenomenological ‘lived time’ (subjectively experienced time) 24 (Ricoeur, 1984: 86-87; 
1988:  245).  His  argument  is  that  “time  becomes  human  to  the  extent  that  it  is  
articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full  meaning when it  
becomes a condition of temporal existence” (Ricoeur, 1984: 52). Since human time is  
narrated,  there  is  no  clear  distinction  between  historical  accounts  and  fictional 
narratives.  On  the  one  hand  history  is  fictionalized.  It  depends  on  controlled 
imagination to move from the dated past to the reconstructed past to the refigured 
past,  in  order  to  invoke  an  illusion  of  vividness.  Fiction,  on  the  other  hand,  is  
historicized. The narrative voice recounts events as if it were the past for him (Ricoeur, 
1988:  180-192).  In  Oneself  as Another Ricoeur succinctly  sums up the argument in 
Time  and  Narrative insofar  as  it  pertains  to  identity.  “Self-understanding  is 
interpretation. This interpretation of the self finds in the narrative a privileged form of  
mediation. Narrative borrows both from history and from fiction. This makes the life-
24 Subjective  time has been  understood quite  differently  by different thinkers.  Where Augustine  sees a 
collision  of  past  and  future  into  the  eternal  ‘now’  of  the  present,  Heidegger  -  and  Dilthey  -  speak  of 
existential finitude and orientation towards death.
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story a fictional history or historical fiction” (Ricoeur, 1992: 114 fn1). This claim is both 
an object of critique in this thesis and its starting point. Is narrative still the dominant 
medium we think with (has it always been so, and everywhere)? If our media culture  
and practices change, does narrative remain the privileged form of mediation? Or must 
we find another mediation that better suits contemporary identities? 
1.2.2 Threefold mimesis
The realm of the imaginative  as if is key to narrative mediation. Ricoeur forwards a 
threefold  circular  sequence  of  imitations,  which  he  calls  mimesis1, mimesis2,  and 
mimesis3. First, we already have an implicit narrative preunderstanding of the world of 
action (everyday life). Ricoeur calls this  narrative prefiguration (mimesis1). Action has 
structural, symbolic and temporal features. If narrative plot is an imitation of action, 
then an initial  competence for  identifying the  structure of  actions  is  required.  The 
structure  of  actions  consists  of  a  conceptual  network  of  goals,  motives,  agents, 
circumstances,  and  interactions  with-.  Precisely  the stuff  narrative  is  made  of.  Our 
narrative  preunderstanding  of  the  world  therefore  actualizes  the  practical  field  by 
giving  signification  to  the  disparate  elements,  and  integrates  the  practical  field  by 
synthesizing  the  heterogeneous  elements  into  a  whole.  Second,  narrative 
preunderstanding  confers  ‘readability’  on  actions  by  imbuing  them  with  shared 
symbolic meanings. Action is “a quasi-text”, because cultural symbols provide common 
rules for the interpretation of behavior. By ‘reading’ symbols we understand whether 
raising  one’s  hand  symbolizes  greeting  someone,  hailing  a  taxi,  or  voting  (Ricoeur, 
1984: 58). Third - and this is the point around which Time and Narrative revolves - we 
recognize in action temporal dimensions that call for narration (ibid: 59). We connect 
the  linear  sequence  of  actions  in  cosmological  time  to  subjective  ‘lived  time’  by 
applying narratives. Ricoeur summarizes: “[t]o imitate or represent action is  first to 
preunderstand  what  human  acting  is,  in  its  semantics,  its  symbolic  system,  its  
temporality. Upon this preunderstanding,  common to both poets and their readers, 
emplotment  is  constructed  and,  with  it,  textual  and  literary  mimetics”  (ibid:  64). 
Thanks  to  this  prenarrative  understanding  of  the  practical  field  of  actions  we  can 
express our experiences and actions in stories. Do we indeed preunderstand the world 
of actions and events as (solely) made up of stories? In section 1.3 I argue that various 
types of play are equally powerful ‘mediating metaphors’ for understanding the world, 
and our place in. Further on in this thesis I argue that mobile media contribute to a  
shift in our prereflexive understanding of the world in terms of a dialectic between free  
play and rule-governed games. 
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Second,  actions  and  events  in  life  are  organized  as  if they  were  narrative. 
Composing  a  story  means  drawing  a  configuration  out  of  a  succession.  We  place 
separate elements into the structure of the plot, and turn ourselves into characters. 
Ricoeur calls this  narrative configuration (mimesis2). Emplotment mediates between 
individual  events  and  the  story  as  a  whole.  The  event  gets  meaning  from  its  
contribution to the story, and the story in turn organizes events into an intelligible  
whole.  Emplotment  mediates  between heterogeneous  events  and  the  unity  of  the 
story. Plot also gives primacy to concordance over discordance (Ricoeur, 1991a: 22).  
This means that individual elements acquire their meaning inasmuch as they fit into 
the whole. This  concordant discordance is the most important mediation of the plot, 
Ricoeur says, since it connects the practical field with the field of narrative fiction. The  
plot brings actions and events in a logical relation to each other, and connects them to 
the  characters  of  the  story  (Ricoeur,  1984:  66;  1992:  141).  Emplotment  mediates 
between  two  modes  of  time:  the  linear  chronology  of  episodic  events  and  the 
configured temporal unity that is the story. Plot gives the story a beginning and an end,  
and an overarching point or theme. Narrative configuration does not only consist of  
writing but also of reading. The narrative scheme allows people to follow a story, retell 
it, and reflexively apply it to their lives. This scheme is embedded in cultural traditions. 
Traditions consist of genres (Greek tragedy), and of great key works (the Iliad). Tradition 
oscillates  between sedimentation and innovation.  Tradition offers  lasting paradigms 
that lay down the rules for authoring and reading, and room for experimentation with 
these rules. Therefore, according to Ricoeur, even innovation is rule-governed. This is 
particularly apparent in new literary styles such as the anti-novel, where deviance has 
become the rule. Ricoeur himself poses the question whether such radical innovations 
entail  the  “death  of  narrative”.  However,  he  subsumes  such  deviance  under 
paradigmatic change within narrative tradition itself (ibid: 69-70, 80). In my view this is 
a hermetic rather than a hermeneutic approach. Instead, I would propose that true 
innovation occurs outside the paradigm. To develop a new perspective on mediated  
identities  we  must  step  outside  the  rules  of  narrative,  and  play  by  other  rules. 
Furthermore, I argue that mobile media communications as interactions are not neatly 
organized in a unified plot with a clear beginning and closure. For instance, mobile  
conversations tend to highlight discordant events. And instead of having clear openings 
and  closures,  mobile  conversations  between  intimates  are  never-ending  ‘infinite 
games’. 
Third, we reflexively reconfigure ourselves by applying narratives to our life and 
that  of  others.  This  is  called  narrative reconfiguration (mimesis3).  At  this  stage the 
world of text and the world of the hearer/reader intersect. The narrative scheme and 
tradition of  mimesis2 contribute to a breaking down of the opposition between the 
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worlds inside and outside of a text. Narrative only acquires its full meaning “when it is  
restored to the time of action and of suffering in mimesis3” (ibid: 70). The “received  
paradigms” (i.e. the plotting scheme plus narrative genres) offer guiding rules how to 
read. They shape the expectations of the reader. And by the act of reading the story is  
actualized (ibid: 76). This ‘reading’ of the plot joins mimesis2 to mimesis3. We reflect 
on ourselves and come to understand ourselves as readers and writers of our own life 
(Ricoeur, 1988: 246). A great advantage, Ricoeur asserts, is that narrative identity can 
be applied to the individual as well as to communities. Both the individual and the 
community  turn narrative into an actual  history in order to preserve self-constancy 
(ibid: 247). One question Ricoeur does not answer is  to what extent individual  and 
communal stories may differ  and indeed clash (the difference - similarity  paradox). 
Furthermore, he does not tell how an increasing number of people nowadays move 
between perhaps  incompatible  individual  and shared ‘imagined histories’,  and how 
these stories  themselve  travel  via  various  media.  We need a  view that  takes  such 
mobilities into account, and offers a perspective on difference in relation to similarity. 
1.2.3 Narrative identity: character and promise
According to Ricoeur, narrative imitates life and life imitates narrative. Ricoeur admits 
that because of the emphasis in  Time and Narrative on the relation between history 
and fiction, it lacked “a clear comprehension of what is at stake in the very question of  
identity applied to persons or communities” (Ricoeur, 1992: 114 fn 1). It is in Oneself as  
Another that  he  applies  narrative  most  forcefully  to  identity.  Narrative  acts  as  a  
mediator between the pole of character, in which idem and ipse coexist, and the pole 
of  self-maintenance or  promising, which marks the gap between the permanence of 
sameness and that of the intentional self. Character is “the set of lasting dispositions by  
which a person is recognized” (ibid: 121). Habitual dispositions that are distinctively 
mine (ipse) become character traits that make me recognizable as one and the same 
person (idem). The character of a person or a community is also made up of shared 
“identifications with values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes, in which the person or 
community recognizes itself. Recognizing oneself  in contributes to recognizing oneself 
by” (ibid: 121). Loyalty to shared values is internalized, and contributes to the fidelity of 
one’s character. If the acquisition of habits entails a dialectic between innovation and 
sedimentation,  identification is  a  dialectic  between  otherness  and  internalization. 
Character - composed of habits and identifications - is a largely stable component of  
personal identity. In character, selfhood presents itself as sameness. “[It is] the ‘what’ 
of the ‘who’. It deflects the question “who am I?” to “what am I?” (ibid: 122). There is  
another model of permanence in time besides character (the generalized “what” of  
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identity).  That  is  the  promise  25.  Keeping  one’s  word  in  faithfulness  stands  as  a 
challenge to time. It provides self-constancy solely on the level of the particular: the  
‘who’ of identity (ibid: 123-124). The promise marks Ricoeur’s move from description 
to prescription. It stands out as an ethical imperative to which one should adhere. In  
addition  to the givenness  of  character,  the promise adds the element  of  choice  to 
identity. Narrative thus not only mediates between idem and ipse but also between the 
two modes of maintaining permanence in time: character and the promise. 
Still, the application of fictional narrative to life itself (mimesis3) poses some 
problems,  Ricoeur  notes.  With  the exception of  autobiographical  narrative,  author, 
narrator,  and character are  distinct.  Further,  life  itself  has  no clear beginning (who 
remembers his own birth?), nor an end that we can oversee. Life seems incomplete 
when  compared  to  narratives  that  have  openings  and  closures.  Additionally,  life 
consists of multiple and often incommensurable stories that are entangled with the 
histories of others. Finally, the application of narrative to one’s own life seems to cover 
only  the remembrance  of  past  experiences  to the exclusion of  future  anticipations 
(ibid: 159-161). Ricoeur tackles these objections one by one. He argues that only a  
naive  conception  of  mimesis would  make  these  arguments  seem  valid.  Precisely 
because fiction is an imitation of life, it can be appropriated and applied to life. The 
problem of authorship then becomes part of the struggle between individual agency 
and playing a role in a play we did not write ourselves. (This is the closest Ricoeur gets  
to the tension between freedom and force). Life’s incompleteness is not incongruent  
with narrative unity; rather, it is resolved with the help of fiction. We need to impose 
narrative beginnings and ends to our actions in life in order to retrospectively organize 
them. As for the entanglement of life histories, he goes on, doesn’t the narrative with 
its different protagonists and references to other narratives offer an intelligible model 
to deal  with this  complexity? The final  objection -  applying narrative to life is  only  
retrospective - neglects that the narrative, by looking back to the past, sows the seeds 
of future-oriented anticipations (ibid: 162-163). Ricoeur concludes: “literary narratives 
and life histories, far from being mutually exclusive, are complementary, despite, or 
even because of, their contrast. This dialectic reminds us that the narrative is part of 
life before being exiled from life in writing; it returns to life along the multiple paths of  
appropriation and at the price of the unavoidable tensions just mentioned” (ibid: 163). 
Several points are disputable (and will be provided with further argumentation 
in the final chapter). First, the idea that identities only exist as interpretations seems 
one-sided. In Ricoeur’s view, identities come into being though interpretations “after 
the fact”, to borrow a phrase from Clifford Geerz (Geertz, 1995). Even while he asserts  
25 Ricoeur’s promise is similar to the notion of commitment, which Charles Taylor sees as a central aspect of 
identity (Taylor, 1989: 27).
42
that narrative sows the seeds for future anticipations, each event has to pass through 
the  interpretative  cycle  of  mimesis  to  be  fitted  in  (or  discarded).  It  neglects  a  
perspective of identities as performed actualizations in the here and now. Further, do 
we indeed still understand ourselves as characters in stories with the rise of mobile 
media  technologies?  It  shall  be  argued  that  the  interactivity  of  mobile  media  on 
multiple  play  levels  gives  rise  to  self-understanding  as  players.  A  third  point  that  
appears disputable is the strength of the promise nowadays. Considering the way many 
people flexibly organize their lives with the aid of mobile phones, this stable promising  
self seems to become a rarity. I argue that the focus shifts from what is being said to 
the  conditions  under  which  promising  statements  are  made.  Finally,  the  ethical 
imperative that we should be promising selves I find hard to accept. It favors stability, 
unity, and fixity over change, multiplicity and movement. 
The ethical imperative in Ricoeur’s work further shines through in his idea that 
human life is merely a biological phenomenon as long as it has not been interpreted.  
Following Socrates’ maxim, he says life is only worthwhile when it is examined (Ricoeur, 
1991a: 28). We can only know ourselves via the detour of the narrative. The narrative is 
the privileged form of mediation because we are most familiar with the various types 
of plot in stories as a way of cultural learning (ibid: 23). In Ricoeur’s own words:
The refiguration by narrative confirms this aspect of self-knowledge which goes 
far  beyond the  narrative  domain,  namely,  that  the  self  does  not  know itself  
immediately, but only indirectly by the detour of cultural signs of all sorts which 
are articulated on the symbolic mediations which always already articulate action 
and, among them, the narratives of everyday life. Narrative mediation underlines 
this remarkable characteristic of self-knowledge - that it is self-interpretation. The 
appropriation of the identity of the fictional character by the reader is one of its  
forms. What narrative interpretation brings in its own right is precisely the figural  
nature of the character by which the self, narratively interpreted, turns out to be  
a figured self - which imagines itself (se figure) in this or that way. 
(Ricoeur, 1991b: 198-199)
Narrative  identity  theory  can account  for  the  translatability,  mobility  and  the 
multiplicity  of  cultural  ‘blueprints’  for  self-understanding,  even  while  in  my  view 
Ricoeur pays too little attention to it. Narratives can easily be put in another language,  
although inevitably something gets lost in translation 26. Narratives do not necessarily 
26 This loss results both from the fact that each language has unique hard to translate expressions (German  
Weltschmerz and Portuguese  saudade  are  typically  forwarded  as  untranslatable),  and because a  certain 
background knowledge of a cultural context or narrative tradition is presupposed in the reader. Still,  the  
accumulated reading of narratives from one narrative tradition may increase this background knowledge of 
elsewhere. In a very real sense, reading can give the reader a sense of nearness to a place he/she may have 
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rely on synchronicity or physical co-presence to be shared among people. They can be 
communicated across time and distance through various media technologies (books, 
radio,  television,  internet,  mobile  phones,  and  so  on).  Further,  individuals  and 
communities can apply multiple narratives with different origins to themselves, instead 
of founding their identities on a singular characteristic or essence. Narratives can even 
be folded into each other. This allows for onion-like layered identities that span across  
time and space. In this respect, narrative’s explanatory power appears to fit well with  
both traditional  identities based on physical proximity,  and with modern ‘imagined’ 
identities. A sketchy meta-narrative of the concept of (western) identity illustrates this. 
Socio-historical  accounts  of  western  identity  describe  a  transition  from 
“communities of life”, with identity founded on shared space, to “communities of fate”, 
with identity founded on shared ideas (see Bauman & Vecchi, 2004: 11) 27. Identity in 
pre-modern times was firmly tied to a singular physical  setting and social  position. 
People often were born from parents hailing from one place. They lived in one village,  
worked one job. They occupied a rigidly  defined position in a social  hierarchy,  and  
stayed  there  during  their  whole  life.  Narratives  about  the  world  descended  from 
undisputed mythical sources. They described and legitimized the world order as it was.  
Everyday stories - gossip, parables, fairytales - served as a valve to preserve the social  
order.  With  the  birth  of  modern  nation-states,  identifications  shifted  to  ‘imagined 
communities’  based on shared idea(l)s  (Anderson,  1991).  Supra-local  organizational 
entities arose: the city, the monarchy or the republic, and indeed later the nation-state. 
These  became  time-  and  space  transcending  units  for  identifications  with  fellow 
citizens one did not even know personally 28. Identification was no longer a given fact of 
life, merely confirmed by transmitted narratives, but had to be imagined and actively  
created through stories  29.  Supra-local  and idea-based identities  needed man-made 
‘grand narratives’ that prescribed how society should be organized. The legitimacy of 
stories  was  no  longer  founded  on  their  mythical  origins  but  on the spirit  of  great  
achievement humans were capable of. And they were grand indeed, often starting with 
capitals: Enlightenment, Civilization, Imperialism, Nationalism. The expansion of idea-
based  communities  peaked  with  nation-transcending,  universal  ideas:  liberal 
never visited physically.
27 Some  influential  early  sociological  notions  that  capture  this  shift  include  Tönnies’  Gemeinschaft  to 
Gesellschaft; Durkheim’s mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity; and Weber’s shift from charismatic and 
traditional societies to rational disenchanted bureaucracies.
28 It should be added that already much earlier the monotheistic religions constituted imaginary bonds that 
transcended the local.
29 Because of this, the need to define otherness and difference also became urgent. A well-known example is 
the emerging urban bourgeoisie, who in every possibly way sought distinction from the peasantry and lower 
classes. Multiple borders between us and them had to be erected, literally so in the case of nation-states.
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democracy,  communism,  fascism,  modernity,  ‘western  world’,  ‘non aligned nations’, 
pan-Arabism. Then a second great rupture in the foundation of identity occurred (often 
placed in the mid-20th century, in the aftermath of the horrors of the Second World 
War).  Man-made  grand  narratives  lost  their  legitimacy,  at  least  in  many  western 
countries. They were debunked as potentially destructive, and regarded as repressing 
individuality. This became an era of growing individualism 30. With the loss of belief in 
grand narratives and institutions, a new foundation of identity arose. As we have seen  
with Giddens, people now became responsible for their own biography. When the self  
turned into a radically reflexive project, the autobiography became the core of  late 
modern self-identity (Giddens, 1991: 76). Surely this is a somewhat sketchy historical  
account of the concept of (western) identity 31. The point is that narrative can account 
for multiplicity and spatiality in identity as a historically variable concept, even though 
Ricoeur does not pay attention to it.  Narrative identity is  a very powerful  image of  
identity construction. It intuitively “feels right”, at least to most western people, the 
majority of whom have been brought up in a thoroughly literate society.
However,  the question emerges whether narrative, with its  roots  in oral  and 
written  culture,  remains  the  most  adequate  medium  to  understand  contemporary 
digital culture. Many authors argue that narrative indeed can and should be redefined 
to  incorporate  digital  media  storytelling  that  is  characterized  by  qualities  like 
interactivity and immersion (Aarseth, 1997; Bolter, 2001; Hayles, 2002; Murray, 1998; 
Ryan, 2001). The rise of computers, especially the World Wide Web with its typical  
form of the hypertext, has spurred postmodern critiques on the traditional narrative. 
Traditional  narratives represent suspicious epistemological elements, like coherence, 
rationality,  closure of  narrative structures, and totalizing interpretation,  Marie-Laure 
Ryan notes (Ryan, 2001: 7). Hypertext by contrast, with its  interactive qualities and 
blurring  of  author  and  reader,  supposedly  entails  a  liberation  from  linear  logic, 
logocentrism,  arborescent  hierarchical  structures,  and  repressive  forms  of  power 
(Ryan, 2001: 8). Hypertext provides a fertile metaphor “for the postmodern conception 
of the subject as a site of multiple, conflicting, and unstable identities” (Ryan, 2001: 7).  
Various literary scholars have identified play elements in narratives, and indeed suggest  
play is central to new forms of storytelling (Aarseth, 1997; Murray, 2004; Murray, 1998: 
142; Ryan, 2001: 181-186)  32. From the ‘other side’, that is new media studies, there 
have been fierce debates  about  whether digital  media,  especially  computer games, 
30 “The  century  of  the  self”,  to  use  the  title  from  the  brilliant  BBC  series.  See 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbcfour/documentaries/features/century_of_the_self.shtml.
31 For instance, where exactly should the decisive breakpoints in history be placed? Have grand narratives 
truly lost their attraction? Isn’t this an account from the perspective of the ‘dominant class’? What about the 
narratives of the “people without history”, as Wolf calls those (non-western) people who are denied a place  
in the narratives of progress (Wolf, 1982)?
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should be understood as new types of  narratives or indeed on their own terms as  
games (Juul, 1998; Raessens, 2006; Wardrip-Fruin & Harrigan, 2004). Nevertheless, I 
am  not  interested  in  narrativity  as  such  (nor  in  games  or  play  per  se),  but  in  
technologically mediated identities. Therefore, I  shall  not enter the debate whether 
digital  media  narratives  are  play,  or  whether games are narratives.  When I  discuss  
narrative and play, I do so in their capacity as identity mediations. Thus, my discussion 
revolves  around  Ricoeur’s  views  of  narrativity,  since it  is  he who most  elaborately 
formulates a theory of narrative identity. In my view, Ricoeur builds his theory on a 
rather  traditional  conception  of  narrative,  in  which  temporal  permanence, 
emplotment,  coherence,  neat  openings  and  closures,  and  singularity  are  guiding 
principles. As a result, I see two possible routes to address the relation between digital  
media  and  identity.  One  is  working  from  within  narrative  theory,  stretching  its 
boundaries  in  order  to  incorporate  new  mediations.  The  other  is  stepping  outside 
narrative  theory  and  using  play  as  a  wholly  different  lens,  after  which  we  try  to 
reconcile narrative and play. I choose the latter route. Several points of critique have 
already been inserted along the way. They can be thrown into two baskets: the general 
shortcomings  of  narrative  as  a  theory  about  identity;  and  the  specific  attack  on 
narrative as the privileged medium for self-understanding in the so-called digital age. 
Both of them, I argue, can be fruitfully overcome by applying the concept of play and 
its associated terms. 
1.3 In search of play
The research of play and games has yielded a considerable body of literature, primarily 
in the humanities, social sciences, literary studies, and - recently - game studies. Other  
disciplines, like economy, biology, and engineering, use a methodology called ‘game 
theory’ as a branch of applied mathematics. Moreover, there is a widespread tendency 
to invoke play notions in metaphorical ways, most notoriously in cultural studies trying 
to capture ‘the post-modern condition’. In his aptly titled The ambiguity of play Brian 
Sutton-Smith points to the widely diverging ways various disciplines have appropriated 
play for their own agenda, in what he calls “play rhetorics” (Sutton-Smith, 1997: 9-11).  
32 Kendall Walton even recognizes imaginative play in more traditional literary narratives. He says fiction is a  
representational art and all representations involve make-belief (Walton, 1990: 4).
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The sheer quantity and variety makes the question how play is  conceptualized and 
applied in this study all the more urgent. As said, this not a study about play or games, 
but  about  playful  identity  construction  shaped  by  mobile  media.  Therefore,  I 
investigate  the  applicability  of  play  and  derivative  notions,  and  work  them  into  a 
framework  for further inquiries.  Point  of  departure  is  the classic  literature  used in 
today’s game studies. Then a number of terms are presented that are useful for looking 
at  digital  media  technologies.  Since  this  is  a  study  about  mobile  communications 
media, attention is given to the relation between play and communication. Finally, we 
see how play as a mediating metaphor informs how we understand life itself in playful  
terms. 
1.3.1 Play and games: the classics
The bible of play and game studies remains the work Homo Ludens: a study of the play-
element in culture by Dutch historian Johan Huizinga (Huizinga, 1955)  33. In this work 
Huizinga tries to find the essence of play and expose how culture bears characteristics 
of play. One of its most important characteristics is that it is “free”, in the sense of not  
being a need or task in order to achieve something else (ibid: 8). He summarizes play as  
“a voluntary activity  or occupation executed within certain fixed limits of  time and 
place, according to rules freely accepted but absolutely binding, having its aim in itself  
and  accompanied  by  a  feeling  of  tension,  joy  and  the  consciousness  that  it  is  
“different” from “ordinary life” (ibid: 28). Notably, the word “fixed” means something  
else  than  the  original  Dutch  “vastgestelde”  (ibid:  29).  “Fixed”  suggests  that 
spatiotemporal  limits  are  pre-given  and  unchanging.  “Vastgestelde”  (“determined” 
would have been a more apt  translation)  suggests  the active stance of  the players  
themselves in erecting arbitrary boundaries. 
Huizinga does not draw a sharp distinction between play and games, as video 
game researchers do  34.  Contemporary game studies often attribute to Huizinga the 
claim that play takes place within the confines of a ‘magic circle’ (most notably Salen & 
Zimmerman, 2003: 94-97). The magic circle supposedly separates play from ordinary  
life (Huizinga, 1955: 19-20). Entering this magic circle requires a voluntary submission 
33 The originally Dutch work was written in 1938 (Huizinga, 1951). It was based on Huizinga’s 1933 oration, 
entitled Over de grenzen van spel en ernst in de cultuur  (“About the boundaries of play and seriousness in 
culture”),  and  two subsequent  lectures.  In  1950  an English  translation  of  dubious quality  appears.  The 
translation is  often sloppy and on some points  saliently different from the original.  This starts  with the 
translation of the subtitle. In his original foreword Huizinga stresses that his aim is to explore “the play  
element of culture” (“het spel-element der cultuur”). He does not want to study play as one of many cultural  
manifestations, but how culture itself bears the character of play, and originates in play. Nevertheless, I refer  
to the English translation unless there is a compelling reason to do otherwise.
34 Likely from a strategical point of view to carve out their own research field.
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to the rules that count within the confines of this temporally and spatially bounded  
area. After Coleridge, it entails the “willing suspension of disbelief” (quoted in Ricoeur,  
1992:  159  fn22;  Ryan,  2001:  105).  In  fact,  Huizinga  remains  ambiguous  about  the 
separation of  play from serious ordinary life.  The separation is  gradual  instead of a 
clearly  demarcated division (see also Ehrmann, Lewis,  & Lewis,  1968:  32).  Huizinga 
stresses,  at  least  for  the  ‘savage  mind’,  “the  unity  and  indivisibility  of  belief  and 
unbelief....  In play as we conceive it  the distinction between belief and make-belief  
breaks down” (Huizinga,  1955: 24-25)  35.  Only  in the highly  reflexive modern world 
these boundaries are solidified, while the play origins of culture are forgotten.
French  philosopher  Roger  Caillois  analyzes  play  and  game  with  far  more 
conceptual rigor than Huizinga (Caillois, 2001)  36. Caillois feels Huizinga’s definition is 
both to broad and too narrow. Too narrow because Huizinga focuses almost solely on 
competitive aspects of play. Too broad because Huizinga fails to delineate the sphere of 
play as a restricted universe, a “pure space” (ibid: 4-7). According to Caillois play is: 
1. Free: in which playing is not obligatory; if  it were, it would at once lose its  
attractive and joyous quality as diversion; 
2. Separate: circumscribed within limits of space and time, defined and fixed in 
advance;
3. Uncertain: the course of which cannot be determined, nor the result attained 
beforehand, and some latitude for innovations being left to the player’s initiative;
4. Unproductive: creating neither goods, nor wealth, nor new elements of any 
kind; and, except for the exchange of property among the players, ending in a 
situation identical to that prevailing at the beginning of the game;
5. Governed by rules: under conventions that suspend ordinary laws, and for the 
moment establish new legislation, which alone counts;
6. Make-belief: accompanied by a special awareness of a second reality or of a 
free unreality, as against real life.
(ibid: 9-10)
35 Again these erroneous conclusions stem from mistranslation. The English ‘magic circle’ is more passive  
than the Dutch tooverkring or toovercirkel (old spelling), words Huizinga uses at a few points only (Huizinga, 
1951: 12, 21, 79, 218). ‘Magic circle’ suggests that players surrender to some inherent magical quality of 
playful activities. ‘Toovercirkel’ by contrast suggests the power of players themselves to imbue their activities  
with magic,  since  toveren is  a verb that means ‘to enchant’.  The Dutch emphasizes the responsibility of 
players themselves to erect a circle around play activities.
36 Originally published in French in 1959.
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Some of these characteristics are defined negatively (“play is not ...”), and all of them  
breathe the strict opposition between play and ‘real life’.  This is debatable. Jacques 
Ehrman criticizes Caillois (and Huizinga) for opposing imaginary and gratuitous play to 
work, “the real” and “everyday life” (Ehrmann, et al., 1968: 32). Ehrman refutes the 
idea that play is an ‘extra’: 
[I]f play as the capacity for symbolization and ritualization is consubstantial with 
culture, it cannot fail to be present wherever there is culture. We realize then 
that play cannot be defined as a luxury. 
[P]lay cannot be defined by isolating it on the basis of its relationship to an  a 
priori  reality and culture.  To define play is  at the same time and  in the same  
movement to  define  reality  and to  define  culture.  As  each  term  is  a  way  to  
apprehend the two others, they are each elaborated, constructed through and on 
the basis of the two others. 
(ibid: 46, 55)
Ehrman adds that it is illogical for Huizinga and Caillois to separate play from everyday 
life and call it gratuitous, in order to show that play is part of culture/society itself 37. In 
chapter 4 we see that location-based play on mobile devices challenges precisely this  
boundary between play and real life, and in fact turns it into the central play element. 
Caillois’ definition of play as unproductive and involving the return to a previous 
situation is downright wrong. As we shall see in the analysis of mobile communications  
as an infinite cycle of gift exchanges, each gift transforms the status of the relationship 
(section  5.3).  Performance  theorist  Richard  Schechner  stresses  this  transformative 
power of  ritual  play  and theater.  According  to Schechner,  a  performance does  not 
merely refer to, or stand for a transformation, it  is the change (Schechner, 2003: 127, 
129, 186). Play as an activity actualizes changes in relations and situations in ordinary 
life. Play then is never a return to a zero-sum equilibrium but an ongoing movement, 
permanently unstable. A similar view of play as movement is found with philosopher 
Hans-Georg Gadamer. He describes play as “to-and-fro movement that is not tied to 
any goal that would bring it to an end.... rather, it renews itself in constant repetition” 
(Gadamer, 2004: 104). Gadamer stresses that the subject of the play does not depend 
on the subjectivity of the person who is playing. “It is the game that is played - it is  
irrelevant whether or not there is a subject who plays it. The play is the occurrence of  
the movement as such” (ibid: 104). While stepping into a game may be a voluntary 
movement, once inside the play the subject is being played. If all play involves some 
form of ‘mobility’, can we make the inverse claim that the mobilities shaped by the  
37 A good point, although not completely justified in the case of Huizinga, who stresses the “indivisibility of  
belief and unbelief”, and criticizes the modern world for forgetting its play origins (see also Motte, 1995: 10).
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mobile phone are playful? This  claim is  not  self-evident (and can even be a logical  
fallacy).  However,  at  various  places  in  this  dissertation  I  argue  that  the  mobilities 
shaped by mobile media indeed are playful. 
The true merit of Caillois’ study is his classification of four play types and two 
play attitudes. The four play types are competition (agôn), chance (alea), simulation 
(mimicry)  and  vertigo  (ilinx)  (Caillois,  2001:  12).  Agôn involves  games  of  skill  and 
contest.  Alea involves  games  of  chance  such  as  playing  dice  or  cards.  They  are 
opposites. “Agôn is a vindication of personal responsibility;  alea is a negation of the 
will, a surrender to destiny” (ibid: 18). They also are a pair. Contrary to real life, agôn 
and alea create an ideal condition of pure equality for the player, a ‘level playing field’.  
These types of play are “an attempt to substitute perfect situations for the normal 
confusion of  contemporary life....  one escapes the real  world and creates  another” 
(ibid: 19). By contrast, both mimicry and ilinx are attempts to escape not the world but 
oneself. Mimicry involves the temporary acceptance of an imaginary universe in which 
someone believes or makes others believe that he is someone else (in the theater, or 
when  wearing  a  mask).  Ilinx involves  the  destruction  of  reality  through  a  dizzying 
confusion of the senses (as in dance, improvised music, and speedy horseback riding). 
Mimicry, like agôn, is a controlled movement, whereas ilinx, like alea, is uncontrollable.
Cross-cutting this classification of play types, Caillois discerns two play attitudes.  
Suggestively opposing Greek poetics versus Latin solemnity, Caillois calls these paidia 
and  ludus.  Paidia refers to diversion,  turbulence, free improvisation,  carefree gaiety 
and laughter, spontaneous, impulsive, joyous, uncontrolled fantasy. Ludus on the other 
hand disciplines and enriches  paidia, since it is absorbing, rule-governed, for its own 
sake and amusement, and involves skill and mastery (ibid: 13, 27-35). Although ludus 
and paidia occur in each play type, agôn and alea lean to the pole of ludus, while ilinx 
and  mimicry  tend  towards  paidia.  “Vertigo  and  simulation  are  in  principle  and  by 
nature in rebellion against  every type of  code,  rule,  and organization.  Alea,  on the 
contrary, like agôn calls for calculation and regulation” (ibid: 157). Caillois’ play types 
and attitudes constantly return throughout this thesis. Hence the following scheme: 
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agôn 
competition
alea 
chance
mimicry 
simulation
ilinx 
vertigo
paidia 
free play
↓  ↑
ludus 
rule-governed 
games
unregulated 
competition
contests, 
sports
counting-out 
rhymes
betting
lotteries
illusions, 
masks
theater, 
spectacles
horseback 
riding,
dance,
music
carnivals,
skiing,
mountain 
climbing
Figure 1:  Slightly  adapted version of  Roger  Caillois’  scheme of  four  play  types and two play  
attitudes. 
Caillois seems to contradict himself by giving examples of ludus in mimicry and ilinx, and paidia  
in agôn and alea (Caillois, 2001: 36).
Caillois acknowledges that these rubrics are ideal-types. They seldom exist in a pure 
state. Pairing the four game types yields six possible combinations. Caillois dismisses 
agôn - ilinx, and alea - mimicry. Rule-based control and losing oneself are incompatible. 
So are simulation and chance, since there is no point in deceiving chance (ibid: 72-73).  
Agôn - mimicry and alea - ilinx are viable but contingent combinations. A gambler can 
experience vertigo.  Competitions often carry  elements of  a spectacle.  Fundamental 
relationships  exist  between  agôn and  alea and  mimicry and  ilinx.  Competition  and 
chance  are  both  strictly  rule-based.  Pretense  and  vertigo  presume  a  world  of 
improvisation  without  rules.  Caillois  emphasizes  the  dangerous  potential  of  this  
combination of mask and trance 38. Between these four viable pairs one is creative and 
active (agôn-mimicry) and the other passive and destructive (alea-ilinx). Agôn involves 
a  struggle  against  and  control  over  external  obstacles.  Alea means  submitting  to 
external forces. Similarly,  mimicry entails active creation of illusion, while  ilinx entails 
the  intoxicating  submission  of  the  will  and  mind  to  external  powers  (ibid:  76-78). 
Pursuing Huizinga’s attempt to understand culture itself as play, Caillois proposes that 
cultural history entails the transformation from primitive societies based on simulation 
and vertigo to civilized societies based on competition and chance. Superstition, magic 
and delirium have made way for a new social game defined in terms of birth versus 
38 Game researcher McKenzie Wark suggests that Caillois saw agôn and alea as “the antidote to the Nazi’s 
toxic mix of two other kinds of play - intoxication [ ilinx]  and spectacle [mimicry]” (Wark, 2007: 109, my 
additions in brackets; the number refers to section, not page), a view also forwarded by Roger Silverstone  
(Silverstone, 1999: 62).
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merit, the triumph of the luckiest versus the best (ibid: 125). This is where Caillois goes  
wrong in my view. Caillois’ attempt to formulate a sociology based on pairs of game 
categories is at best a highly selective view of societies. Leaving aside his simplistic and 
colonialist view of ‘progress’ across various societies (see Motte, 1995: 8-9), this model  
hardly  accounts  for  the  tremendous  importance  of  mimicry and  ilinx in  modern 
‘civilized’ societies  39. As discussed below,  mimicry underlies the notion of identity as 
theatrical  role-playing  (Goffman,  1959),  while  ilinx is  central  to  the  so-called 
‘experience economy’ (Pine & Gilmore,  1999).  Mimicry make-belief,  and to a lesser 
extent ilinx thrill-seeking, occur in (mobile) media practices and experiences too, as we 
shall see. 
1.3.2 Game, play, playability and playfulness
Digital game researchers make extensive use of Huizinga and Caillois. They often use  
paidia and ludus to distinguish between play and game (Frasca, 1999), or free play and 
rule-bound  play  (Kücklich,  2004:  25).  It  should  be noted  that  neither  Huizinga  nor 
Caillois  oppose  play  and  game  like  many  game  researchers  do  40.  Play  is  usually 
differentiated  from  game  as  being  more  ‘free’.  Gonzalo  Frasca  makes  a  valuable 
addition  to Caillois  by  saying that  a  game differs  from play  not  because it  is  rule-
governed but because it has a result (Frasca, 1999: 2). What matters to the player, what 
gives him pleasure, is not the material result of the play action but the idea that the  
game has been successful. Something is at stake (Huizinga too noted this: Huizinga, 
1955: 50). Games have an end, in the double sense of an aim and an endpoint. This is  
an  important  difference from play.  Play  is  not  geared towards  fulfilling  a  goal  that 
would end it, but towards prolonging and extending itself. The goal-oriented finitude of  
games  is  incorporated  in  Alexander  Galloway’s  working  definition:  “[a]  game is  an 
activity defined by rules in which players try to reach some sort of goal. Games can be 
whimsical  and  playful,  or  highly  serious.  They  can  be  played  alone  or  in  complex 
scenarios”  (Galloway,  2006:  1).  Galloway  continues:  “video  games  are  actions.... 
Without the active participation of players and machines, video games exist only as  
static computer code” (ibid: 2). Obviously games exist outside their enactment. Chess is 
still a game, even when it is not played. It exists a a material object (the board), a set of  
constitutive rules, and an act (playing chess). Similarly, computer code is a scripted  
structure that enables  the execution of  the predesigned gameplay  41.  The compiled 
computer code can be downloaded or sold on a DVD as  an instance of  the game. 
39 Nor does it support rational thinking in the belief systems of ‘primitive societies’ (a central argument in  
Evans-Pritchard & Gillies, 1976).
40 Dutch and French have no distinct words for play and game (nor does Indonesian; Indonesia is the locus of  
the next two chapters). 
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Without the design embedded in code there would be no game action in the first  
place. Play and game thus can be structure (existing ‘virtually’, in the sense of potential, 
as a set of rules or code),  object (the actual instantiation), and  praxis (as an actual 
executed activity).  Game leans towards structure,  and play towards praxis,  but  this 
distinction is not solid. Gaming is an activity, while a play can be defined in structural 
terms. 
In addition to being noun and verb, playful as an adjective describes the quality 
of  something.  Objects,  people,  and  situations  can  have  properties  that  elicit  play 
(‘affordances’). A ball invites people to kick it. A clown invites people to laugh and be  
joyous. A theater invites people to suspend disbelief and let themselves get enchanted. 
When computer code is executed as a program and appears on the screen it invites 
play. The game environment invites people to explore, compete, tinker, engage with 
other players, cheat, and so on. This property of inviting play can be called playability 
(Kücklich, 2004: 21). We will see how the mobile phone invites people to tinker and 
play with it.
The adverb playfully qualifies a subject’s actions or subjective experience during 
play. In his  research about happiness, psychologist Mihali  Csikszentmihalyi describes 
so-called “flow experiences”. These occur when people achieve control over their inner 
life during certain activities (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990: 6). For flow experiences to happen 
an optimal balance must be found between tasks that are too hard and induce anxiety,  
and tasks that are too easy and cause boredom. Sportsmen who have ‘good legs’ can 
reach  a  level  of  perfectly  clear  inner  harmony  with  what  they  are  doing,  with 
themselves,  and  the world  at  large.  In  this  state  of  mind  a  very  difficult  or  heavy 
activity seems effortless (ibid: 74). Central to activities that induce flow experiences is  
that they are autotelic. They are done for their own sake and preferably for as long as 
possible  (ibid:  67).  The  long-lasting  and  intrinsically  rewarding  nature  of  play,  as 
opposed to game, is  also central  to James P.  Carse’s distinction between  finite and 
infinite  games  (Carse,  1986).  Finite  games  are  defined  by  external  rules,  have  the 
purpose of winning and thus ending the game. Infinite games are internally defined.  
They are played for no other purpose than to continue the game itself (ibid: 3, 8-9). We 
will  see  how  mobile  communication  between  intimates  is  such  an  ‘infinite  game’ 
(section 5.3).  Flow is  but  one  of  many  possible  play  experiences.  Play  experiences 
reside anywhere in between the exhilaration of a roller-coaster ride or any other joyous 
‘free  play’  (pure  paidia),  and  utterly  serious  concentration  during  a  hazardous 
mountaineering  maneuver  or  any  other  solemn dedication to rule-governed games 
(pure ludus). 
41 The actual playing of a game can be different from what the makers intended, just like hacking the mobile 
phone entails alternative uses. This play with pre-given boundaries can be called “counterplay”.
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1.3.3 Communicative play
If playful  experiences occur only during play, a playful  orientation or mood is directed 
towards  the  play  itself.  Playful  then  refers  to  a  frame  of  mind  that  is  geared  to  
playfulness. Obviously that is a circular definition (the clause that needs defining is part  
of  the description itself).  But with reason. Sutton-Smith sees playful as “a mood of  
frolicsomeness,  lightheartedness,  and  wit”  (Sutton-Smith,  1997:  147).  Crucially,  he 
reserves  playfulness  for  what  he  calls  ‘metaplay’.  Metaplay  “plays  with  the normal 
expectations  of  play  itself,  as  does  nonsense,  parody,  paradox,  and  ridiculousness. 
Playful would be that which plays with the frames of play” (ibid: 147-148). Playful thus  
is reflexive: it applies to the activity it is part of and relates to its own being. We find 
the  same  idea  and  formulation  in  Gregory  Bateson’s  essay  A  Theory  of  Play  and  
Fantasy (Bateson, 1972: 138-148). One day in the zoo, Bateson observed two monkeys 
engaging in combat-like play. Neither the monkeys, nor Bateson, took this behavior for 
combat itself. From this observation he concludes that the monkeys were capable of 
meta-communication. They exchanged signals that carried the message “this is play”. In 
its expanded form meta-communication says: “[t]hese actions in which we now engage 
do not denote what those actions  for which they stand would denote” (ibid: 139). 
Bateson generalizes this to a double paradox of play:
We face then two peculiarities of play: (a) that the messages or signals exchanged 
in play are in a certain sense untrue or not meant; and  (b) that that which is 
denoted by these signals is nonexistent.
(ibid: 141)
Bateson  identifies  three  types  of  communicative  messages:  (a)  messages  that  are 
mood-signs; (b) messages that simulate mood-signs; (c) frame-setting messages that 
enable the receiver to discriminate between (a) and (b), by saying “this is play” (ibid:  
146).  Meta-communicative (c) type messages function as ‘frames’ in order to make 
judgments about the conditions for communication. We now reach fertile grounds for 
the  study  of  communications  media  42.  Earlier  we  saw  with  Huizinga,  Caillois  and 
Ehrman that culture and society bear play characteristics. We now see with Bateson 
that all play requires communication (transferring the message “this is play”). Inversely, 
a lot of communication involves play. Frame-setting messages articulate the conditions 
needed to make judgments about the status of communication. As Ehrman says:
42 Bateson himself notes: “[w]e therefore meet in play with an instance of signals standing for other events,  
and it appears, therefore, that the evolution of play may have been an important step in the evolution of  
communication.” (ibid: 140).
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Just as culture is, in the last analysis, communication, so is play and game. Thus,  
any theory of communication (or of information) implies a theory of play and a 
game theory. And vice versa. [...] Play is articulation, opening and closing of and 
through language.
(Ehrmann, et al., 1968: 56)
The  ludic  is  a  highly  spontaneous,  undirected,  and  potentially  disruptive  kind  of 
playfulness. Ludic (and its derivative ludicrous) connotes parody, ironic commentary, 
unreasonable  foolishness,  and/or  theatrical  inversions  of  normalcy.  Huizinga 
throughout  his  Homo  Ludens uses  the  Dutch  word  ludiek as  a  neutral  adjective 
(‘playful’). However, our present understanding of the ludic is heavily influenced by the 
social  protests  of  the  1960s  and  particularly  the  politically  subversive  Situationist  
legacy.  The Situationists proposed to inverse normal situations (détournement),  and 
promoted  aimless  activities  (dérive),  in  order  to  challenge  boundaries  and  pre-
packaged  meanings  of  the  capitalist  spectacle  society  (Debord,  1955,  1958,  2005). 
Ludic attitudes and activities are not completely detached from normalcy. They need to 
balance  between relinquishing  seriousness  and  all  meanings,  and  engagement  and 
even critique. The ludic always has an agenda. Through sheer madness it exposes the 
arbitrariness of what is perceived as normalcy. By its theatrical and reflexive display of 
not  playing  according  to  the  rules,  it  is  indeed  a  play  with  rules  of  everyday  life. 
Contemporary phenomena like ‘smart mobs’ (political mobilizations) and ‘flash-mobs’ 
(silly and unexpected collaborative actions in public spaces) that are coordinated via 
(mobile) media, frequently carry this ludic quality (Rheingold, 2002). Still, in the case of  
flash mobs the question raises whether these are truly disruptive actions, or just a one-
time only play ‘spectacle’ without lasting consequences. 
1.3.4 Play as mediating metaphors: life as play
Play is  used metaphorically  in  staggeringly  diverse ways.  I  take these as  ‘mediating 
metaphors’. Caillois’ four play types serve as more or less concrete thought-images by 
which we understand the world and our place in it 43. Play metaphors not only ‘transfer 
meanings’  (the  literal  meaning  of  ‘metaphor’).  They  actually  produce  them.  They 
become media for self-understanding. This paragraph adds a historical dimension to 
the discussion so far. It shows that play as a mediating concept in fact is very old. 
43 Katherine Hayles speaks about ‘material metaphors’ to foreground “the traffic between words and physical 
artifacts”.  An interactive relation exists between how material  objects are shaped and the way we think 
through them about ourselves and the world  (Hayles,  2002:  22;  2004).  In  this  case,  play types are  not  
material artifacts as much as thought images.
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Evolutionism is  without doubt the most  influential  theory about life as  agôn 
competition. It has come to influence our thinking far beyond biology. Huizinga himself  
exposes how law, war, art, education, and politics stem from competitive play.  Agôn 
presupposes an enclosed system with scarce resources over which different parties try 
to  gain  control.  Moderate,  sophisticated  ideas  emphasize  the  human  capacity  to 
organize  this  competition.  Garrett  Hardin’s  influential  notion  of  ‘tragedy  of  the 
commons’ describes  the problem when multiple herdsmen let  their cattle graze on 
common land. For an individual, the economic benefit of adding more cows outweighs 
the collectively shared ecological penalty of degrading the pasture. Political ideologies 
differ in opinion about the domain in which agôn takes place (economy? social class? 
‘race’?), to what extent a level playing field should be secured, and what institutions 
should  govern  as  referees.  Parliamentary  democracy  itself  is  structured  around 
competition for scarce seats. Vulgar debasements of evolutionism - pejoratively labeled 
‘social Darwinism’ - narrow human life to a “survival of the fittest” between individuals  
or  groups  44.  In  everyday  parlance and popular  cultural  expressions,  we commonly 
encounter such laymen ‘Darwinist’ views of life as a dog-eat-dog world in which the  
fittest  player  wins.  Agôn  also  underlies  modern  notions  of  identity.  We  not  only 
compete with others but also with ourselves by seeing life in terms of ‘challenges’ and  
‘achievements’.  We  attempt  to  control  our  psychological  moods  and  our  physical 
appearances. We formulate career goals and ideals about who we want to become. In 
this competition with ourselves, we set out the stakes and try to gain mastery over life 
in what sociologist Anthony Giddens calls “the trajectory of the self” (Giddens, 1991: 
ch.3).  Competition widely  occurs  in  mobile  media  practices,  as  will  be  shown,  and 
accentuates a view of identity as achievement.
Alea chance informs our sense of life as an unpredictable play of higher forces 
outside our control. Once we were played by the gods. For many people the dices have 
been passed on to other invisible forces. Some are even more abstract and gruesome, 
like pure coincidence, devoid of any greater meaning. Sociologist Ulrich Beck calls our 
highly  complex  contemporary  society  a  “risk  society”.  Some of  these  risks  we  can 
control or minimize but there will always be events we neither can predict nor control 
(Beck, 1992). According to Giddens, the unexpected “fateful moments” over which we 
have no control act as dramatic junctions in life. These moments - a marriage breakup,  
an unexpected death, a crisis - are decisive in identity construction. They force us to 
reflect on who we were, and to decide where we are heading (Giddens, 1991: ch.4).  
44 In  evolution  theory  there  are  two  parallel  processes:  random  variation  and  natural  selection.  Social  
Darwinism  entirely  disregards  random  variation’s  inherent  lack  of  purpose,  and  turns  selection  into  a 
teleology of ‘winning’.
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Alea too occurs in mobile media practices, as we will see. The tension between agôn 
control and being played by aleatory forces partly informs the relation between media 
technologies and identity (section 5.4).
As said earlier, Caillois wrongly asserts that mimicry and ilinx no longer exist in 
modern  societies.  From  Plato’s  cave  allegory,  and  eastern  spiritual  traditions,  to 
modern  day  escapism,  ilinx intoxication  and  trickery  of  the  senses  underlies 
transcendental views of human life as one big deception. For some people the solution 
is reaching a state of enlightenment, here or in the hereafter. For others pursuing ilinx 
experiences is the solution itself. Taking drugs or seeking other thrills can bring one 
closer to reality or truth in this life. Or it can simply be an escape from life, however 
temporarily. Transcendence was a large part of the attraction of the internet in its early  
days (see for example Davis, 1998) 45. The wish for escapism and distraction make up a 
big chunk of people’s media consumption patterns today. 
The most important mediating metaphor for my overall purposes is mimicry. It is 
long held that communication and social interactions consist of theatrical role-playing 
and make-belief, through which we construct our identities. Chicago School sociologist 
Robert Ezra Park well-phrases this view of life as mimicry: 
It  is  probably  no  mere  historical  accident  that  the  word  person,  in  its  first 
meaning,  is  a  mask [Latin  persona].  It  is  rather  a  recognition of  the fact  that 
everyone is always and everywhere, more or less consciously, playing a role... It is 
in  these  roles  that  we  know  each  other;  it  is  in  these  roles  that  we  know 
ourselves.
In a sense, and in so far as this mask represents the conception we have  
formed of ourselves - the role we are striving to live up to - this mask is our truer  
self, the self we would like to be. In the end, our conception of our role becomes  
second nature and an integral part of our personality. We come into the world as 
individuals, achieve character, and become persons.
(Park, quoted in Goffman, 1959: 19-20, my addition in brackets)
Theatrical playacting is an old mediating metaphor, perhaps even older than narrative 
(and more widespread cross-culturally). In the superb The Fall of Public Man sociologist 
Richard  Sennett  pays  a  great  deal  of  attention  to  the  theatrum  mundi metaphor 
(“theater of  the world”,  the world  as  a stage)  (Sennett,  1974:  34-37).  People  have 
understood society, and themselves, in theatrical  terms. Sennett  describes how the 
theater  metaphor  has  been  subject  to  revisions  over  the  course  of  history.  The 
metaphor originated among the ancient Greeks and Christians, for whom humanity 
was in fact a puppet show of and for the Gods. It truly became a dominant thought-
45 See also the Cyberspace Salvations research project at http://www.cyberspacesalvations.nl.
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image in the 18th century, when the ‘audience’ shifted from God/gods to other people 
and  the  idea  of  ‘publicness’  arose.  Sennett  argues  that  the  theatrum  mundi has 
continued  to  serve  three  purposes.  First,  to  introduce  illusion  and  delusion  as 
fundamental questions of social life. That is, social life is performed and involves belief  
and illusion. Second, to detach human nature from social action. That is,  character or 
nature is  something else  than mere observable  behavior  in  role-playing.  Third  and 
most  importantly,  “the  images  of  theatrum  mundi are  pictures  of  the  art  people 
exercise in ordinary life. This is the art of acting, and people who exercise it are playing 
‘roles’” (ibid: 35). 
Ethnologist Van Gennep teaches us that even in pre-industrial societies belief in 
the illusory nature  of  social  life  is  not  a given but  requires  a  willing  suspension of 
disbelief  (Van  Gennep,  1960:  115)  46.  ‘Rites  de  passage’  (rites  of  passage)  mark 
important transitional  phases in people’s lives. Initiates enter a phase of ‘liminality’ 
(limen means border in Latin). It is a period fraught with paradox. Candidates play with 
familiar rules by temporarily  suspending or reversing them (ibid: 115).  During rites, 
secrets  and believe systems are  exposed to be  exactly  that:  just  believe (ibid:  79). 
However, to complete the initiation one has to return to the practice of believing. After 
disenchantment  follows  re-enchantment.  Anthropologist  Victor  Turner  recognizes 
theatrical ‘liminoid’ play elements in modern (western) societies. Liminoid phenomena 
and  settings,  like  the  arts  and  universities,  are  characterized  by  individual  choice, 
creation and continuous innovation in societal margins, and the results are enjoyed in  
leisure  settings  (Turner,  1982:  43,  53-54).  Liminoid  periods  and  spaces  induce  a 
subjunctive mood that opens up room for the as if in which one can reflexively look at 
oneself, whereas full-blown while give meaning afterwards, he says (ibid: 76). At the 
interfaces  between the separate  spaces of  disorderly  liminoid  play  and established 
cultural  systems  technological  innovations  occur,  meaningful  cultural  symbols  are 
created, and society is refreshed (ibid: 32, 41, 45). This too counters Caillois’ idea that  
mimicry in modern societies has vanished. 
Best known for the application of theater metaphors to social life is sociologist  
Erving Goffman (Goffman, 1959).  In Goffman’s  view, role-playing is  not  confined to 
special times, places, and events. The symbolic interactions in which people engage by  
playing roles are the everyday rituals that tie society together. Performers playact in 
front of an audience. This communication process is an “information game” (ibid: 7-8). 
Goffman observes a fundamental asymmetry, whereby the performer is only aware of 
the impression he gives, while the audience is aware of both the impression that is  
given and  the  impression  that  is  given off.  Through  ‘impression  management’  the 
individual tries to restore the symmetry. Performances are given in the ‘front region’  
46 Originally published in French in 1908.
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(ibid: 22,  106-137).  The front  consist  of  a physical  setting that  includes decors  and  
material props, and is  almost always connected to geographical  location (under the 
influence  of  new  technologies  geographical  location  and  settings  for  role-playing 
bifurcate, as we will see later). Front also consists of ‘personal front’: one’s manner and 
appearances,  and  one’s  identifying  physical  items  (ibid:  22-24).  In  the  back  region 
people  can drop their  guard and stop managing impressions.  Here the impressions  
fostered by  the performance are  knowingly  contradicted.  While  in  the front  region 
people  often  act  politely  and  in  formal  ways,  in  the  back  they  adopt  a  tone  of  
familiarity and can behave rude or disinterested (ibid: 112). Goffman’s unit of analysis  
in observing impression management is the ‘team’: a group of people who assist each 
other  in  playing  a  role  together  and  are  bound  together  by  ties  of  reciprocity.  An 
individual  too can be a  team.  He can be  his  own audience,  or  he  can imagine an 
audience to be present (ibid: 77-104). In performing a role, people move between total  
absorption or detachment. People can be completely taken in by their own acting, or 
they can detach themselves from their own performance and be cynical about it (ibid:  
19-20). Members of a team must play their part with a certain measure of discipline 
and self-control. If they would let themselves get carried away, they might destroy a 
successful performance (ibid: 216). Role-playing involves a measure of self-conscious 
distancing,  after  which  people  internalize  these  roles  again.  Therefore,  the  self  is 
double  by  nature.  It  only  comes  into  being  through  this  movement  in  a  “cycle  of  
disbelief-to-belief” (ibid: 20). In order to be convincing as a real person one must play.  
We see the same subjunctive reflexivity with Schechner, who says a performance is not 
just  a  doing  but  “a  showing  of  a  doing”  (Schechner,  2003:  114-115).  It  could be 
otherwise.
Goffman’s  analytical  framework  opens  up  a  view  of  how  people  relate  to 
themselves  through  the  movement  of  self-distancing  and  internalization,  to  other 
people as team members or audience, and to the world as a stage that includes objects 
as props for theatrical performances of the self. It is a view of social interaction and  
identity  as  innate  make-belief.  This  anti-essentialist  view  renounces  the  idea  that 
identity is some (material) property of people. “To be a given kind of person, then, is 
not  merely  to possess the required attributes,  but  also to sustain the standards of 
conduct  and appearance that  one's  social  grouping attaches thereto. ...  A status,  a 
position, a social place is not a material thing, to be possessed and then displayed; it is  
a  pattern  of  appropriate  conduct,  coherent,  embellished,  and  well  articulated” 
(Goffman, 1959: 75). Identity is not a noun, a property or collection of properties one 
possesses, but a verb, something one continually does. Another point we can take from 
the above is that there is no clear separation between playspace and the everyday (as  
also argued by Ehrman). In fact, the everyday comes into being through mimetic play. A 
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further  advantage  of  this  perspective  is  that  it  firmly  ties  the  expression  and 
performance of identity to spatiotemporal situations and socio-cultural contexts. One 
of its main weaknesses however is that it does not address the question if and how 
people  forge all  those different  roles  into a coherent whole throughout  their  lives, 
which after all is the main purpose and strength of narrative theory. One of the main  
tasks  ahead  then  is  to  explore  if  and  how  performative  play  may  indeed  create 
spatiotemporal coherence.
No clear singular meaning of play exists. Play can be viewed as structure, praxis,  
property, experience,  attitude,  and metaphor.  Play thus is  best understood as what 
Wittgenstein  has  called  a  “family  resemblance”,  a  cloud  of  overlapping  meanings 
(quoted in Ryan, 2001: 177). But aren’t we in danger of using a notion that is too broad  
to be of use? To avoid this risk, I turn to the question how media studies have taken up 
play. Building upon previous work will set us on the right path. 
1.4 Connecting media and play
1.4.1 Media ambiguities
A number of authors have suggested that play might be a useful notion to understand 
digital media technologies (see Kücklich, 2004; Lister, Dovey, Giddings, Grant, & Kelly, 
2008:  299-311;  Raessens,  2006,  2009).  One  of  the  first  authors  to  do so  is  Roger 
Silverstone, in a chapter called “Play” of his book Why Study the Media? (Silverstone, 
1999: 59-67). Silverstone takes play as a key dimension of media. He forwards the idea  
that play mediates between several tensions intrinsic to ‘media experiences’: 
Play is central, or so it seems, to media experience. We find its source both in the 
specifics of genre and programming and in the activities of viewing and listening.  
Play involves, like rhetoric, mutual participation. Players and their audiences, and 
audiences who become, even at one remove, players, together are involved in  
discourses  which  the  media  claim  and  construct  and  which  punctuate,  and 
puncture, our daily lives.
However, it is important to note, as Caillois does particularly, the tensions  
identified in  play  and games  between ‘contained freedom’,  ‘secure  creativity’, 
‘active passivity’,  ‘voluntary dependence’.  There is  nothing simple to be found 
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either in the sociology or anthropology of play, or in its mediation. Indeed digging  
deeper produces a sense of a more complex, psychodynamic reality,  and one 
which  relates  play  as  an  activity  both  to  the  construction  of  an  individual’s 
identity and to the mechanics of culture as a process and an achievement. Play is  
both a complex and precarious activity. 
(ibid: 63). 
Silverstone specifically addresses the following tensions:
[1] In the intertwining of media’s meanings with our own, we are neither free not 
in chains. [2] Nor do we anymore engage, even if we ever did, with the products 
of the media in a rational or functional way. The spaces we live in, in our inner as  
well as our outer worlds, are complicated by the lives we lead and the press of 
media on our minds and souls. [3] Boundaries are there to be broken. Sounds to  
be remastered. Images to be refashioned. But meanings are there to be fixed, 
accepted, owned, if only for the moment.
(ibid: 57, bracketed numbers added by me).
This passage expresses some interesting ambiguities that apply well to mobile media. 
These can be termed 1) freedom versus force; 2) means versus end; 3) fixity versus 
flow.  Similar  to  one  of  the  identity  paradoxes  mentioned,  people  experience  their  
mobile phone both as a blessing and a burden. Mobile media offer immense freedom 
to communicate but also place a burden on people to be available to others (section  
5.4  specifically  deals  with  this  ambivalence).  Mobile  media  are  used  as  functional  
means and as ends in themselves. We develop affective relations to our devices, dress 
them up, and imbue them with symbolic meanings (discussed in section 5.2.). Mobile  
media enable people to cross spatiotemporal and social boundaries by constantly and 
rapidly  switching  between  multiple  contexts.  Yet  these  boundaries  must  somehow 
remain understood as boundaries, as Silverstone suggests (analyzed in section 4.3).
How  do  play  and  new  media  come  together?  Here  Silverstone  remains 
somewhat vague, if not contradictory. Silverstone is not clear if and how media spaces 
are separated from everyday life. On the one hand he calls for “attention to play as a  
core activity of daily life” (ibid: 60). A bit further he says: “media have the capacity,  
indeed they entirely depend on that capacity, to engage an audience within spaces that 
are distinguished - marked off - from the otherwise relentless confusions of everyday 
life.  There is  a  threshold  to be crossed each time we participate  in the process  of 
mediation” (ibid: 61). In a critical review of the applicability of play for understanding  
new media, game researcher Julian Kücklich rightly points out that it is precisely the 
present-day ubiquity of the media that cause this “relentless confusion” in the first  
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place (Kücklich, 2004: 12). Further, in talking about ‘the media’, Silverstone does not 
specify if and how some media are more playful than others, or how different types of 
media relate to different kinds of play. I see it as a useful follow-up task to show how  
the  mobile  phone  comes  with  its  own particular  ‘playability’,  playful  practices  and 
attitudes. 
Silverstone deliberately utilizes play’s ambiguity to foreground the paradoxical 
workings of new media as a world apart yet intimately intertwined with everyday life. 
Life with media is characterized by continuous movements across boundaries, he says. 
Even  though  many  postmodernism  thinkers  argue  that  boundaries  have  become 
blurred and indistinct as a result of the media, they do still exist and are recreated on a  
daily basis (Silverstone, 1999: 59).
Play is part of everyday life, just as it is separate from it. To step into a space and a 
time to play is to move across a threshold, to leave something behind - one kind 
of order - and to grasp a different reality and a rationality defined by its own rules 
and terms of trade and action. We play to leave the world. But it is not the world.  
And we return.
(ibid: 60)
In this  passage we again see this ‘subjunctive mood’ of  the media experience. The  
media experience is both real and not real, we believe in it and we don’t, it is a realm 
apart  yet  connected,  it  matters  and  yet  it  doesn’t.  Indeed,  central  to  the  media 
experience seems that, again with Woolgar, it could be otherwise. 
The tensions and ambiguities that Silverstone mentions - ‘contained freedom’,  
‘secure creativity’, ‘active passivity’, ‘voluntary dependence’ - regularly recur in studies 
of (mobile) media technologies. Michael Arnold for instance argues that the mobile 
phone,  like  many  technologies,  is  ‘Janus-faced’  (Arnold,  2003).  Technologies  are 
designed to do things in rational goal-oriented ways, but they often perform in ironical  
and paradoxical ways. The mobile phone is designed to offer mobility and liberation,  
yet wireless communication is dependent on fixed infrastructures and keeps us on a 
leash (ibid: 242-244). The mobile phone makes people independent and in charge, yet  
requires  co-dependence on others  to talk  with and at  times can make people feel 
vulnerable  and  insecure.  The  phone  enables  users  to  be  always  available  but  not 
present, to be distant yet connected (ibid: 245). The mobile phone enables people to 
have private  conversations  in  public,  to  appear  busy  yet  available,  to  manage  and 
optimize  time  but  also  waste  it  (ibid:  247-249).  Arnold  proposes  that  studies  of  
technologies should not try to capture their ‘essences’, and describe their ‘influence’ in 
terms of a singular direction (as either technologically or socially determined). Instead, 
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they  should  open  themselves  up  to  contingency,  paradox  and  irony.  I  follow 
Silverstone’s  explicit  and Arnold’s  implicit  plea for play as a deliberately  ambiguous 
heuristics to look at new media technologies. 
1.4.2 Pleasure, humor, and joking
Pleasure and fun in media use have received little attention in our discussion so far. Yet  
I feel they are crucial to the mobile media experience. Kerr et al. note that pleasure is 
often advanced as a defining feature of new media, but seldom critically interrogated  
(Kerr, Kücklich, & Brereton, 2006: 64). In an overview of literature, they note that some 
authors focus on the (immediate or delayed) gratifications that consumers derive from 
media  use,  while  others  emphasize  the  creative  pleasure  people  experience  in 
‘productive consumption’, and yet others look at the enjoyment of a ‘play aesthetic’ of 
new media. The authors themselves forward play as a compound term for “the unique 
pleasure experienced when control, immersion and performance are combined” (ibid: 
70). Although it should be clear from our discussion that play is a broader notion than  
these authors suggest here, I agree that pleasure in media use merits further attention 
and indeed is one of its salient features. 
Humor  too  needs  special  mentioning  when  we  talk  about  (mobile)  media. 
Neither Huizinga nor Caillois say much about joking and humor as a distinctive feature 
of play 47. It is hard to place humor in Caillois’ scheme of play attitudes and types. As a 
mode of  spontaneous behavior and ‘free’  expression,  joking leans towards Caillois’  
paidia attitude.  However,  rule-based genres  of  humor can bear  ludus  qualities,  for 
example dumb blonde jokes, stand-up comedy, and internet ‘memes’  48. Humor and 
joking are equally hard to place as a type of play. They appear to be closest to Caillois’ 
mimicry as illusory make-belief (clowning, making up silly stories, pretending, reversing 
the  ordinary).  However,  elements  of  alea chance are  present  in  funny  unexpected 
occurrences and Schadenfreude, agôn in competition between being the funniest, and 
ilinx in  total  submission to tumultuous disorder.  Humor frequently  involves  Sutton-
Smith’s metaplay as a deliberate play with the frames of play itself. Laughter can also 
be a way to cope with failures in role-performances, as Goffman notes (Goffman, 1959: 
53 fn1). We will see how mobile telephony elicits joking and making fun. 
47 Huizinga more so than Caillois. Huizinga for instance observes that humor is an integral part of court of law 
procedures (Huizinga, 1955: ch.4).
48 These are inside jokes that suddenly gain popularity and rapidly spread online among a large number of  
people.
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1.4.3 Media as playful learning spaces
Another aspect I deem relevant for the relation between new media, play and identity 
is that people learn through play and games. A great number of authors have focused  
on developmental  play in children (for an overview and critique,  see Sutton-Smith, 
1997: chapter 3). The work of George Herbert Mead connects play, communication, 
and the development of  identity,  and in fact  greatly influenced Goffman’s symbolic  
interactionist  perspective  (Mead,  1934).  Mead  defines  the  self  as  reflexive  (“the 
turning-back of the experience of the individual upon himself”, ibid: 134). This reflexive 
self can be both subject and object to himself (ibid: 136-137). The individual can only 
become an object to himself through social interactions, Mead holds. “[H]e becomes 
an object to himself only by taking the attitudes of other individuals toward himself  
within a social environment or context of experience and behavior in which both he  
and  they  are  involved”  (ibid:  138).  These  interactions  require  communication,  and 
communication  arises  in  play.  Mead  identifies  three  developmental  stages  in  the 
making of the self. In play children adopt roles - an Indian, a policeman - and become 
another to oneself  (ibid: 151). Games are the second stage. Now the roles have an  
organized rule-based relationship to the roles of other children playing. A ball game 
involves multiple players and requires the child to take the roles of his teammates into 
account. “Each of his own acts is determined by his assumption of the action of the 
others who are playing the game” (ibid: 154). A complete self only comes into being in 
the third stage, when the individual  takes on the attitude of  the whole community 
towards a collaborative action, and applies this to himself. Mead famously calls this  
“the generalized other” (ibid: 154-156). From this developmental perspective on child’s  
play  and communication,  we can perceive  why  Goffman but  also  Ricoeur  consider 
identity as mimetic. To become a self we must first imagine ourselves as another. What  
Ricoeur  does  not  take  into  account  however  is  that  this  mimesis  occurs  first  and 
foremost in play.
Now on to digital  media.  In a collaborative study Mizuko Ito  et  al. find that 
young  people  learn  with  new  media  by  tinkering  and  exploring,  in  what  they  call  
“messing around” (Ito, et al., 2008: 20-28). ‘Free play’ with the media is autotelic and  
exploratory.  Contrary  to  goal-oriented  learning,  “[i]t  involves  experimentation  and 
exploration with relatively low investment, where there are few consequences to trial,  
error, and even failure” (ibid: 20). Play can be solitary but is social in nature when it  
involves the creation and sharing of content. Young people learn not only how to play 
with new media but also how to engage in social play through new media. Some of the 
young people under study actually made a livelihood out of their playful tinkering, as 
they grew up and became technology entrepreneurs. From engaging in new media play 
to  becoming  a  ‘serious’  media  professional  appeared  a  gradual  slope.  The authors 
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conclude:  “[p]articipation in the digital  age means  more than being able  to access 
‘serious’ online information and culture; it also means the ability to participate in social  
and recreational activities online” (ibid: 35). From the above we get the sense that the  
construction of identity involves a groping process, in which one learns about oneself  
by  playing  with  oneself,  others  and  the  world.  Media  spaces  are  safe  havens  for 
experimentation  and  offer  room  for  failure.  (And  then  again  they  have  real 
consequences, as Silverstone teaches). 
1.5 Conclusion: outline of the play framework
It is clear that conceptually, play is extremely ambiguous. Play can involve competition 
and mastery but  also chance and fate.  Play can be effortless  but  also difficult  and 
require skill. Play is relaxed and involves no strain but also competitive and intense.  
Play involves self-forgetful mindlessness but also self-aware performance. Play is belief 
but also non-belief, knowing and showing that it is only play. Play is entertaining and 
fun but also a solemn activity that requires full concentration. Play can be frivolous and 
just pretense but is also dead serious. Play has a childish and profane connotation but  
is also seen as sacred in for example ritual. Play can be make-belief yet also be very real 
in its consequences. Play is an autotelic end in itself that needs no players but also a 
means  in  order  to  achieve some external  goal  like  winning.  Play  can be a  solitary  
activity in which one plays against oneself but also a collaborative social activity. Play 
can erase individual consciousness but can also be a highly subjective experience. Play 
is mobile and arises from to-and-fro movements yet it also requires fixed elements like 
rules. Play creates order but it is also disruptive. Play crosses borders and transgresses 
boundaries yet at the same time it needs boundaries to separate it from ordinary life  
and activities and non-playful moods. 
Now substitute  the word ‘play’  with ‘identity’  in  the above.  This  reasonably  
covers  many  tensions  in  how  we  construct  our  identities  in  relation  to  media 
technologies. Still this does not prove much. It only raises the question how we can use  
play as more than a fuzzy metaphor that  covers  some paradoxes of  (post-)modern 
identities. Does play indeed act as the medium through which we interact with the 
world,  other  people  and  ourselves,  and  mediating  metaphor  through  which  we 
understand these relations? Do mobile media shape the modalities of our identities 
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(being - having - becoming a self) as playful and game-like? In order to claim that our  
present technologically mediated identities are ‘playful’, we need to declare how we 
are going to use this notion. I deliberately avoid a singular definition of play. The sole 
‘essence’ of play is its ambiguity, as Sutton-Smith and Silverstone among others expose  
so clearly. This is precisely the power of using play as a heuristic to shed new light on  
technologically  mediated  identities.  As  a  lens  to  look  at  media  technologies  and 
identities,  play  introduces  coherence without  imposing unification or  attempting to 
repeal paradox. 
In  the ensuing analysis  I  use  Caillois’  four  play  types (agôn competition and 
mastery, alea chance, mimicry pretense, ilinx sensory delusion) as a guiding typology to 
identify playful elements in our interactions with mobile media, and in understanding 
ourselves. In addition, I propose that our interactions with mobile media exist on four 
‘play levels’. Each level entails a particular way of looking at mobile media mediations  
as playful. They zoom out from the most literal and concrete to the most figurative and 
abstract.  The first,  play on the mobile,  takes  mobile  media as  gaming devices  and 
interfaces to engage in play. The second, play with the mobile, takes mobile media as 
‘playable’  material  artifacts  that  elicit  play  practices  and playful  orientations  in our  
relations to the devices. As material artifacts, mobile media mediate our interactions  
with the physical  environment, with other people physically present, and ourselves. 
The third, play through the mobile, takes mobile media as communications media that 
shape  our  relations  to  distant  yet  intimate  others  like  an  infinite  game  of  gift  
exchanges.  The fourth,  play by  the mobile,  looks  at  how mobile  media  as  part  of 
‘media culture’  in general evoke experiences of  ‘being played’. The last three levels 
already emerge in our analysis of mobile media in Indonesia (chapters 2 and 3). The 
first is given specific attention in the analysis of a location-based mobile playground 
(chapter 4). The four play levels are analyzed on their own in detail in chapter 5. The 
conclusions drawn from each of these levels return in chapter 6, where the outline of a  
theory of playful identities is formulated. 
In  order  to  make  the  step  from  playful  interactions  with  mobile  media  to 
identity  construction,  I  adopt  the  view  of  identity  as  role-playing  performances. 
Identity does not solely arise from interpretation after the fact but is also something  
we actualize by doing. This doing consists of play on, with, through, and by the mobile 
phone. Furthermore, I argue that a great deal of our communication via the mobile 
phone is  meta-communication on the conditional  (c)  level,  which Bateson calls  the 
frame-settings messages (“this is play”, ”is this play?”). In this conditional order, the 
ambivalences  of  boundaries  that  typically  are  foregrounded  in  mediated 
communication  (near-far,  distant-present,  in-out,  real-pretense)  are  explored  and 
questioned. The performance perspective of identity brings in the much needed spatial 
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dynamics that I feel is lacking in Ricoeur’s narrative theory. Yet it does not say how  
coherence is constructed between the multiple roles we play. Therefore, a structuring 
device is sought that acts in the way plot functions to create temporal coherence in  
narrative identity. I tentatively propose that this is the digital map (see sections 4.3 and  
6.2).  Two  general  conclusions  shall  emerge  from  this  investigation  into  ‘playful 
identities’. One is that the conceptual pair free play/game acts as a structuring principle  
in mediated identity construction. Mobile media open up a playspace for free play in 
our relations to the world, others and ourselves. At the same time they act as coded  
game spaces that delimit the bandwidth and prescribe the terms for these relations.  
The  other  is  that  we  come  to  understand  our  relations  to  the  world,  others  and 
ourselves as boundary play in the conditional order. 
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2. Entering the stage: mobile media and modernity in Jakarta 49
2.1 Handphone mania in Indonesia
In the morning of June 13th 2007 thousands of Indonesians queue up in front of Hotel 
Grand Melia in the capital city Jakarta. Early birds have been standing in line since 2:00 
am. Indonesia is the first country in the world where popular Finnish mobile phone 
manufacturer Nokia launches its new top-end-of-the-market E90 Communicator. Doors 
open at 10:00. A few hours later the whole stock of 1100 devices have found a new 
owner for the price of 10.9 million rupiah (about € 870 in 2007). The next day the E90 
is on sale to the general public. Its price rapidly drops. Telset Magazine, one of the 
numerous Indonesian mobile phone glossies, extensively features this event  50. In an 
interview  with  Telset,  Nokia’s  director  product  management  expresses  his 
astonishment, saying there is  no country as passionate about the Communicator as 
Indonesia. He further faces tough questions like why it only comes in two colors, why 
the casing cannot be changed, and what his solution is for people who despite its rich 
feature set are only going to use the E90 to send text messages (Hamzah, 2007). In her 
editorial, Telset chief editor Ratna Farida Daradjatun does not fail to notice the irony 
that thousands of people voluntary stand in line under the burning sun to get a mobile 
phone in a country where the average yearly income is two-thirds of its sales price. 
“Truly ironic indeed when we remember that at this same moment in other parts of  
Indonesia there are even far more people who have to queue up just to get cooking 
oil” (Daradjatun, 2007). She blames it on the cult of prestige (gengsi). These people 
think that owning a Nokia E90 Communicator is a symbol of status and success. She 
wryly concludes that whatever it  is  that these early buyers do for a living, it  surely 
won’t bear any relation to the scarcity of cooking oil.
49 The material  presented in this and the next chapter is based on ethnographic field  research done in  
Jakarta, Indonesia in 2007 and 2000.
50 Telset Magazine, edisi 74 Juli 2007.
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This case introduces a number of interlocking issues that feature in this chapter and 
the next. First, it  shows how important the mobile phone is in Indonesian views of  
modern urban identities. Like elsewhere - but particularly so in the Indonesian context  
- the mobile phone is not just a medium for communication. It is also a cultural artifact  
infused with symbolic meanings that plays a role in the construction of identities, in  
what Silverstone and Haddon call its ‘double articulation’ (Silverstone & Haddon, 1996: 
62). Many Indonesians customize their mobile phone according to personal taste. Large 
shopping malls in Jakarta are stuffed to the brim with shops that sell new, second hand,  
and  reconditioned  devices,  colorful  casings,  leather  pockets,  danglers,  ringtones, 
attractive  phone  numbers,  and  so  on.  That  is  why  the  Telset  interviewer  poses 
questions about the  looks of the E90 rather than its functionality. The mobile phone 
does not stand in isolation but has rapidly become a prominent member of (popular) 
culture. A broad range of media specialize in the mobile phone, with multiple glossy  
magazines like Telset, but also cheap printed weeklies, tech-columns in regular daily 
newspapers, books about for instance hacking the phone, talk shows and items on 
radio and television about the mobile phone, and various mobile phone websites. The 
mobile phone also features dominantly in other expressions of  popular culture,  for 
instance in soap series, cinema and in the new genre of ‘chick-lit’ books. 
Second, the case highlights the existence of a tension between an individualized 
consumer culture and the lagging state of development of Indonesian society at large. 
New technologies like the mobile phone play a pivotal role in contesting views of what 
an ‘Indonesian modernity’ ought to look like, at the level of the individual and at the 
national level, and also in relation tot he global 51. 
Third, it draws attention to a number of ‘handphone mobilities’.  Linguistically  
there appears no basis for understanding the mobile phone in Indonesia in terms of 
mobility. The most common words for the mobile phone (as we have seen in section 
1.1) are handphone (abbreviated as HP or hape) and ponsel (telepon selular = cellular 
telephone).  Nevertheless,  I  argue  that  in  addition  to  ‘modernity’,  ‘mobility’  too  is 
central  to  understand  the  mobile  phone  as  part  of  urban  life  and  identities  in 
Indonesia. For instance, in a foreword to a book about the mobile phone, the general 
manager  of  Nokia  Indonesia  Hasan  Aula  states  that  “mobility  truly  becomes  the 
keyword in this present Information Century” (Putra, 2004: xxiii, my translation). Bart  
Barendregt and Raul Pertierra write that “for urban southeast Asians, modernity has  
become equivalent to mobility” (Barendregt & Pertierra, 2008: 382). Still, it remains 
unclear what kind(s) of mobility they refer to, and to what ‘modernity’ for that matter.  
51 Unless indicated otherwise I use the term ‘modernity’ as an emic notion, that is, according to the culturally 
specific ways in which people themselves use certain concepts, as opposed to etic: how someone from the 
‘outside’ like a researcher uses theoretical concepts, often as universals.
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My aim is to pursue this argument and ask how the mobile phone informs notions of 
modernity and mobility, and how this influences playful identity construction in urban 
Indonesia. With some imagination three ‘handphone mobilities’ can be distilled from 
the  above  case.  The  case  also  reveals  tensions  in  Indonesian  society.  The  first  is 
corporeal  mobility.  Thousands  of  people  voluntarily  travel  to  an  event  to  obtain  a 
mobile  phone,  while  those  forced  to  wait  in  line  for  oil  are  literally  immobilized 
because  they  have  no  choice.  The  second  is  socio-economic  mobility.  A  relatively 
affluent class has risen of people who can afford an expensive mobile phone. Yet there  
is a huge gap between them, and those who have to queue up for oil.  The third is  
imaginative mobility. Some people seek to increase their symbolic prestige by buying 
the newest mobile phone, while for others this is off-limits because they cannot afford 
an expensive phone (or want not).  Corporeal  mobility and  imaginative mobility are 
terms from the scheme John Urry applies to travel (section 1.1) (Urry, 2007: 47). If  
narrative over-stresses temporal dynamics, Urry’s scheme in my view overemphasizes 
spatial  mobilities,  at  the  expense  of  temporal  and  social  dynamics  in  people’s  life  
trajectories, which are also understood in terms of ‘mobility’. Adding  socio-economic  
mobility highlights the fact that particularly in developing countries like Indonesia, the 
(potential  for)  personal  and shared national  development -  ‘moving forward’  -  is  a 
highly relevant issue, as we shall see in chapter 3. These three mobilities correspond to 
practical issues many Jakartans face on a daily basis. How to manage corporeal travel in 
the terribly congested urban sprawl? How to raise one’s own standard of living and 
build and maintain social ties in the metropolis, and often also with the place of origin?  
How to shape ‘modern’  urban identities  in  the changing contexts  of  the local,  the  
regional,  the national,  and  the global?  By  highlighting  inequalities,  the  above case 
underlines  that  ‘handphone  mobilities’  are  not  just  naturally  given  and  inherent 
qualities of the technology. These mobilities must be understood as cultural practices.  
Modernity and mobility thus are the prisms through which I consider the role of the 
mobile phone in the construction of Indonesian identities. 
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2.2 The shaping of modernity in urban Jakarta
What is the influence of the mobile phone on Indonesian urban identities? To answer 
this question we need to understand more about the social and historical context of 
Indonesia, and Jakarta in particular. By looking at Jakarta’s urban layout and history, I 
describe how shifting notions of ‘modernity’ have informed post-colonial Indonesian 
society. I look at differences in the social makeup of Jakarta, and briefly introduce the  
cult of prestige (gengsi) and modern socializing (bergaul) as characteristic of Jakartan 
urban culture. These notions feature as defining elements in the shaping of identities 
by  mobile  media  (section  3.1).  This  section  shows  the  complexities  involved  in 
Indonesian identity construction in general, and already suggests that play is a useful  
notion to understand this. 
2.2.1 Jakarta’s metropolitan setting
Figure 2: Map of Jakarta, Indonesia. 
Legend:  1.  Soekarno-Hatta  airport;  2.  central  business  district;  3.  Tanjung  Priok  harbor;  4. 
Merdeka Square (ca. 1km2). Map source: OpenStreetMap.org.
72
Nobody knows exactly how many people live in Jakarta, the ‘megalopolis’ situated on 
the  northwestern  coast  of  the  densely  populated  main  island  of  Java,  Indonesia.  
Estimates vary from an official year 2000 census of 8 million inhabitants, to a probably  
more accurate 15 million, and even over 20 million when the surrounding towns Depok 
and Bogor to the south, Tangerang to the west, and Bekasi to the east are counted in 
(Cybriwsky & Ford, 2001; Firman, 1998) 52. Jakarta is called ibu kota, the “mother-city” 
and has the political status of a province with a governor and multiple mayors heading  
sections  of  the  city.  Jakarta  stretches  out  over  a  huge  area  of  some  6418  km 2 
(Cybriwsky & Ford, 2001: 199). The main toll road is the city’s aorta. It runs in a circle  
from international  airport  Soekarno-Hatta  in the northwest  underneath the central 
business  district  to  Tanjung  Priok  harbor  in  the  northeast  and  back,  with  several 
branches.  Historically,  Jakarta  has  mostly  expanded  along  the  north-south  axis. 
Bordering on the Java Sea to the north lies the old part of town. Many remains from 
Dutch colonial times can be found here, often in a deplorable state, although recently  
city officials have started to recognize the cultural value and tourist potential of this 
colonial legacy. In the last few years, some historical areas and buildings have been 
renovated.  The southern part  of  the old  town is  the Chinese quarter,  rebuilt  after  
having been set on fire in 1998 anti-Chinese riots and looting. This area is an important  
commercial center for consumer electronics.
Further south lies  the immense Freedom Square,  the symbolic center of  the 
nation.  In  the  middle  of  the  square  stands  the  huge  needle-shaped  national 
monument. The basement hosts a permanent exhibit that depicts the official narrative 
of Indonesia’s national history. The regalia of the nation-state are found on the ground 
floor.  All  the  way on top a  gold-plated flame expresses  the strength of  Indonesia’s 
people.  Concentrically  located  around  Freedom  Square  are  the  state  palace,  the 
immense Istiqlal mosque, the old catholic cathedral and protestant church, the town 
hall,  various  state  departments,  the  national  museum,  and  an  army  base.  Further 
south, the economic heart of big business is pulsing along the main roads of an area 
called the golden triangle. High and mighty shiny skyscrapers reach up to heaven. Most 
residential  areas  are  located  south  of  the  toll  way.  Many  of  the  homes  in  elite 
neighborhoods like Pondok Indah are walled with spikes  or broken glass,  and have 
exuberantly decorated facades in blinding white, pastel or candy pink colors, while the 
other three sides are in grey concrete. Over the last few years the trend to build high-
rise apartments has become more and more visible. These buildings are dotted all over  
Jakarta  along  its  busy roads,  and house young urban professionals.  They  are  cities 
52 A possible reason for these incompatible statistics is the huge number of poor and illegal migrants who 
often  temporarily  live  in  Jakarta.  For  the  official  year  2000 census,  see  the  Statistics  Indonesia  website 
http://www.bps.go.id/tab_sub/view.php?tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek=12&notab=1.
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within the city, incorporating many functions into one building, from parking garages 
and shopping malls in the basements, to saunas, swimming pools and fitness rooms 
upstairs. These very visible symbols of modern urban life cannot shield from the eye a 
completely different side of  the city. On every busy street an army of hawkers and 
street  vendors  encroaches  upon  slow-paced  travelers  in  their  air-conditioned 
automobiles with tainted windows. Taking a turn off the main roads, the appearance of  
the city changes drastically. Gone are the shiny high-rise symbols of modernity. Hyper-
urban Jakarta suddenly shows its other face as a collection of little villages (kampung). 
This Jakarta is made up of low concrete houses, wooden shacks with corrugated iron 
roof-plates, a mishmash of overhead electricity cables, open sewers, half-finished brick 
houses, small mosques in bright paint, little food stalls, narrow roads and alleyways  
where people can only go by foot or by motorbike, and where the business is done by 
push cart vendors. Many of these neighborhoods are quite tidy and have reasonable 
facilities, but some are true shantytowns. The vast majority of urbanites dwell in such 
kampung. For most people this is the everyday reality of living in Jakarta. A symbiotic 
relationship exists between the middle- and upper class neighborhoods and kampung 
housing the poorer folk. Each morning the same ritual repeats itself.  The rich leave 
their upscale neighborhoods in air-conditioned cars to drive out to work downtown, 
while the poor flock in by public transport, by foot or on motorbikes to sweep houses,  
sieve dead leaves from swimming pools, weed gardens, cook dinner, do the laundry, 
baby-sit. At the end of the workday this movement is inverted. When darkness falls,  
the barricades that fence off the neighborhood are lowered and security guards sit  
outside all night on watch.  
2.2.2 Jakarta as the center of the modern nation
Jakarta is the economic and political heart of the nation 53. The capital is the place to be 
for almost  all  matters,  from job opportunities,  education,  politics,  to shopping and  
modern  cultural  life.  This  central  position  of  Jakarta  is  clearly  seen  from  the  high 
density of media enterprises. Most of the national and commercial television stations, 
radio,  written  press,  cinema  and  television  producers,  the  music  industry,  book 
publishers  and  agencies,  and  other  entertainment  industries  are  stationed  in  the 
capital.  Until  Indonesia’s  reform  period  that  started  in  1998,  media  productions 
predominantly radiated outwards from the capital to Indonesia’s remote regions, while 
influences from outer regions rarely  seeped into Jakarta (Sen & Hill,  2000: 26).  For  
53 For example, during the mid-1990s 70% of the money in the Indonesian economy circulated here (Schulte  
Nordholt & Klinken, 2005: 6).
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most Indonesians Jakarta is the undisputed center of ‘modernity’. At the same time 
there has been, and still is, resentment among Indonesians from other regions against  
Jakarta’s privileged status in politics, the economy, and culture. 
In  spite of  its  central  position,  Jakarta  is  not  representative of  the whole  of  
Indonesia. Most provincial cities consist of one dominant ethnic group. Yogyakarta is a  
Javanese city, Bandung is a Sundanese city, Padang is a Minangkabau city, Medan is a  
Batak city. While the Javanese outnumber other ethnic groups and dominate Indonesia 
politically, Javanese culture does not dominate in the capital. Jakarta does not belong 
to any group in particular, although recently the indigenous ‘hybrid’ culture of  orang 
Betawi is reviving 54. Jakarta is arguably the most diverse city in Indonesia in terms of 
ethnicities, religions, cultures, and economic classes. Separate groups from within and 
from outside Indonesia to some extent occupy their own areas in the city and maintain 
their traditional culture among themselves. To a degree Jakarta then is Indonesia in  
small, a ‘city-world’ (see Augé, 2008: xii). However, Jakarta’s urban culture transcends 
this mosaic of traditional cultures. Its image and the prevalent mode of interaction in 
public is not based on rules and prescriptions of one traditional culture. Instead it is 
based on a shared (though contested) understanding of a modern urban lifestyle. The 
dominant urban culture, especially among young people, is based on ideas about what 
it  means  to live a  modern life  in  a  ‘world-city’  shaped by  global  influences.  Many 
elements  of  this  modern urban way of  life  have spread to other Indonesian cities,  
notably the popular youth language and expressions (bahasa gaul). We will see how 
these ideas about modern life and identity are performed in practices of gengsi (status 
display,  prestige)  and  bergaul (the art  of  modern socializing),  and how the mobile 
phone shapes this (section 3.1). 
What is understood by ‘modernity’ in Indonesia is crucial for understanding new 
technologies and urban identities. The notion has always been a contested one. The 
official version has been subject to a number of changes in the young history of the 
nation.  Post-colonial  Indonesian  history  is  often  chopped  up  in  three  phases:  the 
Soekarno period (1945-1966), the Soeharto period (1967-1998), and the reformation 
era (1999-present)  55. After the declaration of independence from the Dutch colonial  
regime on August  17 1945,  ‘founding father’  Soekarno sailed a highly  independent  
political  course.  He steered away  from western capitalist  democracy  and,  although 
distancing  himself  less  from communism,  sought  a  third  way by  collaborating with 
other  newly  decolonized ‘non-aligned’  countries.  His  politics  of  ‘guided democracy’ 
54 Orang Betawi (people of Batavia) are the descendants of different Indonesian, European, Indian, Arab and 
Chinese people who for centuries have lived in the city.
55 Indonesian modern history is obviously more complex, but this division suffices for our purposes to sketch 
the broad outlines of urban life and Indonesian media history in relation to the theme of modernity. Further, 
I use the old spelling of president’s names (Soekarno instead of Sukarno).
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depended on a highly centralized state. Almost all government institutions, as well as  
most big corporations and media institutions, were concentrated in Jakarta. Soekarno 
aimed  to  mold  the  immense  scattered  collection  of  islands  into  one  unified  and 
modern nation. No light task considering the fact that both ‘subnational’ local, as well  
as transnational frames of reference for identities have had far older histories than a  
shared  national  identity  (Meuleman,  2006:  48)  56.  Soekarno  developed  a 
comprehensive and unifying ideology as the basis for a modern national identity. This  
ideology was rich in symbolism and fiercely anti-imperialist. The official motto of the  
Republic of Indonesia became bhinneka tunggal ika, Sanskrit for “unity in diversity” 57. 
This  phrase  reflected  the  complexity  of  uniting  very  diverse  internal  and  external 
historical influences into one nation. Under Soekarno the state ideology of  pancasila 
was formulated, another Sanskritic word meaning “five pillars”. Pancasila consists of 
‘universalist’ values rather than local specifics: the belief in one supreme God; just and 
civilized humanitarianism; nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia; consultative 
democracy; and social justice (ibid: 52; Sen & Hill,  2000: 11). Soekarno promoted a 
societal  ethics  of  gotong-royong (mutual  help).  Politically,  he tried to integrate and 
appease  the  agonistic  forces  of  nationalism,  religion  and  communism,  which  each 
upheld a different view of how Indonesia should modernize. Soekarno wisely chose 
Malay,  the mercantile  lingua franca native to eastern Sumatra,  as the basis  for  the 
national  language  bahasa  Indonesia,  instead  of  Javanese  spoken  by  the  dominant 
ethnic group (and to which he belonged). His large urban renewal projects in modernist 
Sovjet-style changed the face of former colonial Batavia, already huge at the end of the 
19th century with an estimated population of 800.000 (larger than any city was in the 
Netherlands). Soekarno, who was trained as a civil engineer and architect, wanted to 
turn Jakarta into “the greatest city possible” (Cybriwsky & Ford, 2001: 203). He built  
new government buildings, department stores, shopping plazas and hotels, Senayan 
sport stadium for the 1962 Asian Games, and a new suburban residential district, all  
interconnected  by  a  broad  north-south  avenue  that  boasted  fountains  and  heroic 
56 Indonesia consists of 17.500 islands and over 700 different languages. Mercantile, political, cultural and 
religious influences from elsewhere have always made a strong mark on Indonesia and often blended with  
local traditions. Indian traders brought Hinduism (which now only persists on Bali and western Lombok), and 
Buddhism, and founded great kingdoms; Arab traders brought Islam (now the dominant religion); European 
traders  and  colonial  powers  brought  Catholicism  and  Protestantism;  Chinese  migrants  brought  cultural  
influences  as  well,  but  have  a  somewhat  marginalized  position  and  are  often  treated  with  resentment 
because of their perceived economical success.
57 Literally, this phrase means “divided, yet one”. The phrase was adopted from a 14th century poem in which  
Hindus and Buddhists were called to harmonious relations. The poem was written during one of several great  
Indonesian kingdoms (Meuleman, 2006: 48). Its reuse as a national motto is not only a ‘functional’ plea for  
national harmony but also a symbolic reference to Indonesia’s own great historical civilizations demolished 
by outside (colonial) forces.
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statues depicting the birth and pride of a new nation. He renamed the former central  
city square to Freedom Square, and commanded large-scale projects like the world’s 
third largest mosque Istiqlal (notably built by a non-Javanese Christian architect). One 
of his last projects was the already mentioned national monument Monas (ibid: 203-
204) 58. 
Soekarno’s modernizing projects were meant to raise the people’s morale but 
did not fill their hungry stomachs. After an alleged communist coup attempt in 1965,  
power was seized by army general Soeharto, who not long after set Soekarno aside. 
Soeharto’s dictatorial ‘New Order’ regime (Orde Baru) lasted until 1998 and favored 
economic development instead of nationalistic symbolism. Soekarno’s nationalism was 
subdued  of  its  mobilizing  force  by  fixating  it  into  state-monitored  ceremonialism 
(Schulte Nordholt & Klinken, 2005: 24). Foreign investors and capital, kept at bay by 
Soekarno’s revolutionary rhetorics, were now welcomed with open arms. Under the 
steady  economic  growth  a  relatively  affluent  urban  middle  class  arose.  Jakarta 
expanded mostly southwards with luxury housing estates, apartments and golf courses  
for the newly rich and many expats. In their slipstream followed many slums for the 
rural immigrants that came to try their luck in this city of new possibilities. Until the 
1960s urban growth had been relatively slow, with some 1.2 million inhabitants. During 
the  New  Order  reign  population  growth  accelerated.  Separate  domains  of  work, 
education, living and leisure became part of an emerging modern urban lifestyle. Each 
have their own physical nodes in the city. The urban landscape became dotted with the 
landmarks of a new type of modernity: prestigious high-rise office buildings for big 
business and insurance companies; convention centers; countless universities, colleges, 
private academies and campuses; luxury apartment complexes, gated neighborhoods 
and estates where the rich could retreat; golf courses, tennis courts, sport stadiums, 
racing circuit Sentul,  discotheques and bars, hotels and resorts, leisure theme parks  
Ancol,  Taman  Mini  and  Ragunan  Zoo;  all  interconnected  by  broad  (toll)  roads, 
interchanges and overpasses. 
Today, the most visible symbols  of  modernity  from the Soeharto era are the 
many shopping malls  littered throughout the city.  Malls  truly  form a topography of 
their own. One does not need to know any street name, as long as one knows which 
mall is nearby. The interiors of prestigious malls are always spacious, with copious use 
of marble, shiny copper, steel and glass, little fountains, and air-conditioning. Inside 
one finds designer clothing from Paris, Milan and Tokyo, global brand sneaker stores, 
58 Some typical examples of Soekarno’s idealist-modernist architecture are the at that time massive Sarinah 
warehouse, and Hotel Indonesia along Jakarta’s main artery. This heroic symbolism in Jakarta’s architectural  
facade is challenged in typical Indonesian mild defiance through everyday speech. The Youth Monument, a 
statue of a large muscular man holding a plate with a flame with one stretched arm, is dubbed Pizza Man, 
while the Monas with its needle-shaped appearance is jokingly described as Soekarno’s last erection.
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interior  design  shops,  trendy  hairdressers,  super-  and  hypermarkets,  media  shops 
selling  laptops  and  mobile  phones,  (internet)  cafés,  game  arcades,  cinemas,  food 
plazas,  and  in  some  malls  even  an  indoor  ice-skate  yard.  Many  urbanites  enjoy 
spending time in malls. Most people just window-shop without buying anything. They 
stroll around and sit down to “wash their eyes” on all the nice things and good-looking  
other  people.  They  envelop  themselves  in  the  cool  air  and  enjoy  the  relaxing 
environment, clean and safe inside. Malls are places to watch and be watched. They  
are reflective mirrors for self-conscious urbanites. These privatized ‘inside’ places are 
the beacons of the New Order modernity within the vast, chaotic, hot, polluted, and 
dangerous urban landscape.  Under Soekarno,  and initially also under Soeharto,  the 
understanding  of  ‘modernity’  was  mostly  a  shared  ethics  aimed  at  collaborative 
national  development. In the later phase of New Order,  this  made way for another 
modern  ethics  that  foregrounded  personal  development  and  individual  prospering 
within a globalizing economy. Malls became the epicenters of a new modern culture of 
prestige (gengsi) (Leeuwen, 1997; Sastramidjaja, 2000). 
In 1997 the Asian financial crisis  struck. The monetary crisis (krismon,  in the 
typical Indonesian tendency to create acronyms) hit Indonesia particularly hard. The 
rupiah plummeted to a low, dramatically diminishing annual  per capita income and 
burning up middle class savings and investments. The rupiah went from 2000 to 17000 
to  the  dollar,  and  slowly  reestablished  at  8000.  Neighboring  countries  quickly 
recuperated  but  not  Indonesia.  Soeharto  refused  all  financial  aid  programs.  He 
continued an all-is-well course and got himself re-elected for the seventh time by a 
servile People’s Congress. Only after much international pressure he bowed for IMF 
chairman Michael Camdessus and signed an aid program that demanded the sanitation 
of banks and institutions, which largely belonged to relatives and allies. The economic  
crisis unveiled a deeper crisis. The krismon was the last push for Soeharto’s legitimacy, 
which was already waning with the death of his spouse and the many uncontrollable 
forest fires at that time, interpreted as divine signs of a crumbling kingdom. As earlier 
in  Indonesian  history,  students  assumed  a  heroic  role  as  freedom  fighters.  They 
initiated a process of  reformasi (reform) (Aspinall, 1993, 1995; Pabottingi, Nusantara, 
Putra, & Sudarmanto, 1998). They demanded more democracy and wanted to put an 
end to the double role of the army as both defensive and political power. They targeted 
the widespread corruption, collusion and nepotism, summarized in their slogan KKN 
(Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme). Small-scale protests on the campuses evolved into mass-
protests on the streets, not just in Jakarta but all over Indonesia. After five students  
were shot at Trisakti University in west-Jakarta, the bomb burst. In the ensuing days 
massive  looting  took  place,  directed  at  New  Order  symbols  like  shopping  centers,  
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hotels, gas stations, toll  roads, banks, offices, and Chinese stores  59.  More than one 
thousand people died in the mayhem. Finally, after 32 years, Soeharto stepped down.  
The fall of the Orde Baru regime in May 1998 ushered in the beginning of a new reform 
era.  Although  the  symbol  of  evil  disappeared,  the  problems  themselves  did  not. 
Student organization kept rallying against KKN and pro conviction of Soeharto and his 
cronies. After a brief transit period, during which former minister of technology and 
vice-president  Habibie  assumed  presidency,  the  respected  Muslim  leader 
Abdurrahman  Wahid  (known  as  Gus  Dur)  became  the  first  democratically  elected 
president. He strategically appointed Soekarno’s popular daughter Megawati as vice-
president.  In  2001  she  took  over  from  Wahid  but  failed  to  deliver  economic 
improvement  and  political  stability.  In  2004  former  army  general  Susilo  Bambang 
Yudhoyono (commonly called SBY) became president. He was reelected in 2009. 
2.2.3 Unity in diversity?
Under Soeharto, expressions of ethnic, religious, racial, and class identities were taboo.  
Local ethnic culture was folklorized in order to render it harmless (Schulte Nordholt & 
Klinken,  2005:  23).  A good example of  how cultural  diversity  was dealt  with is  the 
theme  park  Taman  Mini  Indonesia  Indah (“Beautiful  Indonesia  Miniature  Park”), 
located in south-Jakarta 60. This brainchild of Soeharto’s wife opened in 1975 and still 
today is a popular destination for domestic tourism. It showcases traditional houses 
and cultural artifacts from each of Indonesia’s 26 provinces (now 33), and hosts copies  
of  buildings  for religious worship from the five official  religions (Islam, Catholicism,  
Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism). Obviously all of these five major religions stem 
from outside Indonesia. Yet they are presented as indigenous. Taman Mini erases all 
historical references to outside influences, be it Indian, Arab, European, or Chinese. 
The indigenization and homogenization of cultural diversity is reflected in the spatial  
symbolics  of  the  theme  park.  The  material  symbols  of  Indonesia’s  diversity  are 
concentrically  placed  around  a  huge  central  pond  with  little  islands,  that  forms  a 
miniature map of Indonesia. A sky-lift cable car gives visitors an arial view of the whole  
scene. This  spatial  layout,  and the fact  that  the park is  located in Jakarta,  absorbs  
regional diversity into homogenized and centralized national unity. Cultural selfhood 
and difference is subsumed under national sameness and similarity. The park further 
features a Disney-style ‘children’s palace’,  a science and technology center, an IMAX 
59 The Chinese were seen as having the best jobs, sand therefore close to the Soeharto regime.
60 See http://www.tamanmini.com.
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theater,  and  a  mini  train  tour.  Cultural  identities  thus  are  made  into  items  to  be 
consumed for playful enjoyment and family recreation (see also Sastramidjaja, 2000: 
53-54). 
In  trying  to  contain  ethnic,  religious,  racial,  and  class  identities,  New  Order 
played them out against one another. This proved a dangerous strategy. A case in point 
is the transmigration policy, whereby many poor farmers from densely populated areas 
(mostly Muslims from Java) were more or less forcibly moved to outer islands (mostly  
Christian and animistic regions in Kalimantan, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Papua). The policy’s 
stated  purpose  was  to  alleviate  pressure  on  scarce  farmland.  It  has  also  been 
interpreted as  a  deliberate  strategy  to weaken local  separatist  movements,  and  to 
spread nationalism by mingling populations. Transmigration lead to frequent tensions 
and  violent  clashes  between  different  groups.  New  Order’s  attempts  to  safeguard 
national unity ironically resulted in the proliferation of ‘primordial’ communal identity 
categories,  and  gave  rise  to  an  ongoing  struggle  about  the  boundaries  of  these 
categories: what constitutes ‘true’ Islam, ‘true’ local Dayak culture, who are the ‘true’ 
indigenous Indonesians or Jakartans, why are the Chinese a privileged class? With the  
fall of the New Order regime this volatile mix was released. Reformasi set in a process 
of  political,  economic  and  legislative  decentralization  to  accommodate  anti-Jakarta 
sentiments in the outer regions. In its wake however followed corruption among local  
strongmen,  an  ‘identity  politics’  by  local  groups  seeking  to  shake  off  their  former 
marginalized  status,  and  frequent  ethnic  and  religious  clashes  (Schulte  Nordholt  & 
Klinken, 2005: 12-31). Tensions in Indonesian identity construction (between diversity 
and unity, between primordialism and nationalism, between urban and outer regions,  
between different interpretations of modernity) played up with full force. In section 3.3 
we see how moral concerns and disputes about the country’s direction pivot around 
new technologies like the mobile phone.
It has been noted that ethnic protests tend to have a certain staged theatrical  
quality. They arouse great emotions in the heat of the moment and then quickly dim  
again  (Schulte  Nordholt  &  Klinken,  2005:  24).  Theatrical  metaphors  are  frequently  
involved both by Indonesians themselves and in studies about Indonesia, for instance 
in the portrayal of both Soekarno and Soeharto as pulling the strings of Indonesian 
society like a dalang (the master puppeteer in traditional wayang shadow plays), and 
in Indonesian politics in general as a puppet play (Amir, 2007: 288; Aspinall, 1993: 31;  
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1995: 27-41, 43; Erb & Adams, 2000: 2; Hidayat, 2002: 161) 61. In the next section we 
see that pre-reformasi state-control  over the information that was disseminated via 
mass media has fostered a thorough sense of suspicion and disbelief. 
We can already discern some contours of ‘playful’ identity construction and expression 
in  the  Indonesian  context,  without  even  fully  taking  new  media  technologies  into 
account. Social and cultural identities are the focal points in agonistic and competitive 
struggles for authenticity and recognition (agôn). At the same time, many Indonesians 
have the sense of being puppets played by greater forces over which they have no 
control (alea). This highlight the double paradox of freedom and force: taking control  
over one’s own destiny (but driven by outside forces), or being objectified in a game 
played by higher forces (but being free of the burden to take matters into one’s own 
hand). Further, mall-dwellers engage in self-conscious identity performances (mimicry). 
They  express  a  unique individuality  mirrored in a  to-and-fro movement  with  other 
individuals. This theatrical play with difference and similarity also occurs among ethnic  
groups in their theater of ethnic protests. At the same time, in the Taman Mini theme 
park cultural diversity is subsumed under the umbrella of national identity and made 
into consumer items for playful experiences and leisure (coinciding with Caillois’  ilinx 
sensory vertigo, in which ‘experience’ is central). This highlights the tension between 
difference and similarity (and its internal paradox): expressing difference in relation to 
other people who do exactly the same, and creating unity from of differences. Further  
on we see how new technologies like the mobile phone play a role in this, and how 
they act as an arena where tensions about modernity and identity are played out. 
61 Much  literature exists about the relation between  wayang theater and Indonesian social, political  and 
cultural  identities  (e.g.  Mrázek,  2005:  118-120;  Weintraub,  2004:  11-12).  Wayang plays  have  been 
understood as legitimizing the existing political order but also as subversive socio-political commentary (see 
Clark, 2004).
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2.3 From old media to new media: a short media history of Indonesia
The mobile phone’s influence on Indonesian urban identities cannot be isolated from 
the history of other media, and its place in a broader media landscape. We now look at  
transformations  in  the  Indonesian  media  landscape  in  order  to  grasp  how  mobile 
media technologies are imbued with certain symbolic values. 
2.3.1 From old media...
In their thorough work on media during the New Order regime, Krishna Sen and David 
Hill argue that mass media form ‘sites of struggle’ between on the one hand discourses 
of the unified nation-state, the homogenizing tendencies of cultural policies and the 
political hegemony of the regime; and on the other hand the aspirations, anxieties and 
dissident  voices  of  Indonesian  citizens  and  “various  parochial  regional,  localized 
interests,  histories  and  identities”  (Sen  &  Hill,  2000:  1).  Under  Soekarno,  cultural 
production and media were coerced into compliance with state ideologies and policies.  
Soeharto focused more on economic development and tried to maneuver expressions 
of  culture  to  apolitical  grounds.  New  Order  demanded  that  media  organizations 
support the cause of nationalism and help to legitimize the regime. “As the guardian of 
the Pancasila, the press was to be ‘free but responsible’,  in contrast to the ‘liberal’  
Western press, seen as libertine and ‘irresponsible’” (ibid: 53). In its last decade New 
Order started to lose its grip on the media:
For most of the New Order, the media appeared to be under the command of the  
government,  controlled  through  layers  of  formal  and  informal  censorship 
processes  and,  increasingly,  through  ownership.  Overt  political  dissidence  - 
expressed as textual or institutional practices - occupied only a very small space 
in the culture industries. ... In the last decade of the New Order, however, the  
state  was  losing  control  of  media  products  in  a  more  general  sense,  due  to 
changes in media technologies and economies. ... What is common across the 
culture industries  ...  is  the way what might be called ‘media ecology’ worked 
against the express policies of the New Order: where the policies wanted a single 
voice  of  national  culture,  the  ecology  produced  diverse  and  hybrid  forms 
involving national, global and local codes. 
(ibid: 12)
New  Order  saw  internal  ethnic  diversity  as  a  bigger  threat  to  national  unity  than 
cultural influences from the outside (ibid: 16). With the exception of radio, which was  
granted a large measure of local flavor, the regime was much more lenient towards 
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‘global’  media influences than towards media that stressed regional differences and 
identities (ibid: 101). Regional cultures, even the dominant Javanese culture, had only a 
minority status in the media. In 1986 the government, eager to pursue new economic  
opportunities, declared an ‘open sky’ policy. This allowed satellite television reception 
through parabolic antennas. Privatization of television in 1988 opened the market for 
many new commercial  TV channels  (ibid: 111-117).  Although these licenses initially  
were issued under the table through nepotism, Soeharto soon started to lose his grip 
on the media landscape. The eroding influence of the regime resulted in a much more 
varied landscape. Due to the increase in television channels  the task of  censorship 
became  almost  impossible.  As  the  late-New  Order  grip  on  the  media  weakened, 
borders  opened  to  ‘global  culture’.  Indonesia  sucked  in  not  just  ‘western’  cultural 
elements but also dangdut music from neighboring Malaysia (ibid: 174-181), Japanese 
manga comics  (ibid:  31-32),  Brazilian  telenovelas,  Indian  Bollywood  movies,  and 
Caribbean reggae music. Ironically, the late-New Order media policies reinforced the 
influence of both global and local cultures instead of national culture.
For a long time Indonesians held a skeptical and even cynical view of the media 
because of its close ties to the prevailing order. Many felt they were kept ‘stupid’ by the 
media  under  New  Order.  Indonesian  political  history  can  be  written  as  a  story  of 
believe and disbelief, and of attributing double meanings to media content. To a large 
extent, politics has centered around (mediatized) make-belief in order to generate and 
sustain a public facade of stability and order, and national unity. New Order was “a  
regime busy keeping up appearances” (Schulte Nordholt & Klinken, 2005: 6). As already 
said, this has led to a sense of politics as a game, both as a mimetic puppet play and as 
aleatory game of chance. A ‘ludic’ style of dissent and protest arose, which sought to 
inverse  the New  Order  ideal  of  societal  order  and stability,  by  bringing  chaos  and 
mobility to the city streets (Lee, 2007). During the last days of Soeharto these protests 
became bigger,  more frequent and more organized.  And digital  media technologies 
contributed to this.
2.3.2 ...To new media
In the second half  of  the 1980s Indonesian universities started to experiment with 
computer networks. It took ten years for the internet to take off. Initially, government 
institutions, universities, and research institutes were connected to the internet via the 
research network IPTEKnet. Not long after, the Ministry of Tourism, Post and Telephony 
(Deparpostel)  started its  own internet service provider (ISP) WasantaraNet.  This ISP 
provided  access  to  citizens  via  its  infrastructure  of  post-offices  spread  all  over  the 
archipelago. In addition, a number of commercial ISPs started to offer internet access 
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to businesses and consumers. By the end of 1995 there were five commercial ISPs, in 
May 1996 already 22 (Hill & Sen, 1997: 73). In May 2000 the organization responsible  
for the registration of  Indonesian domains  IDNIC  mentioned a  total  of  68 ISPs  (De 
Lange, 2001: 46). The number of internet subscribers at the end of 1996 was estimated 
at 40.000, of  whom 25.000 used commercial  providers (Sen & Hill,  2000: 196).  Lim 
gives  a  figure  of  4  million  users  for  the  year  2001  (Lim,  2003:  276).  Due  to  the 
widespread practice of sharing accounts, the actual number of people who had access 
to the internet was probably much higher. 
Creating  access  to the ‘information superhighway’  was  part  of  a  prestigious 
series of policies devised by Soeharto’s brilliant and faithful Minister of Research and 
Technology  Habibie  to  guide  Indonesia  on  the  road  to  progress  through  high-tech 
developments  (Sen & Hill,  2000:  195).  Habibie  had acquired a  PhD in  aeronautical  
engineering in Germany and was vice-president of a German aviation company for ten 
years. In 1974 he returned to Indonesia at the request of Soeharto to join his cabinet.  
Under  Habibie,  technological  policies  were  tied  to  the  project  of  modern  nation-
building and the formation of a national identity. Amir describes the emergence of a 
discourse of ‘technological nationalism’, in which spurring high-tech development and 
strengthening national pride hold each other in mutual embrace (Amir, 2007). Amir 
presents the case of Indonesia’s domestic aviation industry, as “a vehicle that would 
enable the country to take off toward a brighter future” (ibid: 283). After decades of  
development,  the  Indonesian-built  N250  airplane  was  ceremonially  launched  on 
Patriots  Day  (November  10,  1994),  exactly  49  years  after  thousands  of  Indonesian 
freedom fighters died in Surabaya in a battle against former colonizer the Netherlands. 
The airplane was nicknamed Gatotkaca,  a heroic  flying character in  Hindu-Javanese 
mythology  (ibid:  288).  During  the  ceremony,  a  choir  chanted  a  national  prayer  of 
thanksgiving. President Soeharto poured flower-scented water over the airplane’s nose 
from a jasmine-decorated pitcher, a Javanese blessing tradition. The use of symbolism 
had to suggest the revival of Indonesian civilization and its technological superiority. It 
turned  a  ‘global’  technology  into  an  Indonesian  technology.  “[T]he  embrace  of 
modernity, as exemplified by the development of aircraft industry in Indonesia, does 
not necessarily mean that Indonesia is, or wants to be, fully Western. The technology 
absorbed from the West must be wrapped in a spiritual force that will strengthen it as 
an indigenous creation” (ibid: 288). The successful maiden flight of the N250 on August  
10 1995 (exactly one week before the 50th birthday of the nation) meant a huge boost 
to the regime’s  legitimacy.  August  10 was proclaimed  Harteknas (Hari  Kebangkitan  
Teknologi Nasional = national technology revival day) and is still annually celebrated in  
the presence of high-ranking officials. In the written press Habibie proudly declared: 
“the N250 successful flight enables us to walk tall and equal to any nation” (ibid: 290). 
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From this case we see how building a modern national identity is supported by, and 
expressed  through  high-tech  developments.  However,  the  technology  has  to  be 
indigenized.  Fortifying  national  identity  by  means  of  high-tech  requires  creative 
bricolage with  indigenous  symbols,  in  order  to ‘domesticate’  and  appropriate  it  as  
Indonesia’s own technology. Further, we see from Habibie’s declaration in the press  
that this  modern national identity is constructed and expressed in relation to other 
nations. On a national level the same dialectic occurs as among the mall visitors, who 
mirror themselves to other people in order to become individuals. This is the paradox  
of  difference and similarity  at  its  clearest:  difference derived from the overarching 
concept (an Indonesian identity mirrored by other nations), and similarity expressed as 
difference  (standing  equal  to  other  nations  by  means  of  an  indigenous  airplane). 
Modern  identities  evolve  from  such  ongoing  circular  movements:  from  inside  to 
outside and from unicity to being like others, and back again. This is true for Indonesia 
as  elsewhere;  indeed  I  take  such  movements  as  a  universal  aspect  of  modern 
identities. 
Opposed to the high-tech vision of an Indonesian modernity stands a vision that 
favors the development of inexpensive ‘modest’ or ‘effective technologies’  62. In this 
vision  the  development  of  new  technologies  should  not  be  about  aggrandizing 
personal  or  national  prestige,  but  be  foremost  geared  to  improving  conditions  for 
laborers,  farmers,  fishermen,  and to providing basic  necessities  like healthcare  and 
education.  Modest  technologies  need  not  come  from  abroad  but  can  easily  be 
developed at home. Technologies thus constitute both a defining force of modernity, as 
well  as an arena for opposing visions about the direction the country should head. 
More about this later. 
Initially there was a lot of uncertainty which government body was responsible 
for  the  distribution  of  licenses  and  policies  governing  the  internet.  It  was  unclear 
whether the internet were a broadcast mass medium similar to press, television and 
radio, or a narrowcast medium like post and telephony. The first category was under 
the firm supervision of the restrictive Ministry of Information (Deppen) 63. Under New 
Order  Deppen imposed  self-censorship  on  press  and  television  under  the  cloak  of 
‘acting responsibly’ and serving the interest of the nation (Hidayat, 1999: 363). Deppen 
saw the internet as a potential threat to the norms and values of Indonesian society,  
since it offered unlimited access to information from all over the world. Internet was 
62 The Indonesian terms for such technologies are: teknologi tepat guna (effective/appropriate technologies), 
teknologi sederhana (modest technologies), and teknologi dasar (basic technologies). The special “teknologi 
tepat guna” page on the IPTEK website (Indonesian Center for Science and Technology) lists many examples:  
http://www.iptek.net.id/ind/warintek/?mnu=6.
63 Indonesia  was no exception to the rule  that under restrictive  regimes any governmental  organization 
carrying the word “information” actually serves its exact opposite.
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the accomplice  of  globalization and would  induce  foreign cultural  penetration.  The 
more economically oriented and more liberal Ministry of Tourism, Post and Telephony 
(Deparpostel)  saw  in  globalization  new  opportunities  for  the  economic  future  of 
Indonesia (Hill  & Sen, 1997: 78-82). In the end  Deparpostel became the responsible 
department  for  internet  issues.  This  had  profound  consequences  for  the  future  of 
Indonesia. (More about the tension between the global and the local in section 3.3.)
The internet quickly grew into a free-haven for all things regular media could  
not publish. Dissident information and opinions could be expressed, shared, and found. 
The exchange of  information occurred both inside Indonesia and with the outside. 
Student leader Anas Alamudi from the University of Indonesia (UI) recounted that from 
1996 onwards,  he  and his  politically  aware student  friends started to use  email  to 
communicate amongst  themselves and with other student organizations they knew 
from a special trip to cities all over Java  64.  According to Anas, the politically active 
students were extremely paranoia about everything. Friends at the Technical University 
in  Bandung  (ITB)  taught  them how  to  employ  encryption  techniques  such  as  PGP 
(Pretty Good Privacy). Of course not everybody had internet at that time. But in each 
student organization there were always three or four people who had access. They 
emailed information to each other and informed members of their own organizations.  
Emails were printed out, photocopied, and distributed, as had been done earlier via 
stenciled  pamphlets.  Anas  believed  these  printed-out  mailings  were  even  more 
important  than the  internet  itself  in  forming  opinions.  Anas  noticed that  he  could 
influence  people’s  opinions  via  IRC  (internet  relay  chat).  At  that  time  he  was  the  
channel  operator of  two of  the biggest Indonesian IRC channels  on EFnet:  channel  
Jakarta and  channel Indonesia. One or two days before a planned demonstration he 
would  set  the  topic  to  “demonstration  there-and-there,  be  there!”.  The  ensuing 
discussions  in that  channel  would  often turn  to heated debates  about  politics  (De 
Lange, 2001: 47-48). 
People  and networks  from outside Indonesia  also played a large part  in  the 
spread of  free information.  Very influential  was the  apakabar mailinglist  (“how are 
you?”,  litterally:  “what’s  the news?”),  moderated from the United States.  Apakabar 
grew  into  the  main  international  forum  for  the  dissemination  of  news  and  for 
discussion about  Indonesian  politics  and society.  Under  New Order  the centralized 
press filtered out most personal experiences and opinions in their news accounts, and 
always gave the last word to government officials. The internet enabled eyewitness 
accounts of protests, brutalities and casualties to reach the world news in an instant. It  
gave room to a rich palette of experiences and opinions, allowed people to compose 
64 Source: interview with Anas Alamudi on May 6 2000 (see De Lange, 2001: 47-50; for a description of how 
networks between student journalists in multiple cities were forged, see Juliastuti, 2006: 140).
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their own personal visions of events, and induced a sense of being heard by the whole  
world (Hill & Sen, 1997: 84-87). The internet was a two-way portal between Indonesia 
and the outside world. Local information and knowledge bypassed the national media 
and directly went global (Sen & Hill, 2000: 210). The world functioned as a guard dog  
that  kept an eye on local  misdeeds.  Inversely,  the global  directly  entered the local  
without  being  filtered  through  layers  of  state  censorship.  Via  the  internet,  news 
accounts and opinions in worldwide media about the escalating political situation and 
student  protests  returned  to  Indonesia.  Most  international  media  portrayed  the 
student  movements  and  protesters  as  noble  fighters  for  freedom  and  democracy 
against the brutal regime of dictator Soeharto. These outside reports imbued national  
events and actions with a tremendous sense of urgency and weight. Protesters who 
realized  that  the  whole  world  was  watching,  considered  this  a  great  support  and 
legitimization for their actions. They were making world news. They were steering the 
country onto the road towards freedom and democracy. And at the same time they 
wrote  the  headlines  of  the  international  press,  played  a  leading  role  in  the  news 
reports  of  major television stations,  and filled the websites of  main news agencies  
around the globe (Hidayat, 1999: 358). 
Initially, the internet was used primarily for the unhampered spread of dissident 
news  and  dissenting  opinions  directed  against  the  Soeharto  regime.  After  several 
newspapers and magazines payed attention to the  apakabar mailinglist, the tone of 
voice and content of posts became more diverse and far more opinionated, according 
to Anas. The internet became a cross-section of society and its many different voices  
and truths. Individuals and groups engaged in information battles about events taking 
place.  The  underlying  agonistic  struggle  was  one  about  who  represents  the  ‘real 
Indonesia’, and whose ideology would be best for the development of the country. On 
September 28 1999 a certain Frangkie from the Moslem Brotherhood Association sent 
an  email  to  the  apakabar mailinglist.  Frangkie’s  email  was  titled  “Watch  out  for 
minority group movements; the Semanggi Tragedy (2) September 24 1999”  65. After 
some Quranic quotes, Frangkie noted that the demonstrations caused many victims 
and a lot of damage. He then asked what really happened, and pointed an accusing 
finger at the radical  pro-reformasi movement. He wrote that the opposition were an 
extremist minority characterized by secularism and “Islamophobia”. They were mostly 
Christians and their way of protesting was not democratic but anarchistic. He claimed 
the majority of students were Muslim and supported the official road to reform. They 
65 During a protest at the Semanggi junction in Jakarta on November 13 1998, 14 protesters were shot,  
among whom eight university students, and more than 400 injured. On September 24 1999 a second incident 
happened at the Semanggi crossing, claiming nine lives. This email was a follow-up and revised version of a  
website by Frangkie (archived at http://www.bijt.org/scriptie/scriptie/Scriptie/links/Mewaspadai1.html). The 
email is archived at http://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/1999/09/28/0041.html.
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were “the pure students”. Frangkie named a long list of media that allegedly supported 
the “extremist minority groups”, and that portrayed the opposition as being tyrannized  
by the existing order. In his view the opposite was true:
In reality it is the lefter-than-leftist Forkot student Anas Alamudi who deliberately 
and brutally drove his VW Safari through the barricades of the army apparatus, 
causing victims amongst the apparatus and journalists  66.  Yet the mass media, 
which are controlled by minority groups, turn around the facts to make it look like 
this Forkot student became the victim 67.
Anas himself recounted this event in very different words:
After the fall of Soeharto we kept demonstrating against the double-role of the  
army and against the special meeting of the People’s Congress, which we knew 
would elect Habibie as Soeharto’s successor  68.  On the 11th of November we 
marched towards the parliament. I was to negotiate. I drove forward in my car. 
Then all of a sudden the students riding motorbikes were beaten by the soldiers. 
And the soldiers advanced  and started to beat me. In an attempt to escape, I 
stepped on the gas and turned hard right. It turns out that nine soldiers were ran  
over. The official number was nine,  although some friends in the army hospital 
say only two were actually injured. I remember clearly it was on Wednesday. On 
Friday a nicely printed newsletter was handed out to people who went to pray in 
the  Al-Azar  mosque,  claiming  that  I  was  a  member  of  Forkot,  that  I  was  a 
Christian, and that I had very leftist leanings. My  friends joked that everything 
they said was wrong because I am not a member of Forkot, I am not a Christian,  
and I am leftist, not merely leftist leaning! 69
2.3.3 Physical nodes of new media
Another element  in the rapid and almost  unhindered dissemination of  information 
were the many  warnet  (= warung internet,  internet shops) that since the mid-1990s 
started mushrooming all over the larger cities with a considerable student population. 
66 Forkot stands for Forum Kota (city forum), or according to enemies like Frangkie “Forum Kommunis Total”.  
Forkot was one of the more radical student organizations. Although it was not  aligned to a specific university  
Forkot had many supporters from the Christian University Indonesia (UKI).
67 Source: website archived at http://www.bijt.org/scriptie/scriptie/Scriptie/links/Mewaspadai1.html.
68 The People’s Congress consisted of carefully selected pro-government representatives from various groups 
and regions in the country, and included seats for the army. Habibie, who briefly succeeded Soeharto, was 
seen as part of the New Order regime, so most students kept demonstrating against  Habibie even after  
Soeharto stepped down.
69 Source: based on an interview with Anas Alamudi on May 6 2000 (De Lange, 2001: 50).
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At that time, few Indonesians had a fixed telephone line at home. Internet cafés were 
much  cheaper  than  internet  access  from  a  commercial  ISP  70.  Warnets  played  an 
important role as physical hubs in disseminating information directed against the New 
Order regime. Merlyna Lim describes how warnets in Bandung pinned the notorious 
list  of  Suharto’s  wealth  on  their  walls,  and  helped  to  print  out  and  spread  this  
information to non-internet users (Lim, 2003: 280-281). Around 1% of the Indonesian 
population  at  that  time  had  access  to  the  internet,  but  its  reach  was  far  greater 
because online information spread via other media, like print, fax, photocopy, and even 
word of mouth. Lim further writes that warnets adopted the physical appearance of  
traditional  warung,  public  eating  places  where  people  congregate  and  chat  while 
having  a  simple  meal.  Some  warnets,  particularly  in  Bandung,  resembled  the 
traditional  eating style of sitting on the ground behind a low table. Warnets, like the 
warung,  were  simultaneously  a  point  of  commerce,  a  meeting  place,  and  an 
information  network  (ibid:  277-278).  According  to  Lim,  globalization  obsoleted  the 
urban middle class habit of going to traditional  warung. People preferred to frequent 
fast-food restaurants and shopping malls instead, commodified places that do not have 
the privacy to talk freely and meet others in dialogue. The warnet “has emerged as a 
reincarnation or contemporary form of the warung” (ibid: 279). Warnet were both an 
entry  point  to  cyberspace,  free  from  interventions  of  the  state  and  the  corporate 
economy that posed restrictions on social identities, and a civic space where people  
could meet, socialize, and engage in conversations. Thus, as also noted by Lim, the  
appropriation  of  new  technologies  cannot  be  understood  solely  from  ‘within’ 
cyberspace but also in relation the physical spaces and culture (see for instance also  
Miller & Slater,  2000).  This local  specificity of  ICTs (information and communication 
technologies)  occurs  even  within Indonesia.  Other  than in  Bandung,  where indeed 
visitors often sit down on the floor, most warnets in Jakarta have a decisively modern  
office-like  appearance.  They  have  desks,  office  chairs  and  air-conditioning,  a  more 
polished and designed look, and some cater ‘western’ sandwiches and soft drinks to 
visitors; all  more in line with the lifestyle of Jakartan urbanites. In my earlier study 
about the internet in Jakarta I concluded: “[t]he  warnet is the place where the real 
world (dunia nyata) and the virtual world (dunia maya) come together and the border 
between them often seems to dissolve. ... If the mall is the well-lit  frontstage for the 
performance of a consumer modernity, the warnet is the backstage setting for the new 
informational  understanding  of  modernity”  (De  Lange,  2001:  63).  This  serves  to 
illustrate a general point, to which we will return at length in chapter 4, namely that  
70 In 2000 internet access at a  warnet  was anything between 2000 and 15000 Rupiah per hour with an 
average of 6000 Rp (€ 1 at that time). In 2007 the average price was 15000 Rp per hour (€ 1.20) in Jakarta,  
and 10000 Rp elsewhere.
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social and cultural processes increasingly take place in both media spaces and physical  
spaces at the same time. This is particularly true for mobile media, as these are used in  
a wide variety of physical settings. Physical and digital spaces mutually influence and 
shape each other. As we see in chapter 4, they become ‘hybrid spaces’.
2.3.4 New media’s new modernity
So  what  does  this  “new  informational  understanding  of  modernity”  entail?  The 
internet appeared under a dictatorial regime that reigned firmly for decades. A few 
years later the regime fell. Coincidence? Or a direct cause? The answer lies somewhere 
in the middle, and it certainly was not the internet alone, as the media landscape in 
general had become more open in the last phase of New Order. The answer is less 
important  than  the  question  itself.  By  mere  association  digital  information-  and 
communication technologies were tied to the fall of the regime and to the winds of 
change  sweeping  through  the  nation.  The  rise  of  the  internet  ran  parallel  to  the  
societal  revolution that  took place at  the dawn of  the new millennium. In popular 
thought  digital  media  technologies  and modernizing  developments  became tied  to 
each other like a Siamese twin  71. Internet and mobile phones helped to coordinate 
student protests in Indonesian “smart mobs”  avant la lettre (Nas & Sluis, 2000: 155-
157; Rheingold, 2002) 72. Using Castells’ terms, the internet was initially used to forge a 
‘resistance identity’ against the New Order ‘legitimizing identity’ (Castells, 1997: 8). It  
later united many Indonesians in a ‘project identity’ by bringing them together in their 
shared wish for reformasi and to become a modern nation. 
After the fall of Soeharto and his clan the internet shed off its underground 
revolutionary feathers and became more mainstream and commercialized. Many new 
internet startups sprouted. Initially, these were mostly news and opinion websites. In 
1998 Detik.com was launched, the online version of critical opinion magazine Detik,  
banned by Soeharto in 1994 along with two other critical magazines. Later, community  
and lifestyle-oriented portals arose, like Astaga.com, KaféGaul.com and Satunet (the 
last already perished).  These were platforms for individual  expression and breeding 
grounds for what early  internet  researchers  call  ‘virtual  communities’  (Jones,  1995, 
71 For example, this idea is expressed in the article “Peranan Internet dalam Reformasi Indonesia” (The Role 
of  the  Internet  in  Indonesian  Reformation),  originally  published  on  July  10  1998.  See 
http://www.bloggaul.com/leo_transparancy/readblog/73678/peranan-internet-dalam-reformasi-indonesia.
72 Rheingold’s  analysis  of  the  mobilizing  and  revolutionary potential  of  (mobile)  media  to  oust  regimes 
focuses on the case of Estrada in the Philippines. Rheingold claims that “[o]n January 20, 2001, President 
Joseph Estrada of the Philippines became the first head of state in history to lose power to a smart mob”,  
after over 1 million Manila residents were mobilized by waves of text messages (Rheingold, 2002: 157-160).  
In my view this claim neglects the role of digital media in the earlier Indonesian revolution.
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1997, 1998;  Rheingold,  1993).  E-commerce promised great  economic prosperity  for 
internet entrepreneurs. The internet radiated an aura of unprecedented possibilities 
and fortune: step into these developments now and the horn of plenty will surely be 
yours. In advertisements for expensive business seminars the internet was touted in 
rosy imperatives: “Go Internet or it’s over”, “e-business: the new wave of the future”, 
“guiding  Indonesia  on  the  road  to  global  convergence”  73.  Doing  online  business 
signified  a  new type of  entrepreneurship based on flexibility  and merit,  instead of  
being tied to the olds  ways of  centralized planning,  knowing the right  people,  and  
getting  things  done  via  KKN.  Indonesians  all  of  a  sudden  attained  unprecedented 
freedom of  speech.  Universal  human rights  appeared  on the  political  agenda.  The 
promise of true democracy shimmered on the horizon. A broad civil demand arose for 
political and corporate transparency and responsibility. The market opened up further 
to  global  trade.  And  Indonesia  became  seriously  infected  by  the  worldwide  hype 
surrounding  the  possibilities  of  information  technology,  new  economy,  and  e-
commerce  (a  hype  known  as  the  “internet  bubble”,  collapsing  in  april  2000,  and 
reincarnating into what later was called web 2.0). 
The  rise  of  digital  media  in  Indonesia  became  embedded  in  a  narrative  of 
modernity  that  shaped  how  Indonesians  used  and  understood  these  media 
technologies.  This  narrative  partly  stemmed  from  the  (re)construction  and 
interpretation  of  the  historical  events  that  took  place,  and  partly  was  deliberately 
produced by new media entrepreneurs, journalists, NGOs and so on. It imbued new 
media with symbolic values and the capacity to do things. The internet supposedly was 
a “liberator” from political oppression (see Hidayat, 1999: 368); it was a global platform 
for the expression and spread of free information and personal opinions; and it was a 
juggernaut  of  new  economic  opportunities  for  businesses  big  and  small.  Under 
Soeharto  the  discourse  of  modernity  transformed  from  an  ideology  of  symbolic 
nationalism to  being  framed in  terms  of  economic  progress,  national  stability,  and 
individual consumer culture. With reformasi the discourse again shifted. We have seen 
from  the  case  of  Indonesia’s  aviation  industry  that  voicing  modernity  in  terms  of  
technological developments was not typical of the reformasi era. But the new values 
embodied by digital technologies were. With reformasi ‘technological modernity’ was 
no longer solely  about  acquiring international  prestige and breeding nationalism. It  
now  involved  freedom  of  speech,  personal  liberty,  individual  development  and 
opportunity, and political and corporate transparency and responsibility (bertanggung 
jawab).  An illustration of  this  new ethics  is  the fact  that  president Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono  (known  as  SBY)  gave  out  his  private  cellphone  number  to  the  public 
(Barendregt, 2006a: 3). We must situate the rise of the mobile phone in this context.
73 See some of these advertisements: http://www.bijt.org/scriptie/scriptie/Scriptie/links/Seminar1.html.
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2.4 The ‘production’ of the handphone
In the final section of this chapter, we investigate how various parties and stakeholders 
produce the mobile  media  landscape in Indonesia,  as  opposed to how the mobile 
phone  is  ‘consumed’  (the  focus  of  the  next  chapter).  This  does  not  mean  that 
production and consumption are separate  spheres  and processes.  On the contrary, 
production is profoundly cultural. Employees bring in their own cultural backgrounds. 
And most businesses have some kind of corporate philosophy. Moreover, in the so-
called ‘digital age’ consumption is not the endpoint of the chain (if ever it was), but  
feeds creative processes back into the circle. Digital media contribute to a breakdown 
of the boundaries between production and consumption by enabling and stimulating 
creative productive practices, in what is generally known as ‘user generated content’ 
by  ‘prosumers’  or  ‘professional  amateurs’  74.  The  tension between  production  and 
consumption is in fact an old theme. In the 1940/50s, critical theorists Adorno and 
Horkheimer argued that culture became commodified in the hands of a few capitalist 
culture  industries.  While  making  claims  to  originality  these  industries  actually 
produced  standardized  commodities  and  thereby  fed  mass  consumer  culture  and 
‘pseudo-individuality’ (see Holmes, 2005: 24-25; Negus, 1997: 72-77). Here again we 
see  the  paradox  of  difference  and  similarity:  expressing  difference  through  mass-
produced commodities. Cultural theorist Negus argues against this simple dichotomy. 
“Production does not take place within a completely separate sphere but in relation to  
the broader social contexts of consumption” (Negus, 1997: 102). If Marxist theory is 
too one-dimensional in its cynical view of the hegemony of production, cultural studies 
in my view often tend to uncritically laude the creativity involved in consumption. As  
seen in  section 1.1,  Silverstone  and  Haddon attempt  to overcome the production-
consumption dichotomy by introducing the design/domestication pair (Silverstone & 
Haddon,  1996).  Focusing  only  on  domestication  without  design  neglects  the 
production side of technologies. As a result, it is hard to maintain a critical perspective  
on how the supposedly creative consumption of technological artifacts may in fact be 
74 User-generated content,  consumer-generated media,  web 2.0,  professional amateurism (Leadbeater & 
Miller, 2004), hacker ethic (Himanen, 2001), networked participation (Russell, Ito, Richmond, & Tuters, 2008), 
remix culture (Lessig, 2004), wisdom of the crowds, and so on, are all terms that signify profound changes in  
the  ways  cultural  content  is  being  produced,  spread,  and  consumed.  The  people  formerly  known  as  
consumers are no longer passive recipients of products, services, and content. They have taken the means of 
production  and  distribution  into  their  own  hands,  thanks  to  cheap  and  readily  available  access  to  
technologies, software and networks, growing media wisdom, and participation in online communities and 
e-culture. In addition, systems of collaboration and recommendation - often based on reputation - change 
the organization of knowledge and expertise. According to some controversial critics like Andrew Keen, this 
“cult of the amateur” has lead to an abundance of “user-generated nonsense” that destroys the distinction 
between the trained expert and uninformed amateur (Keen, 2007).
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purposively  built into ‘the design’ at large 75. In this section and in the next chapter, I 
take  production  as  ‘design’,  and  consumption  as  ‘domestication’  in  the  broad  and 
dynamic sense of Silverstone and Haddon. This enables us to see production in cultural  
terms, and consumption as (at least partially)  designed. Starting the analysis of the 
mobile  phone  in  Indonesia  with  ‘production’  (with  an  emphasis  on  ‘catching  the 
consumer’,  by  looking  at  branding  and  advertising)  by  no  means  suggests  that 
consumers  are  passively  lured  into  a  prepackaged  message.  In  my  view  the  social  
production of  the mobile phone is  just as  much a reflection of  existing values  and 
aspirations as it is a way to make money. 
2.4.1 Market and numbers
The  earliest  types  of  cellular  telephony  in  Indonesia  based  on  pre-GSM  analogue 
standards,  were  introduced  between  1984  and  1992  76.  In  1993  state-owned 
telecommunications operator PT Telkom announced the start of a trial project based 
on the digital GSM standard in the free-trade Riau islands Batam and Bintan. One year 
later PT Satelit Palapa  Indonesia (Satelindo) launched the first commercially available 
service  in greater Jakarta,  after having acquired a nation-wide GSM 900/1800 Mhz 
license, a satellite telephony license, and an international telephony license. In 1995 
Telkomsel, a daughter company of PT Telkom, became the second commercial mobile 
telephony  operator  in  Indonesia.  Telkomsel  grew  into  the  biggest  operator,  with  a 
market share of 50% in March 2009 (although shrinking from 53% in 2007) 77. In 1996 
PT Excelcomindo was the third company to launch its mobile phone services, initially in 
the three biggest cities on Java: Jakarta, Surabaya, and  Bandung. Excelcom was born 
out  of  a  collaboration  between  national  and  foreign  investors,  among  which 
corporations from the USA and Japan, and the Asian Infrastructure Fund by the Asian 
Development Bank. In 2005 Telekom Malaysia (84%) and Emirates Telecommunications 
Corporation  (16%)  took  over  XL.  Under  pressure  of  the  IMF  and  the  Worldbank 
Indonesia  liberalized  many  former  state-led  companies.  Privatization  and 
internationalization also occurred with Telkomsel and Indosat. State-owned PT Indosat  
75 Consumers are continuously ‘being played’ by a multi-billion dollar advertising industry that tries to seduce  
the consumer through branding and product positioning. Branding strategists have thankfully appropriated 
former subversive  and anti-consumerist  tactics  of ‘guerilla  marketing’,  ‘culture  jamming’,  ‘logo mashups’,  
‘flash mobbing’, and ‘viral campaigning’ associated with internet culture; yet another illustration of the fact 
that production and consumption are deeply intertwined.
76 This paragraph is largely based on Budi Putra (2004) Planet Seluler: ketika teknologi bergerak mengubah  
kita. pp. 96-108, and on a report by IPTEK, the Indonesian Center for Science and Technology (IPTEK, 2006).
77 Source:  company  profile  at  http://www.telkomsel.com/web/company_profile.  Accessed  December  20 
2007 and May 2 2009.
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took over Satelindo in 2002. At the end of that year the government divested 42% of its  
shares to foreign Singapore Technologies Telemedia. State-owned PT Telkom still holds 
65% of Telkomsel, while the other 35% are owned by Singtel Singapura. 
Indonesia at that time was a promising country for telecom investments. It knew 
reasonable economic growth, apparent political stability, a large population of over 200 
million, and low penetration of fixed telephony at home. The New Order government  
was very generous in supplying licenses to companies that wanted to operate a cellular  
network. As many as twenty-one national and regional licenses were given off, many of  
which remained in  the drawer as  the 1997 monetary  crisis  hit.  The  krisis  moneter 
grinded developments to a halt. Telecom infrastructure investments paid for in dollars  
outpaced the eight-time inflation of the rupiah. Middle class buying power evaporated,  
post-paid  subscriptions  declined.  Telkomsel  was  the  first  operator  to  introduce  an 
upgradable  prepaid  (prabayar)  card  as  an  alternative  strategy  to  post-paid 
(pascabayar) cards. Prepaid turned out to be a huge success. It was rapidly adopted by 
other companies and saved the industry. Up to this day prepaid remains by far the 
most common type of subscription. Estimates are over 90% of Indonesians use prepaid 
cards (IPTEK, 2006: 27-28; Putra, 2004: 98). After virtually no growth in 1998, numbers  
again grew exponentially (see figure 3). Indonesia’s amazing boom in mobile phone 
subscribers is considered among the highest in southeast Asia. In 2002, 55 out of 1000  
Indonesians had a subscription, in 2007 353, and in 2009 almost 700 78. 
78 Source: ITU statistics at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ICTEYE/Indicators/Indicators.aspx.
94
Figure 3: Number of mobile phone subscribers in Indonesia 1994-2009 in millions 79.
2.4.2 Wartel as precursors to mobile telephony
How come the mobile  phone rose so quickly  in Indonesia? First  of  all,  landlines  in  
Indonesia have never been widespread. The state-led telco PT Telkom Indonesia was 
notoriously  slow and unreliable in providing landlines  to the home. Actual  delivery 
could take months, or even years. In the 1990s the situation improved somewhat. Still  
it would take three or four months to get a landline. In 1993 there were less than 2  
79 Source: ITU statistics at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ICTEYE/Indicators/Indicators.aspx (rounded off to 10.000 
people; Indonesia’s total population in 2009 was 229.96 million). As often, these numbers may either be too 
high or too low in representing actual access and use. Too high because many Indonesians have multiple 
subscriptions (for instance both GSM and CDMA), and a considerable number of subscriptions are ‘zombies’:  
no longer in use but still counted. Too low because particularly among poorer households multiple people  
may share one subscription.
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million fixed telephone lines in Indonesia, one per 100 inhabitants. In 2000 there were  
more than 6.5 million fixed lines, 3.25 per 100 inhabitants 80. Compared to other Asian 
countries Indonesia ranked among the lowest (IPTEK, 2006: 8). To fill the gap public  
telephone shops  sprang up all  over  Indonesia:  so-called  wartel,  an  abbreviation of 
warung telpon (telephone shop). Every neighborhood had one or more wartels that 
served the communicative needs of the local community. In the early 1990s there were 
25,000 public phones and 800 wartels in the country (Sen & Hill, 2000: 197). This rose 
to 116,445 coin/card pay-phones and 228,863 public wartels in 2000 (IPTEK, 2006: 15).  
Especially in Jakarta wartel presence was high with 3.19 per 1000 inhabitants in 2005 
(the national average was 1.65 per 1000 inhabitants; ibid: 13-14). Wartels were mostly  
operated by small private entrepreneurs. With an initial investment of just $ 1000 one  
could start a telephone kiosk with two telephone booths and a computerized billing 
system. The telecom sector in Indonesia has since long offered opportunities to small  
entrepreneurs to start their own business. This has been true for both wartels and 
warnets.
Many Indonesians thus were accustomed to go out and travel short distances in 
their neighborhood for their communicative needs. In this sense, telecommunication 
was already ‘mobile’. Enters the mobile phone. It provided an increasing number of 
Indonesians with a personal communication device. People could now communicate 
with others from anywhere instead of traveling to a wartel. More importantly, they 
could now be reached directly by others. Wartels are fine if you wish to call someone.  
But  what  if  someone  else  wants  to  call  you?  People  could  now  be  addressed  as 
individuals (of course only by virtue of belonging to social networks). It is tempting to 
think that the spread of the mobile phone has obsoleted the ‘corporeal mobility’ of  
traveling  to  wartels.  This  has  not  happened.  Although  growth  flattened,  wartels 
continue  to  exist.  Telecommunication  is  not  necessarily  a  substitute  for  corporeal 
travel,  as  for  instance  proponents  of  teleworking  have  hoped.  In  Indonesia,  as 
elsewhere, various types of mobilities tend to reinforce and modify each other rather 
than  being  substitutes  (see  Mokhtarian,  2002;  Mokhtarian  &  Meenakshisundaram, 
1998). 
2.4.3 CDMA technology: bridging high-tech and low-tech
Obviously,  the lagging state  of  fixed telecommunications  only  partially  explains  the 
explosive  growth  of  mobile  telephony  in  Indonesia.  After  all,  countries  with  well-
developed  landline  infrastructures  have  witnessed  similar  spectacular  growths.  A 
80 Source:  ITU  statistics  at  http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ICTEYE/Indicators/Indicators.aspx.  These  numbers 
include public pay-phones.
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second reason is its affordability even by the standards of a developing nation. The 
three biggest telecom operators have diverse brands under their wings, each targeted 
at specific customers 81. In addition, several smaller operators have sprung up that offer 
cheap CDMA based communication. CDMA is the new kid on the block in Indonesia. It  
is rising fast in popularity  82. CDMA is a wireless technology incompatible with GSM 
that uses local ‘fixed line’ numbers. CDMA is much cheaper than GSM. Many Jakartan  
urbanites now carry two handsets, and use their CDMA phone for local communication 
exchanges 83. Young kids who enter the mobile market - from age 12 onwards – often 
opt  for  CDMA  deals,  offered  incredibly  cheap  by  new  telecom  providers  like  Fren 
(www.mobile-8.com), Esia (www.myesia.com), and Smart (www.smart-telecom.co.id). 
In 2007 a CDMA-only handphone from Esia cost 200.000 rupiah (€ 16). CDMA call rates  
are as low as 45 Rp/minute (= 2700 Rp/hour, less than € 0.25) within the same network  
and area. Comparing, GSM starts at 250 Rp/minute. So these are truly low prices, even  
for Indonesian standards, where the average income is  less than 1 million rupiah a 
month (ca. € 80). Students and young workers who frequently move residence often 
use CDMA-based wireless  internet  as  an  alternative  for  going  to  warnets,  or  using 
internet at university or work 84. The mobile internet is believed to become the most 
important way to access the internet in Indonesia. For instance, the online version of 
Tempo Magazine reported that the development of the fixed internet in Indonesia is 
losing  out  to  cellular  technology  85.  Similarly,  Budi  Putra  writes  that  wireless 
technologies are not just for rich western consumers. Instead, “via cellular technologies 
the web will truly become worldwide” (Putra, 2004: 16).
Mobile communication technologies, and CDMA in particular, bridge the divide 
sketched in the previous section between global  high-tech and affordable ‘effective 
technologies’  that  fit  local  domestic  needs.  On the one  hand Indonesians  perceive 
mobile media technologies as ‘global’  and ‘high-tech’  86.  When I asked people what 
81 Differentiation  is  based  on  prepaid  or  post-paid,  tariffs  for  local/national/international  calls,  roaming  
options, access to GPRS/3G internet services, validity of credits.
82 Indonesia  is  said  to  be  the  third  biggest  CDMA  market  in  the  world  after  China  and  India.  Source:  
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/07/10/telecommunications-moving-21st-century.html.
83 A limited number of dual mode phones exist that are capable of accessing both GSM and CDMA networks.  
They are not really popular in Indonesia, since there is little choice in choosing a model and therefore, in  
terms of domestication, limited potential for ‘conversion’: showing that one is part of consumer culture.
84 Wireless  internet  in  Indonesia  can  be  accessed  via  GSM  standard  Edge  and  WCDMA networks,  and 
increasingly also via  the cheaper CDMA 2000 1X and faster EV-DO (Wimode).  In addition,  many upscale  
coffee bars in Jakarta like the worldwide chain Starbucks sell Wi-Fi internet access cards.
85 Source:  online  article  published  on  September  1  2007  at 
http://tempointeraktif.com/hg/nusa/2007/09/01/brk,20070901-106709,id.html.
86 The Indonesian word most often associated with new technologies such as the mobile phone is canggih, 
which means ‘sophisticated’ and ‘advanced’, but also ‘artificial’ and ‘complicated’.
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they saw as typical about the mobile phone they often gave answers like: “it is a global  
technology that enables people to connect to the world at large”. In the Indonesian 
blogosphere, many bloggers express their sense of being connected to the world at 
large via the handphone  87. In an article about a remote village on Sumatra that was 
connected  to  the  internet  via  CDMA,  Budi  Putra  concludes:  “I  think  that  is  what 
telecommunications means: When everyone, even those who come from rural areas, 
can communicate  and connect  to the world  easily”  88.  We have seen in the Nokia 
Communicator  case  that  many  Indonesians  were  attracted  by  the  newness  of  its 
features. As will be discussed in further detail, the mobile phone as high-tech exerts 
prestige both on its individual bearer and on the country as a whole. The mobile phone  
stimulates ‘technological nationalism’, a sense of national self-pride derived from the 
adoption of new technologies. On the other hand the mobile phone is perceived as a 
useful  ‘effective  technology’  that  brings  potential  and  real  benefits  to  people,  
especially those in the lower echelons of society. As elsewhere, ICTs in Indonesia are  
heralded to bring opportunities to agricultural producers (in the African context, see 
Donner, 2005; Overa, 2008). Earlier this happened with the internet. In a special year  
2000 report on the internet, critical opinion magazine Tempo joked that thanks to the 
internet farmers from the village of Njuwok could now sell their produce directly to 
New York (Idayanie,  et  al.,  2000).  Similarly,  the mobile phone is  expected to make 
everyday  life  easier  and  more  efficient  in  realms  like  household,  public  services, 
education, health, work, and leisure (Putra, 2004: 121-125). It is a technology that is  
“appropriate for the current day and age” (Putra, 2004: 7). CDMA challenges the older  
GSM  network  and  is  touted  to  ‘democratize’  mobile  communication  by  making  it 
affordable to a wide audience 89. CDMA operator Esia wants to bring low-cost telecom 
services  to the masses,  According to its  director  “[t]he telecommunications service 
provider business is not merely about the latest state-of-the-art technology. It's about 
fulfilling  what  consumers  really  need”  90.  This  points  to  the  remarkable  quality  of 
mobile  media  technologies  to  represent  and act  upon  ‘global’  and ‘local’  levels  of  
identification (and intermediate levels; see section 3.3). 
87 This  blogger  for  instance  calls  the  mobile  phone  “the  connection  to  my  outside  world” 
http://www.herdianto.web.id/2007/06/penghubung-dunia-luarku.html.
88 Article  published  on  August  11  2006.  Source:  http://asia.cnet.com/member/budip/blog/?
v=post&id=3938973.
89 The marketing strategies of these new CDMA operators in for instance newspaper advertisements are 
markedly different. Instead of emphasizing technological features they stress simplicity and low costs, and  
depict ordinary people rather than trendy urban young people, as GSM operators commonly do.
90 Source: http://asia.cnet.com/member/budip/blog/?v=post&id=61955482.
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2.4.4 The ‘design’ of the mobile phone
A third reason for the mobile phone’s popularity is the influence of active branding  
strategies and the visual omnipresence of the mobile phone. Mobile phone businesses  
are  concentrated  in  specific  places  in  the  city.  In  Jakarta  these  places  tend  to  be 
shopping malls. High-end official brand stores in prestigious shopping malls only sell 
new mobile phones and accessories. Mid- to low-end bazars (like ITC Roxy Mas, Roxy 
Square,  Mall  Ambassador,  and electronics  centers  in  the Chinese  quarter)  house  a 
myriad of small shops that sell a far greater range of mobile phones and items. ITC Roxy 
Mas is a not very prestigious looking building in a poor and somewhat off-track though 
populous neighborhood, some two kilometers west of the central Freedom Square. Its 
building and location convey the message “best deals” rather than luxury  91.  This is 
handphone heaven. Entering ITC Roxy Mas truly is a dizzying ilinx experience. Roxy has 
five stories and is filled to the brim with mobile phone shops mostly owned by small  
entrepreneurs.  There  are  shops  that  sell  new,  second  hand  (bekas),  and/or 
reconditioned  mobile  phones  (rekon)  made  from  ‘cannibalized’  old  parts  (see 
Barendregt,  2008: 165);  shops that  sell  colorful  SIM and credit  upgrade cards  from 
various operators, with continuously changing prints to be made into collector items 92, 
and “beautiful numbers” (more about this in the next section); shops specialized in 
accessories like casings, holders, danglers, chains, stickers, and so on; official customer 
and repair centers for the most popular mobile phone brands; unofficial phone repair  
shops that also provide other semi-legal services like phone unlocking; little shops that 
sell  mobile phone ringtones (a booth with someone behind a PC loaded with mp3s 
from  which  one  can  choose  a  song);  and  shops  that  sell  books,  magazines,  and 
newspapers  about  mobile  phones.  Noteworthy  is  the  number  of  publications  that 
explain how to hack the mobile phone, for instance turning it into a dual-SIM phone, or  
adding additional functions.
Many of the people working in the shops are young, somewhere between 16 
and 25. The majority are female. William, one of the many shop owners of Chinese 
descent, makes a profit of about 100.000 rupiah (€ 8) on each mobile phone sold 93. He 
must sell around ten phones a day to make a reasonable profit. He pays a steep rent of 
15 million rupiah per month for his store space, which is why many of his colleagues go  
bankrupt. Much depends on his supply lines. He imports most phones from foreign 
countries.  Compared  to  Taiwan  and  Malaysia,  countries  he  knows  well,  William 
91 The same is true for Mall Ambassador, located in the upscale southeastern quadrant of Jakarta’s central 
business district. Mall Ambassador used to be a high-end mall  with many brand stores. With the mobile 
phone boom, it has transformed into a bustling bazar with many small shops.
92 A new SIM card usually costs 10.000 or 15.000 Rp; upgrade cards come in denominations from 5000 to  
100.000 Rp, while some CDMA operators sell cards as low as 1000 Rp (less than € 0.10).
93 Source: interview with William on August 2 2007.
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believes that Indonesia is the biggest market for high-end handphones. In the mall,  
most visitors wander around in groups of friends, going from store to store. Sometimes 
they ask a shop tenant about features and price. It seems most handphone shoppers 
have prepared themselves in advance to make a well-informed choice before they buy.  
They wander around with one of the cheap handphone newspapers rolled up in their 
hand, and sometimes have with specific models encircled with a pen. These tabloid-
sized weeklies list the latest market prices for almost any phone on sale, and mention 
the cheapest places to buy in a number of large cities in Indonesia. Especially in the  
secondhand and rekon market there is room for bargaining, so it pays to have a sense 
of the prices and shop in different places. 
Mobile phone commerce is not confined to the mall. Mobile phone advertising 
is  omnipresent  in  physical  urban  space,  as  a  very  visible  element  of  everyday  life. 
Everywhere in Jakarta one finds roadside stalls  and hawkers  on foot  selling mobile  
phone credit. Many roadside stalls, pushcart eating places, and smaller shops display 
advertisements  for  mobile  phones  or  telecom  operators.  Busy  streets,  large 
intersections, pedestrian crossings, busses, and sometimes entire facades of buildings 
have neon advertisements  or huge billboards plastered all  over them, boasting the 
newest phone models or the best network carrier. Branding is also flourishing in the 
media. This occurs through various channels: via television, radio, in print and online, 
via the mobile phone itself (SMS advertisements), through sponsorship of sports and 
events, and product placements in popular television soap series. Advertising parties 
are  telecom operators,  mobile  phone manufacturers,  and sometimes a  coalition of 
both  telco  and  manufacturer.  Other  commercial  parties  that  engage  in  media 
advertising are shops selling devices or related items, businesses offering third party 
mobile phone services (ranging from downloadable ringtones, mobile games, and sexy 
or funny wallpapers to SMS services for dating, sports, restaurant guides, horoscopes,  
future-telling,  sexual  advise,  and so on),  a multitude of  mobile  phone glossies  and  
newspapers,  calls  for  media  and  technology  exhibitions  and  shows  in  convention 
centers, private individuals selling second hand phones or ‘beautiful numbers’. Even 
banks and insurance companies advertise with gifts of free mobile phones if one joins 
94. The content of advertisements is equally diverse. Most businesses place their bets 
on multiple horses. Some ads emphasize functionality (good network signal; low cost;  
features). Many ads position the mobile phone, the network, and accessories as part of  
a modern mobile and ‘global’ lifestyle. They use visual or linguistic references to other 
countries, depict ‘young urban executive’ models, and place the phone along other 
material  items indispensable for a modern lifestyle,  like sunglasses,  organizers,  and 
94 One of the bigger banks LIPPO even set up its own mobile phone operator LippoTel, which has already 
been taken over by Malaysian telco Maxis.
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new  cars  95.  Lifestyle  branding  sometimes  is  targeted  at  the  professional  business 
market. More often it emphasizes playful qualities of the mobile phone as part of a 
leisure  life,  for  instance  by  portraying  young  people  who  listen  to  music  on  their 
handphone, dressed-up models striking a bizarre pose, or depicting the mobile phone  
as  part  of  an  outgoing  lifestyle  of  clubbing  and  nightlife.  Lifestyle  advertisements 
emphasize the capacity of the mobile phone to aid in the construction of an individual 
identity  96.  Other  advertisements  congratulate  the  Indonesian  people  with  actual 
events, like Islamic fasting month Ramadan or Indonesia’s Freedom Day. All big telecom 
companies actively promote an image of corporate social responsibility. They advertise 
about their involvement in building new schools for remote regions, or announce that 
they donate a portion of their income from calls and text messages to special projects.  
Finally, telecom companies actually communicate with their customers by responding 
to written complaints sent to newspapers. National newspapers publish letters from 
readers on a daily base. They invariably demand ‘responsibility’ from some company or 
government  institution  because  it  failed  to  deliver  on  its  promise.  The  next  day, 
companies and institutions will actually put on the hair-shirt and express repentance in  
a  written  response  in  the  same  newspaper.  The  power  of  this  ritual  is  hard  to 
underestimate in a country  where not  long ago these roles  used to be completely 
inverted, and where the media had to be ‘responsible’.
In short, the mobile phone is omnipresent in both physical and media spaces. In 
a competitive and largely prepaid mobile phone market customer loyalty is low. A new 
or extra SIM card is easily bought. The Indonesian consumer has to be seduced on a 
daily base. Operators regularly advertise with temporary deals, like cheap calling rates 
on certain days and hours, or free gifts with the purchase of a new device or upgrade 
card. During Ramadan, when many Muslim Indonesians go on pilgrimage, operators 
tumble  over  each  other  with  special  international  calling  rates  to  and  from  Saudi  
Arabia.  Operators  regularly  organize  lottery  games  for  loyal  customers  with 
considerable prizes, such as brand new Mercedes cars, cash money, laptops, and new 
mobile phones. Handset manufacturers too give out prizes, like the chance to win a 
vacation for two to Paris for new Nokia buyers. Operator XL employs a promotion team 
asking people on the streets in a ludic clown-like fashion whether they are with XL and 
95 This  symbolic  connection  to  ‘modernity’  also  occurred  in  fixed  telephone  marketing.  Claude  Fisher 
describes how in the beginning of the 20th century the landline telephone in the USA was branded as an  
emblem of “being modern” (Fischer, 1992: 243). Of course the difference lies in what this ‘modernity’ entails.
96 Some examples: Nokia (in Indonesian): “Me, my life, my music. Three things that cannot be separated. I 
am Nokia N-series”; Samsung (in English): “Imagine the most unique phone is mine. Samsung is mine”; Sony-
Ericsson (in English): “I love [using the round SE symbol somewhat resembling a heart] freedom to create”. 
This  ongoing  repetition  of  unicity  might  drive  a  more  cynical  onlooker  back  to Adorno & Horkheimer’s 
‘pseudo-individuality’.
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giving away free 500.000 Rp credit and a new phone to lucky winners (and in turn used 
for a TV commercial) 97. From the perspective of mobile media producers, ‘catching the 
consumer’ is an infinite game. 
2.5 Conclusion: four play levels
We have seen several reasons for the explosive growth and popularity of the mobile  
phone  in  Indonesia:  the  lagging  state  of  a  personal  fixed  telecommunication 
infrastructure,  its  affordability,  and  the  role  of  advertising  and  corporate 
communication in making the mobile phone a ubiquitously visible part of everyday life. 
By far the most important reason however is that the mobile phone offers people rich  
new opportunities for the construction and expression of identities. In the next chapter 
we see how mobile media shape identity construction, and how this is playful. At this  
point, three of the four play levels introduced in section 1.5 have emerged. The first  
level, play on the mobile, has not been given much attention (but will be in chapter 4). 
The second is play with the mobile. The mobile phone is an artifact that invites people  
to creatively tinker. We have seen this in the ‘dressing-up’ of the artifact with various 
accessories,  and  in  customizing  the  phone  with  own  wallpapers,  ringtones  and 
applications (more about this in 3.1). A more advanced stage of play with the mobile  
phone consists of hacking the phone. The mobile phone also is an artifact played with  
as a prize in lottery  games. The third level  is  play through the mobile.  The mobile 
phone is a communications medium through which people can express their identity in 
playful performances (more in 3.1 and 3.2). The fourth level is being played by the  
mobile.  Many  people,  in  Indonesia  as  elsewhere,  feel  not  only  masters  of  the 
technology  but  frequently  its  slave  too.  Relentless  branding  and  design  for  rapid 
obsolescence  traps  people  in  an  infinite  game  of  having  to  express 
(pseudo-)individuality  by  continuously  acquiring  new  consumer  goods.  Moreover, 
always-on communication may overshoot into tyranny of availability, loss of privacy, 
and disruption of  public  space. Interestingly,  few Indonesians seem to worry about 
97 This TV commercial is cached at http://www.bijt.org/indo/070816_iklan_XL_gratis-pulsa.mpg
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these issues 98. However, they have other fears and uncertainties. These revolve around 
the question how to integrate the mobile phone with a modern life and with culturally 
specific values (as we will see in 3.3). 
98 This supports the argument for a culturally specific view on ‘mobile phone modernity’.
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3. Playing the stage: mobile media, mobility and identity in Jakarta
3.1 From gengsi to gaul: how to become a proper handphone user
In the beginning of chapter 2 I cited Barendregt and Pertierra in agreement, who say:  
“for  urban  southeast  Asians,  modernity  has  become  equivalent  to  mobility” 
(Barendregt & Pertierra, 2008: 382). I questioned what modernity they refer to, and 
what mobility or mobilities. In the current chapter this question is picked up in full, by  
asking how the mobile phone informs the notion of ‘modernity’ (section 1),  how it  
informs ‘mobility’ (section 2), and by discussing contesting views of modern identities  
(section 3). 
3.1.1 Handphone gengsi
The  already  mentioned  term  gengsi is  one  entry  point  to  understand  the  mobile 
phone’s shaping of identity.  Gengsi means prestige or status and originally connoted 
family standing and class. With New Order’s economic boom the notion has shifted 
from an inherited property to an image achieved by outward appearances. Appearing 
prestigious  involves  the possession and  display  of  material  goods  that  symbolically 
convey progress and cosmopolitanism. The notion regularly recurs in descriptions of 
Indonesian  consumer society  in  general  (Leeuwen,  1997;  Sastramidjaja,  2000),  and 
Indonesian technological culture in particular (Barendregt, 2008: 164; De Lange, 2001: 
19, 36, 82). People rarely use  gengsi to describe themselves, but frequently ascribe 
gengsi to others, or use the term to point to the general Indonesian obsession with  
conveying impressions through status symbols. The moral attitude towards  gengsi is 
somewhat  ambivalent.  On  the  one  hand  it  is  synonymous  with  consumptive 
materialistic hedonism, and treated with mockery, contempt or concern. On the other 
hand it is a sign of progress that defines what it means to live a modern life, and seen 
as a source of pride and self-worth (Sastramidjaja, 2000: 51). 
Mobile media technologies have quickly become an indispensable part of this 
prestigious  way of  life.  First,  prestige  can be conveyed by  the mobile  phone as  an 
artifact.  The  device  rubs  off  its  prestigious  qualities  on  the  individual  bearer. 
Technology  journalist  Budi  Putra  explains:  “Indonesians  like  to  possess  prestigious 
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devices.  Technical  specifications  are  not  important.  The  phone  is  used  to  express  
oneself, to make one feel higher. I’d say for 80 % of people the mobile phone is about  
gengsi and at most 20 % really knows and uses the technology”  99. According to two 
editors of Telset magazine, “the mobile phone has become a kind of benchmark of the 
individual. The mobile phone is an object you carry with you all the time and can put  
on display at any moment. It is seen as part of someone’s social status. Someone who 
doesn’t have a mobile phone is thought of as backward” 100. 
After choosing a particular brand and model, the device has to be customized 
from a generic stock item into an extension of someone’s personality. Many people 
‘dress  up’  their  phone  to  give  it  life.  Girls  and  young  women  like  danglers  and 
handphone  sleeves.  Some  guys  wear  their  handphone  in  (fake)  leather  pockets. 
Changeable colorful fronts are also popular. A very common way to personalize the  
phone is by choosing a special telephone number, a so-called nomor cantik (beautiful 
number). Regular SIM cards sell for 10.000 Rp (< €1). A ‘beautiful number’ usually costs 
at least 125.000 Rp. Exceptionally beautiful numbers sell for 3 million Rp or more (€ 
250 in 2007). A website devoted to selling nomor cantik explains: “Cellphone number is  
your prestise [sic]”, because “your number already introduce yourself  first,  who you  
are,  before  you  introduce  yourself  fully.  What  people  think  with  the  owner  phone  
number  of  99999999?  The  owner  must  be  not  a  common  people,  he  must  be  an  
important people” 101. Nomor cantik can be easy to remember numbers, carry a specific 
personal  meaning  (e.g.  one’s  date  of  birth),  and/or  a  cultural  significance  (see 
Barendregt, 2006b: 329; 2007; De Lange, 2001: 65-66; Li, 2007). A female student from 
the Javanese city Yogyakarta, who appears in Bart Barendregt’s documentary about the 
mobile phone Generasi Jempol (“thumb generation”), tells that the number 7 has the 
shape of a “slim number” while the number 8 is a “fatty number” (Barendregt, 2007). 
A mobile phone salesman says that in Javanese the word for 4 is papat. This sounds like 
pati (death) and therefore has a negative connotation. The number 7 is  pitu,  which 
sounds like  pitulungan (help,  support). Higher numbers are more popular. Even the 
sequence of numbers can be meaningful. Going up (789) is preferred over going down 
(987)  102.  Adi,  a young marketing sales manager at Telkomsel, explains another way 
99 Source: interview with Budi Putra on August 3 2007.
100 Source: interview with Telset’s managing director Walid Hidayat and editor Nurhamzah on August 10 
2007.
101 Source: website www.perdanacantique.com (now offline), accessed April 17 2008.
102 The large Chinese minority in Indonesia (who mostly live in the cities) attach different kinds of meanings  
to numbers. For them the number 8 is a lucky number and very much in demand. The Indonesian-language  
website devoted to selling  nomor cantik explains that eight is pronounced “fa” in Cantonese, which is a 
homophone for fortune, or “getting rich” (source: website www.perdanacantique.com, now offline, accessed 
April 17 2008). And in a comparative study of Chinese and Korean practices of “lucky numbers”, Li explains 
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mobile phone numbers can express  gengsi.  Post-paid is  held in higher esteem than 
prepaid, because it is not for everyone. In a low-trust economy like Indonesia, post-
paid  customers  are  thoroughly  checked by  telecoms to  make sure  they  are  credit-
worthy and have a steady income. Telkomsel kartuHALO post-paid numbers start with 
the  combination  0811.  Such  numbers  reveal  that  one  can  afford  a  post-paid 
subscription,  and that  one is  with what is  considered the best and most expensive 
operator 103. 
Physical contexts matter too in handphone related signifiers of prestige. Adi one 
day shows me around the Telkomsel office and customer area in Wisma Slipi,  a tall 
building  in  west-Jakarta.  He explains  that  Telkomsel’s  “high  value customers”  come 
here to get personal assistance. The customer area is designed to make customers feel 
more  important.  Telkomsel  recently  moved  to  a  new  building  and  redesigned  its 
interior in a style called “futuristic”.  The customer area has lots of  shiny metal and 
glass,  curved  lighting  units,  furniture  and  help-desks  in  shapes  inspired  by  science 
fiction  movies,  and  product  booths  with  touch-screen  interfaces.  The  space  has  a 
sterile ‘cool’  quality that is  diametrically opposed to Jakarta’s chaotic,  hot and dirty 
streets. Even queuing up can become part of the display of prestige, Adi continues. He 
explains why it is so quiet in the new building. People now have to specially stop by at  
Wisma Slipi and cannot be seen by others. When Telkomsel’s customer service was still 
located in nearby Mall Taman Anggrek (one of the biggest and most luxurious shopping  
malls in Jakarta) customer desks were always busy. People had to wait in long queues  
and could be seen by other people passing by. Many did not have real questions for the  
service  desk,  Adi  confides,  but  just  wanted  to  be  appear  to  belong  to Telkomsel’s  
customer base. 
As  Adi  and  I  have  a  coffee  in  a  small  café  downstairs  near  the  exit  of  the 
building, he talks about office culture in Jakarta, not without a touch of irony and self-
reflection. Adi points me to the people walking in and out of the building, many with a 
communicator-type  handphone  clung  to  their  ears.  He  confides  there  are  many 
aspiring “eksekutif muda” (“yuppies”) who act as if they are very important, and who 
wish to look like a successful  businessman. According to Adi,  the majority are only 
pretending. Adi uses the phrase “hanya main-main” (“only play”). This phrase regularly 
recurs when it comes to the prestigious qualities of the mobile phone. Telset editor 
Nurhamzah for instance suggests that many people use the internet on their mobile 
phone “only for play” 104. Motor courier Raoul, whom we will meet later, also says that 
that 6 sounds like the word for “to flow”, connoting “everything goes smoothly” (Li, 2007).
103 Source: interview with Adi on August 24 2007. ‘Adi’ is a forged name.
104 Source: interview with Telset’s managing director Walid Hidayat and editor Nurhamzah on August 10 
2007.
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for many Indonesians the mobile phone is just for play 105. Game-theorist Caillois calls 
this imitative pretense of “playing as if”  mimicry (Caillois, 2001: 19-23). Theorists like 
Erving Goffman have long pointed out that everyday interactions are characterized by 
theatrical  play  (Goffman,  1959).  The  work  domain  is  a  stage  for  theatrical  as  if 
performances of being a successful businessman, with the handphone as one of the 
main props.  Mimesis  resides  not  in  narrative  storytelling  ‘after the fact’  but  in  the 
doing itself. 
In what is called ‘appropriation’ in the domestication approach, personalizing 
the  phone  quite  literally  changes  its  character  from  being  an  undetermined  ‘wild’  
object to a ‘domesticated’ companion tailored to a person’s preferences. Further, in 
what is called ‘conversion’,  this  personalized phone becomes a symbolically charged 
object that ‘speaks’ for its owner. It tells others who they are and conveys the message 
that  they  take  care  of  their  ‘image’.  A  tamed  device  also  is  a  tangible  everyday  
reminder to owners that they are in charge over their own lives. Many Indonesians are  
acutely  aware  that  they  live  in  an  underdeveloped  nation.  They  reflexively  see 
themselves  though  the  eyes  of  others.  Here  we  see  again  how  the  emic,  that  is, 
culturally  specific  meaning of  ‘modernity’  coincides  with its  etic universal  meaning. 
Reflexivity, or “the turning-back of the experience of the individual upon himself”, is 
often forwarded as the distinguishing feature of modern identities (Mead, 1934: 134) 
106.  In  the  eyes  of  many,  reformasi has  failed  to  deliver  on  its  promises.  People 
commonly  describe  the state  of  the country  as  “chaos”,  and say  Indonesia  is  “still 
running behind” or “not advanced” 107. Many feel that the country as a whole is hardly 
a source of self-pride. Showing that one is capable of at least exerting control over 
one’s own life by taming technological artifacts offers the individual a much-coveted 
sense of pride and prestige.  Gengsi through the mobile phone is  not just a sign or 
signal of individual progress, it actualizes it. It  is the progress. Through gengsi people 
distinguish  themselves  from  ‘backward  people’,  and  distance  themselves  from  the 
deplorable general state of the country. Technological prestige is not only a centrifugal 
force. It can also be a way to identify with the larger social group. In the opening case  
of this chapter we saw that Indonesia was the first country in the world where the 
high-end Nokia  E90 Communicator  was launched (a  strategic  business  decision,  no 
doubt). ‘Being the first’ made people feel more proud about their country and certainly 
added  to  the  popularity  of  the  device.  Quite  explicit  about  the  potential  for 
technologies to represent the modern face of the nation is Elnar, a young woman of 23 
105 Source: interview with Raoul on August 25 2007.
106 For  instance,  Cooley’s  ‘looking-glass  self’  evaluates  himself  through  his  apprehension  of  how  other  
perceive him (see Turner, 2009: 205). Mead’s ‘doubled self’ is an object to himself and only exists by applying  
the views of his social community - “the generalized other” - to himself (Mead, 1934: 154-155).
107 Some even long back to the Soeharto era when the appearance of stability and prosperity was held up.
108
years old. Elnar likes to chat online and get in touch with other people on international  
chat channels. Foreigners often ask her whether Indonesia has many slums. She feels  
that they are under the impression that Indonesia is a poor and backward country.  
Elnar then tries to explain “it is modern here too. We also have factories, our own  
airplane, and the internet” (De Lange, 2001: 78). 
3.1.2 Handphone gaul
The mobile phone is not just a symbolic prop used for aggrandizing personal prestige, a 
‘cultural artifact in the pocket’, as Budi Putra calls it 108. It is of course also a profoundly 
social communication medium. Knowing how to use the mobile phone to socialize is 
part of the practice of  bergaul, which can be loosely translated as the  savoir-faire of 
modern socializing (Barendregt, 2008: 164, 166; De Lange, 2001: 30-31; Sastramidjaja, 
2000: 67-74)  109.  Bergaul consists of creative play with language.  Bahasa gaul (gaul 
language) is the trendy language spoken by young people in Jakarta, and has spread 
out  all  over Indonesia  (see Saxby,  2006).  It  borrows  words  from various  languages 
spoken in the capital,  notably prokem (Jakartan lower-class vernacular),  English and 
Chinese. Rather than consisting of a fixed vocabulary, mastery of  bahasa gaul entails 
continuously  inventing  new  words  and contractions,  and  creatively  reusing  existing 
expressions in unexpected humorous ways, often in reference to topical events and 
well-know figures.  Bergaul is a dynamic collection of meta-rules that inform not only 
what to say, but also how to say it and to whom, how to move around town, which 
places to go to, and what stuff to buy, eat and wear. One must know how to present  
oneself and have an own opinion. Bergaul means knowing what is ‘now’. Moreover, it 
is  showing the knowing through speech and demeanor.  It  is  reflexive social  play in 
continuous flux: an infinite play with its own rules. If gengsi departs from individuality 
and  exclusion,  bergaul departs  from  social  interactions  and  inclusiveness.  Mild 
competition in one’s self-presentation and the expression of originality should never 
overshadow connecting with other people and playing together. Someone who is too 
competitive and uses bergaul to only increase gengsi is seen as arrogant. As we have 
seen,  Jakarta’s  social  and cultural  heterogeneity  causes social  interaction not  to be 
based on more or less stable regional cultural traditions, but on negotiating a modern  
urban lifestyle.  Newcomers  to Jakarta,  like  young students  from all  over Indonesia, 
must quickly familiarize themselves with  bergaul in order to connect and participate 
with their peers. Young people consider someone with the wrong accent, choice of 
108 Source: interview with Budi Putra on August 5 2007
109 The prefix  ber- turns a noun or adjective into a verb that applies its properties to oneself.  Bergaul thus 
means to  engage  oneself  in  gaul:  to  socialize,  to  associate.  The word also has a  sexual  connotation  as  
‘intercourse’.
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words, topics, and manners automatically as a backward person  110. Such a person is 
seen as  standing still,  unable  to catch up  111.  Bergaul is  an essential  social  skill  for 
upward mobility and successful  life.  It  is  the ability to move oneself  with ease and 
confidence in any situation, and to build up a useful network of people. Although the  
appearance of pure sociality must never be pierced, there is in fact a fine line between  
bergaul and berkoneksi (networking) (Sastramidjaja, 2000: 70). It is a well-considered 
strategy to present oneself and make friends with people who might be useful in the 
future. “You never know how things look in the future, that’s why it is handy to know  
many  people  who can  help  you  when  they  do well.  Initially,  you  have  to  present 
yourself as favorable as possible, make jokes, and make sure you keep it light and easy-
going”, a former housemate explained the basics (De Lange, 2001: 31). 
There is a lot of bergaul talk about the handphone. People share information on 
the best models and providers among each other and talk about their personal relation 
with the phone.  Late night  television shows hosted by  trendy  young women invite 
viewers to call in and chat about ‘have you ever broken your handphone?’. A popular 
bloggers ‘meme’ at some point was writing down “ten things about my handphone”  
and pass these questions to blogger friends. These were questions about phone brand 
and type, special number, what wallpaper, last SMS, where do you wear your phone, 
and so on 112. Besides being a researcher’s goldmine, this shows how the mobile phone 
is caught up in reflexive bergaul. One cannot just carry any phone. One should be able 
to explain why one has this brand and not another, and that specific wallpaper and 
ringtone. The self-conscious relation to the device informs the relations with others 
and oneself. 
As a topical artifact but also as a communication medium the mobile phone is  
central to bergaul. Especially texting offers rich possibilities for connecting, socializing, 
self-expression, and linguistic play. This is a text message an Indonesian girl (25 years)  
sent to a male friend: 
110 The common adjectives for a backward person is  kampungan,  ‘from the village’, or  masih bodoh (still 
dumb).  Not  tradition  but  this  static  backwardness  is  the  real  opposite  of  the  savvy  urban  modernity  
actualized through bergaul (De Lange, 2001: 31-32; Sastramidjaja, 2000: 68-69).
111 The extent to which movement and fluidity is engrained in ideas about modern urban life was illustrated 
by  one  of  my  housemates,  who  liked  to  poke  fun  at  other  people’s  accents.  He  said  about  another 
housemate, who had just moved to Jakarta, “his accent is still  syrupy” (logatnya masih kental).  In other 
words, it is thick and does not flow nicely. Such a person is “kuber”: kurang bergaul, insufficient in bergaul 
(De Lange, 2001: 31).
112 See  for  a  few  examples: http://endhoot.blogspot.com/2007/08/hapekuh.html, 
http://miramarsellia.com/2007/08/15/hape/, http://blog.abepoetra.com/?p=279.
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Gw g taw,,c iwan jg g taw.lo cb dtg lgs di graha mobicel jl.mampang prapatan gw 
taw lg dah,,rabu gw lbr.ikut dunkz 113
In English this says:
I don’t know. Iwan also doesn’t know. Please come directly to Graha Mobicel,  
Mampang  Prapatan  road.  I  do  know  something  else  though.  I  am  free  on 
Wednesday, so come along!
In this short message we discern several elements of mobile communication bergaul. 
First, this message is an ad hoc invitation to socialize and join in without applying too 
much pressure (“Please come directly to Graha Mobicel”) 114. Second, the message is a 
prelude to a possible physical encounter. Yet Dewi is not very precise about a specific  
hour  and  location  and  keeps  the  options  open  (“I  am  free  on  Wednesday,  come 
along!”). This suggests that at least a few more messages will be exchanged to fine-
tune the actual  time and place for a meeting,  if  it  will  take place at all.  Third,  the 
message jumps into an ongoing conversation that involves multiple people (“I don’t  
know.  Iwan  also  doesn’t  know”).  Fourth,  the  message  makes  creative  use  of 
abbreviated SMS language,  leaving  out  vowels  and seeking  shorter  alternatives  for 
common words,  and  sometimes  using  words  from other  languages  like  English  115. 
Although  surely  an  example  of  mobile  phone  bergaul,  this  example  has  many 
similarities to mobile communication practices observed elsewhere. In the context of  
Norwegian  teens,  the  use  of  the  mobile  phone  to  organize  and  coordinate  future 
physical  meetings  -  often  in  sequences  of  increasingly  precise  communicative 
exchanges - has been called ‘micro-coordination’ (Ling & Yttri, 2002: 139, 142-146). In 
addition to its instrumental use, mobile communication often involves an expressive 
dimension  of  self-presentation  and  a  social  dimension  of  group  discussion  and 
agreement, particularly among young people. This has been called ‘hyper-coordination’ 
(Ling & Yttri, 2002: 140, 147-166). The use of abbreviated language in texting has also 
been  widely  described  in  diverse  contexts  (see  for  instance  Castells,  Fernandez-
Ardevol, Qiu, & Sey, 2004: 226; Ling & Yttri, 2002: 162; Plant, 2001: 80; Taylor & Harper,  
2003: 290, 294). 
113 Source: interview with Dewi (forged name) on August 25 2007. I had asked her to show me ‘a typical text  
message’.
114 Dewi uses the words “try to come..” (coba datang), a polite way to phrase an imperative in Indonesian.
115 In English, the c in “c iwan” would be pronounced “si Iwan”. In Indonesian, si is a definite article used in 
front of the names of people one is familiar with.
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If the elements in this example have universal parallels, then what is typically  
Indonesian  about  it?  The  answer  is,  predictably,  that  it  is  Indonesian  because  its  
language,  content,  and  context  are  Indonesian.  It  is  an  Indonesian  expression  of  
individual  and  group  identities.  This  needs  further  explication.  In  bahasa  gaul this 
message may be written out as follows:
Gue  nggak  taw,  si  Iwan  juga  nggak  taw.  Lu  coba  datang  langsung  di  Graha 
Mobicel, Jl. Mampang Prapatan. Gue taw lagi deh. Rabu gue libur. Ikut donk!
In official bahasa Indonesia the message may be rendered as:
Saya tidak  tahu.  Si  Iwan juga  tidak  tahu.  Kamu mencoba  datang  langsung  ke  
Graha Mobicel, Jl. Mampang Prapatan. Saya tahu lagi. Hari Rabu saya libur. Ayo 
ikut!
Two  steps  of  ‘encoding’  occur  in  composing  this  message.  First  from  standard 
Indonesian  into  bahasa  gaul,  and  then  from  bahasa  gaul into  abbreviated  SMS 
language.  Almost  always  the  national  language  is  used  in  text  messages,  often 
interwoven with English words, rather than regional languages. One of the reasons is 
that particularly Javanese has an intricate way of establishing and expressing status. 
Not particularly handy when you try to cram a message into 160 characters. Another 
reason  is  that  bahasa  Indonesia and  international  languages  are  considered  more 
modern (Barendregt, 2006c: 145-146; 2008: 166). Some young people say they even 
mix in Japanese and French words in their text messages (Barendregt, 2007). Writing 
down spoken bahasa gaul itself is a creative play with language. People must make up 
their own transcriptions. There is no written standard and bahasa gaul rarely features 
in ‘official’ publications like newspapers, books, film and television subtitles. Written 
bahasa gaul thrives in informal media where there is a place for the voices of young 
people themselves: internet blogposts,  text messaging,  email,  and youth magazines 
that publish letters from readers  116. These (new) media spaces boost  bergaul as an 
alternative system of communication to carve out a distinct space for youth identities 
(Saxby, 2006). The mobile phone contributes to the formation of such play spaces for 
experimenting with identities. Many young people now own a personal communication 
device that enables them to bypass parental or institutional surveillance. Their use of 
bahasa gaul as well as abbreviated SMS language erects further boundaries. Even to 
non-Indonesian speakers it is clear that the difference between the text message and 
the transcription in official Indonesian are considerable. The potential to communicate 
116 On how the internet promoted informal speech in other Indonesian media, see Sen & Hill, 2000: 147.
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outside the purview of parents by using the mobile phone has also been noted by Ling 
and Yttri  (Ling & Yttri,  2002: 152). This development however is far more urgent in  
Indonesian society, which (in somewhat generalized terms) is characterized by strong 
family ties and social hierarchies. Not surprisingly new liberties cause reactions of deep 
moral  concerns.  As  we  will  see  in  section  3.3  these  reactions  often  focus  on  the 
perceived bad influence of the mobile phone on young people. 
The  receiver  on the other  side  also  must  be able  to  ‘decode’  the  message. 
Encoding/decoding is  not  just  a  way to hide the content  of  the message from the 
prying eyes  of  parents  or  school  teachers.  It  is  a  meta-communicative  message by 
which both sides ‘perform’ to one another their knowledge and versatility in playing 
with the rules  of  bergaul.  Not just what you say but  how you say it  is  part  of  the 
message. Both in form and in content  gaul text messages convey reflexivity towards 
one’s  self-presentation.  The  ‘rules’  of  bergaul prescribe  an  individual  should  be 
knowledgeable and have a personal opinion. Dewi apparently broke this rule when she  
started  with  “I  don’t  know”.  But  then  she  retook  herself  by  saying  “I  do  know 
something else though”, which negates her earlier statement and can be interpreted as  
a  reflexive  comment  on  the  rules  of  bergaul itself.  In  terms  of  theater  theorist 
Schechner this is a performative “showing of a doing” (Schechner, 2003: 114). 
Further on it is argued that a theory of playful identities takes this reflexivity towards 
the utterance and the medium into account. From theatrical performances of the self  
in  gengsi to the social  play  in  bergaul,  mobile  media  technologies  are used in the 
construction and expression of ‘modern’ personal and social identities. The paradox of 
difference and similarity resurfaces.  Gengsi highlights how the consumption of mass-
produced goods fosters individualism and highlighting status differences, while bergaul 
shows how differences are  played out in collectives  based on similarity.  In the last 
section of this chapter we will see how the mobile phone shapes even larger identities  
on regional, national, and global levels, and how these identifying categories become 
the stakes in agonistic struggles. But  first we take a closer look at how the mobile 
phone influences ‘mobility’.
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3.2 Three handphone mobilities
Up to this  point the focus has predominantly been on the notion of  ‘modernity’ in 
Indonesian identity construction, and the playful qualities of mobile media. As said, 
mobility is another crucial notion in the construction of Indonesian identities. In this 
section three  cases  are  presented that  show  how different  types  of  mobilities  are 
shaped by the mobile phone and how this informs identity construction.
3.2.1 Corporeal mobility
Jakarta  is  chronically  congested  with  traffic.  It  can  take  one  hour  to  bridge  five 
kilometers.  A slow-moving queue crawls forwards and emits  thick black fumes that 
tarmac the lungs of tens of thousands of street vendors on flip-flops who try to scrape  
together a few daily  rupiah by  selling  almost  anything from food to mobile  phone 
credits. Many Jakartans commute daily. For some traveling is their job. One of them is 
Raoul (male, 21 years) 117. Raoul has a most peculiar job. He drives around on a scooter 
to buy human hair  from barbershops.  He resells  this  hair  to salons to be used for  
extensions. Raoul proudly confides that many celebrities wear extensions from hair he 
provides. Raoul gets paid per delivery. When he finds good long pieces of hair he earns 
more. Raoul receives around one call a day on his mobile phone from his boss. They 
communicate about whether he has found any new hair, where he has to deliver, or 
where he can pick up new goods. On his scooter Raoul covers the entire city and even 
the neighboring towns. Raoul bought his second hand mobile phone two years ago. He 
paid for it in cash. Too many people buy things on credit, he says, including mobile  
phones. He does not like to be stuck in a loan. It is not really an advanced device, he 
admits, but it does have a handsfree set and a camera. He is reasonably happy with it.  
Most important for him is that he can make calls and send text messages. In addition  
Raoul really likes the mobile phone camera. “I takes pictures of special places I visit, 
mostly leisure places  like the Zoo,  or special  moments,  for instance when I  meet a 
foreigner like you”, he says. He prints out these pictures and pins them on his wall at  
home. With a broad weave of the arm Raoul indicates he has a wall full of pictures to 
remember his travels through the city. On my question why he does this, he answers: “I 
do it for my own personal pride. Since I have my mobile phone and make pictures all  
the time for a hobby, I feel I have become some kind of artist”. Too many people own a  
mobile phone just for prestige, Raoul adds. He knows people who have two phones but 
don’t  need  them for  work.  He  thinks  that  for  them the  mobile  phone  is  only  for 
prestige: “it is not a life’s necessity but just to play around”. Only when your work is  
117 Source: interview with Raoul on August 25 2007. Raoul is a forged name.
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mobile,  a  handphone  is  truly  a  necessit,  he  says.  In  the  days  before  he  had  his  
handphone, he just had to go to all the shops and ask. But now it is much easier to  
coordinate. 
How does the mobile phone influence corporeal mobility? Are people moving 
differently in urban space? Does the experience of  the city  change? Clearly  Raoul’s  
mobile job would have been much more difficult before the mobile phone. The mobile  
phone enables the kind of ‘micro-coordination’ that is needed to fine-tune supply and 
demand (Ling & Yttri, 2002: 143). One of the biggest changes the mobile phone brings  
is that corporeal mobility and communication no longer exclude one another. Raoul 
does not need to stop moving when he wants to communicate or is called. Travel time 
and communication time have become “travel partners” (Urry, 2007: 179). With the 
mobile  phone  Raoul’s  ‘image  of  the  city’  changes.  Urbanist  Kevin  Lynch  famously 
argued  that  people  move  through  the  city  by  ‘reading’  the  cityscape.  They  orient 
themselves by composing ‘mental maps’ of the urban environment (Lynch, 1960: 1-13). 
These  mental  or  cognitive  maps  are  made  up  of  publicly  visible  and  generally 
recognized items, like paths (routes people take while moving through the city), edges 
(boundaries  and  breaks  in  the  continuity  of  the  urban  landscape),  districts  (areas 
characterized by common characteristics), nodes (strategic focus points for orientation 
like squares and junctions), and landmarks (external points of orientation, usually an 
easily identifiable physical object in the urban landscape) (ibid: 46-48) 118. By contrast, 
Raoul’s  movements  in  the city  are no longer based on commonly  shared cognitive 
maps. His way of relating to the urban landscape is far more private (as opposed to  
public),  personal  (characteristic  of  one  individual,  idiosyncratic;  as  opposed  to 
commonly  shared),  and  creative  (in  the  sense  of  active  construction  rather  than 
passive reading). Raoul’s travels are coordinated by means of the mobile phone. This 
way of orientation is invisible to other people and brings him to places others might 
never even notice.  By taking pictures  during his  travels  of  what  he sees as  special  
places, Raoul’s notion of ‘place’ has become a very personal one. Instead of merely 
‘reading’ the city as a passer-by, the mobile phone camera allows him to ‘write’ the city 
with his own personal experiences through the photographs he takes for his private 
pleasure (for a discussion of how mobile media enable people to ‘write’ the city, see 
Greenfield  &  Shepard,  2007).  The  mobile  phone  opens  up  the  city  for  playful 
exploration and creative production through everyday movements. For Raoul play is 
not a separate domain of leisure time after work. Instead, creative play is part of his 
everyday working hours, and what makes it fun. This is a different kind of play than 
“just playing around”, which is how he perceives most people use their mobile phone. 
118 More about Lynch and mobile media in the urban environment in chapter 4.
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It  has long been held that ICTs are ‘post-urban’  and ‘placeless’ (see Graham,  
2004: 3-29; Ito, Okabe, & Matsuda, 2005: 8-13). Digital technologies would eliminate 
the need for people to live close together in a specific place, since information and  
communication could now travel with the speed of light to the other end of the world. 
Mobile  media  technologies  by  contrast  enable  people  to  (re-)establish  all  kinds  of  
relations with urban places. These relations can be visual, as in this case of Raoul taking  
photographs of special places with his mobile phone camera. Or they can be auditory, 
for instance when people listen to music on their portable device and augment their 
travels  with  a  personalized  soundtrack  (Bassett,  2005;  Bull,  2005;  Du  Gay,  1997).  
Mediated relations with the urban environment need not be personal  only.  Mobile 
media also mediate relations to places in social ways. Locative media, media that can 
pinpoint someone’s exact location, enable people to share experiences of places with 
other  people.  This  happens  for  instance  via  geotagging:  the  annotation  of  digital 
objects like photos with geographical information acquired via GPS (global positioning 
system).  An  Indonesian  example  is  FireAnts.  This  is  a  collaborative  location-based 
service that uses the mobile phone to warn Jakartans in real-time about traffic jams 
and to suggest detours by using information people themselves provide through the 
FireAnts application 119. In a way, this is a case of play on the mobile. The mobile device 
is  used to ‘interface’  with the physical  environment.  It  turns the city into a playing  
board in order to ‘conquer’ obstacles like traffic jams, and achieve an external goal  
(reaching one’s  destination) through strategic decision-making. Place-based usage is 
even inherent to some mobile wireless technologies, as in the case of CDMA networks 
that  favor  local  communication,  or  in  the  case  of  Bluetooth  networking  based  on 
immediate  proximity.  More about  play on mobile media  and the relation to urban 
place in chapter 4. 
What makes this case typical of an Indonesian ‘mobile modernity’? The ‘social  
production’ of the city has long been a centralized top-down project. Bottom-up city  
‘writing’  was  limited  to  erecting  illegal  slums,  organizing  protests  against  land 
expropriation for golf  courses (Aspinall,  1993: 18-19), or mildly defying authority by  
giving mock names to urban landmarks. In the 1980s, pedicabs were banned from the 
main streets of Jakarta. This turned corporeal mobility into the prerogative of the car-
owning elite, at least when they did not get stuck in a traffic jam (Sidel, 1998: 160-161).  
The  mobile  phone  gives  urbanites  an  instrument  to  shape  and  act  upon  their 
environment through corporeal mobility. This can be in poetic ways, as in Raoul’s case.  
119 Source:  interview  with  Dien  Kwik  on  August  23  2007.  See  also 
http://dienkwik.com/blog/2008/12/16/avoid-traffic-jams-in-jakarta-know-where-they-are/ and 
http://bebasmacet.ning.com/page/about-us.
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It can be in highly political ways, using the mobile phone to coordinate collective action  
(‘smart mobs’) against the regime (Nas & Sluis, 2000: 156; Rheingold, 2002). Or it can  
be in functional ways, as in the case of FireAnts. 
3.2.2 Socio-economic mobility
Ida (female, 20 years) is a domestic worker in my house with rental rooms for young 
workers and students 120. Ida was born in central Java. Like so many other Indonesians 
from rural areas she moved to the capital in search of work. In Jakarta she can make far  
more money than back home. She has not permanently settled in the metropolis but 
only  seeks  temporarily  employment,  like  many  temporary  workers  in  large  Asian 
metropolises. Most temporary work migrants travel back to their native village once in 
while, often to celebrate Idul  Fitri,  the end of  Muslim fasting month Ramadan. Ida  
however hasn’t been back to her village for at least two years to save up money. In fact, 
Ida hardly ever leaves the house in Jakarta. With her first earned money Ida has bought 
a mobile phone. Her mobile phone is a very important possession to her. She often 
strokes it lovingly and keeps it close to her even while she is cleaning the house. Ida  
tells she only uses her mobile phone to make calls to her family in her village once in a 
while. Although Ida hasn’t been back to her village in two years, these ties remain very  
important to her. 
How  does  the  mobile  phone  influence  socio-economic  mobility?  ‘Vertical  
mobility’, as it if often called in Indonesia, signifies (the potential for) moving upward 
on the social ladder and raising one’s standard of living. Corporeally Ida is immobilized  
to the domestic sphere of the house. But through the mobile phone she maintains a  
sense of proximity with her relatives far away. The mobile phone makes it bearable for 
her to work in a place where she is  confined to the house and where she has  no 
relatives or friends. Thanks to the mobile phone, migrant workers from rural areas and 
with  little  education  or  social  capital  can  seek  opportunities  and  employment 
elsewhere while maintaining the backup of family within reach. The phone functions as  
a security  rope for climbing the socio-economical  ladder,  an ‘umbilical  cord’  to the  
family 121. The mobile phone is not only a functional item in managing Ida’s position as  
a worker away from home. It  also expresses her newly acquired status as a female 
worker who makes her own money in the city. Socio-economic mobility sustained by  
the mobile phone occurs elsewhere too (about migrants workers in southern China, 
see Law & Peng,  2008;  and Qiu,  2009).  It  may also  involve  trans-border migration 
120 Source: interview with Ida on August 4 2007. Ida is a forged name.
121 This metaphor is a recurring one in literature about the mobile phone (see Castells, et al., 2004: 176; De  
Gournay, 2002: 201; Fox, 2001; Townsend, 2000: 93).
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(about  Filipinos  working  overseas,  see  Paragas,  2005).  Being  away  from  home  is  
managed and made bearable by keeping in touch via the mobile phone. The mobile  
phone  itself  provides  economic  possibilities  too.  As  we  have  seen,  small-scale 
entrepreneurs have embraced the mobile phone as an opportunity to start their own 
businesses. There are those who rent a space in shopping malls. Some sell  prepaid 
cards in roadside stalls. Others hawk the city streets to sell phone cards.
Socio-economic mobility occurs not just by means of the mobile phone. It is also 
involves acquiring knowledge about the mobile phone. Consumers first must educate 
themselves in order to make the right buying decisions (brand, type, network operator, 
subscription plan, etc.). Then they must learn how to operate the mobile phone on a 
technical level. And they must gain knowledge how to use the mobile phone for their 
own benefit. We have seen that learning how to engage in mobile phone bergaul helps 
to  create and maintain social networks needed for potential career opportunities. As 
with  the  adoption  of  all  new  technologies  people  must  follow  a  path  from  initial  
motivation  for  use,  to  actual  access,  to  acquiring  operational  skills,  to  acquiring  
knowledge how to benefit from using technologies (Dijk, 2003: 13). The mobile phone 
contributes to the formation of ‘network capital’, by increasing access to networks and 
facilitating the development and maintenance of network ties (Rettie, 2008; Wellman 
& Frank, 2001). One further step can be added, and that is the capacity to see through 
and expose the hidden ideological presumptions and rules of media technologies. This  
step  involves  a  reflexive  mentality  towards  the  media  and  mediating  processes 
themselves, and is often called ‘media wisdom’ (Raad voor Cultuur, 2005, 2008). 
In addition to climbing the socio-economic ladder, the mobile phone informs 
another  type  of  mobility  in  the  social  sphere.  Popular  Indonesian  television  soaps 
frequently employ the mobile phone as a dramaturgical device. A dominant theme in  
soap series is romantic love. Choosing one’s own boyfriend or girlfriend often causes 
trouble with the family, fueled by daddy who disapproves of the relationship. Young 
people use the mobile phone to keep in touch with the forbidden friend anyway. In  
these soap series tensions are played out between loyalty to the family and choosing  
one’s own life, while trying not to completely break with one’s background. The mobile  
phone mediates in this tension and appears to tilt the balance to the latter. The mobile 
phone offers  more individual  freedom of  movement,  at  least  in  soaps (although in 
Indonesia too soaps are as much a reflection of reality as the inverse).
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3.2.3 Imaginative mobility
Dewi (female, 25 years) lives in one of Jakarta’s poorer neighborhoods 122. She was born 
in Jakarta. At the age of one she was sent to Bandung to live with her grandmother 
because her mother could not  afford to raise both her and her little brother.  After 
finishing school Dewi moved back to Jakarta. She recently found work at a call center  
for a credit card company. From her first savings she bought a shiny new Sony Ericsson  
950 Walkman edition, with 4GB of memory to store her music. It is by far the most 
expensive item she possesses. She deliberately chose this model to express her love for  
music. Her mobile phone is an expression of her “true self”, she says. “When other 
people see me with my mobile phone, they say: oh, apparently she loves music”. Dewi  
wants to be different from other people, “a trendsetter, so that other people follow  
me”. This is why she hates Nokia. “Everyone has one, they quickly fall out of fashion, 
and then you are no longer modern”. Her Walkman phone makes her feel ahead of 
others instead of a follower. “I always want to be the first”. When I ask what kind of  
music she likes, Dewi decidedly states she likes western music more than Indonesian 
music. She has customized her phone with a R&B ringtone and a self-made wallpaper.  
She also gave a personalized name to her phone instead of the default name 123. She 
owns two handsets: her new Walkman phone, and a CDMA phone to make cheap calls. 
Before finding a job, Dewi did not care much about the brand of her mobile phone. She 
expressed her identity via clothing. She believes most Indonesians buy mobile phones 
not for function but for prestige. People who carry expensive looking mobile phones 
“are upgrading themselves”. Because Dewi works in a call center, her boss pays half of  
her post-paid subscription bill, around 500.000 rp/month (ca. € 40). She mostly uses 
her mobile phone for texting and calling with family  in Bandung,  friends,  and with 
customers.  She sees  no problem in  using  the same number  for  private  and  work-
related calls. While traveling to work Dewi puts in her earbuds as a kind of self-defense.  
A girl alone in the big city has to be careful, she adds. Dewi calls herself a career girl.  
She wants to be independent from others and choose her own way of life. She does 
not see this job as a permanent endpoint but as a phase. Later she wants to become a 
teacher. Dewi tells that not long ago girls of her age should already get married. She 
firmly states she’s not going that way. She first has to choose a “fitting candidate”. Dewi 
further stresses her independence by smoking in public, which is not really considered 
‘proper behavior’ for Indonesian girls. 
How does  the mobile phone influence ‘imaginative mobility’? Urry  uses  this  
term  to  describe  how  media  technologies  allow  people  to  ‘travel’  elsewhere  by  
imagination  (Urry,  2007:  169).  Although  Urry  is  mostly  concerned  with  the  spatial  
122 Source: interview with Dewi on August 25 2007. Dewi is a forged name.
123 Networking over Bluetooth requires the device to be given a name.
119
imagination of other places, I extend the term to highlight the ‘mobile’ character of  
identity construction. The notion of identity has shifted from describing some innate 
and timeless essence of a person or group to identity as a never-ending task of self-
interpretation and expression through the imagination. Identity is a ‘historical fiction’  
or ‘fictional history’, and oriented towards future anticipations, Ricoeur says. The role  
of the ‘imaginative’ has been theorized at the level of the individual, for instance in 
narrative identity based on mimetically imagining oneself  as a fictional character in  
stories;  and  at  the  level  of  the  collective,  for  instance  in  Anderson’s  well-known 
description of national identities as “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1991). Close 
to  Urry’s  point,  the present  exchanges  and interrelations  between people,  objects, 
systems and ideas on a worldwide scale  -  commonly labeled ‘globalization’  -  make 
these imaginative identities more mobile. Most people are confronted on a daily base 
with images from elsewhere to which they must relate in some way (even ignoring is 
an  active  choice).  New  media  technologies  contribute  to  ‘imaginative  mobility’  in 
identity construction. Dewi explains how she uses the mobile phone as a medium for 
self-expression and impression management, and to construct a sense of self. This two-
way imaginative movement is directed outwards and inwards. Dewi expresses her self 
to  other  people  through  the  mobile  phone,  and  internalizes  this  perception  by 
reapplying it to the self. Now that she has a job Dewi finds herself in a new life-stage.  
She adopts the associated role as a successful working urbanite. Her carefully chosen 
mobile phone expresses her “true self”, as she calls it. This outward movement is from 
an internally constructed private self to an external presentation. Dewi also uses her 
mobile phone to perform “an image” in front of other people and then reapplies this 
image to herself. She ‘wears’ her mobile phone deliberately like a fashion item to show  
off who she is to others (see Fortunati, et al., 2003: 5, 9). This performative aspect is  
similar  to  what  has  been  called  “stage-phoning”,  to  describe  the  way  people  are 
“enjoying and exploiting the presence of third parties as a unique opportunity to put  
something  of  themselves  on  display”  (Plant,  2001:  49).  Her  awareness  of  the 
impression she makes with her mobile phone as a ‘stage prop’ signals a self-conscious 
reflexive movement inwards. External public perceptions thus inform one’s self-image. 
Which of these two movements comes first is a chicken and egg question. One cannot  
exist without the other. The mobile phone not only mediates Dewi’s relation to other 
people, it also shapes her life trajectory as an imaginative movement. Living a modern 
life means becoming an independent girl with a career in the big city, and working for a 
modern type of business. The mobile phone acts both as a necessary instrument for  
her job,  and as a symbolic medium that reflects her achievement.  In fact, it  is the 
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achievement.  With  her  new  mobile  phone  Dewi  has  ‘moved  out’  of  her  poor 
neighborhood,  and  closer  to  a  generalized  image  of  modern  life,  at  least  on  an 
imaginary level. 
The mobile phone has become emblematic of a ‘mobile modernity’ (Barendregt, 2008: 
163). In this  modernity individuals are free to move corporeally, socio-economically,  
and imaginatively. This stands in stark contrast to earlier times. During Soeharto’s New 
Order  regime  stability  and  normalcy  were  maintained  in  the  pursuit  of  economic 
development. Any kind of public mobilization was repressed. Expressions of political 
and cultural plurality were marginalized in order to promote national unity (Kleden,  
1999: 12-13). About the sole legitimized mobilities were the circulation of capital, the 
rotation of people in high offices who become too powerful (Sidel, 1998: 162-163),  
forced transmigration of  farmers  from over-crowded Java to outer islands,  and the 
cultivated  societal  ethics  of  ‘reciprocal  assistance’  (Marzali,  2005:  155-163).  The 
ensuing reformation period fostered a mobilization of  Indonesian society  as whole. 
Student movements mobilized large protests, initially on campuses and later on the 
streets. They wrote in student tabloids with names like “On the Move!” and demanded 
political and societal reforms. Reformation ushered in a phase of initial optimism with 
unprecedented freedom of speech, decentralization of political power, and far more 
room for cultural diversity. Change and mobility acquired positive connotations. But 
they  have  also  fueled  new  uncertainties,  fears  and  disputes.  Formerly  suppressed 
tensions in Indonesian identity construction awoke. In the final section of this chapter  
we  see  how  media  technologies  like  the  mobile  phone  act  as  an  arena  where 
discussions about modern mobile identities are played out.
3.3 Moving forward: contesting modernities
Under Soeharto’s New Order regime the media served to represent and strengthen 
national  identity.  Identity  categories  other  than  national  identity  were  considered 
potential threats to national stability and order. It was taboo to publicly debate these 
topics.  The  acronym  SARA,  which  in  itself  merely  sums  up  a  number  of  identity 
categories  (suku,  agama,  ras,  antargolongan -  ethnicity,  religion,  race,  political 
factionalism),  was  a  word  imbued  with  the  frightening  power  of  the  bogeyman. 
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Internal cultural differences were contained and rendered harmless by turning them 
into  folklorized  entities  for  leisurely  consumption,  as  we  have  seen in  the  case  of 
Taman Mini. After Soeharto, the media landscape acquired both a more global and a  
more regional, even local character (Arps & Van Heeren, 2006: 290; Sen & Hill, 2000:  
13-17).  Mass  media  and  emerging  ICTs  could  now  present  a  far  wider  scope  of 
information, and give access to a plurality of opinions instead of the singular voice of  
state propaganda. This has brought Indonesians new freedoms, in the double sense of 
freedom  from  superimposed  homogenized  national  identity  and  solidified  identity 
categories, and freedom to explore and engage in different identifications  124. Digital 
media technologies like the mobile phone offer young urbanites ample opportunities 
to construct and express ‘modern’ personal and cultural identities on their own terms. 
Yet  in the dialectic between freedom and force,  media technologies also pose new 
identity problems. Many Indonesians - particularly young people, including those who 
outwardly appear to play the game of gengsi and bergaul - feel burdened with the task 
to decide whether and how to fit the mobile phone and other ICTs into their daily lives.  
They are faced with a confusing array of choices for identifications. What’s more, the 
question  “to  which  identity  category  do  I  belong?”  now  shifts  to  “what  are  the 
definitions of  the categories?”.  Solid boundaries  around identity  categories  become 
flexible, or in Baumann’s terms, ‘liquified’ (Bauman, 2000)  125. At the same time new 
boundaries are erected. In this section we see how ICTs shape Indonesian identities on 
multiple spatial levels, and what identity problems arise from this.
3.3.1 Conceptualizing place: locality and the global
In discussions about the role of ICTs in shaping identities, ‘the global’ is often opposed 
to ‘the local’. Various authors have argued that in actuality the global and local fold into 
each other, in what they call ‘glocality’ (e.g. Meyrowitz, 2005; Wellman, 2002). I agree, 
but to better understand how this occurs in Indonesia - and what tensions this evokes - 
we must briefly pause to look at these terms. An analysis of ‘the local’ (and  mutatis  
mutandis ‘the global’) offers a sharper view how ICTs shape Indonesian identifications 
on multiple spatial levels, and are central to place-based identities.
Let’s start by defining ‘place’. John Agnew distinguishes three elements of place: 
(1)  Location: a specific position or area. This is geographical metric place. (2)  Locale: 
the material setting in which social relations are constituted. This social meaning of  
place can also be called social  situation.  (3)  Sense of  place:  the  local  “structure of 
124 These two notions of freedom have been forwarded by Isaiah Berlin (Berlin, 1958).
125 Baumann uses the term “liquid modernity” to describe the dissolving of boundaries around formerly 
clear-cut identifying categories like class (Bauman, 2000: 7).
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feeling”. This is the subjective and emotional experience people have of place (Agnew, 
1987: 28). A sense of place needs not be restricted to the local level but can span wide 
geographical distances. We thus have geographical, social, and phenomenological (or 
mental) place. These are related and mutually influence each other (ibid: 28; Lefebvre,  
1991).  Agnew  emphasizes  that  places  are  not  fixed  but  historically  contingent 
processes (Agnew, 1987: 32). Places are constructed differently by different people, 
and also vary in time depending on the hour, season, historical context, and so on.  
Practices of ‘place-making’ are part of people’s identity constructions and expressions. 
In Cresswell’s words, “place is not just a thing in the world but a way of understanding 
the world” (Cresswell, 2004: 11). People identify with particular geographical locations 
or areas, and call them theirs. As individuals (“this house is my home”), and/or as a  
group (“this territory is our country”). People play social roles and identify with locales, 
and derive a sense of self from these settings (“I like frequenting the Hardrock Café 
nightclub in Sarinah”). People apply a sense of place to who and what they are (“I am a 
Jakartan”  coincides  with  young  people’s  self-descriptions  as  modern  urbanites).  In 
place-making and identification the three dimensions of place are hard to separate. 
Further, place-based identities are only in part a matter of individual choice. Someone’s  
identity is frequently ascribed by other people based on one’s birthplace and lineage. 
Many  Indonesians  consider  people  to  be  ‘true’  Jakartans  when they  were  born  in 
Jakarta (and/or from a orang Betawi family). People remain Jakartan, even when they 
no longer live in the city. People from other regions who have moved to Jakarta and 
have been living there for decades may still be considered non-Jakartan, although less 
so among young people. Moreover, place-based identities often are ‘politicized’ when 
they are defined as exclusive (“our country, not yours”). Place becomes the focus of  
contesting  views  about  who belong  ‘here’  and  who do  not,  who  has  the  right  to 
inscribe place with particular meanings and narratives, or who are allowed to perform  
in certain ways at particular locations 126. 
‘Local’ and ‘global’ have geographical, social, and experiential dimensions too. 
However, these are often conflated. First, as a geographical notion the local indicates 
an absolute point in space, a particular location. This geographical notion of the local is 
a measure of distance: near versus far. Second, as a social setting localness refers to a 
concentration in space. Localness describes physical or imagined proximity to objects 
and people in a  locale, as part of a social situation. This dimension of the local is a  
126 Spatial definitions of identity are not absolute but constructed contextually. Only when students from the 
former colony of the Dutch east-Indies traveled abroad to the Netherlands for higher education, met fellow  
countrymen from different regions, and learned about Europe’s own recent nationalist struggles, the idea of 
an independent unified Indonesian nation could develop (Anderson, 1991: ch.7). Some trendy young women 
who would not want to be found dead in local traditional kain and kebaya dress when they are in a shopping 
mall, very much enjoy wearing these clothes at a wedding.
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measure of scale: presence versus absence. Third, as sense of place localness refers to 
the feeling that one originates from and belongs to a certain place, or multiplicity of 
places. This experience is crucial for people’s personal, social, and cultural identities.  
This is a measure of scope: what fits in my outlook, and what does not belong to my 
sphere?
The global also has these three dimensions. As a geographical notion it refers to 
what is from far away (either with or without a known point of  origin). As a social 
notion it  often means  ‘worldwide’.  It  refers  to  cultural  practices,  consumer goods, 
systems and institutions, that are shared by a wide variety of people all over the world. 
As an experiential notion the global is often invoked as the negation of local scope, a  
residual  category  of  alien  cultural  artifacts,  images,  and  practices  that  do  not 
(originally) belong to ‘here’. One can sense the different moral connotations in these 
formulations.  These  three  dimensions  underly  frequently  forwarded  yet  divergent 
criticisms against globalization, from the progressive ‘left’ to the conservative ‘right’. 
First, the flows and mobilities of globalization cause the end of distance. Labour and 
produce formerly rooted in location become footloose, the environment is impacted, 
and  new inequalities  arise  127.  Second,  globalization is  a  homogenizing  force  when 
locale becomes a worldwide scale. Globalization, it is argued, obliterates the former 
mosaic  of  cultural  heterogeneity.  Third,  globalization  is  an  alien  outside  force  that 
penetrates  and disrupts  local  senses of  place,  and makes people feel  disoriented.  I 
hasten to add that the global now seems to be phrased rather negatively, but need not  
be valued as such. In fact, this is precisely what the term ‘glocality’ aims to capture. The 
global and the local cannot be separated. They are intertwined in a circular movement,  
whereby people from the localness of their experience appropriate ‘the global’  and 
introduce it back into their local situations (Meyrowitz, 2005: 21-23). At least, that is  
the ideal.
How do ICTs fit into this? Before the advent of transport- and communication 
technologies the geographical, social and experiential dimensions of localness largely 
overlapped. With ‘space- and time-transcending’ technologies our sense of distance, 
scale,  and  scope  changed.  Different  dimensions  of  place  grew  apart.  Mass  media 
pushed this process further. In No Sense of Place, Joshua Meyrowitz argues that where 
you are no longer defines who you are (Meyrowitz, 1985). Electronic media lead to the  
dissociation of physical place and social situations (location and locale). When people’s 
social roles no longer depend solely on physical places but increasingly take place in  
social situations shaped by the media, people lose their  sense of place, his argument 
127 Doreen Massey calls this “the power geometry of time-space compression” (Massey, 1993: 62; 2004: 11); 
Castells calls this the ‘space of flows’ of the globally mobile elite versus the ‘space of places’ for the rest of  
the people stuck in their locations (Castells, 1996: 378).
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goes. Identities become ‘placeless’ (ibid: 308). A problem with this argument is that it  
confuses the particular concept of location for the general concept of place. Meyrowitz 
rightly redefines locale (‘social situation’) from being rooted in geographical location to 
include mediated and distant social interactions. But why doesn’t he redefine sense of  
place too,  to  include  mediated  mental  experiences  of  places?  By  contrast,  other 
authors  point  out  that  media  technologies,  instead  of  being  ‘placeless’,  indeed 
constitute new mediated social settings (locales) and help to foster an imagined sense  
of place by for instance establishing ‘virtual communities’ (Jones, 1995, 1997, 1998; 
Rheingold, 1993) or promoting ‘reimagined communities’ (Morley & Robins, 1995: 37-
42) 128. And we will see in the next chapter that location-based media even reintroduce 
geographical location in mediated interactions and experiences. Media technologies do 
not substitute but modify place-based identities. 
3.3.2 Spatializing identities
This  frame  offers  a  sharper  look  at  how  (mobile)  media  technologies  shape 
identifications with- (and rejections of-) along spatial dimensions, and how definitions 
of identity themselves become questioned. Mobile media are local in a geographical 
sense because of certain technical specificities. Local CDMA networks work within a 
certain  range.  With  the  integration  of  GPS  in  mobile  devices  information  and 
communication is tied to locations. The mobile phone also fosters practices that are  
local in a social sense.  Gengsi and  bergaul entail the theatrical display of prestige in 
front of other people, the frequenting of certain material settings, and the exchange of 
local knowledge in social interactions. ICTs are also used in the expression of a local 
sense of place. For example, Elnar liked to show people from all over the world that 
Indonesia is  a modern nation too.  At  the same time these types of  ‘localness’  are 
profoundly tied to the global. The technical protocols of CDMA and GPS are established 
by international institutional bodies.  Gengsi is about self-presentation by often using 
prestigious  ‘global  brands’.  Bergaul is  the  opposite  of  kampungan (being  from the 
village). As knowing what is ‘now’ and showing it, it is decisively cosmopolitan in scope. 
And Elnar’s experience of ‘technological nationalism’ is displayed in front of a global 
audience. Information- and communication technologies feed an imaginary sense of  
tapping into ‘the global’. This can be an inclusive sense of participating on a worldwide 
scale. ICTs connect individuals and remote communities to the outside world in a two-
way movement. The protests against the Soeharto regime were fueled by information 
128 That digital media spaces establish new senses of place is perhaps most strikingly voiced by one of Sherry 
Turkle’s respondents, a heavy internet user who spent most of his time in online environments, who said real  
life is “just another window” (Turkle, 1995: 13). Turkle however has been criticized for suggesting that online  
worlds and ‘real life’ exist as separate locales.
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exchanged via international mailinglists such as apakabar, and by heroic depictions of 
student resistance in worldwide media. Digital media have come to represent the new 
reformasi values of modernity, which are seen as universal values: freedom of speech, 
human rights, political transparency and corporate responsibility, room for individual 
development  and  mobility.  Young  people  often  use  English  in  mobile  phone 
communication, and even Japanese and French words. This perception of participating 
in a global modernity stems from the historical developments that have taken place in  
Indonesia. It is thus partly constructed on a ‘local’ level. This illustrates the point of  
‘glocality’. ICTs however are also perceived as ‘global’ in an exclusive sense of distant  
otherness. Further on we will see how ICTs are valued negatively as an alien influence  
incompatible with local values.
ICTs  contribute to practices  and identifications on regional  and transnational 
levels. Reformasi has brought far greater room for the expression of identities based on 
regional cultural traditions and ethnicity. Mass media now give attention to regional  
culture. National newspapers like Kompas regularly publish about the consequences of  
political  decentralization.  This  has  turned  local  politicians  into  veritable  cultural 
entrepreneurs who actively market regional cultural heritage to attract tourism and 
business.  Outer  provinces  like  Papua  (formerly  called  Irian  Jaya)  and  Aceh  now 
regularly appear in newspapers and on television. Hand in hand with reports on their 
economic  importance,  attention  is  given  to  regional  culture  129.  Indonesians  from 
Chinese ethnic descent are much more visible in the media. Calls for participation for a 
Chinese  song  contest  are  broadcasted on  television.  Newspapers  write  about  Miss 
China-Indonesia elections. ICTs are part of this changed media landscape. Below we 
see that CDMA telecom operator Esia – with its purposively chosen name - caters to 
various cultural  and religious identifications, by offering a range of  thematic mobile 
devices. Mobile technologies are connected to an Asian modernity. Not the USA is the 
frontrunner but Japan, according to Budi Putra (Putra, 2004: 34). Japanese companies  
like DoCoMo have pioneered technological advancements that soon will become part 
of what Japan has to offer to the rest of the world, in addition to  sumo,  sushi and 
geisha (Putra,  2004:  37-39).  Young  Chinese  people  in  Jakarta  wear  their  clamshell 
phones  on  a  colorful  neck  cord,  like  their  peers  in  Singapore,  Hong  Kong,  and 
elsewhere. They often adorn their  phones with little  danglers,  such as  the Chinese 
lucky  cat,  or  the cute Japanese Hello Kitty.  Korean handset  manufacturer LG ran a 
television advertisement for a new high end fashion phone. The 30-second ad opens 
129 There are fears that some outer provinces, which are of huge economic importance to the nation, want to 
separate themselves politically, as East Timor did in 2002. Without much exaggeration, for the first time  
Papua is acknowledged to have its own culture in the first place. Many Indonesians consider Papuans as 
primitive uncivilized people without culture, hardly human even. One of my former roommates for instance 
used to make monkey noises when talking about Papuans.
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with  an  aerial  night  shot  of  Malaysia’s  modern  capital  Kuala  Lumpur,  instantly 
recognizable by its  landmark Petronas Towers. The footage is  played at high-speed, 
blurring  the  lights  of  car  traffic  and  suggesting  an  accelerated  urban  metabolism. 
Accompanied by a synthesizer tune a pretty (light-skinned) woman with vaguely Asian 
features holds up an LG phone that radiates a bright light. With the phone in her hand  
she  sashays  over  a  spotlessly  clean  boulevard,  her  over-the-knee  evening  gown 
seductively swaying from left to right, towards the Petronas Towers in the distance, 
which  emit  a  bright  glow.  The  ad  ends  with  the  payoff  “LG  -  Life  is  good”.  The 
advertisement portrays a desirable image of a hypermodern Asian city, and of life that  
is  to  be  enjoyed.  Despite  the  Indonesian-Malaysian  love-hate  relationship,  many 
Indonesians look up to their “Asian Tiger” neighbor as a role-model 130. 
The  idea  of  neatly  compartmentalized  identities  becomes  questioned.  From 
August 24-26 2007, the three-day Urbanfest festival for contemporary urban culture 
was organized in theme park Ancol  in north-Jakarta.  Kompas Gramedia,  the largest 
media  group  in  Indonesia,  was  one  of  the  main  organizers.  In  addition  to  ‘global’  
expressions of urban culture and identity (indie music and hip-hop, street games and 
sports, graffiti art), the festival prominently featured elements of Asian popular culture 
like Japanese drumming and dancing, and a Japanese Harajuku cosplay competition as  
one of the evening’s highlights 131. During the festival many of the young people were 
continuously  using  their  mobile  phones  and  photo  cameras  to  capture  a  sense  of 
‘being there’. One of the performing acts was an Indonesian-language hip-hop act from 
Yogyakarta. They invited a female  dangdut singer (a popular genre in Indonesia with 
Malay, Arabic and Hindustani influences) on stage to sing some songs together. After 
the  evening  prayer,  an  indie  (‘independent’)  rock  band  appeared  on  stage  yelling 
“Assalamu'alaikum  wa  rahmatullah  wa  barakatuh!”  (full  version  of  the  Islamic 
greeting) and asked if everybody had done their evening prayer. After finishing their set 
they thanked all the sponsors of the festival and shouted “indie forever”. These may  
seem unlikely combinations: Indonesians dressing up as Japanese comic figures; hip-
hop  meeting  dangdut;  overtly  Islamic  young  people  playing  western-oriented  rock 
music;  an indie  band that  does not  shun commercialism.  Indeed exploring cultural 
hybrids and identity boundaries was precisely what the festival was about. According 
130 The  two  countries  have  almost  the  same  official  language,  their  cultural  histories  overlap,  many 
Indonesians share a Malay ethnic background, both are large Muslim countries. Several bigger and smaller 
political  clashes  have  occurred.  Indonesians  perceive  Malaysia  as  arrogant  because  of  Malaysia’s  rude 
treatment of Indonesian migrant laborers and students.
131 Cosplay  (costume  play)  is  a  Japanese  youth  subculture  whereby  people  elaborately  dress  up  like 
characters from popular culture like anime, manga and video games, and engage in role-playing. Its epicenter 
is the Tokyo neighborhood Harajuku.
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to  one  of  the  festival  organizers,  the  festival  was  meant  as  an  antidote  to  recent 
conservatism. There are no genuinely Indonesian cultures, he said, since the country 
has long been open to foreign influences 132.
3.3.3 Contesting mobile media modernity
There is a downside to these new freedoms for identifications and fluid boundaries of  
identity categories. Many Indonesians feel uncertain about the compatibility of new 
technologies  with their  cultural  and religious values.  When it  comes to the mobile 
phone, the majority of Indonesians are hardly bothered with issues playing in western 
countries, like loss of publicness, tyranny of availability, or deterioration of language.  
Their bewilderment and fears  center on the alien side of  the mobile phone in the 
process of constructing a modern identity. Anxieties about the uncanny come in many 
guises, as Barendregt notes: from the use of mobile phones as detonators in Islamic 
extremist terrorism, to alleged occurrences of the supernatural via the phone; from its  
presumed role in causing the general loss of moral values and cultural traditions, to  
promoting pornography in particular (see Barendregt, 2006a, 2006c, 2008; Barendregt 
& Pertierra, 2008).
Until  mid-2007,  the  second-largest  telecom  operator  Indosat  ran  an 
advertisement campaign via posters, print and television commercials with the slogan 
“Hari gini nggak punya handphone?” (Still today you don’t have a handphone?). One of 
the commercials depicted a group of kids who enter a shopping mall. A security guard  
searches them, standard practice after a number of bomb attacks shook the capital  
over the last few years. All of them take out their mobile phones. Except one boy. He  
hesitantly dips into his pocket and pulls out a banana. As this fruit in Indonesia too 
bears a familiar anatomical connotation, the message conveyed was that someone who 
does not yet have a handphone must be a real loser 133. This may seem like a funny and 
playful way of advertising. But in a country where for many people the possession of  
consumer goods is one of the main sources of status and self-respect, advertisements 
like  these do have a  serious  impact.  In  May 2007 a  female  teenager  killed  herself  
132 See  article  “Indie  festival  to  mix  up  city's  melting  pot”  in  Jakarta  Post,  August  23  2007: 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/08/23/indie-festival-mix-city039s-melting-pot.html-0;  and 
“Gairah  ‘Indie’  di  Panggung  Licin  Globalisasi”  (“Indie”  passion  on  the  slippery  stage  of  globalization)  in 
Kompas, August 24 2007 p.1 and 15.
133 In this blogpost about the advertisement “The boy without a handphone” the connotation is explicitly 
made,  saying  the  guy  in  the  ad  is  meant  to  look  like  a  ‘dick’  (tolol): 
http://daunlontar.blogspot.com/2005/07/lelaki-yang-tak-bertelepon-genggam.html (Indonesian),  published 
on July 2 2005.
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because she could not afford a mobile phone and felt rejected by her peers 134. In face-
to-face conversations, and in the Indonesian blogosphere, the advertisement provoked 
critical  discussions about the downsides of  a modern way of life  that  is  defined by 
consumer goods and new technologies. Some of the issues mentioned were harmful 
peer pressure, social inequality, loss of respect for parents and elders, loss of religious  
discipline and morals,  individualism, hedonism, and the superficiality  of  the cult  of  
prestige with its obsessive fear of being regarded as backward 135. 
Especially  common  are  discussions  about  the  compatibility  of  media 
technologies  with a pious life.  On the ‘study Islam’ mailing list  somebody with the 
nickname antoniobandalem wondered whether Muslims are allowed to use products 
that are made by non-Muslims: 
As far as I know, we as Muslims are not allowed to use any products or goods 
made  by  non-Muslims  [kaum  kafir]???  Because  it  is  said  this  is  haram [not 
permitted by Islam], can you please clarify this?? Islamic teachers in my village 
often  say  that  one  becomes  polluted  [diharamkan]  if  one  uses  or  consumes 
goods that are produced by non-Muslims. The dilemma also is that on the one  
hand the Islamic community [umat islam] wants to commit itself to the Islamic 
law [syariat], however on the other hand we are also still  dependent on non-
Muslims like America and its allies. 136
He received several responses from people on the list who say it is all right to use kafir 
products. Most used religious argumentation. They referred to sections from the Quran 
or religious fatwas by (self-proclaimed) imams that justify consumption of such goods. 
One of most active people on the list, an IT specialist with the nickname Chandraleka, 
gave a more pragmatic reply: 
Wow, don’t be too extreme! As long as the product itself is  halal [permitted by 
Islam]  it  doesn’t  matter  who  produces  it.  This  idea  would  make  modern  life  
134 Several people brought this case to my attention. This blogpost published on February 19 2008 mentions 
the case: http://cefil19.blogspot.com/2008_02_01_archive.html#1067191792759757311 (Indonesian).
135 Some examples of critical  blogposts about the campaign: “Literary science to stimulate social  sense”,  
posted February 10 2008 at  http://cefil19.blogspot.com/2008_02_01_archive.html#1067191792759757311 
(Indonesian), in which the author criticizes consumer culture and makes a plea for literary studies to increase 
media  literacy;  “Peer  Pressure”,  posted  on  May  30  2006  at 
http://yovindra.blogspot.com/2006_05_01_archive.html (Indonesian,  no  longer  accessible),  in  which  the 
author  rejects  the  uncritical  following  of  social  trends;  and  “Marshall  McLuhan  and  Cellphone  culture”,  
posted  February  17  2005  at  http://jovinworks.blogspot.com/2005/02/marshall-mcluhan-and-cellphone-
culture.html (English), one of the few critical notes on the ethic of constant availability.
136 Source:  “study  Islam”  mailing  list,  posted  May  18  2006:  http://www.mail-
archive.com/assunnah@yahoogroups.com/msg08382.html.
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nearly impossible: you cannot drive a car, cannot use a computer, cannot use light 
bulbs, cannot use a mobile phone... One of the causes of extremism is ignorance 
about Islam. That’s why it is important to study religion. Muslims are allowed to 
use kafir products, thank God! It makes this life much easier!” 137
This case is emblematic for debates among (young) Indonesian Muslims about whether 
one should reject or accept technologies as part  of  one’s  religious life.  In this  case 
technologies are understood as consumer goods. In other discussions technologies are 
considered as media. This leads to question like: “Is it allowed to divorce via SMS?”, or:  
“Does the exchange of ‘crazy’ emails, SMSes, and phone calls count as adultery?” 138. In 
such discussions about technologies the boundaries of Islam are questioned. The way 
antoniobandalem formulated his  question (interspersed with religious terms)  is  not 
“am I a good Muslim when I use kafir products?”, but “is Islam capable of incorporating 
the use of these products?”. A term like haram underlines the perceived alien nature of 
such products as polluting not just the individual Muslim but Islam as a whole. Further, 
antoniobandalem connected his religious identity directly to issues on a global scale. In  
terms of we versus them, he referred to the worldwide Islamic community and the 
political dominance of America. Not just the identity category on itself is questioned, 
but the relation between Islam vis-a-vis other entities. The above case further shows 
how new media technologies are used to question and bypass traditional authorities 
on cultural and religious matters. This can swing both ways. It  can either lead to a  
broadening or a narrowing of perspectives. Antoniobandalem’s Islamic teachers from 
the village profess one cannot use kafir products, but thanks to the answers he gets on 
the  mailing  list  he  now  knows  one  can.  By  contrast,  Frangkie  from  the  Muslim 
Brotherhood  (the  case  discussed  in  chapter  2)  seemed  to  use  the  internet  to  dig 
himself into a trench in his opposition to any student group that wasn’t “pure”. In both 
cases media also (re)solidify boundaries. 
Muslims who call themselves modern have no qualms about using technologies 
per se, but question certain media practices they perceive as alien to their cultural  
values  139. During fasting month Ramadan national newspaper Republika, the voice of 
137 Abbreviated and translated from the “study Islam” mailing list, posted May 20 2006:  http://www.mail-
archive.com/belajar-islam@yahoogroups.com/msg00092.html.
138 Sources:  “Question:  Divorce  via  SMS”  posted  April  24  2007  http://www.mail-archive.com/belajar-
islam@yahoogroups.com/msg00231.html (Indonesian); and “Question: do email, SMS, telephone contribute 
to  adultery?”  posted  April  5  2006  http://www.mail-archive.com/belajar-
islam@yahoogroups.com/msg00071.html (Indonesian).
139 To avoid confusion, I use the word ‘modern’ here to refer to an attitude of self-awareness rather than 
referring  to  the  so-called  ‘modernist  Islam’  in  Indonesia,  as  opposed  to  the  ‘traditionalist  Islam’.  These 
qualifications are often given to the two largest Islamic movements in Indonesia, the Muhammadiyah and 
the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).
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the nationalist Islamic majority, published an article titled: “Technology can disturb the 
fasting” 140. The article acknowledges that ICTs make the lives of modern people much 
easier. However, technologies act as a double-edged sword because of their potential  
to  threaten  religious  life.  The  article  introduces  Fathurin  Zein  from  the  faculty  for 
religious studies at the State University Jakarta to give his expert opinion. According to 
Zein, ICTs have changed the former social ways of life of the Indonesian people. The 
tradition  of  reading  the  Quran  together  with  fellow  Muslims  or  the  family  after 
Ramadan evening prayer is waning as a result of technological progress. People have 
become more individualistic. One of the “nasty impacts of technology” is a new type of 
behavior. “Nowadays after the evening prayer father is watching the news, mother is 
watching  soap  series,  and  the  children  are  each  engrossed  with  their  own  X-Box,  
internet  computer or  handphone”.  Zein fears  that  technology,  which is  increasingly 
“without control” and “met with an inexperienced attitude”, will weaken the Islamic 
majority in Indonesia. This becomes “a new challenge”, he says. There are three points 
parents  must  take  heed  of.  First,  the  western  propaganda  of  absolute  freedom of 
expression  without  borders  of  new  media  clearly  contradicts  universal  Islamic 
teachings. The freedom given to mankind has limits set by the Islamic law. The problem 
of ICTs is that the unlimited freedom of expression includes besmirching the prophet  
Muhammad. Second, the problem of ICTs is the unhampered spread of defamation,  
gossip and scandals. People no longer feel ashamed but are even proud about it. Third,  
the  back-and-forth  information  streams  in  the  ICT  cosmos  often  do  not  have  any  
standard measures of truth and credibility. Its consumption may lead people who have 
insufficient awareness of religion on the path of deviation, thus says Zein. 
It would be a mistake to see such a religiously inspired view that promotes the 
curbing  of  free  speech  and  dissemination  of  information  as  the  antithesis  of 
‘modernity’. What we see here is an example of an Islamic modernity. The question 
how Islam and (technological) modernity go together would merit a study of its own. 
Therefore I limit myself to the point that a religiously inspired attitude towards new 
technologies is not antithetical to modernity but entails the search for an alternative  
modernity. Modern Muslims acknowledge that one’s identity as a Muslim no longer 
comes naturally  but  must  be actively  constructed in relation to oneself,  to God, to 
other people and the outside world  141.  This  modern Islamic identity  is  in constant 
movement too. It tries to balance between building an economically prosperous and 
140 In  Republika,  September  19  2007,  page  5.  Online  cache:  http://www.infoanda.com/linksfollow.php?
lh=WAsAV1FTU14E (Indonesian). The article is freely translated and abbreviated.
141 Another typically modern attitude mentioned earlier is looking to oneself through the eyes of others. This 
too has spatial dimensions. Some worry that other Muslims closer to Mecca - and thus closer to the origins 
of Islam - do not see Indonesians as true Muslims. Others self-consciously plead for an Indonesian Islam 
instead of trying to emulate an Arabic version that is alien to southeast Asian culture.
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intellectually  developed  nation,  and  adopting  an  attitude  of  critical  engagement 
towards consumption and technological  culture that  is  in accordance with religious 
values.  It  tries  to  reconcile  local  pre-Islamic  cultural  traditions  and  ‘global’  Arabic-
Islamic  influences  into  a  national  Indonesian  Islam,  while  voicing  global  political  
solidarity  with  the  umat (worldwide  Islamic  community).  Rules  for  living  -  even  if 
considered universal - are no longer unthinkingly followed. They must be self-imposed 
in an active and reflexive manner. Zein rejects “an inexperienced attitude” towards the 
role of technologies in life. Instead he calls for increasing awareness. In true modern 
vocabulary, living a modern religious life with technologies is “a challenge”.
The  above  cases  exemplify  a  key  tension  between  different  factions  in 
Indonesian society. For some ‘global technologies’ are connections to the world, while 
for others they are a Trojan horse that infiltrates local culture and society, and destroys 
them  from  within.  For  most  they  are  both  at  once.  This  is  largely  a  generational  
conflict.  Young people  use new media as  play spaces,  for  instance to explore their  
sexuality. This causes older people to react with moral panic. On February 13 2000 
newspaper Republika dedicated a whole page to the increasingly popular Valentine’s 
Day (February 14). One descriptive article was juxtaposed with several other articles 
that had headlines like: “This is not our culture”, and: “This is cultural colonialism 142. A 
letter to the editor said: “This leads to free sex”. “Free sex” is the catch phrase for all 
sexual  activity  outside marriage. Like many other concepts in  Indonesia it  is  Janus-
faced. Publicly, it has become the label for perfidious western cultural influences that 
lead to  immoral,  un-Indonesian  behavior  and spoil  the young.  Behind  the screens, 
“free  sex”  exerts  huge  attraction  and  the  promise  of  excitement  for  many  young  
people.  Other  letters  warned:  “Don’t  follow”,  and:  “Follow  the  example  of  the 
prophet”. Some letters associated Valentine’s Day with Christianity, and pointed to the 
Quranic saying: “if you adopt the culture of others (those who are not Muslim) you will  
become one of them”. The Republika page pushed the message that Valentine’s Day 
neither  roots  in  the  values  of  Islam,  nor  in  “our”  Indonesian  culture.  As  this  was 
published one day in advance, and appealed to the reader in terms of an ‘inclusive us’,  
it seemed a call for action instead of being informative  143. In the same issue of the 
newspaper,  the  chairman  of  the  “society  for  family-friendly  media”  criticized  the 
ubiquitous availability of pornography on the then popular carrier VCD (Video CD). Like 
drugs, the danger is that it young people who watch pornography will need more and 
more stimulants, he wrote 144 
142 Republika, February 13 2000, p. 3.
143 Indonesian is unique in that it knows two words for we/us/our. Difference and similarity are built into the 
language itself. Kita includes the addressee (we, including you), kami excludes those spoken to (we, not you). 
Kita was used in these articles.
144 Republika, February 13 2000, p. 14.
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Bart  Barendregt  has  written  extensively  on  how  the  mobile  phone  is 
connected  to  fears  about  pornography  (Barendregt,  2006a,  2008).  A  multitude  of  
scandals have appeared in the media whereby the mobile phone camera was used to 
record sexual acts. Such scandals involved soap actors, pop singers, and politicians, and 
- more worrying - ordinary students and schoolgirls and boys (Barendregt, 2008: 168).  
These recordings spread via the internet or pass from hand to hand, for instance via 
Bluetooth file exchange. As a reaction, the movement “Don’t go naked in front of the  
camera” was founded to dissuade young people to succumb to the temptations of 
mobile phone pornography. Ironically the group uses the same media technologies it  
considers  potentially  dangerous:  it  has  a  website  and  a  Facebook  group  145.  Their 
website  lists  a  selected  overview  of  “naked  before  camera”  cases,  including  juicy 
details like the age and number of people involved, place, duration, and type of act. 
Fear  and  pleasurable  thrill-seeking  seem  to  touch  each  other.  One  of  the 
‘commitments’  this  movement  formulated is:  “to be  critical  of  policies  that  always  
prioritize the availability and access of information technologies, which consciously or 
unconsciously  ignore  the  availability  and  quality  of  content  and messages  that  are 
child-friendly,  family-friendly,  and  improve  education  and  empowerment  of  the 
Indonesian people” 146. On the forum Mypulau.com (my island), a website maintained 
by telecom provider Telkomsel, a member provided a number of “Tips for super-safe 
sexual  affairs”  with  the  help  of  the  mobile  phone  147.  The  post  opened  with  the 
sentence “Still today you don’t have an affair??? You’re probably not very trendy!!”, a 
playful  reference  to  the  Indosat  advertisement  “Still  today  you  don’t  have  a 
handphone?”.  Advise  included:  “delete  all  SMSes  from  your  phone  immediately, 
otherwise your suspicious girlfriend or boyfriend might find out!”, and: “Buy two SIM 
cards, or better, buy two telephones: one for your girlfriend and the other for your 
affair”. The tong-in-cheek  gaul joke was not appreciated by everyone on the forum. 
Among  the  many  negative  reactions  one  commenter  likened  adultery  to  addictive 
drugs and said “it is only a virtual pleasure, the real pleasure is found in heaven soon”. 
3.3.4 Reconciling differences
Despite  frictions  and  struggle,  for  most  a  technologically  defined  modernity  and 
religious  and  regional  cultural  identities  go  well  together.  More  than  20.000 
Indonesians  have  joined the Facebook  group “SOS Internet  Indonesia”,  founded  to 
145 See their website at http://www.jbdk.org, and http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=63425608697.
146 Source: organization’s website and Facebook page.
147 Source: http://www.mypulau.com/news_view.php?newsentry_id=899.
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oppose national government plans to censor new media content 148. Telecoms actively 
cater to the reconciliation of ICTs and different identities. During the fasting month  
many operators and mobile phone producers advertise with special offers, like Islamic 
ringtones and cheap calling rates from/to Saudi Arabia. CDMA operator Esia introduced 
an ‘Islamic’ mobile phone called the Hape Esia Hidayah (‘divine guidance phone’) with 
a Quran, prayer time warnings, and the chance to win a pilgrimage to Mecca 149. The 
hidayah became a big success. Esia claims to have sold almost 500 thousand phones in 
one year since its launch in August 2008  150. Following its expansion to other islands 
with different cultural  traditions and religions, the company made a Hindu-Balinese 
mobile phone Hape Esia Bali with a Hindu calendar; a Chinese phone Hape Esia Fu with 
fengshui and  fortune  cookies  applications  and  50%  discount  on  calls  to  China, 
Hongkong  and Singapore;  and a  Christian  phone  Hape  Esia  Kasih with  a  bible  and 
Christian ringtones. People who do not wish to express ethnic or religious difference 
can buy the patriotic Hape Esia Merdeka (‘freedom phone’) with symbols of Indonesian 
national unity. If none of these ‘old’ identity categories seem appealing, one can always 
opt for the Hape Esia Slank with special content from one of Indonesia’s most popular 
rock bands Slank. Founder of critical Tempo Magazine, and one of Indonesia’s  main 
public  intellectuals,  Goenawan  Mohamad  succinctly  describes  the  reconciliation  of 
religious  and  cultural  identities  with  modern  life.  He  notes  the  apparent  tension 
between religious  or  moral  values  and (capitalist)  modernity.  At  the same time he 
witnesses its nullification. He gives the case of a film star friend, who for his birthday is  
offered the choice between a handphone or an  umroh (pilgrimage to Mecca outside 
the hadj month). Both product (handphone) and communal religious ritual (umroh) are 
by now commodified as matters of individual choice, Mohamad concludes 151. 
At stake are the three identity tensions identified earlier. Can people maintain 
their traditional values and stay the same in the face of technological changes, or do 
they have to adapt and redefine selfhood? Do these technologies impose a ‘global’  
homogeneity  on  everyone,  or  offer  room  for  people  with  different  cultural 
backgrounds to mold these technologies in accordance with their lives? Do people play 
the  media  in  freedom  or  are  they  forcibly  being  played  by  the  media?  Many 
Indonesians have the sense that the mobile phone and other ICTs inescapably draw 
them into an infinite game. The stake in this game is identity itself. Whether it is the  
competitive pressure to possess the most prestigious handphone, remain up-to-date, 
148 See http://www.facebook.com/tolakrpmkonten.
149 See product website at http://www.myesia.com/hidayah_web.
150 Source:  Bakrie  Telecom  press  room,  published  on  August  12  2009  at  
http://www.bakrietelecom.com/bakrie-telecom-pelopori-lagi-hape-islami.
151 Article  “Handphone”,  February  7  2000 
http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/caping/2000/02/07/mbm.20000207.CTP111488.id.html.
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and engage in ongoing socializing,  or the task to actively resist the mobile phone’s 
seductions;  new  media  continuously  burden  people  with  unavoidable  choices  that  
affect their sense of who and what they are. People must respond to this pressure  
through long-term strategies and ad-hoc tactics. They must create their own rules that  
prescribe how to use media  technologies  in  accordance with themselves,  and self-
impose these rules. Indeed, life with mobile media technologies becomes ‘a challenge’. 
This burden makes up the fourth level of play: being played by the mobile.
3.4 Conclusion: four play types
In  these  two chapters  we have  seen how Indonesian  identities  are  shaped  by  the 
mobile phone. Two main points have been made. First, changes in identities are too 
‘rich’  and  complex  to  be  the  direct  result  from  media  technologies.  By  taking  a 
contextual perspective that involves spatial, social and cultural dimensions, the relation 
between media technologies  and identity  construction is  understood in terms  of  a 
‘mutual shaping’. We have seen that mobile media do not exist in isolation but are part  
of  a  broader  media  landscape,  which  has  developed  in  a  specifically  Indonesian 
context. Similarly, identities are constructed in relation to historical, social and political 
developments.  We  have  described  this  particular  context  in  terms  of  a  ‘mobile 
modernity’. Second, evidence from the Indonesian case supports the argument that 
play  is  a  fruitful  way  to  look  at  technologically  mediated  identities.  Following  the 
conceptualization of the play framework outlined in chapter 1, four levels of play have 
been recognized. These have been summarized at the end of chapter 2 and reappeared 
in chapter 3. In addition, four types of play have emerged. We have seen elements of 
competition and mastery (agôn) in the practice of increasing  gengsi through mobile 
phone related signifiers, and in the display of social know-how through  bergaul. We 
have seen elements of chance and luck (alea) in the practice of lucky numbers and in 
the  lotteries  held  by  telecoms.  We  have  seen  elements  of  pretense  and  illusion 
(mimicry)  in  the  imitation  of  being  a  successful  young  businessman or  woman,  in 
Dewi’s reflexive performance of having achieved a desirable new position in life, and in  
the  creative  joking  of  bergaul.  We  have  seen  elements  of  thrill-seeking  and 
disorientation (ilinx) in the exchange of illicit mobile phone pornography, and in the 
dizzying  experiences  that  stem  from  the  overabundance  of  mobile  phone 
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customization items in shopping malls, and the confusing myriad of identities that the 
media landscape as a whole has opened up. Further, we have seen how mobile media  
shape the construction of modern identities in a dialectic between opening up new 
play spaces for free play, and setting new stakes in rule-bound games. Most attention 
has been paid to the play levels of play with, play through and play by the mobile. Play 
on the mobile has received less attention. It is to this level we now turn.
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4. Locating the media: mobile media and urban plays 152
4.1 In search of locative media
In this chapter we look at locative media, a development that integrates positioning 
technologies  in mobile media. This development is  analyzed as  case of  play on the 
mobile.
4.1.1 Location-based technologies
The principal factors in media impact on existing social forms are acceleration 
and disruption. Today the acceleration tends to be total, and thus ends space as 
the main factor in social arrangements. 
(McLuhan, 1994: 94). 
For a long time information and communication technologies have been understood as 
‘placeless’.  The  dominant  vision  was  that  ICTs  weaken  or  even  obliterate  the 
importance  of  physical  place  (location)  in  general  and  the  need  for  spatial 
concentration in cities in particular (Downey & McGuigan,  1999; Graham, 2004),  as 
well as social relations and identities based on proximate face-to-face interactions in 
social situations (locale) (Meyrowitz, 1985: 308). This ‘paradigm’ has been captured in 
the phrase “anyplace, anytime, anywhere” (see Graham, 2004: 4; Kuitenbrouwer, 2006: 
56). As late as 1998, ‘virtual community’ researcher Steve Jones claimed:
cyberspace hasn't a “where” (though there are “sites” or “nodes” at which users 
gather).  Rather,  the  space  of  cyberspace  is  predicated  on  knowledge  and 
information, on the common beliefs and practices of a society abstracted from 
physical space. 
(Jones, 1998: 15)
152 Many themes and ideas addressed in this chapter were shaped through collaborations with researcher  
Martijn de Waal, with whom I founded the project The Mobile City (www.themobilecity.nl), and locative 
media  artist  Esther  Polak,  with  whom  I  participated  in  a  locative  media  project  called  NomadicMILK 
(www.nomadicmilk.net). However, all omissions or mistakes are entirely mine.
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In response to this ‘old’ new media paradigm, recent work shows that mobile media  
practices in particular are frequently tied to physical places and physically co-present 
social situations. And via mobile media the internet too. Instead of being placeless, 
mobile  media  indeed  contribute  to  “a  sense  of  place”  (Nyíri,  2005:  17-18).  A  few 
examples from literature illustrate this. Many people start a mobile phone conversation 
by asking “where are you?” in order to ‘situate’ the other person (Arminen, 2006: 320; 
Laurier, 2003; Licoppe, 2004: 138; Plant, 2001: 29, 61; Townsend, 2000: 87; Wellman,  
2001: 239). In what is called ‘micro-coordination’, the phone is used as a prelude to 
actual face-to-face meetings that take place somewhere (Ling & Yttri, 2002: 139). Most 
people are very aware of which situations are appropriate for making a mobile phone  
call, and what kind of topics are acceptable in that particular setting (Höflich, 2005:  
160).  Mobile  phones  are  used  as  audio  players,  and  add  an  aural  layer  to  one’s  
experience of  physical  spaces  one  is  dwelling  in  or  passing  through.  They  offer  an 
intense  experience  of  one’s  environment  through  sound  (Bassett,  2005:  175;  Bull, 
2005).  Many  migrants  call  and  text  with  family  and  friends  overseas,  and  thereby 
maintain a sense of ‘home’ (Paragas, 2005: 241). The mobile phone also helps to create 
an imagined sense of nearness with other people (called co-presence). Familiar people 
are “always in the pocket” (De Gournay, 2002: 201-204; Fox, 2006: 13).
Mobile media technologies are considered part of a broader class of information 
and communication technologies (ICTs). Nevertheless, from the outset they have been 
conceptualized as distinctive from computers and the internet precisely because of this  
relation to physical  context.  In a comparison of  (early)  internet  studies  and mobile 
media  studies,  Mizuko  Ito  notes  that  mobile  communications  studies  have 
“foregrounded sociocultural diversity in a way that was not, at least initially, evident in 
Internet studies” (Ito, et al., 2005: 5). Indeed, edited volumes about the mobile phone 
almost always present studies from a wide range of cultural contexts (examples are 
Castells, et al., 2004; Katz, 2008; Katz & Aakhus, 2002; Ling, 2004; Ling & Campbell, 
2009; Ling & Pedersen, 2005; Nyíri, 2003a, 2003b, 2005). Ito further says that by using 
terms like ‘cyberspace’ and ‘virtual reality’, early internet studies “focused on the ways 
in which the new media seemed able to constitute spaces or places apart from the rest 
of  social  life  (‘real  life’  or  offline  life)”  (Ito,  et  al.,  2005:  8).  Mobile communication 
studies emphasize how the mobile phone integrates online and physical worlds (ibid: 
8). Another difference she notes is that internet studies have looked at the mediation 
of  social  relations  as  ‘virtual  communities’  that  are  formed between strangers  and 
sustained online, while mobile communication studies look at communication between 
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intimates who already know each other in relatively small  circles  153.  Mobile phone 
ethnographies focus on how the mobile phone is being used in actual physical places, 
Ito  continues.  “Keitai [the mobile  phone in Japan]  users  are  characterized by  their 
attention to and immersion in the physical environment and social order, even as they 
increasingly  maintain  contact  with  distant  personal  relations  through  an  intimate 
portable  device.  The  keitai both  colonizes  and  adapts  to  the  structures  of  exiting 
practices  and places”  (ibid:  13,  my addition in brackets).  Finally,  Ito notes  that  the  
mobile technologies have moved computing away from the desktop and into everyday 
settings.  The  mobile  phone  can  be  considered  an  instantiation  of  visions  about 
“ubiquitous computing” (more about this below). She proposes: “[a] crucial emergent 
area of  inquiry is  the need to theorize the layering of different forms of social and 
physical  presence  and  to  study  interactional  practices  for  managing  simultaneous 
presence in multiple social situations” (ibid: 13). I pick up this suggestion in the current  
chapter.
By  contrasting  mobile  media  to  other  ICTs,  Ito  primarily  focuses  on  mobile 
phones as communications media. Two other dimensions receive less attention. Unlike 
the personal computer that tends to be tucked away under the desk, the mobile phone 
is tied to everyday physical settings as a visible material artifact 154. We have seen how 
Indonesians use the mobile phone as a prop in the display of  gengsi. Anthropologist 
Alex Taylor observes that for teenagers “the phone’s physical presence - its materiality - 
in everyday talk enables it to provide a means to manage and organize topic” (Taylor,  
2005: 153). Its taken-for-granted presence among young people makes the phone an 
easy target to divert attention to as a non-awkward topic. And Fortunati et al. analyze 
how  the  mobile  phone  is  integrated  with  the  human  body  as  a  fashion  object 
(Fortunati,  et  al.,  2003:  1-11).  Second, and of  chief  concern in this  chapter,  mobile 
devices and networks are increasingly equipped with location-based technologies, like 
GPS  (global  positioning  system),  cell  tower  positioning,  Bluetooth,  Wi-Fi  (wireless 
fidelity,  i.e.  a  wireless  networking  protocol),  RFID  (radio  frequency  identification), 
compasses, accelerometers and proximity sensors. Location-based mobile media not 
only (re)establish a sense of place by being tied to physical  locales, they also connect 
digital information and communication to actual locations. From a technological point 
of view location-based media are characterized by a convergence of portable media,  
wireless  networking  technologies,  and  positioning  technologies.  GPS  uses  satellite 
signals to establish a receiver’s absolute geographical position with fair accuracy (up to 
153 This is culturally specific too. In Indonesia for instance it is much more common to exchange handphone  
numbers amongst strangers than in Europe, north America or Japan. In various print media young people - 
boys and girls alike - publish little personal announcements to seek new friends.
154 Visions about the future of computing envisioned its embedding in everyday settings, yet the aim was to 
make the device disappear into the background (Weiser, 1991; Weiser & Brown, 1996).
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30  cm accurate  under  good  conditions).  Assisted  GPS  (aGPS)  uses  carrier  network 
signals to establish a quick but less precise position, based on signal strength to the 
nearest unique cellular tower or triangulation between multiple towers. Internet users 
have  IP  numbers  that  reveal  someone’s  physical  location  with  surprising  accuracy. 
Other technologies like Bluetooth, NFC (near field communication) based on RFID, and 
WiFi, depend on the relative position (or proximity) of a device to another device or  
the network.  Many recent smartphones house an accelerometer,  a compass, and a 
proximity sensor, to measure how the device is being held, to which direction it points,  
and whether it is near to another object. 
Figure 4: Various location-based technologies (protocol, range, transfer speed, access time).
4.1.2 Locative media practices
On top of these technologies a multitude of applications and services are developed 
that  use  geographical  positioning.  Location-based  developments  thus  are  partly 
technologically driven, and partly consist of transdisciplinary practices in and between 
the digital  media  arts,  research and development  in ‘ubiquitous  computing’,  urban 
research and design, ‘pervasive gaming’, telecom industries searching for new services 
and business models, and an academic fascination with digital media and the ‘revenge’  
of locality. This diversity is reflected in the many names that are given to overlapping 
developments  in  location-based  and  context-aware  computing.  They  are  variously 
called ‘locative media’, a term coined in the digital media arts (Albert, 2004; Bleecker & 
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Knowlton,  2006;  Chang  & Goodman,  2006;  Galloway  & Ward,  2006;  Lemos,  2009; 
McCullough,  2006;  Norman,  2006;  Pope,  2005;  B.  Russell,  2004;  Shirvanee,  2006; 
Tuters  &  Varnelis,  2006);  ‘urban  computing’,  ‘urban  new  media’  and  ‘urban 
informatics’, terms rooting in urban studies (Foth, 2009; Graham, 2004; Greenfield & 
Shepard,  2007;  Williams  &  Dourish,  2006);  ‘pervasive  computing’,  ‘context-aware 
computing’,  ‘ubiquitous  computing’,  the  ‘internet  of  things’,  ‘ambient  intelligence’, 
terms originating in computer research (Aarts & Diederiks, 2006; Bell & Dourish, 2006;  
Berg, 2009; Bleecker, 2006; Crang & Graham, 2007; Greenfield, 2006; Hinske, Lampe, & 
Carsten  Magerkurth,  2007;  Kranenburg,  2008;  Moran  &  Dourish,  2001;  B.  Russell, 
1999;  Sterling,  2005);  and  ‘location-based  services’  (LBS)  and  ‘geospatial  web’,  the 
preferred labels in telecom and internet industries (Rao & Minakakis, 2003; Scharl & 
Tochtermann, 2007). For practical reasons I stick to the name ‘locative media’ in this 
chapter 155.
Digital media artists have been quick to engage in the development and artistic  
uses of locative technologies (Paul, 2008; Tuters & Varnelis, 2006). The term ‘locative 
media’ was coined for a 2003 media art workshop in Latvia  156. Subsequently, artists 
and researchers started exploring the potential of this emerging domain and tried to 
stake out a ‘locative media’ field in a number of publications 157. Some of the recurring 
themes in locative media arts are depicting the spatial dimensions of economic and 
social relations; representing a sense of embodiment through media; narrating place-
based  identities;  visualizing  the  poetics  of  mobility;  exposing  layman  geographical 
knowledge and experience;  and critically  questioning the omnipresence of  wireless 
technologies, surveillance issues, and the politics of place (Albert, 2004; Bleecker & 
Knowlton, 2006; Galloway & Ward, 2006; Nold, 2009; Norman, 2006; Pope, 2005; Sant,  
2006; Sharpe, 2006; Shirvanee, 2006). Locative media artists invariably use cartography 
as a visual medium. Using maps raises issues of representation (as in reflexive modern 
art the medium itself becomes scrutinized). What is included and what is left out? Who 
represents? It has been argued that the ‘universalist’ Euro-centric Cartesian maps that  
are often deployed as backends in locative projects (for example Google Earth/Maps) 
favor an abstract, rational spatial knowledge aimed at control (Fusco, 2005). Moreover, 
GPS originated as a US military technology. It was only opened up for civilian use in the  
year  2000.  GPS  is  “inextricable  connected  to  military  complexes  and  its  increasing 
commercial ubiquity” (Galloway & Ward, 2006). Still, artists have embraced subjectivity 
in mapping people’s own experiences of space and places. Examples are the projects  
155 Mainly because my introduction in this field started with a collaboration with a locative media artist.
156 See workshop website at http://locative.x-i.net/intro.html.
157 Notably in Mute Magazine, numbers 28 (2004) and 29 (2005) (http://www.metamute.org) and in a special 
issue of Leonardo Electronic Almanac, vol. 14 issue 3-4 (2006) (http://leoalmanac.org).
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Bio Mapping (2004) by Christian Nold, and Amsterdam RealTime (2002) by Esther Polak 
and Jeroen Kee at Waag Society 158. In Bio Mapping participants went out for a walk in 
their neighborhood. They wore a specially crafted device that measured their ‘galvanic 
skin response’, an indicator of emotional arousal, and a GPS device that logged their 
movements.  Upon  their  return,  an  ‘emotional  map’  was  compiled  with  three-
dimensional  spikes  at  points  were  people  felt  aroused  (like  busy  junctions).  In 
Amsterdam  RealTime a  cross-section  of  Amsterdam  urbanites  were  given  a  GPS 
receiver and a mobile internet-enabled device. As they moved around town, their GPS 
geo-coordinates were directly uploaded to a central server. At the exhibition space the 
GPS data were visualized as individual traces of participant’s corporeal mobilities in the 
city and could be viewed in (almost) real-time. In the course of the two-month project  
a  recognizable  map  of  the  city  of  Amsterdam  emerged  from  the  cumulative 
movements  of  all  participants.  On  an  aggregate  level  the  movements  followed 
predictable and logical patterns. The busy main arteries of the city were very visible, 
while  residential  areas  remained  almost  dark.  On  an  individual  level  however  it 
appeared  the  majority  of  the  participants  did  not  venture  very  far  from  their 
neighborhood. In the week they carried the device they only traveled between a small 
number of places. This countered the idea that people nowadays live a hyper-mobile 
‘nomadic’ lifestyle. Locative media mappings thus can expose what normally remains 
hidden. As we have seen, urbanist Kevin Lynch argues that people make cognitive maps 
of the (urban) environment in order to orient themselves. In this chapter we explore 
how people relate to their environment, to other people, and themselves, and what 
the role is of digital cartography in making this visible.
Locative media can be traced back to vision of ubiquitous computing. Xerox Parc  
researcher Mark Weiser famously begins his 1991 article  The Computer for the 21st  
Century  with the words: “[t]he most profound technologies are those that disappear. 
They weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable  
from it” (Weiser, 1991). Weiser pictures a future in which computing technologies will  
be a constant background presence. Location and scale are crucial, as computers have 
to invisibly and seamlessly integrate into the everyday world. “[U]biquitous computers 
must know where they are. [...] If a computer merely knows what room it is in, it can 
adapt  its  behavior  in  significant  ways  without  requiring  even  a  hint  of  artificial  
intelligence” (ibid). Weiser speculates that when computers make relevant decisions 
for us without standing in our way, they can overcome the problem of information 
overload. Since his influential article, much has been written about ‘ubicomp’ as the 
158 See Bio Mapping website at http://biomapping.net, and Nold, 2009; Amsterdam RealTime website at 
http://real-time.waag.org.
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third big paradigm in computing, after the mainframe and the personal computer 159. A 
trend is observed towards: “[n]umerous, casually accessible, often invisible computing 
devices;  [f]requently  mobile  or  embedded  in  the  environment;  [c]onnected  to  an 
increasingly ubiquitous network infrastructure composed of a wired core and wireless 
edges” (Moran & Dourish, 2001: 87). Various authors argue that this fairly accurately  
describes the mobile phone (Bell & Dourish, 2006; Moran & Dourish, 2001). Already in 
2001, Moran and Dourish write: “[c]ell phones are really networked computers. The 
distinction between communication and computational [sic] is blurring, not only in the 
devices, but also in the variety of ways computation allows us to communicate, from e-
mail to chat to voice to video” (Moran & Dourish, 2001: 88). Bell and Dourish propose  
that ubiquitous computing is already ‘here and now’ (Bell & Dourish, 2006). “Arguably 
[...] our contemporary world, in which mobile computation and mobile telephony are  
central aspects not just of Western commercial endeavors but also facets of everyday 
life  in  the  developing  world,  is  already  one  of  ubiquitous  computing,  albeit  in 
unexpected form” (ibid: 135). Mobile media are not only communications media (the C  
in ICTs), but increasingly also informational media (the I in ICTs) 160. Other than personal 
computers  at home or at  work,  mobile media are embedded in a myriad of  social 
situations. 
The omnipresence of mobile media has also risen to attention in the field of 
urbanism. Anthony Townsend explores how “mobile communications devices will have 
a  profound  effect  on  cities  as  urbanites  weave  them  into  their  daily  routines” 
(Townsend, 2000: 85). He poses the question what happens to urban space and place, 
and the activities of  urbanites, when information and communication is  freed from 
fixed locations. Townsend proposes that the mobile phone is a decision-making tool 
that allows everyday life information management in real-time. Real-time and personal 
time-management leads to a speed-up and a modification of the ‘urban metabolism’.  
Quantitatively,  the  amount  of  (potential)  interactions  between  urban  inhabitants 
increases dramatically. Qualitatively, modes of organization shift from being organized 
around schedules and fixed locations to being organized into decentralized networks.  
This permits “the withholding of commitment to a set course of action until the last  
possible moment, always holding open the window for better information” (ibid: 98).  
Location-sensitive information “will add a new level of improvement to this on-the-fly  
decision  making”  (ibid:  98).  The  acknowledgement  that  ubiquitous  computing  is 
already  among  us  and  influencing  cities  worldwide  has  spurred  a  hybrid  research 
159 See for instance a special edition about “context-aware computing” in the Human-Computer Interaction 
journal (2001) vol. 16, issue 2-4.
160 According to the New York Times, in 2009 the amount of data in text, e-mail messages, streaming video,  
music and other services on mobile devices surpassed the amount of voice data in cellphone calls in the USA. 
Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/technology/personaltech/14talk.html?_r=1&hp.
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agenda about “cybercities”, “urban computing” or “urban informatics” that investigates 
the interplay between (mobile) ICTs and the city (Aurigi & De Cindio, 2008; Foth, 2009; 
Graham,  2004;  Williams  & Dourish,  2006).  Urban computing  is  deployed  in  actual  
projects. Eric Paulos and team executed a project in Accra, Ghana with mobile devices 
to measure and visualize the city’s air quality. Participants were given a mobile device 
with GPS and an air quality  sensor to measure and log locations with high carbon  
monoxide  concentrations  and  other  gasses.  At  the  end  of  the  day  results  were 
collected to produce a ‘heat map’ of air pollution (Paulos, Honicky, & Goodman, 2007).  
Paulos et al. reconceptualize the mobile phone from a personal communications device 
to  a  “networked  mobile  personal  measurement  instrument”  that  can  be  used  for 
“participatory urbanism” (ibid). In this chapter I specifically deal with the urban context 
by  analyzing  how  locative  media  shape  the  experience  of  the  city,  social  relations 
between urbanites, and urban identities.
Pervasive games use mobile media as platforms to play location-based games. 
Pervasive games are digital games that use media interfaces and simultaneously take 
place in- and relate to the physical environment. An early example is Pacmanhattan 
(2004), a game that used the grid of New York City’s streets as the maze of the well-
known computer game Pacman 161. One player was dressed as Pacman and had to run 
the city streets to collect virtual  points. He was being chased by four other players 
dressed as ghosts, who tried to capture Pacman before all the points were collected.  
Players worked in teams of two: one on the streets and one behind a computer. Street  
players constantly updated their position via the mobile telephone to their teammate, 
who registered the player’s positions in a networked computer program. Pacman was 
allowed to ask the teammate where the ghosts were. The four ghosts could not ask 
their co-player where Pacman was. The game was over when a ghost spotted Pacman, 
or when Pacman had ‘eaten’ all the dots (see for a description: Chang & Goodman,  
2006;  McGonigal,  2007:  225-228).  Pacmanhattan used a primitive form of  location-
awareness via manual updates. More recent location-based games use (a)GPS-based 
positioning to automatically  pinpoint  a  player’s  location (de Souza e Silva & Sutko,  
2008). 
Mobile device manufacturers, telecom providers, and (third party) application 
developers have recently taken up location-aware technologies. A popular service is 
Foursquare. The makers describe the service as a cross between a friend-finder, a social 
city-guide, and a game that rewards players for doing interesting things 162. Foursquare 
uses  special  location-aware  software  for  the  mobile  device  that  allows  people  to 
‘check-in’ at certain physical locations (restaurants, bars, clubs, shops, etc.). Foursquare 
161 See the Pacmanhattan website at http://pacmanhattan.com.
162 See the Foursquare website at http://foursquare.com/help.
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users can attach tips and to-dos to a geographical location relevant to that physical 
context (“do try out the shrimp salad at restaurant The Happy Seagull”). Tips can be 
shared with friends on Foursquare, or on other online social networks like Facebook 
and Twitter  163. Foursquare has competitive game elements. One can earn points by 
checking  in,  receive  badges  for  tagging  places,  get  listed  on  the  Foursquare 
‘leaderboard’ when one is very active, and become the ‘mayor’ of a place if one is the 
most frequent visitor. 
4.1.3 Locative media classification
As often, it seems useful to make a classification of a newly developing field to get a  
feel for its scope and aims. I propose a fivefold typology of locative media, based on  
the primary criterion by which digital media technologies are purposively ‘reconciled’  
with geographical location. After all, new technologies are not just ‘there’. They are 
actively developed and deployed by people with particular aims. This typology is by no 
means absolute, as new developments undoubtedly take place. Nor are the categories 
very strict. They often overlap. So they must be seen as ideal-types that highlight one 
particular aspect of location-based technologies. Locative media technologies are used 
(i) for navigation and orientation in wayfinding; (ii) to measure and visualize what is  
otherwise not visible; (iii) to annotate physical locations with digital information; (iv) to 
organize social interactions; (v) for pervasive games. In addition, I argue that play not  
only occurs in pervasive games but informs the other categories as well. Furthermore, 
in all categories locative media induce us to reflect on ourselves in spatial terms.
i. Wayfinding
Locative media are used to reach a specific  destination and/or to orient oneself  to 
one’s  environment.  In  navigation,  the  endpoint  is  known  but  the  route  is  not. 
Navigation services assist in reaching a location according to predetermined criteria: in 
the least  amount  of  time,  via  the shortest/most  beautiful/safest/cheapest  route.  A 
number  of  commercial  car  and  pedestrian  navigation  services  exist,  like  TomTom, 
Garmin,  Google  Maps,  Nokia  Maps.  In  orientation,  neither  route  nor  endpoint  are  
known beforehand. Locative technologies are used for orientation on locales. Typical  
location-based services enable people to find a nearby Italian restaurant by using their 
GPS-enabled  mobile  phone,  and  to  judge  it  based  on  online  recommendations 
(perhaps  via  a  reputation-based  social  networking  component)  164.  Compared  to 
navigation,  orientation  offers  more  room  for  playful  surprises,  since  people  may 
163 Many ‘web 2.0’ social media networks have an open API (advanced programming interface), the protocol  
used to store and retrieve information. This allows third party applications to access this information.
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diverge  from  their  paths  when  something  interesting  nearby  is  encountered.  A 
projected next step is that objects or services in urban space will actively announce 
themselves (“I am the best Italian restaurant around here!”). In public places like bus  
stops,  advertising  campaigns  offer  free  downloads  if  people  enable  the  Bluetooth 
function on their mobile phone and accept a commercial message 165. Such services are 
hampered because telecom laws prohibit  unsolicited spam. ‘Proximity marketing’  is 
often  about  nearness  rather  than  a  unique  geographical  location.  An  intriguing 
question is whether we retain our capacity for spatial orientation when we outsource  
this to our navigation devices 166? People often literally loose sight of the road. Stories 
abound of people who steer their car into the ditch because their navigation device 
told them to, or unsuspectingly end up in Rio’s most dangerous favela 167. Another issue 
is often called ‘the end of serendipity’. If we ‘optimize’ our movements through the 
urban environment via informational wayfinding devices, do we loose the spontaneity 
of running into an unexpected place or person by chance while looking for something 
else? We return to this question later in this chapter.
ii. Sensing and visualization
Locative  media  are  used  to  capture  and  visualize  what  is  otherwise  not  visible. 
Visualizations frequently rely on aggregated datasets and invariably use some kind of  
mapping.  Cartographic  visualizations  can reveal  people’s  physical  or  communicative 
mobility patterns, either individually or as a group. The BBC television series  Britain  
From Above (2008) visualizes various mobility systems using aggregated (GPS) data 168. 
The series shows physical mobility systems, including train travel, ship movements in 
the North Sea Channel, taxi flows in central London, and airplane circulations above 
Heathrow  airport.  Normally  invisible  informational  and  communicative  mobility 
systems are shown too, like internet traffic and transnational energy logistics. These 
visualizations are a perfect illustration of  Urry’s  point  that  our present-day mobility 
systems are co-dependent on ICT-based systems (Urry, 2007: 14). A case of exposing 
164 Foursquare  does  orientation  via  social  networking.  A  Dutch  example  of  a  location-based  service  is  
restaurant finder http://m.iens.nl.
165 Dutch examples: http://www.Bluetoothreclame.nl and http://www.proximity-marketing.nl.
166 The introduction of new technologies is frequently understood as an ‘extension’ of the human body as 
well as an ‘amputation’ (McLuhan, 1994: ch.4).
167 See  “£96,000  Merc  written  off  as  satnav  leads  woman  astray”: 
http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-23389219-details/Â£96,000%20Merc%20written%20off%20as
%20satnav%20leads%20woman%20astray/article.do;  and  “GPS  guides  Norwegian  tourists  into  trouble  in 
Rio”: http://www.reuters.com/article/oddlyEnoughNews/idUSTRE4AO6G720081125.
168 See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/britainfromabove.
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individual physical mobility is Dopplr, a locative service for frequent travelers 169. Dopplr 
registers  members’  travels,  and  combines  this  with  a  social  network  of  other 
globetrotters. At the end of the year members get a personal visual report. The report 
shows where they have traveled, the total amount of kilometers spent, who they are 
closest to in terms of travel patterns and places, their average velocity, the amount of  
traveling by all people in their network, their carbon footprint, and more. Well-known 
blogger and co-founder of the Creative Commons project Joichi Ito is such a frequent 
traveler. In a blogpost he reflects on his own travel patterns  170. In 2008 Ito traveled 
more than half a million kilometers, almost one and a half times the distance to the 
moon. Not without a sense of  guilt  he confesses that  his  carbon dioxide emissions  
equal those of six Hummers: three times the US citizen average. Ito promises to weigh 
the necessity of future trips against their environmental footprint. Visualizations often 
bring to light the geographical dimensions of ICTs. The project New York Talk Exchange  
by MIT’s Senseable City Lab shows the geography of information and communication. 
The worldwide exchange of information is visualized in real-time as volumes of long 
distance telephone and IP (Internet Protocol) data between New York and other cities  
171. Projects like these counter the idea that ICTs are placeless. Instead, they show that 
information- and communication networks and practices are rooted in, and dependent 
on geography and urban environments. They also reveal that contemporary cities are 
not  self-contained  places.  Cities  consist  of  fragmented  networks  that  are  tied  to 
multiple other (urban) locales via ICT-based infrastructures that bypass the national  
and directly go global, in what Graham and Marvin call ‘splintering urbanism’ (Graham 
& Marvin, 2001). Cartographic visualizations are further used to organize digital data. 
As data sets become increasingly large the problem arises how to order and display  
data in meaningful  ways  172.  Sensing projects  measure environmental  variables  and 
visualize results by using maps. An example from the Netherlands is Geluidsnet 173. This 
project engages citizens in measuring sound levels around airports. Volunteer citizens  
living near the airport place microphones on their roofs to measure sound levels of  
passing airplanes. An embedded computer running open source software sends the 
data to a central server. Aggregated sound levels are displayed in real-time on a web-
based  map.  A  consideration  is  whether  visualizations  can  show  how  people 
subjectively  experience their environment.  Often in these projects,  movements and 
spatial experiences are aggregated and reduced to abstract maps. It is hard to get a  
169 See http://www.dopplr.com.
170 See blogpost at http://joi.ito.com/weblog/2009/01/21/2008-dopplr-per.html.
171 See http://senseable.mit.edu/nyte.
172 Media theorist Lev Manovich argues that culture can be mined and visualized as cartographic information, 
in what he calls ‘cultural analytics’. See: http://lab.softwarestudies.com/2008/09/projects.html.
173 See: http://www.geluidsnet.nl/en/geluidsnet.
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sense of the city as a lived space. These visualizations are not neutral in their language. 
They often convey a spectacular high-tech futurism instead of more mundane everyday 
practices.  We may also wonder whether visualizations  alone can induce behavioral  
changes in people? Will Joichi Ito really travel less when he sees he has burned up six  
Hummers worth of fuel? 
iii. Annotation
Annotative  projects  enable  people  to  ‘write’  physical  places  by  adding  their  own 
personal experiences to locations via ‘geotags’ 174. Geotagging means adding locational 
information to any multimedia ‘object’ (photos, video, audio) to display the geographic 
context  of  that  object.  Some applications  and services  overlay  physical  space  with 
digital  information that  can be accessed on the spot via mobile media devices.  An 
example is the Wikitude ‘augmented reality’ platform for mobile devices 175. Depending 
on where one is (GPS), and where one points the mobile phone camera at (compass  
and  accelerometer),  the  Wikitude  application  displays  information  about  physical 
points of interest from online sources like Wikipedia. It projects this information over 
the camera view on the screen. Users themselves can contribute geotags and points of  
interest  to  the  Wikitude.me  platform  176.  Such  services  depart  from  a  geographic 
position in physical space (‘reality’) and add extra layers of digital information. This is 
why  they  are  called  ‘augmented  reality’  (see  Manovich,  2005).  Other  than ‘virtual 
reality’,  which tries  to supplant  the everyday  experience with an immersive virtual  
experience (see Müller, 2009), augmented reality’s ideal is to blend virtual information 
more or less seamlessly into what people are normally seeing. Augmented reality has 
evolved from clunky head-mounted displays, to glasses, to even integration in contact 
lenses. Most augmented reality services project information on the most ubiquitous 
screen we carry  with us  all  the time: the mobile phone. Other geotagging services 
depart from the other end of the physical-digital spectrum. The geotagging feature on 
photo website Flickr.com shows where and at what time a photo was taken, thereby 
contextualizing  digital  informational  objects  with  geographical  (and  temporal) 
information. A consideration is how in an ever-growing torrent of digital informational 
objects like geotags one can filter on ‘contextual  relevance’  177.  An example of  how 
human intelligence instead of artificial intelligence can be queried and harvested is the 
174 Tuters  and  Varnelis  make  a  distinction  between  ‘annotative’  and  ‘phenomenological’  locative  media 
projects (Tuters & Varnelis, 2006).
175 See http://www.wikitude.org.
176 See http://www.wikitude.me. A similar application is the Dutch Layar: http://layar.com.
177 How machines can understand meaning and ‘context’ is the main question in the development of what is  
called the ‘semantic web’.
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use  of  ‘micro-blogging’  service  Twitter.com  as  a  ‘context-aware’  search  engine, 
whereby  people’s  text  messages  themselves  act  as  geotags  178.  A  search  for 
#vondelpark  returns  the  most  recent  Twitter  messages  mentioning  this  park  in 
Amsterdam. This likely yields better contextually relevant information than a standard 
search engine does (how is the weather there now? is it currently busy in the park? 
who are present at the moment? what has been going on there in the last few hours?). 
Another consideration is that as a practice geotagging is unevenly distributed. A small 
number of people contribute far more than the majority  179. Whose sense of place is 
represented? Who is  ‘authoring’  the city? In the third section we explore  how the 
experience of the city changes through geotagging practices. 
iv. Social networking
Locative media can be used for social networking. Most locative applications, like the 
mentioned  Foursquare,  aim  to  let  people  find  out  where  their  friends  are.  Some 
locative projects take that typical urban phenomenon of the stranger as their focus. 
The  Familiar Stranger project (2003-2004) was executed by the Urban Atmospheres 
group (part of Intel Research) to explore the subtle relations most urbanites have with 
strangers  180.  The project  was  inspired by  social  psychologist  Stanley  Milgram,  who 
describes city life in terms of living among strangers we regularly observe but do not  
interact  with  (Paulos  &  Goodman,  2004:  223).  Familiar  strangers  are  people  who 
recognize  each  other  but  mutually  agree  to  ignore  one  another.  A  mobile  phone 
application was developed to use during commutes. It scanned and logged the unique  
Bluetooth identification numbers  of  other  devices  nearby.  As  time progressed,  the 
presence of familiar strangers was mapped 181. A locative media project that promoted 
the actual meeting of strangers is Fallen Fruit  182. Fallen Fruit encouraged people to 
survey their neighborhood and create an online map that depicts fruit trees accessible  
to the public and indicates when the fruit is ripe to be picked. It often happened that 
people who went out to pick fruit met the owner of the tree and started talking to each 
other  183.  A  recurring  question  is  whether  (mobile)  media  technologies  help  to 
consolidate strong ties with the familiar in-group, and/or can help to maintain weak 
178 On Twitter people post short 140 character text-based messages, emphasize certain key terms by using 
hashtags (#), direct messages at other Twitter users using a @, upload photos and locational information,  
and follow each other.
179 The same happens with the collaborative online encyclopedia Wikipedia (Kittur, Chi, Pendleton, Suh, & 
Mytkowicz, 2007).
180 See: http://www.paulos.net/research/intel/familiarstranger/index.htm.
181 See:  http://www.urban-atmospheres.net/Jabberwocky/info.htm for  a  full  project  description  and 
technical details.
182 See: http://www.fallenfruit.org.
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ties, meet strangers, and organize some form of ‘publicness’ 184. According to Rich Ling, 
the  mobile  phone  strengthens  relations  between  people  who  are  already  close 
(friends, family) at the expense of weak ties and strangers, in what he calls ‘bounded 
solidarity’  (Ling,  2008:  159,  182).  By  contrast,  online  social  networking  typically 
supports  many  weak  ties.  Location-based  social  networking  therefore  might  work 
differently than mobile communication. As a type of mobile computing, locative media 
support not only strong ties through interpersonal communication but also weak ties  
through  one-to-many  or  many-to-many  dissemination  of  information  (for  a  lucid 
exposé of these two ideal-types of communication, dialogue versus dissemination, see 
Peters, 1999b: 33-62). It has been argued that mass media as well as urbanization have 
contributed  to  a  shift  from  physical  co-presence  to  imagined  co-presence  as  the 
dominant mode of social interaction (Urry, 2002). Locative media reconcile mediated 
communication with awareness of other people’s physical locations. In the analysis of  
locative playground Bliin in section 4.3, we ask how social locative media influence ‘co-
presence’, our sense of nearness to other persons. 
v. Pervasive gaming
Finally,  locative  media  are  used  to  turn  the  physical  context  into  a  gameboard. 
Pervasive games explicitly aim to introduce play in everyday settings  185. Other than 
games  that  have  a  predefined  goal  and  possible  outcomes,  the  play-element  in 
pervasive  games  resides  in  the  uncertainty  about  their  status  as  games.  Pervasive 
games blur the spatial boundaries between digital and physical spaces. They blur the 
temporal  boundaries  between being  in  and out  of  the game.  They  blur  the  social  
boundaries between presence and absence, and who is playing along. And they blur 
the boundaries of the self between player identities and ‘normal’ everyday identities. 
Pervasive  play  is  reflexive  because  it  raises  questions  about  its  own  status  as  an 
activity: “is this a game?”, “am I playing?”, and “who are my co-players?” (McGonigal,  
2007). We return to these issues in section 4.3.
Locative media in general stimulate playfulness, as they tend to challenge these same 
boundaries. In the third section of this chapter we look at Bliin as a case of ‘play on the 
mobile’. Bliin is a location-based playground that combines wayfinding, annotation and 
183 Source:  keynote  talk  by  Christian  Nold  at  The  Mobile  City  conference,  February  27-28  2008.  See: 
http://www.themobilecity.nl/conference-reports/keynote-talks-video/christian-nold/.
184 Granovetter  hypothesizes  that  people  tend  to  have  strong  ties  when  their  social  networks  overlap, 
whereas the relation between people with few shared acquaintances is likely to be weak (Granovetter, 1973, 
1983).
185 Many pervasive games hark back to Situationist practices, like dérive (aimless drifting, improvisation) and 
détournement (reversal, counterpoint) (Chang & Goodman, 2006; Debord, 1955, 1958).
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social networking. Bliin is not a pervasive game in the strict sense but a playground that 
opens  up  the  city  for  playful  explorations  and  interactions  through  one’s  mobile 
interface. Further,  locative media stimulate us  to reflect on ourselves. A number of 
locative media projects, especially artistic ones, induce us to rethink our position in-, 
and subjective experiences of the world 186. In the MILK project (2004) by Esther Polak, 
GPS devices were used to trace and map how milk from Latvian cows is turned into 
cheese, sold in Dutch markets, and taken home by customers 187. At each stage in the 
process,  participants  were  shown  their  own  traces  and  invited  to  reflect  on  their 
personal  role in  their relation to the produce. Because of  this  feedback movement 
locative media technologies came to act as a storytelling tool. Stories about the origin 
of cheese collided with personal stories of participants. They got a better sense of their  
own mobilities and their place in transnational  economic chains.  Normally  invisible 
everyday  routes,  relations  with  places,  and  interactions  with  other  people  were 
exposed  and  contemplated  upon.  In  section  4.3  we  see  how  Bliin  induces  self-
reflection. What are  the implications of  locative media developments  for the three 
mediated identity  domains: people’s  relation to the world, to other people,  and to  
themselves? In chapters 2 and 3 I looked at mobile media in the cultural context of  
Indonesia, and particularly its  capital city Jakarta. In this  chapter I  focus on locative 
media in the urban context at large. We therefore must take a closer look at the city  
itself.
4.2 The city and the media
In this section I address the following questions: what is the city, what is its relation to 
media technologies, how can we conceptualize the interplay of ICTs and the city, and 
why do I pay attention to the urban context in the first place? 
186 This is similar to what Tuters and Varnelis call ‘phenomenological’ use of locative media (Tuters & Varnelis,  
2006).
187 See:  http://milkproject.net.  The project was shown at international art  fairs,  like the “Making Things 
Public”  exhibition  organized  by  Bruno Latour  and  Peter  Weibel,  and  won the 2005  Prix  Ars  Electronica  
‘Golden Nica’ for Interactive Art.
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4.2.1 What is a city? Three approaches
The  city  has  been  variously  conceptualized  (i)  in  spatial  terms  as  a  dense  spatial 
concentration; (ii) in social terms as composed of highly segmented social roles and life 
among strangers; (iii) and in cultural terms as giving rise to reflexive subjectivities and  
heterogeneous (sub)cultures. Moreover, ‘the urban’ is invoked as a discursive term to 
conjure up images of ‘modernity’. As “a site of the new”, the city is opposed in spatial  
terms  to  the  rural  and  in  temporal  terms  to  traditional  (premodern,  agricultural) 
societies  (Savage,  2000: 34).  ‘The urban’  is  a container notion for typically  modern 
elements,  like  novelty,  fluidity,  transience,  shock  experience,  contingency,  mobility, 
alienation,  anomy,  reflexivity,  and  so  on.  I  try  to  avoid  this  use  due  to  its  lack  of  
precision. 
A  number  of  interrelated  tensions  regularly  recur  in  literature  on urbanism. 
They  are  weaved  through  the  ensuing  discussion,  because  they  are  important  for 
understanding urban identities. One tension is between a systems view of the city as  
an  organism,  a  closed  space  to  which  people  adapt  in  certain  ways,  versus  a 
constructionist view in which the city offers urbanites the room to move and shape 
their  lives  and  identities  through ‘place-making’  and  meeting.  A  second  tension  is 
between a ‘sedentary view’ of the city in which the most meaningful urban places -  
home and public space - are seen as relatively static, versus a ‘mobile view’ in which  
fluidity,  transience  and  movement  are  constitutive  of  the  city.  A  third  tension  is  
between the city as a homogeneous singular entity, versus the city as a heterogeneous  
entity that stands in networked relations to other locales. 
i. The city as a spatial concentration
The city has been understood as a human settlement that concentrates functions in a 
built environment. Many urban historians follow this approach. Lewis Mumford traces  
urbanism back to the settlements of prehistoric cave dwellers. Before the advent of the 
metropolis,  the city  acted as  a sanctuary,  a village and a  stronghold where people 
gathered for ritual,  trade and safety  (Mumford,  1961:  5-28).  In  later phases,  urban 
concentrations functioned as cities of power (‘courttown’), cities of market exchange 
(‘commercetown’),  and  the  industrial  city  (‘coketown’)  (Hannerz,  1980:  98-99; 
Mumford,  1961:  446-474).  According to Lopez,  urbanism has transformed from the 
fortified ‘stockade city’, where only political and religious leaders lived, to the ‘agrarian 
city’, where feudal landowners started living, to the ‘market city’, where trade became 
the main activity. In Braudel’s view, urbanism developed along political lines from an 
‘open town’, which stands in close relation to the countryside, to a ‘town closed in on  
itself’, where merchants became the leaders, to ‘subject towns’ that were disciplined 
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by emerging nation-states and where the court was in control (see Hannerz, 1980: 89-
90). Problematic in views of urbanism as functional concentrations is at what point in 
time ceases a built  settlement to be a town and does it  become a city? Also,  such 
historical labels emphasize one main function at a time instead of understanding the 
city as a complex ensemble of functions. Further, city-as-container views tend to draw 
strict spatial boundaries around the city. The city as a locale tends to be equalled with 
the city  as  location.  Cities  had,  have,  and no doubt  increasingly  will  have intricate 
relations with other cities in national,  transnational and global networks, as well as  
with rural areas. Some theorists argue that cities all over the world increasingly look 
like  one  another.  They  have  evolved  into  ‘global  cities’  with  identical  economic 
infrastructures and services (Sassen, 1991), into a ‘virtual metacity’ of interconnected 
metropolises that offer access to external cultural sources (Virilio, in Augé, 2008: xii-xv), 
and  into  ‘heterotopias’  (Foucault,  1998:  239),  ‘non-places’  (Augé,  2008:  63),  and 
‘generic cities’ (Koolhaas, 1995: 1248-1264) as opposites of places rooted in history 
and cultural identities. At the same time, the city is a heterogeneous compilation of  
global  influences.  Juxtaposing  these  two  views  of  world-city  and  city-world,  Augé 
remarks  “every  big  town  is  a  world”  (Augé,  2008:  xii).  We  have  seen  this  in  our 
discussion  of  Jakarta  as  simultaneously  ‘Indonesia  in  small’  and  as  ‘center  of  
modernity’ connected to the global ‘space of flows’. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Chicago School sociologists Robert 
Park and Ernest Burgess described the city as a closed ecosystem, an organism in which 
people competed for space and scarce resources. A multiplicity of functions sprouted 
from the city’s social diversity. People who belonged to the same ‘species’ tended to 
cluster  together  in  the  same  neighborhood.  This  led  to  the  formation  of  specific 
functional urban zones 188. Park and Burgess phrased urban social relations in biological 
terms like dominance, symbiosis,  and succession (see Hannerz, 1980: 26-30). In the 
context  of  rapid  urbanization  Chicago  School  sociologists  zoomed  in  on  the  many 
deviant urban subcultures that sprung up. Many of these ‘footloose’ subcultures were 
corporeally and socially extremely mobile. This was considered a possible disruption of 
the  social  order.  High  turnover  rates  of  successive  newcomers  to  the  city  led  to 
deterioration of neighborhoods, and consequently severe social atomism, anonymity 
and moral decay (Hannerz, 1980: 25, 46). Despite their keen eye for heterogeneity and 
the  ‘mobile’  character  of  urbanism,  their  ecological  framework  was  founded  on  a 
rather ‘sedentary metaphysics’, in which ‘a sense of place’ ideally meant engaging in 
long-term  social  relations  tied  to  fixed  locations.  They  are  not  alone.  “Human  life 
swings between two poles: movement and settlement”, Mumford writes, clearly taking 
188 These zones could then be captured in  maps,  as Burgess  did  in  his famous diagram of Chicago (see 
Hannerz, 1980: 29).
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the city as the extreme end of the sedentary pole (Mumford, 1961: 5). More recently,  
Richard Sennett laments the decline of the American suburb. Increased labor mobility 
and  ICTs  profoundly  change  the  character  of  the  suburb,  from  being  a  bedroom 
community  to  an  anonymous  place  where  “no  one  in  them becomes  a  long-term 
witness  to  another  person’s  life”  (Sennett,  1998:  20-21).  Urbanism  as  a  form  of 
permanent settlement contrasts the city with mobile lifestyles. Mobility is considered a 
threat  to  the  social  cohesion  amongst  citizens  (see  Jensen,  2009:  141,  147). 
Concomitant with this view, as discussed below, is that transport and communication 
technologies are naturally understood as disruptive, and causing ‘the death of the city’.
Kevin Lynch (1960) takes a social constructivist view of the city. Lynch presented 
his work as an agenda for urban designers. In his opinion urban elements should not be 
hermetically designed but offer room to urban inhabitants to actively shape their own 
‘image of  the  city’.  Lynch studied  how  people  orient  themselves  in  three  different 
American cities (Boston, Jersey City, and Los Angeles). He compared these cities on the 
basis of their ‘legibility’ (alternatively called ‘imageability’ and ‘visibility’) as the extent 
to which the cityscape can be ‘read’ (Lynch, 1960: 2-3). People moving through the city 
need to be able to recognize and organize their environment into a coherent pattern. 
Urbanites  orient  themselves  by  constructing  mental  maps.  In  chapter  3  we  have 
already seen that these mental maps consist of five elements: paths, edges, districts, 
nodes, and landmarks (ibid: 46-48). Paths are especially important for the organization 
of corporeal mobility. Clear mental maps of the urban environment counter the always-
looming fear of disorientation and bring a sense of emotional security. According to 
Lynch mental maps frame communication and conceptual organization, and heighten 
the depth and intensity of everyday human experience. 
System  views  of  the  city  assume  space  to  be  an  abstract  and  absolute 
geometrical  entity  encompassing  everything:  ‘Euclidian  space’.  ‘Place’  in  this  vision 
means  a  unique  position  in  space.  Inversely,  constructivist  views  hark  back  to  the 
tradition of understanding space in relative and subjective terms. Place in this vision is  
subjectively experienced as ‘lived space’. Some seek to bridge objective and subjective 
views,  by  emphasizing the performative and political  character of  space and place.  
Henri Lefebvre developed a ‘unitary theory of space’ that combines physical,  social,  
and mental spaces (these coincide with Agnew’s three dimensions of place) (Lefebvre,  
1991).  Space is  always socially  produced,  a  product  of  political  powers,  he  argues. 
Lefebvre proposes a conceptual triad of (1) spatial practice: how space and places are  
produced and reproduced; (2) representations of space: how space is conceptualized 
and ordered in knowledge, signs, and codes; (3) representational spaces: how space is 
‘lived’ and imagined through its images and symbols (ibid: 11, 33, 38-39). Michel De 
Certeau  put  the  idea  of  place  as  ‘lived  space’  upside  down  by  considering  space 
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‘practiced place’  (De Certeau,  1984:  117).  Everyday movements  are  the ‘tactics’  by 
which  urbanites  create  new  spaces  for  themselves  out  of  places  produced  by  the 
‘strategies’ of institutions. These theories emphasize that cities are sites of agonistic 
struggles. Mobility is not an adaptation or a threat to urban life but constitutive of it. 
ii. The city’s social heterogeneity
In 1938 Louis Wirth forwarded a sociological definition of urbanism, in which the city is 
a particular way of organizing society. Unhappy with the crude ecological views of his  
Chicago  School  contemporaries,  he  sought  better  criteria  to  define  “the  peculiar 
characteristics of the city as a particular form of human association” (Wirth, 1938: 4).  
This definition should include essential characteristics all cities have in common and  
respect their variations (ibid: 6). He came up with this formulation: “[f]or sociological  
purposes a city may be defined as a relatively large, dense, and permanent settlement 
of socially heterogeneous individuals” (ibid: 8). Wirth proceeds with a more detailed 
treatment  of  size,  density,  and  heterogeneity.  The  size  of  a  population  makes  it 
impossible for urbanites to know each other personally. Competition for space leads to 
specialization of functions in particular areas, and consequently to a mosaic of social  
worlds. This causes segmented and utilitarian human relationships, and gives rise to a 
typical urban mentality:
Characteristically,  urbanites  meet one another in highly segmental  roles.  They 
are, to be sure, dependent upon more people for the satisfactions of their life-
needs than are rural people and thus are associated with a greater number of  
organized groups, but they are less dependent upon particular persons, and their 
dependence  upon  others  is  confined to  a  highly  fractionalized  aspect  of  the 
other's round of activity. This is essentially what is meant by saying that the city is  
characterized by secondary rather than primary contacts. The contacts of the city 
may indeed be face-to-face, but they are nevertheless  impersonal,  superficial, 
transitory, and segmental. The reserve, the indifference, and the blasé outlook 
which urbanites manifest in their relationships may thus be regarded as devices 
for  immunizing  themselves  against  the  personal  claims  and  expectations  of 
others.
(ibid: 12)
High density causes urbanites to develop a sensitivity for material artifacts more than 
for other people, as kind of avoidance strategy. The presence of different personalities 
and ways of life produces a relativistic perspective and tolerance for differences, but 
also agonism in “a spirit  of  competition,  aggrandizement,  and mutual  exploitation” 
(ibid: 15). Social heterogeneity produces a heightened mobility of the individual, as he 
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moves  between  various  social  contacts  and  settings.  He  acquires  memberships  in 
diverging  and  internally  fluctuating  groups,  however  without  putting  them  in 
hierarchical order. As a result the urbanite tends to accept instability and insecurity as 
the norm. This adds to his sophistication and cosmopolitanism (ibid: 16-17). 
Wirth’s definition of the city has been heavily criticized. Often one or more of  
his  factors  are  undermined.  For  instance,  in  some European  countries  the  biggest 
village  is  bigger  than  the  smallest  city,  and  rural  densities  on  Java  surpass  urban 
densities in Zambia or some US cities. Yet these criticisms are unjust in my view, since 
Wirth stresses the interdependency of these factors. More problematic is that size and  
density  are  demographic  factors.  They  do  not  necessarily  warrant  sociological 
consequences like heterogeneity. The causal relations between the three factors are 
unclear. If size and density result in heterogeneity, as Wirth seems to suggest, doesn’t  
he return to the ecological definition he tries to shun? Wirth further remains quite 
vague  about  what  he  means  by  heterogeneity.  Does  he  mean  class  differences  or 
ethnic differences (Hannerz, 1980: 68-69, 68 fn5)? According to urban anthropologist 
Ulf  Hannerz,  Wirth assumes that  people can only  maintain a certain level  of  social 
involvements.  Despite  stressing  heterogeneity,  Wirth  appears  to  depart  from 
generalized sameness,  wherein urbanites have a fixed and limited amount of social 
‘energy levels’, which leads to superficiality (ibid: 71). Besides, as Hannerz also notes,  
many social relations in cities  are not  at  all  “impersonal,  superficial,  transitory, and 
segmental”  (ibid:  71).  As  a  last  point,  Wirth  oddly  fails  to  elaborate  on  the  word 
‘permanence’  in  his  definition.  If  he  means  that  the  physical  shape  of  the  city  is  
permanent, he relapses into a spatial container view of urbanism. If he means that 
human  dwelling  in  cities  is  permanent,  he  is  not  only  empirically  wrong,  but  also 
undermines his own argument about the fluidity of urban social relations. And indeed,  
while Wirth adopts a highly ‘mobile’ view of urban life, he too regards mobility not as 
univocally good. “The distinctive features of the urban mode of life have often been 
described  sociologically  as  consisting  of  the  substitution  of  secondary  for  primary  
contacts, the weakening of bonds of kinship, and the declining social significance of the 
family, the disappearance of the neighborhood, and the undermining of the traditional 
basis of social solidarity” (Wirth, 1938: 20-21).
Despite  his  half-hearted break  with  the  ecological  perspective,  Wirth’s  ideas 
have proven incredibly influential and to this day inspire many social theorist of the 
city. Hannerz adopts Wirth’s density and role segregation as defining elements of urban 
life.  Hannerz  calls  the  city  “the  maximal  adjustment  to  human  interdependency” 
(Hannerz, 1980: 80). Combining ideas from Wirth and Goffman, Hannerz says the social 
fabric  of  urban  life  is  constituted  through  ‘purposive  situational  involvements’. 
Situational  involvements  take  place  in  a  range  of  social  domains  like  household,  
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provisioning, recreation, neighboring, and traffic (ibid: 100-102). Urbanites adopt roles 
depending  on  the  situation.  Together,  these  roles  form  their  ‘role  repertoire’.  The 
aggregate of individual role repertoires makes up a ‘role inventory’. Cities typically have 
very large role inventories. Maneuvering carefully between the classical sociological  
opposition  of  structure  and agency  (similar  to what  we have termed freedom and 
force), Hannerz acknowledges that roles are partly constructed in freedom but also 
partly ascribed on the basis of someone’s ‘role discriminatory attributes’. Hardcoded 
attributes such as age, sex, and ethnic background, together with social mechanisms of 
normative control, structure people’s situational involvements (ibid: 150-152). Hannerz 
underlines the importance of anonymity of urban life. Most interactions in cities occur 
between people who hardly know anything about each other’s  biography. We shall 
return to this point because it is another important argument against the dominance 
of  narrative  identity  theory.  This  lack  of  knowledge  fosters  unpredictability  in 
encounters and uncertainty, Hannerz continues (ibid: 112). He concludes: “serendipity, 
discovering one thing by chance when one was looking for something else, may be  
built into city life to a peculiar degree” (ibid: 118). 
Numerous  other  approaches  of  the  city  zoom  in  on  that  typically  urban 
phenomenon,  the  stranger.  Georg  Simmel  says  that  the  urban  mentality  of 
individuation  and  differentiation  arises  from  performing  before  an  anonymous 
metropolitan crowd (Simmel, 1997a: 181, 183). Elsewhere, he analyzes the stranger as  
a mobile person outside of the group who is  both near and remote, and to whom 
urbanites relate in an abstract objective way. He observes that urbanites frequently are 
surprisingly  confidential  in  their  revelations  to  strangers  (Simmel,  1971b:  143-145). 
Jane Jacobs distinguishes cities from towns based on the fact that cities are places full  
of strangers. “To any one person, strangers are far more common in big cities than 
acquaintances”  (Jacobs,  1992:  30).  She  describes  how  people  in  the  same 
neighborhood are often strangers to each other, yet together keep a surveilling eye on 
the streets and contribute to a sense of social safety (ibid: 38-39). While not forming 
full-blown communities, urban strangers inhabiting the same neighborhood are often 
on “excellent sidewalk terms” with each other (ibid: 62). Stanley Milgram notes that in 
each city there are ‘familiar strangers’: individuals who regularly observe each other 
and mutually agree not interact (Paulos & Goodman, 2004). Richard Sennett famously 
defines the city as “a human settlement in which strangers are likely to meet” (Sennett, 
1974: 39). Symbolic interactionists like Erving Goffman and Lyn Lofland zoom in with 
microscopic  detail  on  everyday  ritual  interactions  as  a  way  to  deal  with  the 
omnipresence  of  strangers  (Goffman,  1959;  Lofland,  1973).  All  acknowledge  that 
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interactions with strangers constitute actual relationships, and that these are a defining 
element  of  social  life  in  the  city.  The  city  requires  its  inhabitants  to  deal  with 
heterogeneity and diversity.
iii. The urban mentality
We have already seen with Wirth that  urbanism is  udnerstood in terms of  shaping 
particular  experiences  and  subjectivities.  Early  modern  thinkers  conceived  of  the 
metropolis as a complex organism to which urbanites can only relate via mediations. In 
his seminal 1903 The Metropolis and Mental Life George Simmel argues that the rapid 
ongoing impressions of  city  life  leads to an “intensification of  nervous stimulation” 
(Simmel,  1997a:  174-185)  189.  This  creates  the  psychological  basis  of  a  typical 
metropolitan individuality. Socio-technological systems like the money system and time 
schedules turn the city into a structure of the highest impersonality. At the same time 
they promote a highly personal subjectivity (ibid: 178). The typical urbanite is someone 
who adopts a blasé attitude and is socially reserved (ibid: 175, 178, 179). The blasé 
individual  takes  an objectifying and devaluating stance vis-a-vis  the external  world. 
Socially  reserved,  he  or  she  treats  strangers  with  indifference  and  even  a  slight 
antipathy.  These are protective measures  in order to preserve one’s  autonomy and 
individuality  against  overstimulation  of  the  nerves,  and  the  anonymizing  and 
generalizing forces  of  urban life.  To non-urbanites this  may seem cold-hearted.  But 
Simmel  counters:  “[w]hat  appears  in  the  metropolitan  style  of  life  directly  as 
dissociation is in reality only one of its elemental forms of socialization” (ibid: 180).  
Two decades later another  chroniqueur of the modern metropolis, Walter Benjamin, 
took interest in the way media like script, photography and film mediated people’s 
perception  of  urban  life  (Benjamin,  Jennings,  Doherty,  Levin,  &  Jephcott,  2008). 
Benjamin describes how media technologies change our way of seeing and bring about 
a visual culture. He argues that the modern city is increasingly dominated by ‘script-
images’.  Texts  in  public advertisements acquire image-like qualities.  “Script  -  having 
found, in the book, a refuge in which it can lead an autonomous existence - is pitilessly 
dragged  out  into  the  street  by  advertisements  and  subjected  to  the  brutal 
heteronomies  of  economic chaos”  (ibid:  171).  Text  flashing up as  an  image causes  
instant  shock experiences (Erlebnisse).  Rapidly  alternating sequences of  text-images 
induce  montage experiences of the metropolis, like in cinema. Similarly, close-ups in  
photography and film expand space, and slow motion extends movement. Through the 
camera, “individual perceptions of the psychotic or the dreamer can be appropriated 
by collective perception” (ibid: 38). Benjamin calls this change in visual perception the 
“optical unconscious” (ibid: 37). Both Simmel and Wirth influenced Stanley Milgram.  
189 Originally published in 1903 in German.
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Operationalizing Wirth’s definition of the city, Milgram applies system analysis to the 
experience of living in cities. The psychological experience of urban life is an adaptation 
to sensory overload caused by life among large numbers of heterogeneous people in 
high densities. The idea of sensory overload explains why urban behavior is different  
from  town  life,  in  aspects  like  the  segmentation  of  social  roles,  norm  of  non-
involvement,  cognitive  adaptations  like  the  blasé  attitude,  and  competitiveness  for 
scarce resources (Milgram, 1970: 1462-1466). In short, urban life produces particular 
psychological and behavioral adaptive responses in individuals. 
At  odds  with  this  rather  reactive  presumption  of  urban  mentality  as  mere 
‘adaptation’ stand constructivist views of the city as a ‘space of potential’ for individual 
exploration and development. The city boasts a tolerant open culture that offers great  
room for the expression of individual and cultural differences. This cultural imagery of 
the city as an open space is profoundly ‘mobile’. Urban identities are about becoming  
rather  than  being  adaptations.  Urbanites  are  not  marked  by  pre-given  identity  
categories, fixed imprints ascribed by birth, one’s environment, or by other people (see 
Massey, 2005: 155). They can, they must choose to experiment, construct and perform 
their identities in ongoing movements of self-description. Self-chosen identities may 
even vary per social context (at day a politician in suit and tie, at night a leather-clad  
gay in ties). In Soft City (1974) Jonathan Raban phrases this plasticity of the city, while 
not losing sight of the fact that we are also shaped by our environment:
...the city goes soft; it awaits the imprint of an identity. For better or worse, it  
invites you to remake it, to consolidate it into a shape you can live in. You, too.  
Decide who you are, and the city will  again assume a fixed form around you.  
Decide what it is, and your own identity will be revealed, like a position on a map 
fixed  by  triangulation.  Cities,  unlike  villages  and  small  towns,  are  plastic  by 
nature.  We mould  them  in  our  images:  they,  in  their  turn,  shape  us  by  the 
resistance they offer when we try to impose our own personal form on them.
(quoted in Hannerz, 1980: 249, my emphasis) 190
The adaptation view departs from structure, and easily descends into environmental  
determinism; the constructivist view departs from agency and easily slips into social  
determinism.  However,  they  have  in  common  that  urbanites  must  make  their  city 
smaller, either by blocking out impulses or by molding their environment to their liking.  
In both views the city can also be a place full of dangers where loneliness, deceit and 
alienation loom. 
190 The reason for italicizing these words becomes clear in the next section, where I argue that the lack of  
biographical  knowledge  among  urbanites  makes  mapping  a  more  prominent  mediation  than  narrative 
emplotment.
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There is one cultural imagery I want to highlight. The notion of play has been 
central  to  (western)  thinking  about  the  city.  From  Baudelaire  and  Benjamin’s 
passionate yet distanced flâneur (Baudelaire, 1964; Benjamin, et al., 2008), Simmel and 
Goffman’s approach to the city as a theater for role-playing (Simmel, 1971a, 1997b;  
Goffman, 1959), Constant Nieuwenhuys’ proposal for  New Babylon, a nomadic town 
for creative play in constant flux (Nieuwenhuys, 1974; De Mul, 2009), Guy Debord’s  
critique of the city as a commodified ‘spectacle’ (Debord, 2005) and the Situationists’ 
ludic  interventions  in urban space (Debord,  1958),  De  Certeau’s  walker engaged in 
playful  spatial  tactics  (De  Certeau,  1984),  Baudrillard’s  view  of  Beaubourg  and  Las 
Vegas  as  parodies  of  mass  culture  (Baudrillard,  1994:  61-72),  to  contemporary 
discourses about the ‘creative city’ (Florida, 2004) and the ‘experience economy’ (Pine 
& Gilmore,  1999); the city has  since long been conceptualized in playful  terms (De 
Lange, 2009b). In fact, in many of the approaches to urbanism discussed above we can 
discern Caillois’ four types of games. Agôn underlies the ecological view of the city life 
as  competition  for  scarce  resources.  Alea is  present  in  the  view  of  urban  life  as 
serendipitous. Mimicry informs the view of urbanism as social role-playing. Ilinx occurs 
in metropolitan life as characterized by rapid impulses, sensory delusions and shock 
experiences. In our analysis of urban playground Bliin in the next section, the question  
is  raised  how  play  on  the  mobile  informs  a  playful  understanding  of  our  urban 
environment, our relations to other people, and to ourselves. 
4.2.2 The media city, or the death of the city?
The relation between cities and media technologies stands in a long tradition. Early  
modern thinkers question how (at that time) new media technologies change city life. 
Despite their differences, for Simmel and Benjamin media technologies and the city are 
dialectically  connected  (Simmel:  money,  time  schedule;  Benjamin:  script-image, 
photography, film). Media technologies are understood in the context of an emerging 
metropolitan  capitalism; and urban life  is  taken as  mediated experience.  Obviously 
both authors distinguish between media technologies and the city  191. Nevertheless, 
media and the city are not radically disjointed realms. In fact they both take the city 
itself as a medium through which urbanites experience life. Simmel: “[a]n enquiry into  
the inner meaning of specifically modern life ... must seek to solve the equation which 
structures like the metropolis set up between the individual and the supra-individual 
contents  of  life” (Simmel,  1997a:  175).  Media and the city  constitute one another. 
Urban life is a mediated life. 
191 Benjamin for instance laments the disruptive influence of the telephone on the household and family life, 
as it moved from the back hallway into the central living room (Benjamin, et al., 2008: 77-78).
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If for analysis’ sake we do want to separate ICTs and the city, we can fruitfully 
employ Mokhtarian’s analytical scenarios (in fact we have already done so at previous 
points)  (Mokhtarian,  2002:  45-46;  Mokhtarian  &  Meenakshisundaram,  1998:  3). 
Originally  intended  to  describe  the  possible  relations  between communication and 
physical travel, this model applies equally well to ICTs and the city. She proposes to see 
this relation as  substitution (one replaces the other),  generation or  complementarity  
(one stimulates the other),  modification (the character of of one or both changes), or 
neutrality (there is no influence) (ibid). Most urban theories discussed above fall in the 
neutrality scenario. They say nothing about media technologies and urban life. Simmel 
and Benjamin are primarily interested in the  generation and  modification scenarios. 
Ironically, their sensitivity for media technologies – and especially Benjamin’s attempt  
to develop something like a media theory - induces their successors to study media as  
a realm of ‘its’ own (indeed often taking media as a singular entity). The substitution 
scenario becomes dominant (Graham, 2004: 9). Media technologies and the city are 
taken as distinct, even as opposing forces. Media technologies supposedly exercise an 
external influence on the city. In deterministic terms, they ‘impact’ society. A mild case 
is Ithiel de Sola Pool’s The social impact of the telephone (1977). De Sola Pool at once 
sees the city and the telephone as substitutes, and as ‘mutually shaping’ or modifying 
each  other.  Avoiding  too  deterministic  terms  De  Sola  Pool  calls  the  telephone  a 
“facilitating device”. The telephone (and the car) “were responsible for the vast growth 
of  American suburbia and exurbia, and for the phenomenon of urban sprawl. [B]ut 
there is  also truth to the reverse proposition that the telephone made possible the 
skyscraper and increased congestion downtown” (Pool, 1977: 141, 302). Other authors  
are  more one-sided in painting the impact  of  new media  technologies  on the city. 
According to McLuhan the city will unavoidably implode under the influence of electric  
media:
Before the huddle of the city, there was the food-gathering phase of man the 
hunter, even as men have now in the electric age returned psychically and socially 
to the nomad state. Now, however, it is called information-gathering and data-
processing. But it is global, and it ignores and replaces the form of the city which  
has, therefore, tended to become obsolete. With instant electric technology, the 
globe itself can never again be more than a village, and the very nature of city as  
a form of major dimensions must inevitably dissolve like a fading shot in a movie.
(McLuhan, 1994: 378-379) 
Likewise, Paul Virilio argues that corporeal travel is substituted by the real-time virtual  
travel of objects. He describes this process as “[a] movement that is today intensifying 
due to remote control and long-distance telepresence technologies that will soon land 
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us in the ultimate state of sedentariness where real-time environmental control will 
take over from the development of the real space of the territory” (Virilio, 1997: 25).  
Substitution scenarios actually consist of multiple arguments. Each is directed at one of 
Agnew’s  dimensions  of  place.  But  often  these  arguments  are  conflated.  First,  ICTs 
supposedly  diminish  our  dependence  on  (urban)  locations.  The  assumption  is  that 
being in a place no longer matters,  since ICTs  enable people  to communicate with 
anyone and find information from anywhere. In this view, the city as a location for 
accessing services and for face-to-face social  interactions is  obsoleted by ‘placeless’ 
media technologies. Downtown bookstores will disappear because of online shopping 
at Amazon.com (for a critical discussion, see Dodge, 2004). Second, ICTs supposedly 
weaken the city  as  locale by supplanting physical  co-presence as  the sole basis  for  
social interactions. Physical nearness in locales will be traded in for imagined nearness 
of ‘virtual communities’ (Jones, 1995, 1997, 1998; Rheingold, 1993). Third, in utopian 
views ICTs will  enable us to transcend our parochial sense of place, or in dystopian  
views cause its loss and lead to loneliness and alienation 192. 
In  recent  years  there  has  been  a  resurgence  of  the  modification scenario. 
Thinkers increasingly realize that ICTs and the city are intimately intertwined, and even 
constitute one another. Mid- and late 1990s studies turn away from seeing the internet  
and  cities  as  separate  realms  193.  As  it  becomes  increasingly  clear  that  the  mobile 
phone is used in everyday ‘real life’ situations, the modification scenario further gains 
weight and momentum. Possibly the most comprehensive attempt to date to collect 
and expose work on the close ties between ICTs and the city is the Cybercities Reader 
(2004)  by  Stephen  Graham.  Graham  argues  that  ICTs  and  the  global  city  are  not  
substitutes but complementary, and often modify each other in qualitative new ways 
(Graham, 2004: 4). He challenges two related ideas that dominated between 1960 and 
1990. The first is that the physical domain of cities and the digital domain of ICTs are 
largely separate realms. The second is  that ICTs are a substitute for urban life,  and 
undermine the city. Graham distinguishes four strands of ‘post-urban’ thought. First, 
there  have  been  utopian  visions  of  ‘cyberspace’  as  a  parallel  universe  that  would 
overcome the ballast of ‘filthy’ material reality. Second, ideas existed about the ‘death 
of distance’ and ‘friction-free capitalism’ thanks to ICTs, in which cities no longer played 
a  significant  role.  Third,  the disembodied hopes  of  Cyberlibertarians  predicted ICTs 
192 Examples  of  utopian  views  are  the  October  1996  Wired  Manifesto  at 
http://yoz.com/wired/2.10/features/manifesto.html and  Donna  Haraway’s  Cyborg  Manifesto (Haraway, 
1991). In section 3.3 we have already discussed Meyrowitz’ argument about “no sense of place”.
193 (Examples  that  cover  the  three  dimensions  of  place  are:  Castells  &  Hall,  1994,  about  economic 
concentrations of ICTs in urban centers; Hampton & Wellman, 1999, about ICTs and social relations in an 
urban community neighborhood; Miller & Slater, 2000, about the internet and Trinidad national culture and 
identity).
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would create inherently democratic and egalitarian communities without the restraints 
of  (urban)  geography.  Fourth,  visions  of  new  kinds  of  transparent  citizenship  and 
telepresence existed, in which the ‘city of atoms’ would be replaced by the ‘city of bits’  
(Graham, 2004:  6-9;  Mitchell,  1995).  Graham forwards a  number of  weaknesses  in 
“anything-anywhere-anytime dreams” about ICTs as transcending urbanization. They 
are  empirically  wrong  since  they  ignore  actual  trends  of  global  urbanization  and 
mobility. They ignore the material geographies of ICTs, which consists of real wires,  
servers,  satellites,  towers,  etc.,  and  the  unequal  spread  and  socio-economic 
organization  of  ICTs  throughout  the  world.  They  overgeneralize  the  ‘impact’  of 
technologies as being the same everywhere. They overstretch the binary opposition 
between  ICTs  and  urban  life  by  granting  ICTs  too  much  power  for  change,  while 
underestimating  existing  physical  practices  of  co-presence.  Ideas  about  the  city 
influence our perceptions and use of  ICTs, just like the inverse. On a political level, 
utopian visions of the liberating capabilities of ICTs act as a cover-up for neoliberalism 
and the proliferation of global inequalities. Not everyone benefits from ICTs. Rather 
than equalizing geography, (corporate) ICTs often exploit differences between places 
and regions. These ideas imply that transformations of urban life are more a technical  
matter than a political one. The potential for policy innovations at urban, regional or 
national levels in shaping and harnessing ICT developments is underplayed (Graham, 
2004: 11-22).
4.2.3 Mobile media as interfaces to hybrid space
So how can we conceptualize this  new ICT-based city, these profoundly urban ICTs? 
Graham  proposes  that  ‘cybercities’  nowadays  are  ‘hybrid  forms’  made  up  of 
‘recombinant  spaces’.  The  recombination  approach  takes  “a  highly  contingent, 
relational  perspective  of  the  linkage  between  technology  and  social  worlds”,  as 
composed of multiple heterogeneous networks (Graham, 2004: 69). This makes it far  
less clear what a city actually is (ibid: 113). The definition of the city becomes blurred  
in two ways. First, cities are saturated with various ICT networks: 
Urban actions thus have their electronic shadow. Every physical movement has its 
computerized  trace.  Every  urban  landscape  crosscuts,  and  interweaves  with, 
multiple and extended sets of electronic sites and spaces. Most of these remain 
invisible. Many are simply unknowable. Increasingly, then, cities and urban life 
can be seen, at least partly, to be computerized constructs.... Separating the city 
from the cyber is thus increasingly untenable, and, indeed, pointless. 
(ibid: 113).
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This ‘cybercity’ is no longer a visible, physical place. It is a hybrid of physical and digital  
infrastructures and practices. Second, cities now exist on multiple geographical scales,  
ranging from the local to the global. Cybercities have become ‘global cities’ (Sassen,  
1991). 
To  underline  that  there  is  no  longer  a  clearly  demarcated  urban  essence, 
Graham  makes  frequent  use  of  terms  like  multiplicity,  heterogeneity,  complexity, 
diversity, hybridity, and so on (Graham, 2004: 113-114). True as this may be, I feel such 
abstract  notions  are  hardly  illuminating  for  understanding  ‘cybercities’.  Such 
obfuscating  notions  widen  the  theoretical  gap  between  an  understanding  of 
cybercities, and an understanding of urban practices  in the cybercity. I am therefore 
more sympathetic  to  the approach taken by  Mizuko Ito  et  al (2009).  In  their  view 
people  use  portable  objects  to  ‘interface’  with  urban  space  and  locations.  Mobile 
communication infrastructure intersects with the physical infrastructure of the city. Ito 
et al do not look at the mobile phone on its own. Instead, the phone is but one of the 
portable objects that are ‘interfaces’ to the city. These include media players, books, 
keys,  credit-  and  transit  cards,  and  identity-  and  member  cards.  Combined,  they 
comprise  “the information-based ‘mobile  kits’  of  contemporary  urbanites”  that  are 
used to navigate the city, and to sustain social relations with other people (Ito, Okabe, 
& Anderson, 2009: 67)  194. The authors present different types of urban interfacing: 
cocooning,  camping,  and  footprinting.  Cocooning is  the practice whereby people in 
public settings shield themselves off from external impressions. Using portable media 
players, books, laptops and mobile phones, they create an invisible bubble of mobile  
private space around them. Camping is the practice of finding a nice spot in town -  
often in coffeehouses - and doing information related work there with laptops, mobile 
phones, etc. This can be for work and private affairs (often both). Camping can co-exist 
with cocooning when people shield themselves off  from physical  social interactions  
through  portable  media  objects.  Footprinting  describes  the  various  customer 
transactions and loyalty schemes through which people leave traces  in a particular 
location. It is “the process of integrating an individual's trajectory into the transactional 
history of a particular establishment, and customer cards are the mediating devices”  
(ibid: 79). Interestingly, the authors find that behaviors vary only slightly between the 
three cities in which they have done research (Tokyo, Los Angeles, and London). Why  
do I find this  interesting? First,  the mobile device as ‘urban interface’ highlights its 
relation to place. It underlines that mobile phones are used in physical situations and  
often act as bridges between the physical and the digital. Second, the mobile phone  
does not exist in isolation but as part of a larger array of informational objects that  
194 Julsrud and Bakke make  a similar point about the research bias towards studying singular technologies 
(Julsrud & Bakke, 2009: 160).
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people carry along with them to manage urban life. Consequently, our implicit view of 
the mobile phone shifts from intruding the urban life that supposedly once was (with  
agora-like  public  space,  face-to-face  interactions,  village-like  neighborhoods, 
serendipitous encounters and discovery, etc.), to a pragmatic view of the mobile phone 
as an everyday necessity of urbanites. Third, this approach does not try to define the 
‘essence’  of  mobile  media.  Instead  it  opens  up  room  to  see  how  mobile  media 
technologies  are used in context: as one of  the prime means to interact  with daily 
(urban) life. Fourth, Ito  et al connect changes in the urban experience to changes in 
displaying identity in public spaces. This point receives scant attention in their chapter,  
but is very important indeed. It emphasizes that for many people the experience of  
urban life is viewed through the prism of their mobile devices. Inversely, we appear to  
other people and to various urban informational infrastructures through our mobile  
devices. More about this in section 5.4.
Early  internet  research  was  founded  on  two  ontologies  that  were  mutually 
exclusive, the real and the virtual. Much current (mobile) media research questions this 
separation. Mobile phone ‘virtualities’ are embedded in ‘real life’. Inversely, ‘real life’ is  
encapsulated in ‘virtual’ communication practices. For this reason I prefer to use the 
more neutral terms physical and digital. The intertwining of physical and digital spaces 
give rise to a third type: ‘hybrid space’ (Graham, 2004: 22, 113, 156; Kluitenberg, 2006:  
38-49; de Souza e Silva, 2006). Hybrid space abrogates the distinction between physical 
and digital through “the mix of social practices that occur simultaneously in digital and  
in physical spaces” (de Souza e Silva, 2006: 265). This is not simply a matter of adding 
digitally  distributed  information  to  physical  situations.  That  would  imply  a  mere 
quantitative step. Lev Manovich talks about ‘augmented space’ when elements from 
digital  space  are  added  to  physical  space  (Manovich,  2005:  4).  De  Souza  e  Silva 
convincingly argues that ‘augmentation’ suggests that one type of space is the primary 
space,  which  is  painted  over  with  a  veneer  of  the  secondary  type,  and  that  it 
presupposes their  separate existence (de Souza e Silva, 2006:  265). ‘Hybrid space’ by 
contrast points out that mobilities, social interactions, and experiences now often take 
place in both spaces at the same time, and cannot exist in either space alone. But what 
exactly  does this  hybridity  entail? Hybridity  in itself  does not  explain much. Like in 
identity  studies,  where the term ‘hybridity’  has  been used for  quite  some time to 
indicate the fact that people can have more than one group affiliation, it has to be 
made clear how two or more components relate to each other. Should hybrid space be  
understood as a seamless blend of the physical and the digital? Or rather as composed  
of separate entities that somehow intersect? What happens to our experience of the 
boundaries  between  the  physical  (the  ‘real’)  and  the  digital  (the  ‘virtual’)?  These 
questions are addressed in the next section. I propose that hybridity is not a perfect 
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solution of the digital and physical. It is not a mix of black and white into grey but a  
specific  composite  in  which  the  distinct  elements  are  still  visible.  I  argue that  the  
playful experience of the city, of relations with other people, and ourselves, revolves 
precisely around this point. 
4.2.4 Why the city?
Why look specifically at the city to study technologically mediated identities? First of 
all, statistics claim that since 2008 over half of the world’s population, 3.3 billion, lives  
in cities. This is predicted to grow to 4.9 billion in 2030, some 60%. The world’s rural  
population -  in  spite  of  worldwide population growth -  will  decrease by  28 million 
between 2005 and 2030 (UNFPA, 2007: 6). This is not to say that ICTs do not have an 
impact  on  rural  areas.  They  do,  profoundly  even  195.  In  fact,  the  sharp  distinction 
between the urban and the rural itself is waning. The countryside becomes increasingly 
urbanized. Access to services, modes of production, social organization, and cultural  
characteristics  previously  deemed  typically  urban  have  spread  into  areas  formerly  
classified as rural. Many cities in the world maintain complex relations not only with 
other cities in the world but also with their hinterland. As we have seen in the case of 
Ida in chapter 3, mobile workforces from rural areas temporarily move to the city in 
search of employment. These migrants use media technologies to keep in touch with  
family  and friends ‘back home’,  regularly  travel  back and forth,  and often establish 
villages within cities along the lines of local and regional places of origin (Qiu, 2009) 196. 
Second, the interplay of media technologies and the urban environment stands in a 
long theoretical heritage. I  like to follow in this tradition with this study. Third, and 
most important for my overall purposes, cities have been the classic settings for highly  
reflexive  identity  constructions  and  expressions.  According  to  Simmel,  the  city’s 
heterogeneous  social  makeup  makes  people  acutely  aware  of  their  differences  as 
individuals and groups. They perceive the need to distinguish themselves from others 
by developing unique identities (Simmel, 1997a: 174-176; 1997b: 152-154, 159). Ulf 
Hannerz notes that cities are places full of strangers who meet each other in highly 
segmental roles. They hardly know anything about each other’s biographies (Hannerz,  
195 According to Fisher, the landline telephone, at least initially, had a far greater influence in rural areas than  
in the city (Fischer, 1992: 98). The consequences of spatial  dispersal and being removed from centers of 
information, communication and entertainment, were felt to a much greater extent. The mobile phone too is 
widely adopted in rural areas, particularly in developing countries where fixed infrastructures are often weak. 
Farmers  and  fishermen  can  now  communicate  directly  to  their  potential  markets  and  increase  their 
bargaining power (Donner, 2005, 2006; Ling, 2004: 3).
196 Inversely, planners and architects long been fascinated by the idea that the industrial city could be infused 
with ‘rural qualities’ like clean fresh air, gardens, spaciousness, and communal living (see Hall, 1988: 88-139; 
Mumford, 1961: 474-478).
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1980: 112). In the urban context a narrative identity therefore seems less important. By 
contrast,  identities  tend to be played out  as  ‘roles’.  Much has  been written about  
identities in either physical spaces or virtual spaces. What happens when both domains 
-  urban  spaces  and  digital  spaces  -  intersect?  As  the  overarching  question  of  this 
dissertation concerns the role of mobile media in identity construction, the hybrid city 
seems a logical setting to study.
This section - one may have noticed - looks like Wirth’s city: of considerable size, high 
density, and heterogeneity. I  have not offered the definitive answer to the question 
what is a city? My aim has been to show how the city is conceptualized on various 
planes (physical, social, experiential) and at once made up of location, locale (or better, 
a complex of locales), and senses of place. So where do I stand? In spite of the critique 
raised against Wirth’s definition, I appreciate his broad understanding of urbanism as a 
constellation  of  a  physical  structure,  a  mode  of  social  organization,  and  typical  
attitudes, ideas and personalities. While relinquishing Wirth’s adaptive perspective and 
his attempt to capture the essence of cities, I embrace his holistic view of the city. It is  
to  technological  mediations  in  these  three  domains  I  now  turn  to:  the  urban 
environment, social relations, and the self. 
4.3 Bliin: A locative playground in hybrid space 197
4.3.1 A playground for boundary play
Bliin is a locative media platform that allows users to share their geographical location  
and movements, and their personal experiences of places and travels online 198. Users 
need a phone capable of  receiving GPS signals.  They install  an application on their 
device that automatically sends GPS position coordinates to the Bliin server in real-
time over a wireless data connection. Bliin’s main interface is a map. Other users can 
see someone’s location and travels as a moving circle on the map (figure 5). Bliin users  
can  capture  photos  and  video  with  their  phone  camera,  attach  descriptions  and 
keywords,  and  upload  them to the  Bliin  server.  GPS  coordinates  are  automatically  
197 An early version of this section has been published as De Lange, 2009a.
198 See Bliin website at http://www.bliin.com.
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attached to  content,  which appear as  geographically  positioned items on the map. 
Such a geotagged image or video is called a ‘share’. Via the interface users can see 
shares and other Bliin users in the vicinity, and can comment on each other’s shares. 
The creator of the share receives an instant notification of any new comments made, 
allowing conversations to take place around shares. There is a feed to see the latest 
shares posted. Users themselves decide whether their position, movement, and shares 
are publicly visible, restricted to friends, or private. 
Figure 5: Screenshot of Bliin web interface.
Is Bliin a game? We have seen that  play  and  game are used as synonyms of Caillois’ 
paidia and ludus. Frasca points out that a game differs from play not because it is rule-
governed  but  because  it  has  a  result.  Games  can  be  won.  Play  (paidia)  has  no 
predefined winning plot. Yet as soon as a player defines a goal for himself it becomes a  
ludus  (Frasca,  1999:  2,  6).  In  some respects  Bliin  is  similar  to location-based social  
software  or  recommendation  services.  Other  than  these  services  that  have  a 
predefined purpose (“find the best restaurant in my neighborhood based on ratings by 
my  friends”),  there  is  no  specific  goal  in  Bliin  besides  the  one(s)  users  create  for  
themselves. Bliin is not strictly a ludus but tends towards paidia. Therefore I call Bliin a 
‘playground’. What makes up the play element? To Huizinga the claim is attributed that 
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playing takes place within the confines of  a ‘magic circle’.  This involves a voluntary  
contract between players that certain activities limited in time and space are called 
‘play’  and exist  separately  from ordinary life  (Montola,  2005;  Salen & Zimmerman, 
2003).  It  has  been  argued  that  play,  and  pervasive  games  in  particular,  blur  the 
boundaries of this magic circle (Montola, 2005; Nieuwdorp, 2005; Rodriguez, 2006). 
According  to  Montola,  pervasive  games  expand  the  spatial,  temporal  and  social 
boundaries of the game. “[A] pervasive game is a game that has one or more salient  
features  that  expand  the  contractual  magic  circle  of  play  socially,  spatially  or 
temporally” (Montola,  2005:  3).  Nieuwdorp says that  as  game interfaces  shift  from 
static screen space to more mobile interfaces, clear-cut boundaries between non-play 
and  (free)  play,  and  between  play  and  games,  are  transformed  into  “porous 
membranes”  (Nieuwdorp,  2005).  Rodriguez  points  out  that  in  experimental  game 
design “[t]he location of the magic circle is no longer taken for granted; it becomes the 
very subject of the game” (Rodriguez, 2006: 6). Bliin is not a game in the strict sense,  
although on this playground little games may occur. Still, Bliin has all three features  
identified by Montola. Bliin expands spatial, temporal,  and social boundaries. These 
boundaries are not completely discarded, however “porous” the “membranes” may 
have become.  They remain discernible.  Jane McGonigal  writes  that  in  pervasive or  
locative games the ‘seams’ have to be visible for the game to be fun (McGonigal, 2007:  
66). Following Rodriguez’ and McGonical’s suggestion, I propose that the play element 
in Bliin revolves around these boundaries. The relationships that players engage in with 
their environment, with other people, and with themselves are playful because of the 
ambiguities of boundaries. 
4.3.2 Playing with spatiotemporal boundaries
How does play on this locative platform shape the way people playfully interact with 
their environment? The argument is that Bliin enables playful movements across the 
boundaries between physical and digital space. Bliin involves playing with inscriptions 
of  places  by  not  only  ‘reading’  the city  but  also  ‘writing’  urban places.  The  social  
character of  the platform turns these inscriptions into collaborative narratives. Bliin  
opens up a playroom (Spielraum) for metaplay: exploring and defining what is ‘hybrid 
space’, what is the city, and who writes it. 
Bliin is an interface to ‘hybrid space’. From the perspective of what goes on in 
physical  space,  Bliin  augments  locations  and  corporeal  movements  with  additional 
digital layers of information. Participants share their physical presence (I am close to 
you),  mobility  patterns  (I  am  going  this  direction),  and  personal  experiences  of  
locations  (I  am  seeing  this)  as  digital  information  via  the  platform.  They  receive 
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background information of each other’s whereabouts by sharing multimedia content. 
Conversely,  the  exchange  of  information  and  communication  in  digital  space  is 
contextualized with physical  locations and temporal  details,  and traces  of  corporeal 
movements. ‘Real world’ information and experiences are added to digital space and 
made accessible via the web interface or via the application running on the mobile  
phone. What goes on in Bliin coexists in both spaces at the same time. 
Places too become hybrid. They multiply and are far more mobile than physical 
places were before. Hybrid places exist as senses of place, locales, and locations. Sense  
of place has always been mobile, insofar it is based on the imagination. Who never 
fantasizes about faraway places and pictures what life would be like elsewhere while 
reading  books,  gazing  at  images  on  postcards  or  in  encyclopedias?  With  transport  
technologies people could travel more and to locations farther away. Asynchronous 
media like print, photography, film, and audio recording transferred renderings of other 
places and allowed people to open up their horizons to places they never corporeally 
visited.  With  real-time  telecommunication  media,  like  radio  (initially  a  two-way 
medium)  and  the  telephone,  people  were  able  to  participate  in  social  situations  
(locales) at a distance. People could be ‘tele-present’ at their child’s birthday a hundred 
miles away through a call. Fixed telecommunication connected two distant locations in 
real-time  and  turned  them  into  social  settings  in  which  people  could  interact. 
Telecommunication also constituted a third locale in itself with prescriptions and rules  
that governed communicative behavior in a calling situation (for a discussion of fixed 
telephony as social situations, see Schegloff, 2002a, 2002b). Mobile communications 
technologies enable people to combine communication and corporeal travel, and be 
‘present’ in multiple social situations at once. The shift in definition of locale and sense 
of  place  is  particularly  salient  in  public  situations  when  someone  makes  a  mobile  
phone in the physical presence of bystanders. If both parties are in a public situation, at 
least five locales fold into each other. The physical situations of the caller and receiver  
are connected and a shared third in-between locale created like in fixed telephony. 
Additionally, audiences on both sides overhear the conversation and are implicated in 
redefining the social  situation (see Bassett,  2005:  39;  Ling,  2008;  Ling & Campbell,  
2009). Public phone calls  differ from calling in the privacy of the home or office by 
reconfiguring front stage and back stage. According to Ling, people who make a call in a  
public  setting have to manage their  performance on two front  stages at  once:  the 
setting of the call and the public physical setting (Ling, 2008: 65, 95, 113). Members of  
the audience are drawn onto a ‘quasi-front stage’, as they have to manage a pose of 
civil inattention (ibid: 69).
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New  about  locative  media  is  that  they  mobilize  geographical  location,  in 
addition to sense of place and locale. Positioning data is attached to digitized objects. 
These  geotags  can  be  transferred,  accessed  over  networks,  copied,  searched, 
commented upon, and reconfigured by people elsewhere. People can ‘virtually travel’  
to  geographical  locations  by  browsing  and  searching.  Their  corporeal  movements 
through the city leave tangible information traces. These are composed of geotagged 
locations that can be acted upon and (re)used (Greenfield & Shepard, 2007: 13). As  
discussed, Urry distinguishes five types of travel (Urry, 2007: 47). These are: physical 
travel of objects, imaginative travel, virtual travel, communicative travel, and corporeal 
travel of people. All five types occur in Bliin. An example. On my way to the Erasmus  
University in Rotterdam I shot and shared a picture of a Surinam eating-place along the  
road. The geotagged image became an informational  object  that  was encoded into 
digital bytes and physically traveled to the Bliin server in the form of electrons. A Dutch  
Bliin user,  who was in Japan at  that  moment,  noticed through the interface that  I  
shared an image of this food stall. She made a few comments on my share, saying she  
felt  like  eating  roti (Surinam food)  after  all  the  sushi.  Although she  was  physically 
somewhere  else,  her  simultaneous  dwelling  in  digital  space  apparently  triggered 
reminiscences of the Netherlands. She was making an imaginative movement to the 
Netherlands. She also made a virtual movement on the platform by going to my share 
via the interface. Her comment that was addressed to me - typed in Japan and reaching 
me in the Netherlands in an instant - is a case of communicative travel made possible  
by  the  digital  messaging  system  of  the  platform.  The  fifth  type  of  mobility  is 
exemplified by another Bliin user, who actually corporeally moved to the eating place I 
photographed, tried something out there, and commented via the platform that it was 
indeed good food (figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Mobile interface of a share on Bliin.
As we have seen, people relate to their urban environment by reading the city and  
creating mental maps (Lynch, 1960). Locative media profoundly change this process. 
Hybrid  places  become  writable.  Instead  of  merely  reading  an  urban  environment 
produced  by  others  (e.g.  professional  architects  and  planners),  urbanites  can  now 
‘write’  the  city  with  their  own  subjective  experiences  199.  With  their  GPS-enabled 
199 Creative Commons founder Lawrence Lessig calls our contemporary remix culture a read/write culture  
(Lessig, 2004). This idea has been adopted by people in the field of urban studies, like Adam Greenfield, who 
sees  the  contemporary  city  as  a  “read/write  city”,  in  which  “the  city’s  users  are  no  longer  bound  to  
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mobile phones people create text, images, video,  and add geographical coordinates 
and a timestamp to this content. They share these personal inscriptions of space with  
other people. Authorship and ownership of the city are redefined. Cartography used to 
be a specialized field of knowledge. Now mapping has opened up to the public, much  
in the same way that  online  encyclopedia Wikipedia  opens up the production and 
sharing of knowledge by non-specialists. Lynch was talking about elements of the city  
that were publicly visible to everyone. Locative media inscriptions only appear through 
an interface, and remain invisible to those who are not active on this platform. A new  
logic  of  orientation  arises,  no  longer  based  on  publicly  visible  ‘objective’  urban 
elements but on more idiosyncratic subjective elements. These remain hidden from 
the general view, and often are shared within small circles. Mental maps change from 
being  composed  of  static  visible  urban  elements  that  are  navigable  (paths,  edges, 
districts,  nodes,  landmarks),  to  far  more  dynamic,  idiosyncratic  and  contextualized 
elements that are searchable. 
At  the  same time,  locative  media  make  things  visible  that  were  not  visible 
before.  They  expose  the  temporal  dimensions  of  places  as  dynamic  processes,  as  
opposed to common perceptions of places as static entities. Every so many seconds,  
Bliin logs and uploads a unique geographical location (for example 52.360555° latitude, 
4.925945° longitude). The accumulation of these logged locations are visualized as a 
trace on the map interface. Such traces show that place as location exists not just as a 
discrete entity but in a sequential relation to other locations as part of people’s routes.  
The multitude of  digital  inscriptions  (geotags)  accumulated over time, especially  of 
frequently  visited places,  expose the wide variety  of  social  situations that  can take 
place there. It reveals that place (as locale) is the setting for a range of social behaviors  
and interactions. For some a public park may be a place to relax. For others it is a place  
to  work  or  meet.  The  park  might  be  a  friendly  place  at  daytime,  but  considered  
dangerous at night. This is reflected in its inscriptions. Different people tell different  
stories about their different senses of place. Locative media thus act as narrative tools,  
albeit unlike the traditional ‘plotted’ narratives that Ricoeur speaks of. Inscriptions of 
locations  travel  faster  than  before.  Places  are  under  continuous  revisions.  When 
geotagged  shares  are  created,  uploaded  and  commented  upon  by  others,  places 
become events, certain moments or ‘happenings’ in time (about place as event, see 
Cresswell, 2004: 40; Massey, 2005: 140). Stories evolve around places as events. These 
are not unified stories with coherent plots but a myriad of ‘micro-narratives’ (Hjorth,  
2005). Popular locations have many geotagged shares. These expose a wide variety of  
experience passively the territory through which they move but have been empowered to inscribe their  
subjectivities in the city itself... that those subjectivities can be anchored in place and responded to by those 
who come after” (Greenfield & Shepard, 2007: 13).
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uses: at night, during festivals, different weather conditions, while under construction, 
and  evoke  different  comments.  Locative  media  dynamically  record  and  reveal  the 
multiple little histories and meanings attached to places. 
This  storytelling  is  social  in  character.  Bliin  stimulates  ongoing  active 
engagement  with  one’s  surroundings,  and  with  each other’s  inscriptions  of  places. 
Social  interactions  stem  from  the  combination  of  the  platform’s  technological 
possibilities (Spielraum), the opening up of hybrid space as a space of possibilities, and 
people’s  ‘willing  suspension  of  disbelief’  in  adopting  a  playful  attitude.  McGonigal 
argues  that  ubiquitous  games  are  “transforming  everyday  objects  and  places  into 
interactive  platforms”,  and  “activate  players  by  making  them  more  responsive  to 
potential  calls  to  interaction”  because  of  “previously  unperceived  affordances” 
(McGonical, 2007: 236). New users who set their first steps in Bliin  are greeted by older 
users, and their shares get comments. This raises expectations of reciprocity. Once ‘in’,  
one  is  expected  to  keep  contributing.  After  players  make  a  willing  step  into  the 
playground they are summoned to play. Over a longer period, players create sequences 
of  photos,  descriptions,  and  (recurring)  mobility  patterns.  Sequences  grow  into 
collaborative  little  stories  that  make  up  a  player’s  social  identity.  Bliin becomes  a 
platform  for  interactive  self-publishing.  Players  tell  who  they  are  by  their  ongoing 
contributions and their involvement with others. Mildly competitive games of spatial  
conquest and social prestige may arise in storytelling. Who is the most mobile user?  
Who makes the nicest shots? Who is the first to share a new place? Who can still add 
something  interesting  about  well-trodden  places  like  Amsterdam?  Users  judge  the 
quality of each other’s photos. 
Writing the city has a political dimension. Players engage in ‘spatial tactics’. De 
Certeau uses this term to describe the various ways people appropriate places on their 
own  terms  by  a  “clever  utilization  of  time”,  as  opposed  to  prescriptive  “spatial  
strategies” that try to establish a singular timeless place from above (De Certeau, 1984:  
34-39). He contrasts the voyeur who takes an elevated birds-eye view of the city space 
to  the  walker who  finds  himself  on  the  ground.  Their  sheer  act  of  walking  is  an 
everyday practice that creates space (room) out of produced place (De Certeau, 1984: 
92-94). An example is the ‘elephant trail’ (or ‘desire line’), the worn out little paths in 
the grass made by people taking cutoffs outside the paved pathway designed by the 
park architect or maintainer. By creating shortcuts people defy the dominant spatial  
planning  strategies  that  prescribe  how  places  should  be  used.  Hybrid  space  offers 
read/write  possibilities  beyond  the  initial  legibility  and  official  reading  of  a  site. 
Nevertheless, this is not always a ‘liberating’ spatial tactics against the hegemony of 
spatial strategies. Someone on Bliin shared a picture of a marihuana plant growing in a  
pot, presumably in his own backyard since he posted many shares in the vicinity. Of  
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course the picture had exact geo-coordinates attached. Although in the Netherlands 
possession of a few plants for home use is allowed, he received a comment by one of 
the older members who half-jokingly warned not to make it too easy for “uncle law”.  
Instead  of  being  a  tool  for  ‘liberation’  locative  technologies  can  easily  turn  into 
surveillance instruments.
4.3.3 Playing with social boundaries
Telecommunication alters co-presence, the experience of sharing a social situation and 
being ‘close’ to each other (as in both near and intimate). Co-presence changes from 
being  based  on  corporeal  proximity  to  being  complemented  -  not  substituted-  by  
imagined and virtual nearness. Kenneth Gergen calls those technologies that enable 
people  to  feel  the  presence  of  others  even  while  they  are  physically  absent 
“technologies  of  absent presence” (Gergen,  2002: 237).  Always-on technologies like 
the mobile phone create a temporal sense of co-presence. Familiar people are always 
available. In potential because at any moment contact can be made via the portable 
phone;  in  actuality  by  the  exchange  of  calls  or  text  messages.  Licoppe  calls  the  
interweaving of physical co-presence and mediated communication into a “seamless 
web”  of  ongoing  communicative  exchanges  ‘connected  presence’  (Licoppe,  2004). 
What happens when location-based technologies like Bliin mediate co-presence? The 
argument is that by adding location to the available information about someone else’s 
situation,  location-based  technologies  add  a  spatial  dimension  to  co-presence.  Co-
presence becomes even more pervasive. Information about each other’s whereabouts  
continues to be available in the background and can be easily revisited, not just in  
actual communication. Ongoing interactions rather than a thoughtful reading of each 
other’s biography characterize social behavior on this locative playground. 
Locative technologies contribute to a spatial sense of  co-presence. Wherever 
others are, they are always visibly ‘there’ on the map. Always-there technologies, as  
they may be dubbed, allow people to pinpoint others and trace their movements and 
experiences. Bliin exposes and visualizes the traces of other users’ past and current 
presence as a kind of digital graffiti. By following or revisiting other people’s ‘digital 
trail’ players become aware of what others are doing, what mood they are in, where 
they are heading next. There is even the possibility of physically bumping into nearby 
Bliin users, friends as well as ‘familiar strangers’. On this locative platform weak ties  
seem to prevail over strong ties. Players easily make comments on each other’s shares,  
without actually knowing each other from face-to-face meetings or sharing the same 
175
friends  200. Computer games create new points of view, since one’s own game avatar 
can be seen from different camera perspectives (Rhody, 2005). Bliin offers a similar 
over-the-shoulder perspective but then of other people. One’s own seeing becomes 
publicly visible by publishing and sharing images online,  and so does the seeing of  
others. This sharing of perspectives creates a strong sense of nearness: “I see what you 
see  now”.  Co-presence  emerges  not  only  when  potentiality  turns  into  actual 
communication but as an ongoing actuality in the background. There is  no need to 
interrupt one’s own activities to get in touch. A quick glance on the screen suffices to 
know what someone is up to. If hybrid places become more mobile and fleeting, the  
inverse seems to happen with people. People become more fixed and pinpointable. As 
always-on  and  always-there  converge,  a  doubled  mediation  of  imagined  nearness 
arises.  We  might  call  this  connected  background  presence  (in  a  pun  on  Gergen) 
‘present presence’. 
Locative media change the ‘narrative’ reading and writing of each other’s lives.  
Bliin  presents  an  ongoing  stream  of  real-time  information  about  other  people’s  
locations  and  movements,  their  senses  of  place,  and  their  interactions  with  other 
people. The exchange frequency of narrative events is much higher and happens in the 
background. It needs little active involvement. Co-players become glancing witnesses 
of  each other’s  lives.  Representations  of  events  are  mostly  visual  (photos,  videos),  
although they  have text  in  their  names,  keywords,  and comments.  We may say  in  
narrative terms that the reading of each other’s lives bears the qualities of a ‘stream of 
consciousness’  novel  rather than a carefully  composed textual  plot  that  ties  events 
together in a coherent structure (Ricoeur’s narrative mediation of identity). In narrative 
emplotment, as well as in earlier genres of visual storytelling, actions and events in  
people’s lives are provided with ‘context’. Traditional plots frequently knot particular  
and personal events around greater events that involve more people and situations 
(often  a  crisis  that  makes  up  for  ‘drama’).  Similarly,  the  postcard  and  the  holiday  
photograph as  genres  portray  commonly  known properties  of  places  (In  Egypt  we 
visited  the  pyramids...),  and  subsequently  recount  personalized  stories  in  photo 
subscriptions or on the back of the postcard (... and poor uncle Joe fell off a camel!).  
They need the spectacular, the beautiful, the lasting as the context for smaller personal  
narratives. Such stories remain within small groups. The postcard is even targeted at a 
specific audience. In such narratives, the general inscribes meaning to the particular. 
Bliin follows  the  inverse  route.  Geotagging  captures  the particular  and uses  digital  
200 Like  in  the  city,  online  interactions  between  strangers  can  quickly  become  surprisingly  candid  and 
intimate. Although people who interact online in this way share no connections within their social network  
(Granovetter’s criterium for ‘strong ties’), these interpersonal relations might indeed be described as ‘strong’.  
Hypothetically this could also occur on location-based social networks, although the fact of knowing each 
other’s location might be a prohibitive factor.
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mapping as a social practice of sharing. Unique personal experiences (This is what I am 
seeing now...) are continuously made public to the outer world as shares on the map 
(... and you may look too!). Instead of trying to convey a deep essence of a place or  
event by tying it to a generalized plot, users often share the odd, transient, sometimes 
ugly or even banal side of their everyday experiences. Collages of textualities (names, 
tags, descriptions, comments, nicknames) and visuals (photos, videos, avatars, screen 
interface) do not create coherent and representative ‘grand stories’ that are meant to 
last.  Rather,  these  ‘micro-narratives’  are  fragmented,  highly  mobile,  and  self-
referential. Bliin shares often refer to other shares, just like many videos on the popular 
online video website Youtube refer to videos  posted by  others.  Many people have 
photographed their own laptop screen while displaying one of their own shares in a 
browser. They turn their sense of place into a self-referential expression (I share this 
share), which is only meaningful to other participants on Bliin. Context is provided by  
performative social interactions rather than by narrative emplotment. 
4.3.4 Playing with boundaries of the self
Although this case is presented as an example of ‘play on the mobile’, it also acts on  
the other play levels: play with the mobile, play through the mobile, and played by the 
mobile. Participating on Bliin involves interacting  with  locative media as interfaces to 
hybrid space; interacting with other people and the environment through the platform; 
and being played by locative media as new mechanisms of dominance, surveillance 
and loss of privacy. I propose the play element of Bliin involves boundary play. Spatial, 
temporal, and social segmentations between normalcy and being at play are constantly  
pierced. Spatiotemporal boundary play consists of exploring the thresholds between 
physical  and digital  spaces and places,  and between being  in and out  of  the play.  
Exploration of these thresholds involves playing with the possibilities of this interface 
to hybrid space. The play element does not reside inside game space as much as in the 
continuous movements between the technologically mediated play world and everyday 
life. The act of participating in Bliin would be meaningless if one of the components of  
hybrid space were to fall away, or if hybrid space itself were to fade into grey. Part of  
the fun is  derived from doing something out  of  the ordinary,  apart  from everyday 
‘normalcy’,  something  that  previously  had  not  been  possible.  Participating  in  Bliin 
involves dragging physical world experiences into the play world, and experiences from 
the play world into the physical world. Everyday normalcy becomes part of the play, 
and  vice  versa.  Bliin  stretches  the  boundaries  of  spatiotemporal  confinement  that 
characterizes ‘traditional’ games. Hybrid play is never really over. It is infinite. Social  
boundary play consists of exploring digitally mediated and physical interactions anew 
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through this locative media platform. The play element arises from exploring the seams 
between physical and mediated interactions, and between distance and presence, and 
from questioning who fellow players are in the same play world. Who am I actually  
playing  with?  The  distant  yet  present  people  who  are  participating  on  the  same 
playground? Or the ‘real’ people in my vicinity who probably are unaware of what I am 
doing  on  this  locative  platform?  The  locative  platform  affords  the  mobility  to 
continuously step through the porous membrane of the magic circle. These are not  
binary switches between now I am in/now I am out. They remain transitions. People  
must define and remain conscious of boundaries between physical and digital space,  
between being in and out of the play, and between who is playing and who is not, in 
order to set their activities apart from normalcy. People also are being played by the 
platform. They  are  dragged into the play,  seduced to  publish private  information - 
among which location - and this data is stored indefinitely on the Bliin servers out of  
one’s own hands. New members will likely not read through the full terms of use. It is 
not entirely clear how the makers of Bliin earn money but they do strike deals with  
commercial parties like beer magnate Heineken for advertisement campaigns. Players 
then are turned into figurants for the benefit of corporate marketing purposes. The 
platform can also act as a tool for surveillance. Both burghers and burglars can see 
where you are. Identity management to some extent is taken out of people own hands. 
Once ‘inside’ players are not in full control over their profiles. They depend on what 
other people publish about them, and what the makers of the platform intend to do 
with it. Boundary play at this level involves stepping over a threshold and giving up a 
measure of privacy. All people can do is draw a line around what to publish and what  
not. Still, leaving without a trace will be impossible (more about this in section 5.4).
Again,  Caillois’  fourfold  play  classification  allows  us  to  further  specify  play  
elements in Bliin. Part of the pleasure in play resides in the sense of agôn mastery over 
hybrid space. People can cross the border from normalcy to play at will, but can also 
easily suspend the play if they want to, or need to concentrate on some other task. 
Further, they have the power to inscribe places with their own personal experiences. 
Part of the fun of playing lies in alea uncertainties like chance encounters with fellow 
players and surprising inscriptions of places. In  mimicry the boundary play is shown 
most clearly. There is pretense involved in the presentation of the self in shares and 
comments before an audience. Indeed all social interactions have this theatrical  as if 
quality, even in ‘normal’ everyday situations, as Goffman argued. The platform opens  
up another play space that is both intertwined with everyday situations and separate 
from it. People bring their private backstage experiences to the front stage through 
self-expressive  publishing.  It  is  not  certain whether  the stage is  the physical  world 
augmented with digital expressions as props, or the digital platform augmented with 
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physical world experiences. It is unclear who ‘reads’ the performance (viewing shares),  
and  who are  participating  in  the  play  (engaging  in  collaborative  storytelling).  Bliin 
foregrounds  questions  that  usually  remain  hidden  in  everyday  normalcy,  questions 
about the  conditions of the performance: What stage am I playing on? What are my 
stage props? Who are my audience? Who are the members of the team? Finally, rapid 
movements  between  physical  and  digital  spaces,  an  ongoing  stream  of  geotags, 
uncertainty about boundaries between who is in and who is not, contribute to  ilinx 
confusion of the senses. 
How does boundary play shape the relation people have with themselves as 
selves? I  propose that locative media emphasize an oscillation between a ‘centered  
self’  and a  ‘distributed self’.  On the  classical  Cartesian  map people  have  to  locate 
themselves. Their position is but one among many possible locations. Locative media 
mapping by contrast is subject-centered. It puts individuals always in the center of the 
map. People see themselves as the pivot around which the environment revolves. With 
a simple click  or press  the digital  map adjusts  itself  around the individual.  Further,  
individuals are endowed with the power to write places through their portable devices  
with  their  own  personal  experiences.  They  are  no  longer  simply  readers  of  their 
environment but writers who create and publish their sense of place. These two factors  
favor the establishment of a ‘centered self’.  This is  selfhood that gravitates towards 
unified sameness. Yet Bliin is also profoundly social. The platform cultivates a culture of 
sharing little personal experiences with other people. These micro-narratives do not 
present a singular coherent image of the self. Bliin enables people to interact, to follow 
and  comment  on what  others  are  seeing  and  doing.  Other  people’s  comments  on 
shares turn personal experiences into collaborative little stories. People find out that  
others  before  them  have  inscribed  places  with  a  multiplicity  of  experiences.  The 
pervasive sense of  co-presence that is  sustained through locative media erodes the 
(western) narrative idea(l) of an atomic and unitary self that exists independently as  
whole  in  itself  (Gergen,  2000:  140,  156).  As  mentioned,  mobile  media  have  been 
described as umbilical cords (Castells, et al., 2004: 176; De Gournay, 2002: 201; Fox,  
2001;  Townsend,  2000:  93).  Individuals  depend  on  others.  What’s  more,  their 
individuality  only  emerges in social  interactions  with other people  and their  other-
ascriptions. In terms of Goffman, people operate as a team (even the individual is a  
team). They play together. As social platforms, locative media foster this ‘distributed 
self’,  a  relational  interdependency  that  comes  into  being  through  continuous 
interactions with others and encounters with diverse places. Kenneth Gergen writes: “If  
it is not individual ‘I’s’ who create relationships, but relationships that create the sense 
of ‘I,’ the ‘I’ cease to be the center of success or failure, the one who is evaluated well  
or poorly, and so on. ... [O]ne’s place in the games of life may always be filled by other  
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players”  (Gergen,  2000:  157).  People  thus  are  faced  with  a  dilemma.  Do  I  seek  a 
centered self characterized by recognizability, homogeneity, singularity, and stability? 
Or  do I  seek  a  distributed  self  by  opening  myself  up  to  heterogeneity,  difference, 
multiplicity, and change? Locative media induce people to explore the boundaries of 
selfhood in ongoing movements between these poles. 
Playing with the boundaries of the self raises questions that pertain to identity 
paradoxes at large. Do locative media favor similarity by a dwelling in the known? Do 
they function as invisible fences around what de facto are ‘gated communities’ based 
on likemindedness and shared preferences? We have seen that urbanites make their 
city smaller.  They impose self-made rules and make mental  maps to cope with the  
sensory overload caused by the size,  density,  and heterogeneity of  the city,  and to  
maintain  a  sense of  coherence  of  the self.  Do  locative  media  function as  blocking  
mechanisms to dwell in small circles and solidify identities? Or do locative media act as 
meeting media that open up the city for new impressions and encountering difference? 
Can they form quasi-public agoras, stages for encountering, interacting and identifying 
with others? Will these media technologies smoothen and optimize our experience of 
the city as a friction-free place, or will they insert unexpectedness and new tensions 
into urban life? The irony - and this again is the paradox of freedom and force - is is that 
they work in both directions. People use technologies to make the city smaller and  
define their own place in it. Yet at the same time technologies become what Gergen 
calls ‘technologies of social saturation’:  they expand the possibility to be present in 
more than one place at a time, and the range and variety of relationships (ibid: 49, 55). 
According to Gergen, such technologies ‘populate the self’ with a great number and 
wide variety of  potentials  for being.  However this  can easily spiral  downwards into 
‘multiphrenia’, as the state of total  ilinx confusion and sense of defeat (ibid: 69, 73). 
The technologies that people use to playfully construct and express their identities now 
come to play them. 
To some extent ‘centered self’ versus ‘distributed self’ coincide with two views 
of what identity does. Does identity function as a means or as an end in itself? Identity 
can be a means toward achieving external goals in an ego-centered ‘politics of the self’  
or in group-centered ‘identity politics’, whereby people claim a space for themselves in 
the name of emancipation 201. In this case, identity is a means to solidify and close the  
201 Proponents of ‘identity politics’ based on gender, ethnicity, sexual preference, nation, and so on, will claim 
that one first has to define a space for oneself in order to meet the other as an other. This is true, but in  
practice these movements are  frequently founded on essentialist  and static  ideas of what selfhood and  
sameness, and otherness mean. Moreover, ‘identity politics’ movements require that individuals or groups 
‘like me/us’ should define themselves as different. They then claim the right to represent them. Those who 
do not wish to go along are easily set aside as traitors. The odd logic of such movements is to minimize  
internal difference to face an ‘outside’ as different.
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circle between the self and others, between the in-group and outsiders, based on some 
a  definition  of  selfhood  as  sameness.  Or  is  identity  an  end  in  itself,  whereby  
heterogeneity and differences are seen as enrichments in the ideal  of  continuously 
developing  oneself?  In  this  case  identity  is  an  end  without  an  endpoint,  infinitely  
evolving by constantly opening up and stepping through boundaries. It is hard to say to 
which  pole  identities  mediated  by  locative  media  gravitate,  although  in  the  last 
paragraph I make an argument that it contributes to the opening up of horizons. The  
newness  of  this  field prevents  any  definitive answers  (and admittedly  some of  the 
above is somewhat speculative). 
I  want  to  highlight  the  role  of  the  map.  Digital  cartography  is  not  just  a  tool  for 
visualizing increasingly large and complex datasets. It is becoming a ‘medium to think  
with’ as the reincarnation of the mental map 202. Marxist thinker Fredric Jameson takes 
Lynch’  idea  of  the  mental  map  and  applies  it  to  how  people  understand  the 
complexities of the post-modern globalized world (Jameson, 1991: 51-54). He makes a 
plea for cognitive mapping as a new political aesthetics or art “which seeks to endow 
the individual subject with some new heightened sense of its place in the global system 
... in which we may again begin to grasp our positioning as individual and collective  
subjects and regain a capacity to act and struggle which is at present neutralised by our 
spatial as well as our social confusion” (Jameson, 1991: 54). Sybille Lammes notes that  
new media technologies increasingly enable people to organize the spatial dimensions 
of  their lives with the aid of  digital  cartographies  (Lammes, 2008: 94-95). I  suggest 
mapping comes to act as a medium to create coherence in identities along spatial lines. 
Narrative identity theory focuses predominantly on the self as a temporal structure. 
Plot creates temporal unity with a beginning and an end from seemingly discordant 
actions and events. Play on the other hand has an ambiguous relation to time. Games  
are often clearly delimited in time. Free play is an activity oriented towards its own 
continuation, it is ‘infinite’ (Carse, 1986). Free play flees from closure. The map is a  
better  medium  to  describe  play  experiences  than  narrative  plot.  As  Henry  Jenkins 
notes: “[w]hen gamer magazines want to describe the experience of gameplay, they 
are more likely to reproduce maps of the game world than to recount their narratives”  
(Jenkins, 2004: 122). I suggest that the map is the spatial equivalent to the temporal  
plot in narrative. What plots do for narrative identities - providing structure to agency - 
maps do for playful identities. They serve to define what belongs to the play and what  
does not, to aid people in orienting themselves, and to organize their movements and 
place them in a meaningful structure. Mapping can be narrative. Benedict Anderson for 
202 This is  similar to Lévi-Strauss’  dictum that artifacts are ‘objects to think with’  and Turkle’s ‘evocative  
objects’ (see Frissen, 2008: 22-23).
181
instance describes how chronologically ordered maps constitute ‘political-biographical 
narratives’ about national territories (Anderson, 1991: 175). Similarly, narratives can be 
spatial.  De  Certeau  talks  about  ‘spatial  stories’.  These  organize  movements  and 
produce “geographies of actions” (De Certeau, 1984: 115-116). In this case we have 
seen  that  collaborative  micro-narratives  are  written  about  spatial  experiences  and 
places. These stories are less temporally structured in an overarching plot than spatially 
ordered  by  using  maps.  Mapping,  like  emplotment,  is  descriptive  as  well  as 
prescriptive. It orders and represents past events and events occurring elsewhere. It 
also opens up a space of potential and sets out future directions in which to move.  
Locative media externalize the mental maps people create to orient themselves in life. 
People  then  reflexively  reapply  these  maps  to  themselves.  Similar  to  narrative 
emplotment, the map functions as an external medium through which people can look 
at themselves as selves, and understand their place in space. This matches Ricoeur’s 
three mimetic movements.  Mimesis1,  the implicit preunderstanding of the world of 
actions and events as narrative, corresponds to the phase of creating metal maps as 
“precartographic  operations”  (Jameson,  1991:  51).  Mimesis2,  the  construction  of 
actions and events into narrative plot, corresponds to writing and publishing spatial  
stories on locative media platforms. Mimesis3, the reflexive process of understanding 
oneself as a character in a narrative plot, corresponds to the step of reapplying maps to 
the  self.  (This  process  is  elaborated  in  section  6.2,  and  reworked  into  play1-2-3). 
Despite  structural  similarities  between  emplotment  and  mapping  there  are  also 
differences. Already mentioned is the movement in locative media inscriptions from 
the particular to the general. Locative media mapping practices are more performative 
than emplotment. They involve expressive self-publishing before the eyes of (imagined) 
others, while narrative reconfiguration (mimesis3) tends to be an inward process. This 
performative play in identity construction is, again, a showing of a doing. 
4.3.5 One more thing: the end of serendipity?
When I myself  tried out Bliin, I  wondered whether it would take away some of the 
spontaneity and exploratory character in relating to place and other people. It  may 
seem so at first. Bliin’s location-based multimedia, tags, descriptions and comments  
pre-inscribe hitherto unknown places with other peoples’ experiences. This makes us 
constantly  aware  that  almost  every  place  is  infused  with  human  experiences  and 
stories,  and that  discovering  unknown places  is  nothing  but  a  romantic  myth.  The 
realization  that  places  are  constituted  through  generations  of  collective  and 
sedimented  memories  may  leave  less  room  for  a  uniquely  individual  instant 
experience. Yet there is another side to the coin. Other Bliin  users offer surprising new 
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perspectives  of  places,  breaking  open  places  thought  to  be  known.  Further,  Bliin 
induces spontaneity by stimulating users to divert from fixed paths, routes and plans. 
As the Surinam food stall example shows, users may let their mobility be guided by a 
playful  mood  afforded  by  the  platform.  Users  may  unexpectedly  stumble  upon 
someone’s share or somebody in the vicinity. Moreover, an exciting sense of newness is  
reinforced by the ‘double articulation’ of locative media. Both its actual use and the 
emergent discourse about the potential of location-based services turn ordinary spatial 
experiences into extraordinary ones. Finally, Bliin adds a playful element of conquest. 
Earth can be mapped all over again. Not geographically but in a ‘geosophical’ way, as J. 
K. Wright proposed (Wright, 1947: 9; see also Cresswell, 2006: 21). Wright, who was a  
geographer,  realized  that  by  the  mid-twentieth  century  the  whole  earth  had  been 
mapped  and  was  ‘known’  to  geographical  science.  He  made  a  plea  to  stretch  the 
definition of what constitutes geographical knowledge. Artistic practices and local folk  
knowledge are different but also valuable ways to understand places, he proposed. This 
is certainly what happens when locative media are used to map experiences of places 
and mobilities.  Location-based platforms like Bliin almost naturally bring alternative 
‘geosophical’  knowledge  to  the  fore.  Users  can  inscribe  their  physical  and  digital 
environments with their own routes and experiences and get absorbed in playful ways 
of place-making while in the enduring company of other people. Locative media open 
up possibilities  for mapping unknown territories, and at  the same time create new 
terrae incognitae.
4.4 Conclusion: playing the boundaries
In  this  chapter  we  have  looked  at  a  particular  development  in  mobile  media 
technologies called locative media. Mobile media with positioning technologies have 
been  considered  as  platforms  for  play,  and  interfaces  to  the  urban  environment. 
Mobile media, instead of being ‘placeless’ technologies, are intimately tied to physical 
place. We have looked at locative playground Bliin as a case of ‘play on the mobile’. It 
has  been  argued  that  location-based  play  on  the  mobile  involves  playing  with 
boundaries: spatiotemporal boundaries, social boundaries, and boundaries of the self.  
In the next chapter we separately analyze the four play levels: play on the mobile, play 
with the mobile, play through the mobile, play by the mobile. 
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5. Playing the media: the playful qualities of mobile media
5.1 Play on the mobile
In chapter 4 we have seen that the mobile device is used to play on the mobile. In  
chapters  2 and 3 the other  three play  levels  have already  emerged:  play  with the 
mobile, play through the mobile, and play by the mobile. In this chapter these four play 
levels are analyzed in greater detail. Each play level comes with its own understanding 
of mobile media. Play on the mobile takes the mobile device as a play interface. Play  
with the mobile takes mobile media as technological artifacts. Play through the mobile  
takes mobile media as communications media. Play by the mobile takes mobile media 
as  part  of  media  culture  at  large.  Since play  on the mobile  has  been discussed in 
chapter 4, this level is only briefly addressed in this section. A distinction can be made 
between three types of ‘play on the mobile’. The first are ‘casual games’, small solitary  
games that are played on the go. The second are ‘pervasive’ location-based games that  
interface  between  digital  and  physical  game-spaces.  The  third  involve  the  use  of 
portable electronic devices not as platforms for gaming but as interfaces for (musical) 
play. 
5.1.1 Casual games
The market for computer games is a multibillion industry. It caters hundreds of millions 
of  players  worldwide.  Early  research on game environments  focused  on  multi-user  
domains/dungeons (MUDs and MOOs) (Turkle, 1995). Massive multiplayer online role-
playing  games  (MMORPGs)  like  Word  of  Warcraft,  and  role-playing  games  such as 
Second Life have been widely studied as well. Less research has been done on casual 
games  played on mobile  devices  (a  notable  exception is  Juul,  2009).  An increasing  
number  of  people  play  little  games  on  mobile  devices.  The  annual  report  by  the 
American  Entertainment  Software  Association  (ESA)  states  that  36%  of  heads  of 
household  report  playing  games  on  wireless  devices  like  mobile  phones  or  PDAs 
(personal digital assistants), up from 20% in 2002 (ESA, 2008)  203. Research group In-
203 Source: http://www.theesa.com/facts/pdfs/ESA_EF_2008.pdf.
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Stat reports that mobile gaming in the USA by October 2008 was already a $1 billion  
industry.  In-Stat  predicts  that  continued  momentum  in  the  global  mobile  gaming 
market may lead to revenues topping $6.8 billion by 2013. This report includes results  
from an earlier survey, in which 29.5% out of 2000 respondents say they have played 
games on their mobile phone  204.  Another report  by research and marketing group 
ComScore from January 2009 says that from November 2007 to November 2008 the 
number of mobile game downloaders in the USA grew by 17%. 8.5 Million American  
people (3.8 % of mobile subscribers) downloaded a game to their mobile device. The 
number of people who use a smartphone to download a game has increased sharply in  
this period with 291%  205. According to ComScore, smartphones like the iPhone and 
BlackBerry  have  replaced  cheaper  low-end  phones  as  the  most  popular  gaming 
platform.  The  high  numbers  of  iPhone  users  who download  games  is  not  really  a 
surprise. Manufacturer Apple has successfully integrated its device with the so-called 
AppStore as a one-stop shop for easy downloading of games and applications. Games 
are  the  most  popular  download  category  in  the  AppStore  206.  Remarkable  is  the 
mentioning of the Blackberry as a popular gaming device. The Blackberry used to be 
targeted at enterprise professionals. The rise of gaming on the Blackberry appears to 
support the often forwarded claim that the boundaries between ‘serious’ work and 
‘playful’ leisure become increasingly less sharp (e.g. Meyrowitz, 2003; de Souza e Silva 
&  Sutko,  2008:  448).  Notably,  mobile  gaming  has  a  different  demographics  than 
console-based gaming. According to Juniper Research,  mobile gaming attracts  more 
older and female players than the traditional male gamer in the age of 12-25 207. By far 
the biggest market for mobile gaming is the Asia Pacific region, with Japan and South 
Korea  leading  (Juniper,  2008:  4)  208.  Games  for  mobile  devices  are  delivered  by 
manufacturers,  telecom  operators,  and  third  party  providers.  Many  mobile  phone 
manufacturers preload their products with simple games and offer games for sale via 
their  own  gaming  platforms.  Telecom  operators  too  sell  games  through  their  own 
portals. A range of third party content and entertainment providers offer their products 
via various channels. 
Qualitatively,  the  way  games  are  played  change  too.  Casual  games  offer  a 
different  gaming  experience  than  console-based  games  (IGDA,  2006;  Juul,  2009). 
Console-based games typically  require  one’s  full  attention and are often played for 
204 Source:  http://www.instat.com/press.asp?Sku=IN0804316MCM&ID=2394.  For  comparison,  research 
agency  Gartner  predicts  a  global  revenue  that  reaches  6.3  billion  in  2011: 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/mobility/business/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=208801005.
205 Source: http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2711.
206 Many of the top-10 free and paid apps in Apple’s AppStore are in the category ‘games’.
207 Source: http://juniperresearch.com/shop/viewpressrelease.php?pr=16.
208 Source: http://juniperresearch.com/shop/viewpressrelease.php?pr=16.
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prolonged periods of time together with other people. Portable games are typically  
played  solitarily  during  short  in-between  periods,  and  played  more  casually,  for 
instance while traveling or waiting.  In 2008 a comprehensive study appeared about 
media consumption and learning by young people in the USA (Ito, et al., 2008). Ito and 
Bittanti  distinguish  five  genres  of  gaming  practices:  killing  time,  hanging  out, 
recreational  gaming, organizing and mobilizing,  and augmented game play (ibid)  209. 
Especially  the first  type (killing  time)  is  done on what these authors  call  “nomadic  
devices”:
Certain forms of gaming have long provided opportunities to fill small gaps in the 
day or  longer stretches of waiting time. [...]  These are the practices in which  
people engage with play and gaming to procrastinate or fill gaps in the day. With 
video  games,  it  happens  mostly  through  nomadic  devices  such  as  portable 
consoles (Nintendo DS, Sony PSP), mobile phones, and laptops. [...] Games are 
often used while waiting for relevant things to happen, as a filler between more 
structured events.  Although we found that  a  wide  variety  of  kids  engaged in  
killing  time  forms  of  gaming,  these  practices  tended  to  skew  toward  either 
younger or less experienced gamers, or for times when more sustained gaming 
was not an option.
(ibid)
This genre of gaming is largely a solitary practice, although more recently there has 
been a shift  to online multiplayer mobile gaming. Notably, many casual gamers are 
female 210. Contrary to more hardcore gaming practices, this genre of gaming does not  
foster the formation of very distinct gamer identities (ibid). Because of this casualness 
and lack of immersion, mobile games are often not radically separated from ongoing  
social  processes  in the physical  world.  People  can easily  cross  the border between 
playing the game and engaging in everyday activities. Katz and Acord reach a similar 
conclusion. “Mobile gaming... ‘throws the ball out of bounds’ by conflating games and 
everyday life” (Katz & Acord, 2008). 
209 The term “augmented game play” is somewhat confusing, since the authors do not use this term in the  
usual sense of digital  media that establish  an “augmented reality”  (creating an informational  space that 
overlays the ‘real world’). Instead their term describes a deep involvement with games, for instance through 
customization, cheat codes, and hacking practices.
210 A report by the Casual Games Association states that women account for 51.7% of casual games players,  
and 74% of paying players (CGA, 2007).
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5.1.2 Pervasive games
The second type of mobile games problematizes the distinction between a separated 
game space and the ordinary world much more radically.  As  we have seen,  mobile  
media  technologies  act  as  platforms for emerging location-based ‘pervasive games’ 
embedded in the physical environment. These are no longer played on a static screen 
but  taken out  on  the streets  on mobile  devices  and  played in  relation to  physical 
localities.  Other  than  solitary  casual  games,  these  games  are  profoundly  social  in  
nature. Since we already paid attention the case of Bliin I will not go into this type any  
further here. 
5.1.3 Mobile play interfaces
A third type of ‘play on the mobile’ uses the mobile device as a play interface. A small 
but lively electronic music scene exists of people who reuse old Nintendo Gameboys 
and other portable (game) computers  not  for gaming but to compose and perform 
what is called “chiptune” music  211. These devices have a very basic audio chip that 
processes audio with only 8-bit precision. This gives a retro lo-fi sound 212. Developers 
found out how to access the internal hardware of these devices, and wrote sequencing 
applications to compose and perform music with. Chiptune musicians typically perform 
with only two Gameboys or other portable devices, and a small  mixing panel. They 
probably are the most ‘mobile’  of all  electronic musicians. Instead of carrying large  
amounts of gear they can easily bring their whole setup in a small bag or briefcase.  
Mobile  platforms  are  increasingly  employed  by  ‘regular’  electronic  musicians  as 
interfaces  for controlling  software instruments.  One advantage of  such mobile play 
interfaces  is  that  they enable musicians  to divert  their  attention away from screen 
space and instead engage more with the audience and fellow players. It combines the  
principles of casual games and pervasive games in its search for integration of digital 
devices into the physical situation of a stage performance. 
211 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chiptune and audio examples at http://www.8bitcollective.com.
212 Entry-level audio interfaces today use at least 16 bit audio processing, more professional interfaces 24 or  
even 32 bits for higher precision.
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5.2 Play with the mobile
On the second level, ‘play with the mobile’,  we look at medium-specific qualities of  
mobile media as artifacts, and the ways we interact with them. In order to avoid a  
deterministic view, I emphasize from the outset that the ‘playfulness’ in interactions 
with  the  device  works  both  ways.  On  the  one  hand  mobile  devices  have  certain 
properties  that  elicit  play.  On the other hand user practices  and attitudes towards 
mobile devices are playful.  These devices are being approached and constructed as 
playful toys. In a two-way movement of ‘mutual shaping’ the device’s playability meets  
the users’  playfulness.  To organize the ideas in this  section I  use Caillois’  four play 
types. Different types of ‘play with the mobile’ are sometimes hard to squeeze into one 
category. Furthermore, the distinction between mobile phones as artifacts (the view of 
this  section)  and  as  communications  media  (the  view  of  the  next  section)  cannot  
always be neatly drawn. In this section we see that people communicate by means of  
the artifact. And in the next section we see that communication through the phone  
involves exchanging ‘gift objects’. 
5.2.1 Toys
In his essay Toys Roland Barthes argues that child’s toys prefigure the adult world by 
shrinking and reducing elements from adult life (Barthes, 1993: 53-55) 213. 
There exist ... dolls which urinate.... This is meant to prepare the little girl for the 
causality  of  housekeeping,  to  ‘condition’  her  to  her  future  role  as  mother. 
However, faced with this world of faithful and complicated objects, the child can 
only identify himself as owner, as user, never as creator; he does not invent the 
world, he uses it: there are, prepared for him, actions without adventure, without 
wonder,  without  joy.  He is  turned into a little  stay-at-home householder who 
does not even have to invent the mainsprings of adult causality; they are supplied 
to him ready-made: he has only to help himself, he is never allowed to discover 
anything from start to finish.  The merest set of  blocks, provided it  is  not too  
refined, implies a very different learning of the world: then, the child does not in 
any way create meaningful objects, it matters little to him whether they have an  
adult  name;  the actions  he performs are  not  those of  a  user  but  those of  a  
demiurge  214.  He  creates  forms  which  walk,  which  roll,  he  creates  life,  not 
213 Originally published in 1972.
214 A demiurge is “an autonomous creative force or decisive power” (Merriam-Webster online); “a being 
responsible for the creation of the universe” (New Oxford American Dictionary, 2nd Edition) (my footnote).
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property:  objects  now  act  by  themselves,  they  are  no  longer  an  inert  and 
complicated material in the palm of his hand.
(ibid: 53-54). 
This quote is insightful for at least three reasons. Ever critical of the bourgeois norm as  
“the  essential  enemy”,  Barthes  evokes  a  very  powerful  (and  somewhat  romantic) 
image of play (ibid: 9). Toys should enable children to learn through creative play. Play 
entails acquiring a sense of mastery and control. Simple building blocks “appeal to the 
spirit of do-it-yourself” (ibid: 53). Plastic urinating dolls by contrast turn children into 
‘consumers’ and ‘users’, not creators. This ‘DIY spirit’ is an oft-mentioned characteristic 
of new media technologies. Through play the child enters a realm of exploration in 
which fantasy reigns supreme. He is playing God of the universe. At the same time, play  
connects  the child’s  world  to  the world  of  “adult  causality”.  Barthes  points  to  the  
ambiguity of play as both fantasy and reality. Play is “half-real” (Juul, 2005). Or better, it  
is  double  real:  infusing  reality  with  an  extra  layer  of  play.  Second,  Barthes’  essay 
prefigures what others developed into theory. Good toys - Barthes states a preference 
for toys  made from Vosges wood -  are not  static  and passive objects.  They act  by 
themselves and quite literally come to life. Toys too become players and blur the line 
between playing subject and played object. We have seen this idea in both Kopytoff’s 
notion  of  biographies  of  things,  and  in  actor-network  theory’s  assertion  that 
(technological)  artifacts  have  a  large  degree  of  agency.  It  also  features  in  recent  
technological development paradigms (or more moderately, thought concepts) briefly 
touched upon in section 4.1. “The internet of things”, “spimes”, “blogjects”, “ambient 
intelligence”, and so on, attribute agency to objects to do things by themselves in a  
more or less ‘intelligent’ fashion (Aarts & Diederiks, 2006; Berg, 2009; Bleecker, 2006; 
Greenfield,  2006;  Kranenburg,  2008;  Pesce,  2000;  Sterling,  2005).  Third,  there  is  a 
political undercurrent in Barthes’ critique. Play risks subjugation to industrial capitalism 
that  spits  out  plastic prefab dolls  and leaves nothing to the imagination.  Such toys 
discipline children to be proper subjects (a mother, a consumer)  215. In lieu of seeing 
play as a separate realm (e.g. of creativity), we must remain aware of the fact that play  
is constantly being drawn into the economic and political domain. Media industries 
produce, distribute, and market their products through play. 
Barthes’ criticism of pre-scripted toys may have held some truth in the time he 
wrote this. It only describes one side of how we use digital toys today. In Barthes’ essay  
the old cliché is conjured up that toys are just playthings for kids. If this were ever true  
(how many adults quasi-secretively play with electric trains in the attic?), it certainly no 
215 This critique of capitalism rings a familiar bell of another highly critical work from about the same period, 
Guy Debord’s “Society of the Spectacle” (Debord, 2005). Barthes, like Debord, is counted among the neo-
Marxists, yet his essay reads as a plea for investing life-like ‘fetish’ qualities in objects through play.
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longer is the case. By contrast, many authors emphasize the creative potential of digital  
media technologies. Digital technologies are said to turn users, child and adult alike, 
into ‘prosumers’,  ‘professional  amateurs’,  ‘hackers’,  and allow them to create  ‘user-
generated content’, engage in ‘remix culture’, and so on (Himanen, 2001; Leadbeater & 
Miller,  2004;  Luders,  2008:  693-694).  Even  if  we  skim  off  the  rhetorics  about  the 
powers  of  digital  media  to  liberate  us  from  the  old  top-down  organized  culture 
industries, there are enough reasons to take these toys seriously. 
5.2.2 Mobile agôn: mastery, competition and pleasure
Complex technological devices like the mobile phone both require learning, and aid in 
learning through play (Raessens,  2007).  In a Swedish study it  was investigated how 
children between 10 to 12 years play with the mobile phone and acquire new skills in  
an unsupervised “casual  play setting” (Jarkievich,  Frankhammar,  & Fernaeus, 2008). 
Almost all kids had been given phones by their parents. The researchers observed that  
in a game called ‘cops and robbers’, kids worked in teams to catch each other, and used 
video calling to show each other where a competing peer moved. Sometimes they 
employed ringtones to find out where an ‘enemy’ was hiding. In another competitive 
game called ‘photo war’,  girls  competed against  boys  to get  as many opponents as 
possible sharply  in one mobile phone photograph. Children also shared multimedia 
content together in creative ways. “To make a tune play louder, two children did for  
instance experiment by playing it on two devices simultaneously, where a challenge 
became to synchronize the sound of the two music players. The effect of the music 
playing slightly off beat seemed to annoy and amuse the children at the same time”  
(ibid: 377). Notably, the observers did not find that kids with more advanced phones 
were more popular  in  the group.  Neither did  they observe children playing single-
player games in the company of other children. They conclude that the mobile phone 
has  a  dual  function  as  a  serious  communication  tool  with  parents,  and  a  playful 
resource to act locally among a group of children. The research shows that children 
display  skills  in  integrating  mobile  technologies  into  existing  games,  and craft  new 
games  around  the  many  functionalities  of  the  mobile  device.  “We  also  observed 
several  ways  to  overcome,  and  even  make  use  of,  the  technical  limitations  of  the 
devices. This suggests that children at this  age put much value into the freedom of 
creating their own play scenarios, as a way to make meaningful use of the technologies 
at  hand” (ibid:  378).  Play  with the mobile  -  at  least  for these children -  alternates 
between playing with the toys at hand, and challenging their boundaries in metaplay: 
playing with the playability of these technologies. 
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Jarkievich et al did not encounter competition based on the type of phone, only 
in the games children play with it. Elsewhere, and in other age groups, competition 
based on brand and type does occur. In chapters 2 and 3 we have seen that many  
Indonesians voluntarily queue up for hours to be the first to buy a prestigious new 
communicator  phone.  In  status-aware  Indonesia  the  mobile  phone  is  used  in 
competitive display of prestige. In the Jamaican context Horst and Miller describe how 
school children engage in little cellphone rivalries about who has the coolest facade 
and ringtones (Horst & Miller, 2006: 62). In Italy, Fortunati observes “what has begun 
to give users prestige is knowing how to use the mobile phone with ease” (Fortunati, 
2002a: 54). People should not use their phones in too exaggerated ways, to avoid being 
accused of vulgarity. One should use the phone discretely, show that one is not anxious 
about being constantly available, and thus win tacit social approval, she concludes.
Acquiring  skills  is  a  source  of  pleasure  in  itself.  It  is  a  potentially  rewarding 
competition with oneself. Designer and anthropologist Victor Papanek observes that 
for  many  fishermen  the  fun  in  trout  fishing  was  lost  when  a  manufacturer  put  a  
slingshot on top of the fishing reel to make it easier to let the dry-fly skim across the  
water.  There  was  no  longer  any  skill  needed  for  fishing  and  thus  no  sense  of 
achievement (Papanek,  1995: 156).  In  terms of  Csikszentmihalyi’s  ‘flow’ model,  the 
play experience lost its optimal balance between being too easy and too difficult. In the 
same vein, people spend endless hours tinkering with their newly acquired phone to 
master the device. Many young Indonesians try to learn how to use the many functions 
of their telephone, with the help of magazines, weeklies, books, and online fora. We 
have seen that it  is popular practice to customize the mobile phone with danglers,  
colored fronts, and ringtones, as a way to show one is in control over life. In the Italian 
context Fortunati notes that wearing the mobile phone as a fashion item or jewelry is 
not  meant  to  please  others  but  a  source  of  personal  pleasure.  The  attraction  of 
wearing mobile devices lies not in its exclusivity and the preciousness of materials used  
but in  the fact  that  “they represent the latest development of  vertical  knowledge” 
(Fortunati, 2002a: 59-60). This observation can readily be transposed to  bergaul as a 
reflexive and pleasure-oriented performance of possessing social know-how. Here, the 
mastery of skills in mobile agôn touches the creation and display of illusions (to others 
or oneself) in mobile mimicry. 
There  are  multiple  dimensions  to  agôn  play  with  the mobile.  It  is  a  way  to 
distinguish oneself from other people through competition, a way to display mastery 
over the device, and a source of pleasure in the display of knowledge and in caring for 
the device. Papanek recounts how a rifle manufacturer approached him - in vein - with 
the idea to develop a self-cleaning gun-cabinet. Cleaning a gun after use is a dirty and 
boring  job.  Yet  this  is  part  of  a  process  beloved  by  sportsmen,  says  Papanek: 
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“eliminating this stage would impoverish the enjoyment rather than adding to the fun” 
(Papanek, 1995: 156). Caring for our devices is  part of the fun experience. Just like  
sportsmen have to take care of their gear, we must groom our phones once in a while 
by cleaning the phone of unnecessary programs and old text messages that clog up the 
memory (see Fortunati, 2002a: 47). There is pleasure in boring and dirty work 216. 
Some take the game of mastery, competition, and fun far more seriously. They  
‘jailbreak’, ‘root’ or ‘hack’ their mobile phone, and flash it with new firmware to install  
‘mods’  (customized  modifications)  or  programs  that  cannot  be installed  otherwise.  
Hacking the mobile phone is very popular in Indonesia. The shelves of bookstore chain  
Gramedia are filled with hacker literature and the topic regularly receives attention in 
newspapers. Glossy magazine Indonesia Handphone explains how to add extra memory 
on your Sony-Ericsson handphone by  modifying the phone’s  firmware that  puts  an 
artificial limit on internal memory  217. Various tabloid print media have special pages 
with detailed descriptions and electronic flow charts of the innards of different phone 
models. An article in newspaper Kompas reports about a big pan-Asian hacker festival 
organized in Jakarta called PANHAC2 (Pazia Acer National Hacker Competition) 218. One 
of the contestants described hacking as “fooling around a bit”. But it is also a matter of  
competitive prestige between hackers. Hacking is an activity that is fun to do, gives a  
sense of personal achievement, and is a source of prestige within a group by being the 
best.  Being  able  to  play  with,  and  subvert  pre-programmed  rules  is  considered  a 
valuable asset in Indonesia. In a country that lived under the strict rules of New Order 
for  32  years,  challenging  boundaries  is  considered  cool.  Katz  and  Aakhus  aptly 
summarize the ‘folk framing’ (popular discourse) of the mobile phone, which applies 
every bit  as well  to Indonesia. “Individuals who master these devices are shown as 
people who control their destiny” (Katz & Aakhus, 2002: 7).
In a cat-and-mouse game hackers attempt to circumvent limitations imposed by 
manufacturers. Each software update closes security holes, after which the challenge 
starts again. The way a particular iPhone crack was announced is a fine example of the  
multiple dimensions of agôn playfulness. On December 31 2008 the iPhone Dev-Team 
put up a picture of a cryptic looking object with the word grail on their website’s front 
page,  accompanied by  the text  “The Dev-Inci  Code:  your  iPhone  will  never  be the 
same”  219. The team of ‘Devs’ (developers) made a humorous reference to a globally  
216 The daily caring routine of connecting the phone to the battery charger even gets a medical connotation  
in the colloquial Dutch expression “to give the phone intravenous therapy” (De mobiele telefoon aan het  
infuus hangen).
217 Source: Indonesia Handphone #51 2007, p. 76.
218 Source: Kompas August 6, 2007 p. 33.
219 Website  at http://blog.iphone-dev.org,  accessed  December  31  2008;  see  also  this  blogpost  at: 
http://www.mobilecrunch.com/2008/12/31/iphone-dev-team-posts-cryptic-message-what-are-they-up-to/.
193
recognizable symbol of puzzle and mystery, the tremendously popular book “The Da 
Vinci  Code”  by  Dan  Brown.  The  announcement  was  accompanied  by  a  blogpost 
containing nothing but ones  and zeros  (01110110 01110100 etc.)  220. Geeky readers 
were instantly able to recognize this as binary code and transpose this into ASCII text:  
vtaber 61060174.  Then they would have to find out that this  apparent meaningless 
message was a simple cryptographic puzzle according to the most common key ROT-13 
(each letter rotated 13 times). This yielded ignore 61060174. The original blogpost URL 
had a similar string of numbers in it (67687499), which had to be substituted with the  
new one. And behold, a page appeared with the text “The man from DelMonte - He 
say  Yes!  [sic]”,  with  an  image  of  two  cans  of  Delmonte  pineapple  with  labels 
“sliced/crushed PWNAPPLE”, and unlocking instructions for the iPhone 221. To be pwned 
is gamer and hacker jargon for being completely defeated or loosing control over one’s 
machine, and Apple of course is the iPhone maker that tries to keep its product tightly 
sealed like a tin can. The Dev-team had created a cryptic puzzling game wrapped as an 
intricate nerdy joke full of metaplay to show off they had skillfully beaten Apple. Or at 
least this round...
Finally,  the  mobile  phone  plays  a  role  in  agonistic  conflict  situations.  Many 
studies find that a large segment of the population find other people’s ringtones and 
calling in public annoying (although in my experience this is less so in Indonesia) (De 
Gournay, 2002: 198-200; Gopinath, 2005; Licoppe & Heurtin, 2002: 97; Monk, Fellas, & 
Ley,  2004;  Puro,  2002:  24;  Various,  2006).  Public  space  has  become  an  arena  for 
contesting norms about proper behavior starring the mobile phone. In Japan,  older  
men have lost hegemony over the streets to high-schoolgirls, who engage in ‘nagara 
mobilism’ (Fujimoto, 2005: 80-81, 86). This is a very visible mobile phone culture that 
has  incubated  among  young  girls,  and  is  spreading  to  people  in  their  thirties  and 
forties. It involves “using the mobile phone while doing something else”, like walking,  
bicycling, taking the train, and so on 222. This new mode of behaving outdoors has lead 
to a generational conflict between young and old (ibid: 80-81, 86). In some cases the 
mobile phone is used to coordinate protests and mobilize large masses against political 
regimes, in what Rheingold calls “smart mobs” (Rheingold, 2002).
220 Source: http://blog.iphone-dev.org/post/67687499.
221 See: http://blog.iphone-dev.org/post/61060174.
222 Interestingly, this often mentioned ‘casual’ use of the mobile phone stands in stark contrast to McLuhan’s 
view of the fixed telephone as demanding our full attention and involvement of the senses (McLuhan, 1994:  
295-296).
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5.2.3 Mobile alea: fate, chance, and surprise
Alea chance is  completely  opposite to  agôn  control  over one’s  destiny.  The mobile 
phone inserts  a strong element of  the unexpected in everyday life,  because of  the 
slumbering potential to be summoned at any moment. Chance and surprise also exist  
in our relation to the artifact and the network. It will be familiar experience for many: a 
phone that loudly rings in an awkward situation, an incoming call at an inconvenient 
moment,  a  text  message  about  something  you’d  rather  not  know,  a  battery  that 
unexpectedly  goes  flat,  sudden  loss  of  connection  during  an  important  call,  an 
application  that  stops  working.  Research  has  shown  that  many  people  experience 
uncertainty and loss of control over life as a downside of the mobile phone’s potential  
for limitless communication and liberation from spatiotemporal constraints (e.g. Katz & 
Aakhus,  2002:  8;  Licoppe  &  Heurtin,  2002:  99-100).  Chance  need  not  be  seen  as 
negative only.  We have already discussed mobile  alea in the Indonesian practice of 
beautiful numbers (nomor cantik). As described in chapter 3, many Indonesians place 
high value on lucky telephone numbers in the hope that this brings them fortune. Of 
course they know that rationally speaking this is nonsense. Yet still... Mobile alea can 
also been seen in the popularity of mobile phone lotteries. Indonesia’s largest telecom 
operator regularly publishes page-wide advertisements in newspapers and magazines 
promoting lotteries. Prizes include automobiles, cash money, laptops, and new phones. 
Another type of mobile  alea in our relation to the device is what Katz calls “random 
reinforcement”. Like gamblers, ‘CrackBerry’ addicts keep checking their phone day and 
night  for  new  messages  in  a  constant  crave  for  the  occasional  reward  (Economist, 
2008).  In  this  case  alea chance  approaches  ilinx thrill-seeking.  We  return  to  the 
aleatory experience of mobile communication in section 5.4. 
5.2.4 Mobile mimicry: creativity, pretense, fun; and the conditional order
Mimicry involves the creation of illusory make-belief. A focus on the phone as artifact  
shows how it  acts as a stage prop, and is tied to local situations and physically co-
present others. Let us take look again at Bateson’s threefold scheme of communicative 
messages:  (a)  messages  that  say  something;  (b)  messages  that  simulate  to  say 
something;  (c)  frame-setting  messages  that  enable  the  receiver  to  discriminate 
between  a  and  b  (Bateson,  1972:  146).  On  a  superficial  glance  Bateson’s  scheme 
appears to presuppose two ontological dimensions: (a) the real as truth, and (b) the 
illusory  as  false,  with  messages  of  type (c)  as  a way to distinguish  between these  
domains. This is highly problematic, as we will see below 223. On closer inspection, we 
223 The issue resurfaces in the final chapter, where I criticize Ricoeur’s narrative identity theory for being 
founded on an ontology of truth.
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see that Bateson's scheme only pertains to the level of discourse, not ontology. It does 
not say anything about a reality apart from how we communicate about it. Bateson’s  
scheme fits in a longstanding tradition of understanding ‘social reality’ as made up of 
collaborative illusions which we treat  as if they were real,  and therefore are real in 
their consequences  224.  Social  cohesion,  national  identity,  public life,  and so on,  are 
“imagined”: based on our shared beliefs in made-up rules and symbols that come into 
being  through  communicative  interactions.  For  founding  sociologists  and 
anthropologists like Durkheim and Van Gennep, shared beliefs become ‘social facts’ 
through communal ritual  interactions: special events with a ‘liminal’  status that are 
separate from ordinary life. Symbolic interactionists like sociologist Goffman recognize 
the ritual qualities embedded in everyday interactions. For him there is no ‘real’  or 
ordinary beyond the illusory. Or more precise, that which we call the real is constituted 
by  the make-belief  we all  continuously  create  through every  day play-acting  (for  a  
discussion of ritual, social interaction and the mobile phone, see Ling, 2008: ch. 3 and 
4). 
It is a widely accepted view - and close to a truism - to say that even on level (a)  
- the level we usually think of as ‘reality’ - we are all players who collaboratively create 
one big social game of make-belief according to rules arising from our interactions. The 
mobile phone then has become a new prop in everyday play-acting. Dewi, whom we 
met in chapter 3, said she uses her Walkman phone in public transport to avoid talking 
to strangers. Appearing occupied with one’s personal device in public situations is a 
commonly  understood  avoidance  ritual  that  indicates  one  wishes  to  be  left  alone.  
Sadie Plant describes how women in several cities use their mobile device “as a phone-
shield against unwanted attentions” (Plant, 2001: 62). Businessmen reported to her 
that they use their phones to deliberately absent themselves from their environment 
and keep other people at bay. One entrepreneur said “If I arrive at a meeting where I  
don’t know anyone, I play for time and composure by doing things with my mobile”  
(ibid: 62). Ling describes how women who arrive early at a bar alone and do not wish  
to be chatted up by anyone sit down and take out their phone. Often this is enough to 
ward off others. In these examples mobile mimicry does not consist of communication 
through the phone with distant yet familiar people as members of what Goffman calls 
the  ‘team’,  but  of  communication  with the  phone  in  front  of  physically  present 
strangers as ‘audience’. In play with the mobile the materiality of the artifact matters  
for the situated performance. While the aim is avoidance, it is a communicative type of 
social interaction. As Ling notes: “[t]he pose of using a mobile phone is a  request for 
civil inattention” (Ling, 2008: 106, my emphasis). By using headphones instead of the 
224 What is known as the ‘Thomas theorem’ in sociology upholds that “if men define situations as real, they  
are real in their consequences” (see Merton, 1995: 380).
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phone speaker, by not setting the volume too loud, by being careful not to come too 
close to others while making a call; people show that they acknowledge the presence 
of others. From these examples we see how rules come into being through mimetic 
interactions.  Nowhere  is  it  written  that  one  cannot  talk  to  someone  wearing 
headphones or fiddling with the mobile phone. Nor are there clearly spelled out social  
sanctions for a breach of this rule. People imitate each other in using such strategies - 
and inversely in leaving such a person alone - and this turns into generally accepted 
practice (and real in its consequences).
If mimetic play on level (a) involves more or less unconsciously playing along 
with the make-belief that constitutes social life by imitating others, level (b) involves a 
deliberate  mirroring  of  ‘the  real  world’  by  creating  illusions.  Traditionally,  play  is 
understood on this level as the opposite of reality. Sadie Plant describes how people 
use the phone in play-acting:
Some mobile users tend to make a virtue of the lack of privacy, enjoying and 
exploiting the presence of third parties as a unique opportunity to put something 
of themselves on display by stage-phoning. On a train, for example, a mobile can 
be used as a way of broadcasting a great deal of information to a pretty much 
captive audience. In some contexts, even the presence of the mobile can be used  
to inform the audience that this is a person with a life, a person of the mobile 
world. 
(Plant, 2001: 49)
The Swedish children who play ‘cops and robbers’ pretend to be real cops and robbers.  
Absorbing as such games can be, no one involved would take them for actual cops and 
robbers.  The  boundary  between  play  and  reality  is  clearly  demarcated.  Surely  the 
children realize that real cops and robbers do not chase each other armed with mobile 
phones (or are ten to twelve years old). The fun is derived from creating this shared  
illusion:  a mobile  phone that  could be gun,  a teammate who could be a cop or  a  
robber.  Under  the  influence  of  various  media  something  odd  happens  with  this  
referentiality of the play world to the ‘real world’.  Presumably,  these children have 
never seen a ‘real’ robber, or many policemen in active chases, except on television as 
actors who play cops and robbers. This is a perfect illustration of Baudrillard’s idea of  
the  ‘simulacrum’.  Media  images  generate  illusions  that  refer  to  one  another 
(‘simulacra’) instead of referring to an ‘original’ based in reality. The circular movement 
of  self-referential  illusions  that  imitate  other  illusions  constitutes  a  ‘hyperreal’ 
(Baudrillard, 1994: 1-3, 79-81; De Mul, 2010: 136). Baudrillard identifies three steps in  
this  increasingly  self-referential  process  of  mediatization.  First,  media  communicate 
about  reality.  We now learn what actual  cops  and robbers  look like.  In  the second 
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intermediary phase, media start to represent reality rather than merely referring to 
reality. In McLuhan’s dictum “the medium is the message” (Baudrillard, 1994: 81-82; 
McLuhan, 1994: 7). In this phase not just children but ‘real’ cops and robbers too start  
to act like the cops and robbers they see in the media 225. Third, media generate reality 
to the extent that there is no reality outside of the media sphere. We can no longer  
speak  of  ‘real’  cops  or  robbers.  These  roles  are  completely  absorbed  by  media  
representations that refer to other media representations. All  acting refers to other 
acting.
Simulacra cast doubt on the ontological separation between reality and illusion. 
If there is no longer an original reality to which mimetic play refers as pretense, what is 
the basis of distinguishing between (a) messages that say something, and (b) messages 
that simulate to say something? What separates play from non-play? If everything is 
pretense  can  we  still  make  a  meaningful  distinction  between  (a)  and  (b)  at  the 
discursive level? Yes we can. Meta-communicative frame-setting messages of type (c)  
provide us with cues about the conditions under which something is communicated. 
They enable us to distinguish  this is play from  this is not play. Or do they? We have 
seen how  in  Indonesia  white-collar  workers  ostensively  flaunt  their  mobile  phones 
while walking in and out of the office building to convey an image of being a successful  
businessman or woman. They queue up in front of the Telkomsel help desk to pretend 
they are important customers. Ling notes that women sometimes pretend to make a 
call when they feel intimidated, for example when alone at night in the city (Ling, 2004:  
44-45)  226. In these examples, people deliberately try to erase the boundary between 
(a) and (b). They pretend that what is communicated is real, while knowing it is not. 
There  is  thus  play  that  clearly  announces  itself  as  play,  and  play  that 
intentionally tries to erase the line between play and not play. Should we add another 
type  of  message  to  Bateson’s  scheme?  If  frame-setting  (c)  messages  enable  us  to 
distinguish  between  (a)  and  (b),  messages  of  type  (d)  would  mask  the  distinction 
between (a) and (b), by pretending to be (c). Such messages can truly be called illusions  
in the etymological Latin sense of  in-ludere, against play or ‘counterplay’: a play with 
the  rules  of  play.  Now  consider  a  Jakartan  businessman  who  wants  to  use  his 
handphone when he walks out of the office. He knows that there are people who use  
their handphone to pretend they are businessmen. He must find a way to act like a 
businessman so as not to appear like someone who acts like a businessman and tries 
to make his acting not look like acting... An infinite regression of self-referential meta-
communicative play looms, in which acting increasingly refers to other acting instead of 
225 Examples abound of such feedback loops,  like  ‘real’  criminals who adopt nicknames from Hollywood 
gangster movies.
226 Something I have also heard in informal conversations with Dutch women.
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an original. But now we are relapsing into the ontological view of reality versus illusion.  
This problem of regression only occurs when we look at the status of communicative 
messages  on  their  own,  as  little  packets  that  ideally  unambiguously  transfer 
information from A to B. If we look at the situation as the unit of analysis the problem 
vanishes. For the outcome of the situation it does not matter whether women alone on 
the streets at night make real or fake calls. However ‘phony’ the act, it works for them. 
The sense of  security it  brings to women is  very real.  And it  deters  others.  Only if  
others do not find the performance believable it fails. Pretense runs the risk of failure:
Calls can be invented for the purpose, in which case the mobile can communicate  
even when it is not in use. On the elevated train in Chicago, a young man talks on 
a mobile in some style. He’s discussing an important deal and at the same time  
trying to impress a group of girls in the same part of the train. It all goes well until 
disaster strikes: his phone goes off and interrupts him in mid-sentence, and his 
fictional deal is exposed. At least the mobile itself is quite real: several young men 
in Peshawar talked of friends - never, of course, themselves - who had carried  
fake mobiles for these purposes of performance and display. 
(Plant, 2001: 49)
These  then  are  two  radically  different  perspectives:  an  ‘inside’  view  in  which  the 
ontological status of the message is interpreted as either real (and thus true) or illusory 
(and thus false), and an outside view in which the ontological status of the message is  
completely irrelevant and only looks at what the message does for the overall situation. 
For the first the ‘real’ is a fact, for the second the ‘real’ is an effect. If the first sees  
communication as action,  the second sees communication as  interaction (and even 
assumes that all communication is pretense). How are these perspectives connected? 
In my view it is unnecessary to capture regressive meta-play in message types of their 
own. Bateson himself points out that in more complex (c) type frame-setting messages 
the assertion “this is play” can also be inverted: “is this play?” (Bateson, 1972: 141). 
Both  messages  aimed  at  distinguishing  real  from  illusion and messages  aimed  at 
masking belong to type (c),  as do all  the regressive meta-communicative messages.  
Bateson’s frame-setting messages exist in the conditional order. They set the conditions 
under  which  a  performance  can  be  believed  or  not,  irrespective  of  whether  the 
messages  are  real  or  pretense.  They  create  the  conditions  for  believable 
communication: to be accepted or rejected as if real in its consequences. They also set 
the boundaries for any other variant of communication: for a message to be debunked 
as pretense, to be mistaken for real or pretense, to be believed despite knowing it is  
not  real,  to be seen as incredible even while knowing it  is  real,  and so on. In this 
conditional order frames are both set and questioned. Like play necessarily involves 
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metaplay in order to recognize it as play, communication as interaction requires meta-
communication. People must identify a threshold and step over it.  Should I  believe  
what  she  says?  Mobile  phones  foreground  this  conditional  order.  In  physically  co-
present  interactions  they  are  props  used  in  intricate  games  of  make-belief.  As 
communications media in distant interactions they lack visible informational cues. This 
foregrounds the need to establish shared conditions for believable communication, as 
we  will  see  further  on.  Play  on,  play  with,  and  play  through  the  mobile  gravitate 
towards the edges in the setting and questioning of frames. Mobile media interactions 
invite boundary play. In section 5.4 we see how the media at large increasingly draw us  
into this conditional order, and what the implications for identity are.
In summary, the mobile phone increases the number of situations and range of 
possibilities  for  play-acting;  media  in  general  create  simulacra  that  destroy  the 
referential nature of play-acting as the imitation of real world roles; communicative 
interaction more and more takes place on meta-communicative levels; our awareness 
of these processes feeds a frame of mind in which one constantly doubts the status of  
communicative interaction: is this play? 
5.2.5 Mobile ilinx: disorientation, thrill-seeking, and escape
Caillois describes  ilinx (vertigo) as destroying the stability of perception. It involves a 
shock-like  alteration of  the sensory  perception of  reality,  often through movement 
(Caillois, 2001: 23-26). The mobile phone contributes to sensory alterations in what can 
be called mobile  ilinx.  People often use their phone as a Walkman during travel or 
while waiting. Listening to music is a way to alter one’s perception. In part, this is a 
willing sensory  deprivation of environmental input. One can block out other people’s 
conversations,  and  to  a  degree  stop paying  attention  to  the  environment.  In  part, 
mobile ilinx is also about the augmentation of experience. Listening to music adds an 
extra aural layer to the experience of traveling (Bassett, 2005; Bull, 2005). Michael Bull 
describes how users of iPods dwell in their own privatized sound ‘bubble’ and get an 
“illusion of omnipotence” (Bull, 2005: 175). One respondent says she feels “as though I  
can part the sea like Moses”; another respondent says “I feel like I’m the star of my 
own  personal  movie,  strutting  along  to  the  theme  song  of  the  moment”;  while  
someone else says “I see people like I do when I watch a movie... there is a soundtrack  
to  my  encounters...  music  to  accompany  my  thoughts  about  others.  It  dramatizes 
things a bit, but it fills the silent void” (Bull, 2005: 175). Similarly, making photos and 
videos with the mobile phone can alter one’s sensory perception of the environment.  
Shoot-n-Share (2008)  is  a  documentary  made  by  two  students  at  the  Erasmus 
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University  Rotterdam,  Lieke  van  Pruijssen  and  Bieke  Versloot  227.  It  portrays  five 
inhabitants of the Dutch city Rotterdam and their relation to the mobile phone camera. 
Thom and Osama are two young guys (both 16) who get kicks from exploring exiting 
urban places  and filming each other  228.  At  some point  they film each other while 
trespassing  on  a  building  (a  hotel  or  office  under  construction?).  In  a  quasi-
spontaneous  way  they  prowl  around  the  corridors,  pushing  elevator  buttons,  and 
looking for thrills. All of a sudden one yells: “this is definitely going to be on Youtube!”. 
They interweave their perceptions of physical space with the perspective of performing 
in an online Youtube video. Their ‘immediate’ actions in the here and now are already 
filtered by the camera and the online sharing platform. They are looking upon their 
own actions as if  they were acting in a Youtube movie.  This  also goes for another 
participant in the film, Hans, who confides that normally he is very shy. When he uses  
his  mobile  phone  camera  he  dares  to  take  pictures  of  the  “small  things  that  you 
suddenly notice”. For both Thom and Osama, and for Hans, the mobile phone camera 
is a protective shield as well as a lens that opens up new perspectives on the physical  
environment. Capturing the city in pictures or video adds an extra dimension to moving 
through the city. First it puts a lens in front of people and the environment, a layer of 
mediation that uses the visual language of movies and photographs. Second, it enables 
people  to  look  back  almost  immediately  on  what  has  just  been  experienced.  The 
experience  of  a  city  through  the  camera  acquires  an  additional  reflexive  layer.  It 
enables  people  to  distance  themselves  from  their  own  immediate  experience  by 
viewing it again through the eyes of a bystander, like an being an audience to their own  
actions.  These  examples  therefore  involve  a  generous  dose  of  mimicry as  well: 
imagining oneself playing in a movie or as having superpowers. 
Sensory  stimulation and giddiness  most  clearly  occurs  in  what can be called 
informational  ilinx.  The  mobile  phone  is  part  of  a  whole  array  of  media  that 
continuously beckon us into distractions. Digital media technologies offer a dizzying 
array of possibilities for temporary ecstasy. Whirlwinds of datastreams on the flickering 
screen, rapidly alternating pixelated images, thuds and squeaks of digital noises, the 
endless oceans of texts and images and video; this vast digital world all accessible in 
only a few clicks. New media offer a sensation of total access to the world - or is it  
escape from the world? - sitting on top of the world - or being abducted by it? We can 
totally lose ourselves in the sensory overload of constantly being in touch, constantly  
acting and reacting to new informational stimuli. This is digital vertigo. According to 
some psychiatrists,  ADD (attention deficit  disorder) is the new medical condition of  
227 Watch the movie at http://www.archive.org/details/DocumentaryShoot-n-share.
228 See the following Youtube accounts: Osama (osama015) and Thom (jump266); together they operate 
under the nick osamathom1991.
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today (see De Mul, 2008: 181). We are not good at multitasking but increasingly have 
to,  both for work and in our free  time. Why do people find this tsunami of  media 
impulses so attractive? Why do people keep their mobile phones on 24-hour a day? 
Why do people put their phones next to their beds, even take the phone to the toilet 
(and often drop it in the bowl)? Why can’t we just pull the plug? I believe the answer is  
the attraction of distraction: escapism in mobile ilinx. 
One of the shortcomings of narrative identity theory is that it ignores how we relate to 
the medium itself (argued at greater length in section 6.1). By contrast, the point of  
‘play with the mobile’ is to show that we not only relate to the world, others, and  
ourselves,  through technologies  as  media,  but  also  relate  to  media  technologies 
themselves as artifacts. Our relation with mobile media is a playful one. As artifacts,  
mobile media technologies are not fixed entities but can be continuously adapted in 
what  Woolgar  calls  ‘interpretative  flexibility’.  They  open  up  a  playspace  in  the 
subjunctive  mode  for  a  potentially  infinite  range  of  creative  interpretations  and 
alterations. A mobile phone  might be used as a telephone, obviously, but also as a 
sexual toy, a bomb detonator, a torch light, a beer bottle opener, an object in throwing 
games, and so on. Engaging with the artifact is not merely an instrumental means but a  
self-rewarding  end  in  itself.  Tweaking  and  hacking  the  mobile  phone  becomes  an 
autotelic activity. Still, technologies at the same time are ‘scripted’ and ‘designed’. In 
the chapters about the mobile phone in Indonesia we have seen the forces at play  
prescribing that people should relate to the artifact as emblems of modernity 229. Play 
with the mobile opens up a view on ourselves as beings who play. Mobile technologies 
are  great  playmates,  for  children  and  adults  alike.  Competition,  chance,  creative 
tinkering, role-playing, and sensory delusions are part and parcel of everyday life. We 
not only relate to the world by telling stories about it. We also interact with the world 
through play.
229 Again, this is not meant to suggest that production is pure force and consumption is pure freedom. Items 
may be designed for openness; users may exert force on each other through sedimented practices.
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5.3 Play through the mobile
On the third level, ‘play through the mobile’, we look at the playful qualities of mobile 
technologies  as  communications  media.  Caillois’  play  types again shine through.  To 
avoid repetition I choose to focus on one overarching type of play through the mobile:  
mobile exchanges in gift circles 230. 
5.3.1 From Kula to mobile gifting
A gift never comes for free, Marcel Mauss says in his classical cultural-anthropological  
essay The Gift (Mauss, 2004) 231. The exchange of gifts is a type of symbolic economy 
(ibid: 94). Gift  giving abides by three rules: the obligation to give, the obligation to 
receive  and  the  obligation  to  reciprocate  (to  give  in  return).  Initiating  a  gift  is  an 
invitation. It  opens up the possibility for an enduring relationship of exchange. The 
exchange of gifts serves to strengthen the bonds between individuals and groups. We 
recognize the same principle in mobile phone use. In France managing one’s telephone 
number is guided by trust and expectations of reciprocity (Licoppe & Heurtin, 2001). 
This stimulates the formation of social ties between people who answer and call often.  
“Reciprocally, the mobile phone becomes a token of trust; its distribution is a small-
scale pragmatic drama in which the status of social bonds is renegotiated and forms of  
trust asserted” (ibid: 102). 
Mauss  draws  inspiration  from  another  classic  work,  Bronislaw  Malinowski's 
Argonauts of the Western Pacific (Malinowski, 1984) 232. Malinowski describes the Kula, 
an elaborate system of  exchange amongst  the Trobrianders who inhabit  a range of  
islands in the western Pacific Ocean. Trobrianders exchanged necklaces and armbands 
made from rare shells. With specially adorned canoes Trobrianders took off to other 
islands often far away (the Kula ring was more than 150 miles in diameter; ibid: 82). 
The tradition of Kula was separated from regular barter that took place in the wake of 
these expeditions. Kula exchanges only took place between acquaintances who already 
had a bond. In mobile phone communication we see that the majority of exchanges 
occur  between  people  who have  an intimate  relationship,  like  friends,  family,  and 
romantic relations. “The mobile phone is the tool of the intimate sphere”, Ling notes 
(Ling,  2008: 159).  The Kula  followed asymmetrical  circular  patterns.  Shell  necklaces 
circulated between islands in clockwise direction and armbands in counterclockwise 
230 A longer version has been published in Dutch as “Geven en Nemen: mobiele telefonie als giftcultuur” 
(Giving and Taking: mobile telephony as gift culture) (De Lange, 2008).
231 Originally published in 1924.
232 Originally published in 1922.
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direction (Malinowski, 1984: 93-94). Circular exchange patterns can also be discerned 
in mobile phone practices. Teenagers in South Korea collectively read and compose 
messages  and  circulate  chain  messages  amongst  themselves  (Yoon,  2003:  337). 
Asymmetrical  exchanges  occur  in  communication between young  people  and  their 
parents. Often the parent calls first or suggests to call the child back in order to save 
costs. Between partners it is customary that if one leaves the home, he or she will be 
the one who keeps the other informed of his/her whereabouts. Even among young 
people  asymmetrical  gifting occurs,  as Taylor and Harper observe (Taylor & Harper, 
2003).  A  British  girl  contributed  £5  to  the  call  credit  of  her  best  friend's  younger 
brother.  She  wanted  to  maintain  a  good  relation  with  her  best  friend,  and  this  
implicated being nice to her younger brother (ibid: 277-278).
Trobrianders  attached  hierarchies  to  Kula  objects  and  told  mythical  stories 
about their perilous  journeys through tempests and rough seas. Malinowski  writes: 
“each one of the first-class arm-shells and necklaces has a personal name and a history  
of  its  own,  and as  they circulate around the big  ring of  the Kula,  they are all  well 
known,  and  their  appearance  in  a  given  district  always  creates  a  sensation” 
(Malinowski,  1984:  99).  Via  the  mobile  phone  people  frequently  tell  little  stories 
(‘micro-narratives’)  by  exchanging  ‘objects’  such  as  photos,  text  messages,  MMS, 
voicemails. People give each other solidified experiences of special events, meaningful  
memories,  and  intimate  emotions.  Telephone  conversations  between intimates  are 
often ongoing stories. These refer to earlier conversations both partners remember. 
Just like the unique character of Kula objects lay in their names and in their histories of 
who possessed them, mobile gifts  derive their unicity from the personalities of the  
giver and receiver. What's more, the message in its original form is not only the carrier  
of  meaning  but  the  meaning  itself.  Simply  copying  a  received  text  message  into 
another form (e.g.  by  jotting down the message as  a  note)  robs  it  of  its  symbolic  
meaning (Taylor & Harper, 2003: 273). Mobile exchanges often have a ritual character. 
Their meaning is not just expressed by the gift, or by giver and recipient, but through  
the  giving:  the ceremony  that  accompanies  the  exchange.  According  to Taylor  and 
Harper, the ordered exchanges of goodnight messages between friends or lovers have 
a ceremonial quality. “Sleep well my love” messages go back and forth. They express  
intimacy and a wish to be close to each other. The end of the exchange is postponed  
with each new message. This act expresses attachment and commitment. Through the 
observation  of  ceremony,  the  exchange  of  messages  that  in  themselves  are  quite  
mundane is charged with symbolic power. The ceremony becomes ritualizing “insofar 
as it results in the meaning of the message being thereby altered in ways that give it  
semi-sacred values” (Taylor & Harper, 2002: 441). 
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According to J.L Austin’s speech act theory, all communication is performative. 
An utterance consists of the meaning of what is said (locutionary act), the function of 
what is said to achieve some goal (illocutionary act), and the effects of what is said  
upon the listener (perlocutionary act) (Austin, 1962: esp. 94-107). Many researchers of  
mobile communication point to its ‘phatic’ function (Fortunati, 2002b: 516, 523; Green 
& Haddon, 2009: 48; Haddon, 2000: 5; Licoppe, 2004: 148; Ling,  2008: 153; Rettie, 
2008: 299). In the words of Leslie Haddon, “the point is not so much the message but 
the gesture  of  getting  in  touch” (Haddon,  2000:  5).  Not  surprisingly,  the notion of 
performative  “phatic  communion” as  “a  type of  speech in which  ties  of  union are 
created by a mere exchange of words” actually was formulated by Malinowski, in an 
article that appeared one year after his major work on the Kula exchange (Malinowski, 
1923: 315). In Argonauts Malinowski already pays attention to the performative power 
of linguistic formulas that were spoken in Kula exchanges. He notes: “[t]he native is  
deeply  convinced of  this  mysterious,  intrinsic power of  certain words” (Malinowski, 
1984: 451). In his ensuing article, he argues that an “utterance has no meaning except 
in the context of situation” (Malinowski, 1923: 307). Language in its written form is a 
“mirror of reflected thought”, whereas in its “primitive uses” language “is a mode of  
action and not an instrument of reflection” (ibid: 312). 
The idea of  communication as  situated performance is  fodder for  two main 
strands of critique I direct at Ricoeur’s narrative identity theory in the final chapter. For 
Ricoeur, narrative is primarily a medium for (self)reflection. It stands in a referential  
relation to everyday actions and events, and represents people’s identity. He pays no 
attention to actual situations and conditions under which people are telling stories,  
and the role of performative utterances. Furthermore, Ricoeur is exclusively concerned 
with the temporal dimensions of identity (how can we retain permanence in time). He 
neglects  the  spatial  dimensions  of  identity.  How  are  identities  shaped  by,  and 
constructed  in  contextual  settings,  and  by  movements  between  these  settings? 
Ricoeur’s narrative identity theory focuses on the content of stories, at the expense of 
the  context of storytelling. In phatic mobile communication, what matters is not just 
what is told, but that something is told, and how it is told.
Gifting also serves to emphasize status differences. Gifts are used as weapons in  
agôn rivalries. The more one gives away the greater the status. When the other can no 
longer meet the obligation to reciprocate he has lost (Mauss, 2004: 50-55). This aspect 
of rivalry has also been observed amongst British teenagers. They engage in the to-
and-fro sending of text messages, whereby neither one is supposed to give in:
The exchange  processes  -  the  to  and fro  of  text  messages,  along  with  other  
phone-mediated  rituals  of  exchange  -  provide  a  backdrop  to  the  plays  and 
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counter plays of rivalry and the organisation of rank, or status, accomplished by 
performances of particular kinds. The gift, with its embodied meaning - the text 
message, the call, etc. - and its value are thus a means of demonstrating positions 
of rivalry and status.
(Taylor & Harper, 2003: 284)
Malinowski  pays  a  great  deal  of  attention  to  hierarchy  and  status  rivalry  through 
gifting. Valuable objects gave the owner, often a high-ranking chief, great status. More 
ordinary  objects  were  exchanged  between  sub-ranking  helpers.  A  similar  status 
differentiation exists in the geography of communicative exchanges. Kate Fox describes 
how gossip dissemination via the mobile phone is based on reputation, which itself is a 
product of  reciprocal  praise and judgment.  We rather chat  with someone who is  a 
“good gossip” (a predominantly female skill, Fox adds) (Fox, 2001). Fortunati suggests 
that calling someone directly on the mobile phone can be an expression of  power,  
especially when the fixed home or work number is knowingly bypassed. In doing so,  
people are “shifting the center of communications gravity in their favor” (Fortunati, 
2002a: 53).
Kula gifts derived their significance and value from continuous movement. Only 
by being giving away, the gift gave off its value to the giver. The former possessor might  
have been left empty-handed in a material sense, symbolically he had become a richer  
person.  After  a  limited  period,  usually  a  year  or  two,  Trobrianders  passed  on  the 
necklaces and armbands to exchange partners on other islands. Keeping an object to 
oneself for too long - and thereby out of the moving circle - was seen as ill mannered  
(Malinowski,  1984:  94).  Similar  rules  apply  to  mobile  phone  gifting.  Young  people 
consider the continuation of the gift circle vital. Norwegian teenagers who don't reply a 
text message after a certain time fall “out of circulation” (Ling & Yttri, 2002: 151-152). 
Teenagers in South Korea who ignore other people's  calls  are “chewing out”, which 
means they are not reciprocating in time. They risk receiving less calls and messages 
and consequently lose popularity. Ignoring someone may also be consciously employed 
in status tactics. The person that is being “chewed out” often suffers from a loss of self-
worth (Yoon,  2003:  338).  Proximity  and distance matter too.  In  France it  has  been 
observed that people who live geographically separated make fewer calls yet twice as 
long as people who live nearby (Licoppe & Heurtin, 2002: 105). Like the Trobrianders, 
they reserve the most precious and rarest gifts for people farthest away.
Trobrianders wore their Kula necklaces only at very special occasions. Armbands 
were too small to be worn even by children (Malinowski, 1984: 87-88). Why did the 
Trobrianders  attach so  much value to  objects  they  hardly  ever  used? Man,  Mauss 
concludes his essay, is no utilitarian  homo oeconomicus who defines value purely as 
use value (Mauss, 2004: 98). Gift giving is not a classic economic transaction in the 
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sense of redistributing scarce goods. Nor can the gift be understood as a mere token or  
sign representing something else, for example as a sign of intimacy between people.  
What makes the gift special is that it is infused with the personality of the giver (ibid: 
16, 79, 99). Gift giving, according to Mauss, is a ‘total phenomenon’ that pierces the 
boundaries  between  economical,  religious,  social-structural,  aesthetic,  and  juridical  
domains (ibid: 49).
5.3.2 Types of mobile gifts
When  does  it  make  sense  to  speak  of  gift  exchanges  in  mobile  communication? 
Obviously,  instrumental  uses  of  the mobile phone -  calling  an information number, 
ordering a pizza,  making a business appointment -  bear little qualities of  ritual  gift  
exchanges.  In  such  cases,  the  service  is  provided  outside of  the  exchange  of  the 
message and exists solely in the economic domain. Further, it does not matter who the  
giver  and  recipient  are,  as  a  totally  different  person can deliver  the same service. 
Moreover, the communicative exchange is oftentimes limited to only one conversation 
without  any  expectation  of  a  continuation.  Mobile  gift  exchanges  therefore  must 
comply to three conditions. First, the form of the exchange has the shape of a self-
contained circle in which people exchange messages. Second, gifts have an intimate 
character, that is, the value and meaning of the gifts does not lie in a material value of  
the object itself but in  who gives and  who receives, and how the gift is ceremonially 
‘wrapped’. Third, the communication must be infinite, principally without closure. It 
must  invite  ongoing exchanges  and commitment.  We now analyze types of  mobile  
gifting in finer detail.
i. Giving a mobile phone
Parents often give their children a mobile phone when they reach a milestone in life,  
like the transition to high school. Kyongwon Yoon describes how South Korean parents 
or uncles give children a mobile phone when they think they are old enough for it  
(Yoon,  2003:  335).  The  gift  is  not  just  the  phone  itself,  but  the  expression of  the 
parent’s trust that the child will be able to stand on its own legs. Yet there are no free 
gifts,  as Mary Douglas  aptly  captures  Mauss’  point in her introduction to the 1999 
revision of  The Gift (Mauss, 2004: ix). A gift implies the reciprocal obligation for the 
child to take more responsibility. The mobile phone underlines the transition to a new 
stage in life. Indeed the giving of a mobile phone may occur ceremonially. For example 
by at once solemnly and teasingly handing over the mobile phone, declaring that from 
now on the child must take responsibility (“now you have to pay your own bills”) and at  
the same time poking fun of his new status (“that’ll mean some extra paper rounds”). 
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It is a modern-day ‘rite de passage’. With the transition to adulthood comes discrete 
ownership over things (Nafus & Tracey, 2002: 213). To possess is to be able to give 
away. To own a mobile phone is the first step into participating in the game of gifting. 
ii. Giving mobile phone numbers
Most  people  do  not  give  out  their  number  to  anyone.  They  tend  to  be  slightly  
apprehensive in giving away (and receiving) phone numbers, especially a mobile phone 
number.  As  already  said,  in  France  managing  phone  numbers  involves  trust  and 
expectations of  reciprocity  (Licoppe & Heurtin,  2001: 102).  There are again cultural  
differences. As noted before, this apprehension is less pronounced in Indonesia, where 
young people  are  quite  eager  to share  their  phone  numbers  for  instance via  print 
weeklies. It  has  also been observed in Jamaica in the practice of  ‘link-up’,  whereby 
people  actively  aim  to  extend  their  social  networks  and  quite  unproblematically  
exchange phone numbers with strangers on the streets (Horst & Miller, 2006: 89-91). In 
any case, exchanging phone numbers is an opening gift that creates the possibility to 
forge a deeper social relationship. 
iii. Sharing the mobile phone
Among teenagers it is common practice to share mobile phones when one has no more 
calling credit. Amongst Korean kids it is considered not done to refuse someone the 
use of one’s phone (Yoon, 2003: 337). Adults tend to do this less, presumably because  
they often have post-paid subscriptions. Still, they too may admiringly play with a new 
device offered for show by a friend, colleague or family member. The mere touching of  
each other’s mobile phone is a very intimate act. It is important to keep in mind the 
performative charge of such gifts. As is observed among British teens, “it is not merely 
the object  of  exchange from which the meaning originates,  but  also its  role in  the 
ceremonial exchange itself” (Taylor & Harper, 2003: 290). 
iv. Sharing mobile phone content and context
By far the most important type of gifting is sharing content. People show each other 
text  messages,  let  others  listen to  voicemails,  share  (self-made)  ringtones,  photos, 
videos,  and other files,  play  little  games  together,  listen to music  together on one 
headset  or  in  groups  over  the  mobile  phone  speaker.  Sharing  through  the  mobile  
phone can occur directly from device to device or via the internet. It occurs between 
people who have a special relationship with each other. As said, what matters is not 
solely the content itself but the context that is established through the sharing. Gifting 
is ritualized and conforms to the rules of reciprocity. People who share their pictures 
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with someone expect to see someone else’s photos in return  233. The mobile phone 
offers a wide range of channels for communication: voice calls via either GSM or CDMA 
networks or voice over IP (VoIP) calling; text messages (SMS), either by phone or via 
some free or paid web service; multimedia messages (MMS);  mobile email;  instant 
messaging (IM) and chatting (IRC); peer-to-peer messaging like Bluetooth. Each type of 
communication has  its  own affective connotations  and is  used in specific  contexts. 
Calling is very direct and personal but may also appear pushy. A text message is less  
direct  and often more playful  in  character by making creative use of  language and 
smilies. Many Indonesians for instance feel that they can say more via SMS, since it is  
less direct. This range of options poses a considerable burden on the giver to choose 
the appropriate carrier as a ‘gift wrapper’. The next challenge is to pick the right words 
and use the right tone. Moreover, the gift has to fit in the short-term or long-term 
micro-narratives that are spun by earlier exchanges. By no means should we forget to 
inform how the job application went, or if last weekend’s flirt worked out or not. Like a  
physical present, the gift succeeds when the recipient feels that the message is the  
result  of  the giver’s  thorough care  and reflects  the personalities  of  both giver and 
receiver. The right gift balances between anticipation and surprise (“I was hoping you 
would call”), between recognition and originality (“that’s so you!”). What counts as its  
‘perlocutionary force’ is that the message conveys: “it is only me who could have said  
this  right  now  to  you”.  This  fits  with  Leslie  Haddon’s  argument  that  people  have 
become “communication managers” who have to make complex decisions in managing 
their “communications repertoire” (Haddon, 2005: 7, 16). From this observation, it is 
not a big step to liken the decision-making process to a strategic game. The goal in this  
game is how to best address someone, or - inversely - how to best avoid someone we 
don’t  want to talk  to.  Haddon notes  that  managing the communications repertoire 
does not always run smoothly. People may have different expectations as to how they 
should  be  contacted.  There  might  be  differences  among the  generations,  or  other 
social variables like class and gender (ibid: 16). Failures can occur in mobile gift giving. 
Receiving  a  template  message  with  standard  content  (“the  answer  is  YES”)  is  like  
getting an unwrapped box of chocolates grabbed from the supermarket shelf. It carries  
no personal value. Especially when the preceding message was carefully composed this 
can be met with disappointment. It is not an equivalent exchange. Taylor and Harper 
found that teenagers attach a relative hierarchy to communication media. Messages 
should be reciprocated with ones approximately equal in value, but not the same. To 
233 While  in  online  environments the obligation of reciprocity  might be less strong, it  does occur in  the 
exchange of computer game tips (Sun, Lin, & Ho, 2003) or in open source software development (Bergquist,  
2003).
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answer a personal text message that is sent via the phone by sending a text message 
via a free web-based service (“powered by Yahoo”) is seen as cheap and an affront  
(Taylor & Harper, 2003: 283-284). 
Gifting practices create ties of intimacy and an imagined sense of co-presence.  
Text messages are used to ‘play’ with distant friends and simulate co-presence (White 
& White, 2005: 7). Several researchers focus on how creative expressions using the  
phone’s multimedia capabilities establish a sense of proximity (Hjorth, 2007; Ito, 2005;  
Koskinen, 2005; Rantavuo, 2007; Villi, 2007). Sharing an ongoing stream of photos from 
an individual point of view with a handful of close friends or intimate others supports  
what Ito calls ‘intimate visual co-presence’ (Ito, 2005). Along similar lines, Mikko Villi 
argues that exchanging mobile phone photos via MMS (multimedia messaging service) 
creates the illusion of spatial and temporal  immediacy (Villi,  2007: 322-323). Again,  
communication establishes shared context, not just content. 
Exchanges  also  occur  within  calls.  Emanual  Schegloff  analyzes  how  ‘opening 
sequences’  in  telephony  are  rule-based  rituals  in  which  each  party  takes  turns  in 
speaking (Schegloff, 2002a: 289; 2002b: 326). An asymmetry exists in calling. The caller  
knows who he is calling but the recipient does not. Therefore the answerer is allowed 
to  speak  first.  Schlegoff  observes  that  people  play  identification games  when they 
make a telephone call. People prefer to be recognized over having to identify oneself.  
This often leads to elaborate guessing games and giving little clues. People sometimes 
cheat. They claim recognition where none occurs (Schegloff, 2002a: 292). Recipients 
can also use Caller ID to neutralize the asymmetry in calling. Callers then might use  
Caller  ID  blocking  as  a  counter-measure  (ibid:  293).  The mobile  phone  offers  even 
further  possibilities  for  restoring  symmetry  in  this  recognition  game.  Most  phones 
enable people to group their contacts in categories (friends, work, favorites),  assign 
specific ringtones to people, or automatically divert calls to voicemail. These can be  
strategies to cope with the invasion of a mobile phone call. I want to underline that  
such little games are not necessarily meant to find a static equilibrium between caller 
and  recipient.  That  would  close  the  exchange.  Communication  between  intimates 
should  always  leave  openings  for  future  contact.  Mobile  communication  has  been 
noted to bear the quality of an ongoing conversation. Formal openings and closures are 
often bypassed (Licoppe & Heurtin, 2002: 106; Ling, 2008: 120; Schegloff, 2002a: 284-
285). Like traditional gifting it is infinite and perpetual.
Language games are an important aspect of mobile communication. We have 
seen the example of Dewi’s text message in bahasa gaul. Such language games mark 
the boundaries of who is in and who is out. The mobile phone both blurs boundaries  
(work-leisure,  public-private,  distant-present,  etc.)  and  aids  in  erecting  new  ones. 
Taylor observes that talking about the mobile phone can be a strategy to turn attention 
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away from more awkward topics (Taylor, 2005). Similarly, Ling notes that teenagers in 
Norway talk about the phone to set a boundary around a particular topic, as if to say 
let’s  stick  to  this  safe  subject  (Ling,  2008:  97).  Young  Norwegians  developed  a 
temporary fad for using pidgin Swedish (ibid: 130-131). They use ever-changing slang 
language as a boundary marker to define membership of the peer group (and inversely 
who does not belong to the group). Oddly, they sometimes use longer words, or words 
that are more difficult to type: tsjenara instead of hei (“hi”); krämmar as a deliberate 
misspelling of the Swedish kramar (“hugs”). Ling concludes that the teenagers trade in 
writing efficiency for more complexity  and more ritually  involved words (ibid: 131).  
Adding to this conclusion, I suggest that such practices can be seen as an example of  
what Clifford Geertz calls ‘deep play’. Deep play means deliberately making activities or 
events more difficult (‘deep’) in order to add drama and importance and to set them 
apart  from  normalcy  (Geertz,  1975a).  Through  deep  play  people  construct  their 
identities.  Enlarging  the  importance  of  particular  aspects  of  life  is  a  meta-social 
commentary  that  allows  people  to  interpret  themselves.  It  is  “a  story  they  tell 
themselves  about  themselves”  (ibid:  448).  Group identities  are  shaped in  this  play 
through the mobile.
Gifting  often  involves  exchanging  jokes  and  laughing  together.  Since  its 
inception,  the  telephone  has  been  a  rich  source  for  humorous  play.  The  fixed 
telephone initially was used more for entertainment and communal participation than 
for business, writes McLuhan. He recalls a joke of the early days whereby people would  
ring their friends, identify themselves as an engineer, and say “cover up your phone,  
we’re  cleaning  the  lines”  (McLuhan,  1994:  297).  Sociologist  and  historian  of  the 
telephone Claude Fisher describes how the landline was used (mainly by women) in 
non-functional  ways,  which outsiders  (mainly  men) considered ‘frivolous’  or  ‘trivial’ 
(Fischer, 1992: 78-81, 234). Koskinen and Battarbee study the use of sound in mobile 
media use (Koskinen & Battarbee, 2006). They find that joking makes up a large portion 
of  people’s MMS messages (multimedia messaging service). Participants were given 
MMS enabled phones and started to send each other weird sounds,  like  cries  and 
laughter. This happened especially in the beginning when people were experimenting.  
“In particular, one man, Mara, became an expert in sending odd cries and sounds to 
others,  including  mimicking  hens,  pigeons,  ostriches  (!),  and  pigs,  as  well  as 
introjections  of  various  sorts”  (ibid:  2-3).  Ling  too  pays  considerable  attention  to 
exchanging joke via the mobile phone (Ling,  2008: 135-148).  He considers humor a 
ritual  form  of  interaction  with  multiple  functions.  “Humor,  joking,  and  repartee 
engender social cohesion, help in integration and in-group identity, provide insight into 
the  exercise  of  power  relations  and  repair  work  within  groups,  and  mark  group 
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boundaries” (ibid: 136). Sometimes however joking can turn into bullying. There are 
stories abound of especially young people who use their mobile phone to harass their  
peers or others 234.
5.3.3 Differences between old and new gifting
Mobile  gifting  underlines  the  ritual  character  of  a  large  part  of  mobile  phone 
communication,  that  is,  communication  between  intimates  235.  It  underlines  that 
mobile media communication does not destroy former ties but to a degree ‘restores’ 
pre-modern  small-scale  sociability  236.  Of  course  this  is  not  a  return  proper  to  any 
previous situation. Mobile gifting differs from traditional gifting. First, the frequency of 
exchanges  is  much  higher.  Trobrianders  only  set  out  in  their  canoes  once  a  year.  
Research  from  Finland  shows  that  young  people  expect  someone  to  reply  a  text 
message  within  15  to  30  minutes.  Longer  is  not  acceptable  and  considered  rude 
(Kasesniemi  &  Rautiainen,  2002:  186).  In  Victor  Turner’s  terms,  traditional  cyclical 
gifting ceremonies were occasional ‘liminal’ inversions of everyday life, whereas mobile  
gifting  are  ongoing  ‘liminoid’  everyday  rituals.  Traditional  gifting  took  place  in 
spatiotemporally segregated zones. Mobile gifting often takes place during otherwise 
lost in-between moments that fold into the ongoing stream of everyday activities. A 
few minutes wait on the train, a brief pause between classes; these otherwise wasted 
moments  are  optimized  to  do  some  ‘social  motor  maintenance’.  Traditional  gift 
ceremonies were public and the stories about legendary Kula objects were publicly 
shared. Mobile gifts sometimes are being made public too, for instance shared via ‘web 
2.0’ platforms. But most of the time the content remains hidden, and the activity of 
gifting  itself  tends  to  be  done  inconspicuously  and  secretively.  Young  people  in 
particular appear to consider it a challenge to use their phone in clandestine ways: 
during class, in the cinema, after bedtime (in the context of romantic relations, see 
Ellwood-Clayton, 2003: 234). Moreover, mobile gifts often consist of words, images, 
and memories that are meaningless for most  people except for the people sharing 
them. This fits with the post-modern idea that meaning and values have become highly 
subjective, and that broadly shared ‘grand narratives’ lost their attraction. 
234 News media have paid a great deal of attention to the stupid fad ‘happy slapping’. A random bystander is  
smacked while filming with the mobile phone camera, and this footage is shared online.
235 Research about the landline telephone similarly shows that “half of the telephone calls from any given 
residence go to only five numbers, indicating that repeated conversations are held with a small circle of 
friends and family” (Fischer, 1992: 225-226).
236 Several authors point to this apparent inversion of Tönnies’ classical characterization of modern society in  
terms of a transition from  Gemeinschaft (‘community’)  to  Gesellschaft (‘society’)  (Ling,  2008:  186; Nyíri, 
2003a: 13; Pertierra, 2005: 28).
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As seen, Caillois calls play unproductive, “creating neither goods, nor wealth, nor new 
elements of any kind; and, except for the exchange of property among the players, 
ending in a situation identical to that prevailing at the beginning of the game” (Caillois, 
2001: 10, my emphasis). This is untrue for mobile gifting (and arguably for any game).  
With  each  exchange  a  transformation  occurs.  Schechner  notes  of  gifting  rituals: 
“[n]ever is a balance struck, because balance would threaten an end to the obligations, 
and this would lead either to war or a stale peace. As long as the obligations are intact  
the  social  web  transmits  continuous  waves  of  paybacks  throughout  the  system” 
(Schechner,  2003:  124).  Each  new  exchange  strikes  a  new  actuality.  Mobile 
communication is a perpetually moving circle, an ‘infinite game’ that needs constant  
care and attention. 
In conclusion, what is playful about mobile gifting? There are a number of game 
elements in mobile gift exchanges (ludus). It is rule-governed, it creates order, it has 
competitive dimensions, it tends to be shaped like a closed circle (a circle of intimacy) 
that includes familiar people and wards off outsiders who are not (yet) gift partners. 
Mobile gifting’s rule-governed interactivity - people must answer in time to a call or  
text  message  -  bears  the  quality  of  game  rather  than  a  narrative,  although  little 
narratives occur in gift exchanges. Mobile gifting at the same time bears elements of  
free play (paidia). It is not goal-oriented but an end in itself, it involves ongoing to-and-
fro movements, and humorous joking, and opens up room for creative expressions and 
experimentation. Contrary to games where the reward exists outside of the activity, in 
mobile gifting the reward is the ongoing exchange itself. Mobile gifting is autotelic: it is 
not  a  sign  or  symbol  that  refers  to-,  or  represents  something  else,  but  a  phatic 
performance that  points  to itself.  Mobile  gifting is  an ‘infinite game’ (Carse,  1986). 
Gifting opens  up a  perspective  on the apparent  triviality  and lack  of  coherence  in 
mobile  communication  exchanges.  From  an  outsiders  perspective  other  peoples’ 
mobile conversations seem pointless, like any play or game ultimately is pointless as  
long as one is not playing. These messages acquire their meaning only to those inside  
the circle. Not just as messages that say something, or pretend to say something, but  
as messages that enable people to articulate the conditions of their relations to others.  
Mobile communication’s ‘phatic’ performativity is a showing of a doing.
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5.4 Play by the mobile
While  technological  progress  as  a  whole continually  narrows  our  sphere  of 
freedom,  each  new  technical  advance  considered  by  itself appears  to  be 
desirable. Electricity, indoor plumbing, rapid long-distance communications . . . 
how could one argue against any of these things, or against any other of the  
innumerable technical advances that have made modern society? It would have 
been absurd to resist the introduction of the telephone, for example. It offered 
many advantages and no disadvantages. ... [A]ll these technical advances taken 
together have created a world in which the average man's fate is no longer in his  
own  hands  or  in  the  hands  of  his  neighbors  and  friends,  but  in  those  of 
politicians,  corporation  executives  and  remote,  anonymous  technicians  and 
bureaucrats whom he as an individual has no power to influence *.
* Since many people may find paradoxical the notion that a large number 
of  good things  can  add up  to  a  bad thing,  we will  illustrate with an  analogy.  
Suppose Mr. A is playing chess with Mr. B. Mr. C, a Grand Master, is looking over 
Mr. A’s shoulder. Mr. A of course wants to win his game, so if Mr. C points out a 
good move for him to make, he is doing Mr. A a favor. But suppose now that Mr. C 
tells Mr. A how to make all of his moves. In each particular instance he does Mr. A 
a favor by showing him his best move, but by making all of his moves for him he 
spoils  the game, since there  is  no point  in  Mr.  A’s  playing the game at  all  if  
someone else makes all his moves.
The situation of modern man is analogous to that of Mr. A. The system 
makes an individual’s life easier for him in innumerable ways, but in doing so it  
deprives him of control over his own fate 237.
In the essay Industrial Society and Its Future (1995), better known as The Unabomber  
Manifesto, the current technological condition is described as the antithesis to human 
freedom.  The writer  is  ‘neo-Luddite’  Ted Kaczynski,  a  former  assistant  professor  in 
mathematics at the University of California, also known as the Unabomber 238. He was 
not your average guy. Between 1978 and 1995 he sent mail bombs to random people  
working at universities, airlines and in computer businesses, killing three and injuring 
24. The ideas voiced in the Unabomber Manifesto are radical but by no means insane. 
They express a broadly felt sense of powerlessness and loss of freedom as a result of 
technological changes.
237 Source:  the  Unabomber  Manifesto,  paragraph  128  and  footnote  21: 
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Industrial_Society_and_Its_Future.
238 The Luddites were a early 19th century movement of textile workers who destroyed weaving machines in  
protest against the mechanization brought about by the Industrial Revolution.
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In  this  section  I  investigate  how  mobile  media  technologies  as  part  of  ‘the 
media’ at large induce a sense of ‘being played’. We are not univocal masters over our 
information and communication technologies. Mobile media also impose their logics 
on us in a dialectic between freedom and force. This dialectic already occurs on the 
other play levels. When we start playing on the mobile we are impelled to play on 
because  of  its  inbuilt  reward  system,  its  ‘immersiveness’,  and/or  because  of  social 
obligations  to  our  co-players  to  continue.  Play  with  the  mobile  can  turn  into  a 
burdensome  competition  of  continuously  increasing  personal  prestige.  And  play 
through  the  mobile  gets  us  inextricably  caught  up  in  reciprocal  networks  of  gift 
exchanges from which it is hard to escape. Still, I choose to analyze ‘play by the mobile’  
as a distinct level. The primary reason is the commonly voiced ambivalence towards  
mobile  phones  and  media  technologies  in  general.  They  bring  new  freedoms  and 
impose new burdens. This deserves separate treatment to underline that the heuristics 
of play is not all about emphasizing the expressive freedom and joyous creativity of  
digital  media  as  ‘technologies  of  freedom’  (Pool,  1983),  but  just  as  much  about  
understanding their sometimes brutal force. It connects to the old discussion in science 
and technology studies between technological determinism and social constructivism. 
Many theorists have sought to overcome this dichotomy. The fact is that this tension 
remains alive and kicking in laymen views. I propose that the pair free play and game 
act as a lens that is less categorical in separating and opposing the technological world 
from the human world. ‘Play by the media’ looks at media  as culture. It shows how 
media  logics  and our  own play  attitudes are  intertwined.  Media  both restrain  and 
enable.  As  code-  or  rule-based  games  they  set  boundaries  and  stakes  ( ludus).  As 
playspaces they open up room for free play (paidia). Playful identities emerge in this 
dialectic of freedom and force. 
Mobile  media  technologies  are  tied  up  with  other  media  technologies:  the 
internet, television, various printed media, and even with literature and poetry. In the  
chapters about Indonesia we have seen that mobile media cannot be understood on 
their own. With the notion of ‘media convergence’, Jenkins convincingly argues that it  
is no longer useful or even valid to speak of old and new media as distinct domains 
(Jenkins,  2006).  The  present  media  landscape  has  become a  hybrid  blend  of  mass 
media,  print,  and  various  ICTs.  In  this  section  I  address  ‘media’  in  a  broad  and 
interrelated way as media culture.  This  involves the risk  of  saying unspecific  things 
about  ‘the  media’  in  general.  To  avoid  this  I  shall  make  clear  at  each  point  what 
medium or media I talk about. 
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5.4.1 Tyrannies of choice and speed; colonization of private and public life
The mobile phone presents us with new choices. Too much choice becomes a burden.  
Barry Schwartz calls this “the tyranny of choice” (Schwartz, 2004). As we have seen, 
Haddon argues  that  we have  become decision managers  who must  cope  with  the 
complexities  of  mobile  communications  technologies  (Haddon,  2005:  7,  16).  The 
mobile phone confronts us not only with more but also with new choices. Should I get 
a mobile phone? What type? How should I customize my phone? Should I use it only 
for functional calls or also to socialize? Should I use the phone in the presence of other 
people? In what situations should I put it on silent? Is it OK to substitute a personal  
visit  to someone with making a call? How often should I  call  my parents? Should I  
call/text/send an email? Is this place or event worth taking a snapshot of? Should I just  
watch and listen to an artist performing in the here and now, or should I record it with 
my phone to share it  with others  elsewhere and for a later time? Should I  ask for  
directions  to  someone  on  the  streets  or  should  I  look  it  up  on  my  GPS-enabled 
smartphone with navigation software? Should I be available for work during holidays? 
And  so  on,  and  so  on.  Such  choices  are  not  limited  to  specific  situations.  They 
continually  ‘flash  up’  as  aleatory  (chance)  moments,  because  we  take  our  mobile  
phones everywhere and cannot  anticipate if  and when we will  be confronted with 
them. As a result, the course of everyday life must be managed like a strategy game. It  
demands of us to make real-time decisions at every junction in order to get a grip on 
the chance moments. We are forced to play 239. 
Mobile phones and other ICTs lead people to experience a speeding up of life, 
ilinx sensory  confusion,  and  a  sense  of  powerlessness.  This  is  not  a  recent 
phenomenon. Speed and the disruption of traditional structures and experiences were 
central themes in commentaries on early modern society. Early modern societies were 
characterized by an emerging metropolitan life in the fast lane, and the rise of space-
time  transcending  transport  and  communication  technologies.  We  have  seen  how 
Benjamin characterizes this mediated urban life in terms of rapidly alternating shock 
experiences.  A few decades later,  speed became a crucial  notion for McLuhan.  His  
analysis  of  electronic  media  revolves  around  the question how quantitative  factors 
cause qualitative changes to occur (McLuhan, 1994). The speed of electronic media 
would lead to acceleration, intensification, and separation of commercial and political  
functions, and eventually cause an implosion of old structures like the city (ibid: 103, 
106). In the same vein, Virilio argues that the logics of speed of electronic media lets  
real time prevail over the real space of the city, and adds: “the more speed increases, 
the faster freedom decreases” (Virilio, 1986: 142). Townsend claims that the mobile  
239 Even saying no to the mobile phone is a reactive decision to avoid playing this game, with social ostracism 
as a potential result. Those who fear cellphone tower radiation will find it is almost impossible to escape.
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phone  speeds  up  the  ‘urban  metabolism’.  This  makes  decision-making  and 
management of everyday life more complex and less predictable (Townsend, 2000: 89). 
For  Meyrowitz,  the  speed  of  electronic  media  has  made  physical,  social,  cultural,  
political,  and  economic  boundaries  more  porous  (Meyrowitz,  2003:  97).  All  these 
authors  express  the idea that  speed not  only  liberates  us  from old spatiotemporal  
constraints  but  also  destroys  old  structures  and  certainties,  and  makes  life  more 
complex.  Digital  ICTs  further add some extra  gears  to society’s  speedy  ‘machinery’. 
While  speed  thus  is  an  old  theme,  it  seems  no  coincidence  that  presently  slow 
movements (‘slow food’, ‘citta slow’, ‘slow living’) are gaining in popularity worldwide.  
This may well be interpreted as a reaction to the broadly felt tyranny of speed ‘caused’  
by  omnipresent  technologies.  One  of  the  main  proponents  of  the  slow  living 
movement,  Carl  Honoré,  explicitly  mentions  information-  and  communication 
technologies  as  one  of  the  contributing  factors  in  a  rushed  life,  without  however  
rejecting  them  240.  That  indeed  seems  the  challenge:  by  maneuvering  between 
embracing and rejecting technologies, we are forced to reflect on our engagement with  
them.
Mobile phones are associated with loss of both privacy and publicness. Many 
feel that the invasive character of mobile communication and concomitant intrusion on 
privacy is a serious downside of the mobile phone (although less so in Indonesia than  
in many western countries). Individuals have nowhere to hide from the all-hearing ear 
of their bosses, spouses, family members, friends. People can ring in at any moment. 
Deciding not to answer may lead to suspicions and provoke anger. Commercial sales 
calls  provoke  rage,  even  more  on  the  mobile  phone  than  the  fixed  line.  In  his  
investigation of mobile messaging in China as a means of control, Jack Qiu aptly calls  
the mobile phone a ‘wireless leash’ (Qiu, 2007). Licoppe notes how the mobile phone 
ringtone “summons us” to react, and can be a threat to our ‘face’ in the presence of  
other people (Licoppe, 2008). Simultaneously, many feel that the mobile phone also 
usurps  the public  domain.  Annoying  ringtones  and private  talk  in  public  situations  
disrupt the level playing field that makes up the ‘commons’, the spaces and places that  
belong to us all  241.  In Japan, making voice calls  in public transport  is  seen as poor 
manners. People usually comply with this social norm (Matsuda, 2005: 23-24; Okabe & 
Ito, 2005: 205). In many other countries the rules are not so explicit, or people refuse 
to  act  in  accordance  with  such  rules.  In  a  survey  among  New  Yorkers,  Kathleen 
Cumiskey finds that bystanders who hear other people calling feel “annoyed, disturbed, 
240 See http://www.carlhonore.com/?page_id=6.
241 Or the spaces that belong to none of us. The omnipresence in our present urban landscapes of what Augé 
calls  ‘non-places’,  places  without  history  or  identity,  may  take  away  a  sense  of  ownership  and  shared  
responsibility. Not technology on its own ‘causes’ the destruction of public space. It is embedded in the  
broader make-up of urban societies, I would say.
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angry, disrespected, and ignored” (Cumiskey, 2005: 229). People experience “a sense of 
powerlessness”,  and  feel  “trapped”  in  the  position  of  onlooker  or  even  “voyeur” 
(Cumiskey,  2005:  230).  In  public  situations  people  are  forced  to  play  the  role  of  
audience and listen to someone else’s performance. Both bystanders and the person 
who is called in public can feel overpowered by the situation. In a UK study about the 
impact of receiving phone calls while on the move, Ann Light finds that many people  
panic and get the sense of “being moved about”. They must “juggle” the phone to  
maintain  a  balance  between  the  contemporaneous  physical  situation  and  mobile 
communication (Light, 2009: 201-202). In her view, the mobile phone is “penetrative” 
as  much as  it  is  an  enabling  device  (Light,  2009:  197).  One  person’s  liberty  forms 
another person’s shackles.
5.4.2 New power mechanisms: from surveillance to sousveillance, identity profiling
The mobile phone is a tool for surveillance. In the Netherlands, the police have more 
than once obtained mobile phone numbers from telecom providers to use them for 
‘SMS bombardments’ in order to find perpetrators of soccer hooliganism. In one case,  
17.000 people  who had been near a  stadium in  Rotterdam between certain  hours 
received a text message in which they were asked for cooperation  242. Other mobile 
technologies like RFID-based public transport cards are frequently associated with loss 
of privacy, surveillance issues, and state control. 
The  mobile  phone  induces  a  new  type  of  surveillance  that  is  often  called 
‘sousveillance’ (Mann, Nolan, & Wellman, 2003). Citizens are no longer monitored from 
above by  institutions and the overarching state authority,  but  from below by  their 
fellow citizens. Armed with mobile phone cameras and internet connections people 
record and upload any breach of social norms. A notorious case is the “Korean Dog  
Poop Girl”. A woman who refused to clean up her dog’s excrements in the subway was  
filmed with a mobile phone camera. After the film was put online many people started 
recognizing her. She was repeatedly humiliated both online and in physical encounters, 
and  reportedly  quit  her  studies  243.  In  Indonesia,  compromising  footage  shot  with 
mobile  phone  cameras  and  spread  online  resulted  in  several  public  sex  scandals. 
Sousveillance is the inverse of the singular and central all-seeing eye of the panopticon,  
a circular prison architecture with guards in the middle and inmates around the edges.  
Michel  Foucault  adopted  this  concentric  architecture  as  an  image  to  depict  how 
institutions  (the  family,  the  school,  the  workplace)  in  ‘disciplinary  societies’  keep 
242 This  outraged  the  Dutch  movement  for  digital  civil  rights  Bits  of  Freedom,  calling  it  “unlawful  and 
immoral”. See http://www.bof.nl/docs/opiniesmsactie.pdf (in Dutch).
243 See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/06/AR2005070601953.html.
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subjects in tightly controlled spaces of enclosure (Foucault, 1995). The  possibility of 
being monitored enforces a self-disciplining in individuals. Gilles Deleuze observes a 
transition from a ‘disciplinary society’ to a ‘society of control’, where it is no longer 
clear to which institution the prying eyes belong (Deleuze, 1990). Deleuze suggests the 
rise of a new type of subject. We no longer are disciplined as integrated individuals 
whose numerical bodies are fixated though the visible monitoring inside institutional 
confines. Instead we are being controlled by many invisible computerized systems that 
turn us into mobile ‘dividuals’ who exist only as traces of code in databases 244. Control 
via (mobile) media is an invisible distributed multiplicity, a networked force in which we 
are implicated as both surveillant(e) and surveillé(e). 
All  mobile  phone  users  unwittingly  scatter  informational  traces.  While  not 
paying particular attention to issues of surveillance, Mimi Ito et al. observe that people 
leave  various  informational  ‘footprints’  in  particular  locations  via  portable 
informational objects, like mobile phones, laptops, RFID-based chip cards and credit  
cards (Ito, et al., 2009: 79). This happens in customer transactions and by participating 
in loyalty schemes. Ito  et al. describe footprinting as “the process of  integrating an 
individual’s trajectory into the transactional history of a particular establishment, and 
customer  cards  are  the  mediating  devices”  (ibid:  79).  Mobile  media  are  not  just  
communication  technologies  that  we  use  for  intentional  utterances  but  also 
information technologies that work in the background and collect data about us. Often 
without us knowing what, where it goes, and for what purposes it is used, let alone  
knowing how to control it. 
These  notions  -  society  of  control,  footprinting  -  point  to  the  emergent 
dominance of informational database systems in a wide range of transactions, not just 
in  the  economic  domain  but  increasingly  also  in  the  social  domain.  The  database 
narrows ‘identity’ to ‘identification’ in order to allow or deny access to certain services  
or people. It reduces a rich understanding of identity to a mere set of preferences. Only 
if we are identified as loyal customers can we get a discount. Similarly, online social  
media platforms are coded spaces that define us by our personal tastes and attributes: 
our date of birth, relationship status, religious views, brands we like, groups we join, 
and  so  on.  These  are  stored  as  database  entries  (and/or  browser  cookies).  These 
entries are data-mined, and used for targeted advertisements. For online businesses 
such databases are valuable assets to draw in other users and reach critical mass, and 
thereby  increase their  shareholder value and potential  takeover revenue.  Even our 
utterances on such platforms  become database entries  that  can be aggregated for 
244 This perspective stands in contrast to the views of Beck and Giddens, who (still) think of late modern “risk  
society” in terms of an opposition between institutions and individuals (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991: 15).
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economic profiling and social profiling  245. Other people believe they can ‘read’ us by 
browsing back through our collection of entries. In fact many organizations skim social 
network profiles before hiring new employees. What’s more, others have the power to 
‘write’  us  without  us  always  being  in  control  over  what  is  written.  They  can post  
messages about us or add party pictures tagged with our name. Just one password 
unlocks access to our online personae, with sometimes dramatic consequences when 
malevolent  others  get  their  hands on this  ‘identity’.  Even if  we actually  can delete  
unwanted entries  (many of  which we don’t  know exist),  they still  exist  as indelible 
traces  in  search  engine  caches.  All  this  leaves  us  at  the  mercy  of  forces  beyond 
ourselves. As argued in the previous chapter, we are less and less the sole keepers of  
our  public  selves.  We  increasingly  drift  away  from  ideals  of  being  autonomous 
creatures shaped in rational deliberation (see Gergen, 2000: 156). In truth, we have 
never  fully  been  in  control  of  our  public  image.  Goffman  keenly  observes  a 
fundamental  asymmetry  between  performers,  who  engage  in  ‘impression 
management’ by communicating information about themselves, and audience,  who 
witness  the  performances  of  others  (Goffman,  1959:  2,  7).  Performers  are  only  in 
control of the impression they give, not of the impression they unintentionally give off. 
The  audience  sees  both.  Media  technologies  -  online  social  media  in  particular  -  
contribute  to  further  entropy  in  identity  management.  Not  only  do  we  have  less  
overview of who the audience are, that is, who have access to our performances, we 
often do not  even  realize  that  we  are  giving  off  information in  the  first  place  via  
‘footprinting’. This makes it much more difficult to manage our public selves. From our  
earlier discussion of Goffman’s theatrical view of social interactions we concluded that 
identity is not a property, something we are or have, but a verb, something we do. We  
are  not  simply  a  static  collection  of  attributes  but  continually  engage  in  dynamic 
interactions with other people, the world, and ourselves. Our identities emerge from 
these  relations.  These  two  sides  of  mediated  identity  -  the  profile  versus  the 
performance - stand in diametrical opposition. Sure, we can use digital media to play  
out ourselves in creative expressions and ongoing interactions. At the same time the 
media play trickery on us. We are lured into believing that technologies and online 
social  networks  offer  a  ‘free’  (as  in  both  speech  and  beer)  play  space  for  ‘doing’  
identity, while their underlying logic is one of categorizing us (and selling us) by our  
informational profiles 246. 
245 In this context, De Mul writes that our present age is ruled by a ‘database ontology’ (De Mul, 2009: 6).
246 These social  networks are  frequently called ‘walled gardens’.  Inside one is free  to move. But getting 
information out (or oneself) is hard.
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Is there a way out? We can trick back. Performers may decide to mislead their 
audience. They can pretend to give off impressions while it is actually an intentional  
performance  (ibid:  2).  Not  being  truthful  is  an  intrinsic  aspect  of  our  everyday 
performances  in  Goffman’s  view.  It  is  a  way  to  restore  the  symmetry  of  the 
communication  process  and  reinstate  control  over  our  self-impressions.  All  of  us 
engage in an “information game - a potentially infinite cycle of concealment, discovery,  
false revelation, and rediscovery” (ibid: 8). When we feel played by the media, deceit is 
the main tactics at our disposal. And indeed we often cheat and lie online as a way to 
deal  with  privacy  protection  247.  People  are  fairly  good  at  recognizing  cheating  by 
judging the conditions of the storytelling, whereas machines and databases are easily  
fooled. Crucially, people often do not mind each other’s cheating under the condition 
that the frames for interpretation are communicated 248. The ubiquitous smiley wink ;-) 
for instance indicates we should take what is being said not too literally. In the context  
of mobile phones, Horst and Miller observe that in Jamaica women often give out false  
telephone numbers to men approaching them on the streets (Horst & Miller, 2006: 91).  
In my interpretation, men probably realize that this happens but prefer taking a false 
number  than  being  truthfully  told  “no”.  In  the  tension  between  the  profile  and 
performance,  cheating  is  a  play  with  the  conditions  of  truth  and  veracity.  Still,  as 
databases become connected and online and ‘real  life’ increasingly intermingle,  old 
habits like adopting separate online personae are much harder to maintain. Little lies  
are more easily exposed. And so the circle moves on: the more we become ourselves 
online the less we are in control over our selves. 
This  touches  on  a  problematic  aspect  of  Ricoeur’s  narrative  identity  theory. 
Ricoeur tries to combine two modalities of our existence: the causal order of sameness 
(the  factual  ‘truth’  of  our  temporal  permanence)  and  the  interpretative  order  of 
selfhood (the truthful fictions we tell). These orders correspond to Bateson’s (a) type 
messages  that  say  something  about  the  causal  order,  and  (b)  type  messages  that 
simulate to say something and work in the interpretative order. In our current media 
world we are increasingly burdened with the difficult task to manage the variety of  
contexts for storytelling. Narrative identity theory lacks a framework for understanding 
under what circumstances people tell certain stories (or distance themselves from their 
own  stories).  Narrative  identity  theory  has  no eye  for  the  everyday  tactics  people 
247 This point is made by Genevieve Bell in a keynote talk at PICNIC 2008 in Amsterdam. See this report: 
http://mastersofmedia.hum.uva.nl/2008/09/25/picnic-08-secrets-and-lies. It is also a central finding in the 
research of behavioral economist Dan Ariely, who finds in experiments that most people cheat, but only a  
little (Ariely, 2008: 201, 213).
248 In the Netherlands people started swapping out supermarket customer cards (Albert Heijn bonuskaart) 
needed for discounts as a way to protect their privacy by corrupting the database. Few people would regard 
those engaging in this rather innocent deceit as intrinsically untrustworthy liars.
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employ to manage their identities in the contemporary struggle between profile and 
performance.  The  conceptual  pair  game  and  play  by  contrast  does  offer  this 
perspective.  Mediated  storytelling  situations  are  shaped  by  the  tension  between 
ascribing  profiles  to  people  in  coded  game  spaces  (ludus),  and  the  room  for 
explorations  and  self-descriptions  in  free  play  (paidia).  I  propose  that  a  theory  of 
playful  identities  focuses  on the conditional  order -  the (c)  type messages  -  under 
which we communicate and convey impressions. This offers plenty room for deceit, 
and failure, in technologically mediated identity constructions and performances. 
5.4.3 Ontological doubt and ludification: between cynicism and engagement
Information- and communication media dissolve the ontological boundaries between 
reality  and  imaginary  fictions,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  discussion  of  Baudrillard’s  
concept of the simulacrum. Media events refer to one another instead of to an external 
reality. We are lulled into believing that events have taken place in the way they are 
represented. Yet a nagging doubt remains. We are not sure whether events portrayed 
in mass media or online media are real. Moreover, we cannot ascertain whether events 
are portrayed truthfully. Illustrative of  this  point is  Dutch journalist  and writer Joris 
Luyendijk’s account of his experiences as a foreign correspondent in the Middle East 
(Luyendijk,  2009).  The  redaction  of  the  Dutch  national  television  news  regularly  
summoned  him  to  a  location  where  an  incident  had  occurred.  The  criterion  for 
newsworthy  events  is  not  some  objective  universal  measure,  Luyendijk  says,  but 
depends on how a region or country is ‘framed’ in the media landscape. Most of the 
time,  Luyendijk  himself  was  oblivious  that  anything  had  taken  place  nearby.  The 
redaction would brief him about the occurrences with information they acquired from 
other news agencies. Then he had to present this ‘breaking news’ on the spot in front 
of  the  camera  as  if  he  had  been an eyewitness.  While  he  probably  was  the least 
informed link in the chain, his physical proximity became the measure of truthfulness 
of the media report. Luyendijk’s account reveals something many people instinctively 
feel (and what by now is almost a truism), namely that mediatized accounts of the 
world ‘cheat’ us into a sense of reality. This raises fundamental doubt not only about 
reality itself, but also about the truthfulness of accounts of reality. We have become 
skeptical about narratives that claim verisimilitude 249.
249 Crises  in  narrative  legitimacy  have  been  declared  on  a  macro-level  in  ‘the  end of  grand  narratives’ 
(Lyotard,  1984);  on  a  meso-level  in  the  general  distrust  of  expert  institutions  and  knowledge  systems  
(Giddens, 1991) and of mediatized information (Baudrillard, 1994); and on a micro-level in the erosion of the 
classical narrative as a means for self-understanding (De Mul, et al., 2005; Maan, 1999).
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We live in a ludic culture fueled by media technologies (even leaving aside the 
tremendous share of obvious playful programming in various media: games, quizzes, 
contests, comedy, cartoons, satire, and so on). Frequently, media do not even pretend 
to be ‘serious’ in their presentations. Truthful accounts of ‘real’ events are presented as 
play. In their formats and ways of (re)presentation media - particularly television - tend 
to ludify the seriousness of domains like politics, business, law, and so on. A few days 
after Obama was elected president, CNN show Political Mann assessed the extent to 
which  he  had  been  truthful  to  his  electoral  promises.  This  was  done  with  an 
‘Obameter’, an animated caricature of Obama with his arm as an arrow on a scale from 
false  to  true,  and  making  funny  cartoonish  noises.  The  sheer  quantity  of  media 
channels and information people digest makes it increasingly hard to achieve impact. 
To make an item that resonates it has to be distinct from all the other expressions. Play 
and games are a fathomless vat of inspiration. Of course play has never been away in  
any of these ‘serious’ domains. Huizinga shows that culture is playful in origin (the play  
element  of culture,  not  in culture).  Huizinga’s  analysis  of  the playful  origins  of  the 
judicial system, war, education, and arts, was innovative because it brought back to 
attention what had been deliberately forgotten, in the process Weber famously terms 
the  disenchantment  of  the  modern  world.  In  order  for  modern  bureaucratic 
institutions  to  ‘work’,  boundaries  had  to  be  erected  between  work  and  leisure, 
between  seriousness  and  fun,  between  real  and  only  play.  Present-day  media 
representations thrive on playing with these boundaries. Present ludification highlights 
play elements in these ‘serious’ domains.
The following example illustrates this. On December 19 2008 the entire cabinet 
of  prime  minister  Yves  Leterme  in  Belgium  stepped  down  as  a  result  of  scandals 
surrounding the Fortis bank takeover  250. After the sale of the bank was announced, 
many private individuals were left with virtually worthless shares and rose to court. It 
was  discovered that  the government,  who had agreed to the merger,  had tried  to 
influence the outcome. The prime minister had been in touch with the spouse of one 
of the judges. She had leaked information about the proceedings of the case via her  
mobile  phone.  With  this  information  the  prime  minister  had  briefed  government 
lawyers about a defense strategy. The mobile phone also played a crucial role in live 
reports of the ensuing events on national television. The government was summoned 
to the parliament and the minister of  justice resigned. It  remained uncertain what  
Leterme himself was up to. In front of the camera a member of opposition wondered 
why he had not yet received a text message announcing the resignation of Leterme. A  
journalist  appeared  on screen.  He declared  that  he had  received an SMS from an 
250 This description is largely based on a television program by Dutch actuality program Nova on Friday  
December 19 2008, in turn largely compiled from live reports by Belgium national television VRT1.
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“exceptionally dependable source”, claiming Leterme had proposed the resignation of  
the whole government. Only a few minutes later he reappeared. Glancing at his mobile 
phone  he  withdrew  his  earlier  statement.  With  an  ironic  smile  he  concluded  that 
different  political  parties  were  “spinning”  this  issue  by  sending  text  messages  to 
journalists with their own version of what is going on. A television commentator noted:  
“if it weren’t so dramatical, we could call it a soap”. Later the journalist reappeared and  
once more said that from an “exceptionally dependable source” he had received a text 
message. Glancing at his mobile phone, he started to read it  aloud with an official-
sounding voice, stating that the entire government had offered their resignation to the  
Belgium king. The commentator remarked: “the Belgium government crisis unfolds by 
SMS”. Later she called the affair a “Shakespearian drama”. The director of a Belgium 
newspaper  later  repeatedly  used  this  term  “Shakespearian  drama”  in  a  television 
commentary.  This  case  shows  how  mobile  phones  were  used  to  blur  boundaries 
between separate worlds and uncover and report backstage affairs. More important for 
my  argument  here,  the  mode  of  storytelling  represented  these  events  as  a 
“Shakespearian  drama”  and  “like  a  soap”.  The  real-time  updates,  the  intrigue  and 
sudden plot  changes,  the multiple elements  involved in compiling a  story  together 
from fragments, the joyous thrill  in revealing secrets, the unreliable story-teller and 
broken claims to truthfulness, the exposure of trickery and double roles among those 
on pedestals; politics was turned into media theater to be consumed for amusement  
rather than to be taken as truthful.
The question I like to pose is who are actually being played? Obviously in the 
Belgian case, politicians and media reporters were ‘playing’ each other through mobile 
and mass media. But in the end it is the audience who are played. Sure, the ludification 
of  ‘serious’  events  by  media  is  pleasurable  for  the viewer.  But  only  for  so long.  It  
provokes a craving for ever-more impulses in a cycle of gratifications and boredom 251. 
More  importantly,  these  are  becoming  confusing  times  for  the  construction  of 
identities through mimesis. When so many of the potential role-models we see in the 
media  are  turned  into  caricatures,  puppets,  actors  in  dramas,  ‘simulacra’  without 
originals; not only what they represent (politics, judicial system, business, academia) is 
taken less seriously and delegitimized, it also raises the question how we ourselves can  
become ‘authentic’ persons? In narrative theory it is clear that protagonists in stories 
are  fictional  characters.  Emplotment  is  a  structure  that,  unlike  life,  has  a  clear  
beginning and closure. And the mimetic process of applying narrative to life connects 
the two separate worlds of reality and fiction. In contemporary media however, these 
boundaries are continually moved, inverted, and transgressed. Apparently in relative 
safety,  and  with  little  consequences  for  viewer  or  reader.  After  all,  it’s  only  
251 Gratification is well-known concept in mass media research (for instance Blumler & Katz, 1974).
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television/the internet/the movies. Yet ludic representations in the media world come 
to serve as blueprints for how we understand the world in playful terms: the theater of  
politics,  the  judicial  circus,  the  president  as  a  cartoon  figure.  Postmodernists  may 
embrace this blurring of  boundaries as a liberation from the modern imperative of 
clarity and clear-cut categorizations, and essentialist categories and power structures. 
Yet how can we escape from lapsing into perpetual irony or even cynicism, when the  
artificiality  and mobility  of  boundaries  and play elements  in  ‘serious’  institutions is  
continually ‘exposed’? Can we avoid putting all our utterances in brackets and quotes 
[‘like this’], suggesting it may be otherwise? Marxist critical thinker Paolo Virno strongly 
phrases this issue in his essay The Ambivalence of Disenchantment:
At the base of contemporary cynicism is the fact that men and women learn by 
experiencing rules rather than ‘facts’ ... Learning the rules, however, also means 
recognizing their unfoundedness and conventionality. We are no longer inserted 
into a single, predefined ‘game’ in which we participate with true conviction. We 
now  face  in  several  different  ‘games,’  each  devoid  of  all  obviousness  and 
seriousness, only the site of an immediate self-affirmation - an affirmation that is 
much more brutal and arrogant, much more cynical, the more we employ, with 
no  illusions  but  with  perfect  momentary  adherence,  those  very  rules  whose 
conventionality and mutability we have perceived. 
(Virno & Hardt, 1996: 16-17)
In  fact,  isn’t  the  ludification  of  culture  by  the  media  a  corruption  of  play?  One 
argument  for  this  is  economical.  Media  enterprises  draw  play  into  the  economic 
domain,  commodifying not  goods but  ‘memories’  252.  Jeremy Rifkin argues that the 
movement from industrial capitalism to cultural capitalism entails a shift from a work 
ethos  to  a  play  ethos  (Rifkin,  2000:  260).  He  worries  that  the  commodification  of 
cultural experiences undermines the status aparte of free pure play as the nurture bed 
of culture (ibid: 263-264) 253. Another argument is cultural. Exposing the play element 
in ‘serious’ institutions is not a rediscovery of their play origins but in fact a denial.  
Sennett describes a transition in the identities of ‘public men’ like politicians (Sennett,  
1974). In the middle of the 18th century public figures in European cities presented 
themselves in public wearing a figurative (and sometimes literal) mask. Public mimicry 
through  clothing  and  speech  underpinned  an  emerging  split  between  private 
personality and public social identity (ibid: 62, 70, 73). In the theatrum mundi (world as 
252 Pine and Gilmore call this the ‘experience economy’ (Pine & Gilmore, 1999: 100).
253 Others are less pessimistic. Jenkins observes the rise of a participatory media culture where the means for 
producing culture are no longer monopolized by corporations but increasingly accessible to active consumers 
(Jenkins, 2006: 169). Still, he adds, this participatory convergence culture can lead to agonistic struggles over  
authorship and ownership of cultural productions between corporations and consumers.
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a stage), it was accepted that public man as actor was detached from his act (ibid: 107-
108).  In  the  19th  century  personality  entered  the  public  realm.  People  became 
increasingly interested in the private lives of public figures. They were now believed 
and  invested with  authority  based  on their  expressive  personalities  (ibid:  195-196, 
211).  This  was  a  de-masking  of  public  man  as  a  facade,  and  an  erasure  of  the 
boundaries between public roles and private life (ibid: 211-212). Current ludification 
deliberately ‘exposes’ the play element in politics. This results in the utter denial of the 
play origins of public roles. The public no longer accepts the masks of politicians. They 
must appear in silly shows ‘as themselves’. At the same time the public expects them to 
be flawless ‘real politicians’, not actors. Selfhood is equaled with sameness: public role 
and private personality must be identical.
Ironically, adopting a playful stance towards the media is a tactics to deal with 
the  ontological  doubt  media  sow,  and  the  ludification  of  representations.  William 
Stephenson writes in  The Play Theory of Mass Communication (1967) that all media 
constitute  play  forms  (Stephenson,  1967)  254.  On  the  one  hand,  mass  media  offer 
people pleasure in ‘subjective play’. They allow individuals to temporarily escape social  
control  (ibid: 1-2).  On the other hand, and crucial  for the point  here,  people must  
approach media with a certain disinterestedness (Stephenson sees disinterestedness as 
one of the characteristics of play). This way people can distinguish between imaginary 
and real events (ibid: 150, 192). A similar argument is made by John Fiske, who says  
that children explore the distinction between real and symbolic content on television 
through play, and satirize representations they identify as not real (mentioned in Lister, 
et al., 2008: 300). The dialectic between freedom and force in ‘play by the media’ again 
emerges. Nolens volens we are forced to adopt a disinterested playful stance towards 
sometimes terrible events on our screens. Earthquakes, disasters, death; in order to 
maintain our sanity we must understand these events as occurring  in the media as a 
realm apart from everyday normalcy. In this perceived borderless media world it is us 
who must erect the boundaries. The more we use the media to engage with the world,  
the more we must shield ourselves by taking a playful attitude towards the media. But  
it is hard work. In the Netherlands, as elsewhere, deaths of known or even unknown 
people  highlighted  in  the  (mass)  media  draw  huge  numbers  of  people  to  online 
condolence registers. Events happening in the media seep through the porous borders. 
It indicates a strong urge for  religare, reconnecting, and sharing experiences  through 
254 See also Kücklich, 2004: 8; Sutton-Smith, 1997: 145.
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the media to counter this disengaged stance 255. It is a declaration of engagement: “I 
care”.  We  are  caught  up  in  a  self-perpetuating  moving  circle  of  cynicism  and 
engagement. We must play.
255 On the ‘linking value’ of products and services in general as a reincarnation of ritual and religion, see 
Cova, 1997: 301; and specifically about the mobile phone, see Ling, 2008.
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5.5 Conclusion: conditional play
On this perhaps somewhat bleak note we return to the mobile phone. In what is now 
often  called  ‘media  literacy’  or  ‘media  wisdom’  people  are  impelled  to  critically 
question  the  conditions  under  which  media  communicate  events.  A  focus  on  the 
conditional  order  of  media  representations  also  occurs  in  mobile  communication 
practices. Interaction via the telephone involves fewer visual or other sensory cues  
than  in  face-to-face  interaction.  This  makes  it  more  difficult  to  establish  trust  and 
manage the presentation of self. Mobile communication involves an ontological play 
with the boundaries of reality. People must imagine a real conversation. They must  
suspend their disbelief and create a sense of intimate co-presence and synchronicity 
out  of  a low fidelity  distant  voice.  Mobile  communication also involves  negotiating 
believe  in  the  truthfulness  of  each  other’s  presentations.  People  compare  the 
consistency  of  answers  to  the  opening  question  “where  are  you?”  with  actual 
background noises (Licoppe, 2004: 137, 147). ‘Frame-setting messages’ are exchanged 
that indicate the status of the call, and that reaffirm relationships by referring back to  
previous  calls  in  ‘summon/answer  sequences’  (Schegloff,  2002a:  289).  Notions  like 
perpetual  contact  (Katz  &  Aakhus,  2002),  connected  presence  (Licoppe  &  Heurtin, 
2001),  hyper-coordination (Ling & Yttri,  2002),  lightweight  interaction (Ito in Ling & 
Pedersen, 2005), and so on, all describe the phatic quality of mobile communication, 
whereby people continuously reassert trust and intimacy. Mobile communication thus 
foregrounds questions about its own mediation. It revolves around the frame-setting 
messages in the conditional order. In the final chapter it is argued that narrative, as 
employed by Ricoeur, does not take this reflexive stance towards the medium and the 
mediating process into account. The objective is to integrate the play perspective that 
has been developed and applied in our analysis so far with narrative identity theory. To 
do so, we must first identify the weak points in narrative identity theory and establish 
the contribution of the play perspective. 
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6. Conclusion. Playing the self: narrative and playful identities
6.1 What narrative does not tell: play critique of narrative identity theory
This concluding chapter consists of two sections. In the first I look at a number of weak 
points in the theory of narrative identity itself,  and maximize the distance between 
narrative  and  play.  To  make  this  section  more  than  a  critique  for  its  own  sake,  I 
formulate maxims for a theory of playful identity along the way based on narrative 
theory’s shortcomings. In the second section I attempt to modify narrative identity into 
a  theory  of  ‘playful  identities’  by  making  an  inverse  movement  back  to  narrative 
through the lens of play. 
6.1.1 Narrative’s closed circularity and sedentary ethics
Ricoeur’s narrative identity appears to be a theory that allows for changing identities.  
Narrative identity rejects fixed essences but is constructed in a continuous oscillation 
between  the  poles  of  I versus  me,  idem versus  ipse,  and  oneself and  other.  Self-
interpretation  via  the  mimetic  cycle  is  never  completely  finished  but  continuously 
remade and reapplied to one’s own life. Temporal permanence is a fragile situation, 
always  under  siege  from  discordant  events.  We  constantly  alternate  between 
innovation and sedimentation. We tend to stabilize and solidify ourselves, yet there are 
always events that impel us to innovate and renew ourselves. We look back on our past 
and apply it to our present situation, and to carve out future directions. Similarly, we fit  
present actions and events in our past through the story. “[I]n narrativizing character, 
the narrative returns  to it  the movement abolished in acquired dispositions,  in the 
sediment  of  identifications-with”  (Ricoeur,  1992:  166).  Even  in  his  hermeneutic 
approach - method by movement - Ricoeur seems dynamic. The so-called ‘hermeneutic 
circle’ always revisits its initial  point of beginning. This however brings the risk of a 
tautology, where the end point is anticipated in the starting point. Life is understood in 
terms of narrative, and vice versa. The only way out is to turn the investigation from a  
flat-surface vicious circle into a three-dimensional spiral; that is, by altering the initial 
terms as a result of increased understanding of them, and reformulating the question 
into  a  new  one,  Ricoeur  is  well  aware  of  this  danger  (Ricoeur,  1984:  72).  He 
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acknowledges that insofar emplotment favors concordance over discordance, it always 
extracts harmony out of life’s dissonances. When narratives no longer fool us, they may 
appear  as  nothing  but  false  consolations  in  the  face  of  our  imminent  death:  
treacherous and violent lies (ibid: 72). Nevertheless, he counters, such argumentation 
rests  on  a  superficial  understanding  of  human  time  as  chaotic.  It  is  rooted  in  a  
modernist fascination with disruption and alienation. Another circularity Ricoeur faces 
is  that  the  stage  of  mimesis3 (narrative  reconfiguration)  seems  a  prerequisite  for 
mimesis1 (narrative  prefiguration).  Narrative  interpretation  would  then  become 
redundant since narrative prefiguration  presupposes narrative reconfiguration. Is our 
pre-narrative experience merely the result of projecting our cultural knowledge about 
existing stories to life? To this critique Ricoeur responds by once again stating that life 
has a prenarrative quality. Even in everyday experience we tend to see our lives “(as  
yet) untold stories” (ibid: 74). He seeks support for this in psychoanalysis. A subject 
must unravel repressed stories and make them an actual part of his personal identity. 
Similarly,  in  court  cases  judges  must  disentangle  and  (re)construct  a  story  from  a 
complex of events and motives. Life, Ricoeur concludes, is in quest of narrative. “We 
tell stories because  in the last analysis human lives need and merit being narrated” 
(ibid: 75, my emphasis). 
Is Ricoeur truly open to alteration to escape the vicious circle? I don’t think so. 
Narrative emplotment as ‘discordant concordance’ remains solid in place. Sure, Ricoeur 
sees changes in literary styles and the birth of the ‘anti-novel’ (he gives the example of 
Musil’s Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, The Man without Qualities). But in the end we 
are  unavoidably  caught  in  the  narrative  loop  as  the  resolution  to  our  temporal 
existence that hovers between order and chaos (a reductionism emphasized in the last 
quote).  It  is  because  of  this  closed  character  that  narrative  theory  has  a  certain 
apodictic character  256. By positing the inescapable nature of narrative mediation he 
renounces possible changes in identity mediation. The circle has become closed and 
static. 
Proposition: a theory of playful identities offers a way out of narrative’s  
closed circularity and is open to its own revisions.
256 I leave aside Ricoeur’s implicit reverence of scripture as the highest road to (self-)knowledge, which itself 
may reveal a culturally conditioned bias. In this respect, it appears that Ricoeur’s religious convictions shine  
through,  despite  his  firm  assertion  that  his  studies  of  identity  “assume  the  bracketing,  conscious  and  
resolute, of the convictions that bind me to biblical faith” (Ricoeur, 1992: 24). Wouldn’t this seem at odds  
with his claim about the privileged status of narrative as cultural blueprint for interpreting life? In other  
words,  how can he ignore biblical  faith  when  narrative  indeed is  the privileged mediation of  who Paul  
Ricoeur is?
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Despite Ricoeur’s dynamic and processual view of identity construction, narrative ‘in 
the last instance’ seeks to abrogate movement and multiplicity. However temporal and 
unstable the  result,  mediation through emplotment posits the maxims of  synthesis, 
stability  and  permanence  as  its  prime  aim.  Narrative  emplotment  seeks  to  unify 
heterogeneous  elements  into  a  whole,  it  places  primacy  on  concordance  over 
discordance, and it tries to craft a configuration (with opening and closure) out of mere  
episodic succession (Ricoeur, 1991a: 22). Further, Ricoeur phrases the main problem of 
identity as how to preserve permanence in time in the face of change. His preference 
for stability  is  most  apparent  in  his  shift  from a descriptive  narrative  identity  to a 
prescriptive moral identity. He normatively charges the task of self-interpretation with 
seeking  permanence.  He  values  the  full  stop  over  the  ongoing  movement.  The 
promising subject takes a moral  stance towards himself  and others.  He halts in his  
wandering that results from the confrontation with so many possible models for life 
(Ricoeur,  1992:  167-168).  By  turning  narrative  into  an  imperative  (“life  is  only  
worthwhile when examined”), Ricoeur can finally trade in the ongoing dynamics of the 
question “Who am I” for the stability of the declaration “Here is where I stand!” (as  
does Charles Taylor, as we have seen in the introduction). What is wrong with that? 
Don’t  we  all  need  to  actively  create  stability  and  coherence  in  the  face  of  life’s 
propensity for entropy?  So what  if narrative helps us to do so? I take issue with this 
ethical imperative of narrative. Ricoeur’s view of life as a struggle to achieve stability  
and coherence is thoroughly conservative. Someone else might just as legitimately ask: 
how to stimulate change and innovation in the face of life’s dread and repetition? As 
the privileged scheme for understanding life, narrative tilts towards the pole of what  
we earlier have described as sedentary metaphysics instead of nomadic metaphysics  
(Cresswell, 2006: 26). Without wanting to slide over to ‘nomadic thought’, I feel this  
dialectic between fixity and flow should be part of a theory of playful identities. 
Proposition: a theory of playful identities allows for mobility and change  
(and shall refrain from moral prescriptions how one should live, or what a  
good life is, veiled as a descriptive account of identity).
The  closed  circularity  of  narrative  is  hard  to  reconcile  with  an  inquiry  into  new  
mediations  of  identity.  How  to  get  out?  Ricoeur  acknowledges  that  the  narrative 
scheme  itself  is  a  historical  model.  It  evolves  from  cultural  traditions,  and  hovers  
between sedimentation and innovation. He sees a continuum from servile repetition of 
sedimented  rules  to  calculated  deviance.  Still,  in  my  view  Ricoeur  takes  a  too 
conservative approach by saying that even innovation is rule-governed behavior, tied to 
the models handed down by tradition. “[A]s soon as we go beyond the field of these 
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traditional narratives, deviance wins out over the rule. The contemporary novel, for 
example,  can to a large extent de defined as  an anti-novel,  for  it  is  the very rules  
themselves that become the object of new experimentation” (Ricoeur, 1991a: 25). By 
contrast, I suggest that true innovation neither entails playing by the rules (novel), nor 
playing with the rules (anti-novel; Huizinga’s cheater), but not playing according to the  
rules (‘a-novel’;  Huizinga’s  ‘spoilsport’  257).  Rather  than  stretching  boundaries  but 
remaining inside, innovation involves transgression and rupture. In the essay What Is  
an Author Foucault says that the initiation of a new discursive practice clears “a space 
for  the  introduction  of  elements  other  than  their  own”  (Foucault,  1991:  458).  By 
contrast, scientific or literary innovation can always be traced back to the machinery of  
transformations  it  has  instituted  (ibid:  459).  In  other  words,  the  need  or  wish  to 
challenge  existing  rules  still  subsumes  innovation  under  the  regime  of  rule-based 
change. The initiation of a new discursive practice on the other hand introduces true 
difference instead of repetition, Foucault writes. Innovation thus requires us not to play 
by the rules set by narrative. We must be spoilsports to develop a new approach to 
identity  mediation.  And  then  we  can  return  to  the  old  in  order  to  recognize  its  
strengths. 
Proposition: a theory of playful identities does not play by the rules set by  
narrative but instead offers a new lens to look at identity mediation.
6.1.2 Narrative’s simplified view of culture
A  related  point  concerns  Ricoeur’s  take  on  (the  transmission  of)  culture  and  the 
privileged role he accords to narratives.  The transfer of  narratives  across  time and 
distance is presented as quite unproblematic, at least, Ricoeur pays little attention to it. 
But culture is never simply a given, nor always compatible with individual identities or  
different cultural identities. Already in 1934 anthropologist Edward Sapir argues that 
culture is not an impersonal abstract system (Sapir, 1934). We ourselves as individuals 
are the bearers  of  culture.  And we reflect on our own culture.  There is  a constant 
dialectic  between culture  and  personality,  or  as  Sapir  specifies,  between a  part  of  
behavior that is considered a cultural pattern and a part of behavior seen as person-
defining  258.  This  dialectic weaves through all  our  paradoxes:  freedom versus  force, 
difference and similarity, and sameness versus selfhood. Frequently, this  becomes a 
257 Huizinga, 1955: 11.
258 People tend to see the familiar  in  terms of personality and the unfamiliar  in terms of culture,  Sapir 
observes. When he sees his son play a game of marbles he interprets this as shedding light on his personality.  
When he sees a Chinese mandarin joining in an academic dinner he interprets this as saying something about 
his cultural background.
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downright  subversive struggle at  some stage in life.  “The discovery of  the world of 
personality is apparently dependent upon the ability of the individual to become aware 
of and to attach value to his resistance to authority” (ibid: 409). Culture is a dynamic 
process fraught with internal struggles. It only comes into being as a result of constant 
explorations,  rehearsals,  mistakes,  and subversions.  “Culture  is  then not  something 
given but something to be gradually and gropingly discovered” (ibid: 414). Aside from 
the word ‘discovered’, which suggests culture exists somewhere ‘out there’ (like the 
idea that the self resides somewhere in us), Sapir’s view paves the way for the idea that 
culture,  instead  of  being  ‘codified’  in  (narrative)  traditions,  is  actualized through 
continuous rule-breaking and boundary-transgressions. Underneath dominant cultural 
narratives  at  least  as  many  counter-narratives  exist.  And,  I  add,  in  complex 
heterogeneous societies even radically  incompatible narratives exist that  stem from 
different traditions. These cannot be defined in terms of countering other narratives. 
That  would  imply  they  are  mere  reactions  to  dominant  narratives,  subsume them 
under similarity, and affirm the status of dominant narratives as such. Furthermore, 
personal  and  group  identities  frequently  become  means  in  political  struggles.  In 
chapters 2 and 3 we have seen how the mobile phone is the focal point in incongruent 
views about  what  kind of  ‘technological  modernity’  Indonesia  should  embrace. We 
have also seen that beneath the dominant stories about mobile phone modernity and  
personal prestige, different, much darker tales circulate about the (sexual) dangers that 
come with this new medium. A play/game perspective opens up room for agonistic  
collisions  between incompatible elements  within and between societies. If  we truly 
want to think difference without an overarching concept, while still leave the possibility  
for interactions between different people, we may take identities as playful. Indeed, 
the  paradox  of  difference  versus  similarity  as  an  apparent  contradiction  can  be 
overcome. On the one hand identities are incompatible games defined internally by  
their own rules. One cannot play soccer with a hockey stick. On the other hand, in free 
play identities are performed in actual interactions. People can decide to create new 
collaborative  hybrid  playforms  (shockey,  hoccer?).  They  need  not  agree  with  each 
other’s rules, as long as they agree on the conditions for mutual interaction. 
Further, culture does not merely consist of stories 259. Other transmitted cultural 
patterns exist that contribute to a person’s sense of who and what he is, for example 
embodied interactions and physical postures, and cultural knowledge that involves the 
senses: sound, smell, touch 260. 
259 Interestingly, Aristotle - from whom Ricoeur derives the crucial notions emplotment and mimesis - says 
that tragedy, as the imitation of action, consists of action not narrative (Aristotle, 1907: VI).
260 In Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu the protagonist famously recalls his childhood memories after 
eating a madeleine cookie dipped in blossom tea. Of course he then recounts his life as narrative, but there is 
a pre-narrative sensuous trigger that evokes memories and only then warps him full-force into his own past. 
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Furthermore,  is  narrative a universal cultural  mediation? Ricoeur restricts  his  
analysis to the Greco-Christian origins of western cultural traditions. He suggests that 
elsewhere other narrative traditions exist. This implies that he holds literary narrative 
as a universal medium. Yet in other societies different mediations of identity may exist.  
Notwithstanding a few exceptions, a rudimentary literary tradition has only relatively 
recently emerged in Indonesia. Lively theater practices have existed for much longer  
and  are  deeply  ingrained  in  many  regional  cultural  traditions.  We have  seen  how 
wayang puppet  play  is  regularly  invoked  to  comment  on  present  (political)  issues 
(section 2.2). Would it not make more sense to say that Indonesians use theater as a 
cultural  blueprint  for  (self-)understanding  rather  than  literary  narrative?  Of  course 
theater has narrative qualities too. But Ricoeur’s conception of narrative is too narrow. 
He  only  looks  at  literary  genres  dominant  in  western  societies.  Therefore,  justified 
critique has been waged against narrative for putting western literate societies at the 
top of a developmental scale (Carr 1987, quoted in Fabian, 1991: 241). 
Narrative  theory  simplifies  what  culture  is  and  how  it  is  transmitted.  It 
disregards agonistic forces at play in the tension between the individual and culture at 
large, and between heterogeneous cultural elements within societies. And its claim to 
universality is questionable. Ricoeur all too easily upholds a broadly shared narrative 
tradition as the privileged medium. 
Proposition: a theory of playful identities pays attention to the agonistic  
struggles involved in cultural innovation and sedimentation, to different  
bearers of cultural knowledge, and to the conditions for interaction.
6.1.3 Narrative’s neglect of spatiality and becoming
For Ricoeur,  shared cultural  symbols  set the rules  for interpretation and define the 
room for  innovation.  This  points  to another  problem,  namely  that  Ricoeur phrases 
identity construction almost exclusively in the sense of temporal dynamics. In my view 
narrative theory lacks a framework for understanding the role of spatiality, place and 
mobility in identity construction  261. This is particularly urgent as the world becomes 
more and more mobile, and people, objects, and ideas travel around the globe. Spatial  
aspects of  identity can be narrative (shown in section 1.3).  Locales are to a certain 
Even if human life were narrative ‘in the last instance’, which I dispute, it glosses over other cultural forms of 
knowledge.
261 Mitchell points out that narratives are profoundly spatial too: the physical text itself, the fictional world 
that is described, the lay-out of the plot,  and the literary work as a system for generating and mapping 
meanings of a  world  outside of  the text (Mitchell,  1980: 550-553).  Ricoeur  however solely  stresses the  
temporal aspects of narrative identity.
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extent ‘scripted’  with prescriptions for behavior.  Sense of  place can be founded on 
historical and/or mythological narratives (section 3.3). However, as argued in section 
4.3,  maps  better  capture  the  interrelations of  places,  mobilities,  and distant  social 
relations  that  shape  people’s  identities  than  emplotment  can.  The  map  acts  as  a  
medium through which people understand their interrelations in spatial terms. What 
plots do for narrative identities, maps do for playful identities. (Room for) movement is  
staked out in rule-driven games (ludus), or opened up in free play (paidia). 
Narrative lacks a practical view of how people initially meet and identify with 
one another at the interpersonal level, other than suggesting people come to share 
personal  and cultural  stories.  I  propose we regard meeting in temporal  and spatial 
terms as a crossing of trajectories. Intersecting routes come before merging life plots 
262. Becoming involves meeting others and forging new relations. This presupposes an 
initial  encounter,  a  ‘spark’  that  potentially  sets  a fusion of  routes  in  motion.  If  we 
consider what circumstance, activity, and mindset is most prone for meeting, play in its 
various guises is the ideal catalyst. Especially when the rules of normalcy are pierced.  
Imagine two strangers in the city walking towards each other on the pavement. At 
exactly the same moment they make a habitual dodging movement. Alas, they choose 
the same side and bump into each other. They may become suddenly aware of their 
little sidewalk ballet as an avoidance game spoiled, perceive the unexpected physical  
contact with a stranger as a play of fate, and that could be the beginning of something 
beautiful... (Of course they could also stick to the rules of urban role-playing, briefly 
murmur an apology, and continue their separate ways without ever knowing about the 
biography of the other). We have seen the centrality of serendipity and encountering 
otherness  in  our  discussion  of  locative  media  and  urban  culture.  For  interaction 
between urbanites biographies are irrelevant, at least initially. In my view a crossing of 
routes, whereby the initial  spark is  a slight diversion or breach of rules, is  a better  
depiction of initiating relationships in this increasingly urban and mobile world 263. 
Proposition:  a  theory  of  playful  identities  takes  mapping  as  a  key  
structure  for  identity’s  spatial  situatedness,  mobilities,  and  ways  of  
becoming.
262 Again narrative’s ‘last instance’ jumps over important dimensions in identity construction. Of course in  
reading novels people ‘meet’ other people and places too. But how do books come upon one’s path?
263 Urban life of course is not all about meeting strangers, as we are often introduced to others via mutual  
acquaintances. Still, this too might be better captured by a mapping of intersecting social networks.
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6.1.4 From narrative reference and representation to playful conditional performances
The biggest problem in my view is narrative’s referential and representational relation 
to ‘practical life’. Ricoeur situates narrative mimesis between being a break from, and a  
connection  to  life.  Narrative  identity  theory  takes  identity  as  the  interpretation of 
selfhood (mimesis3)  through its  representation  in stories (mimesis2),  which  refer to 
events in life itself (mimesis1) (Ricoeur, 1984: 45-46). Ricoeur makes it very clear that 
narrative is not life. Stories function mimetically  as if they were life. In the selection 
and ordering process of emplotment, narrative is cut loose from the occurrences to 
which it refers by creative imitation. In this break from referentiality to representation, 
narrative emplotment opens up a space for fiction with a force of its own. Only when 
narrative has passed through this stage is it reapplied to the self. This double life of  
narrative as both reference and representation seems one of  its  strong features.  It  
accounts  for the doubleness  of  identity as  mimicking other people,  the world,  and  
oneself  as  a  narrative  character;  and  for  identity  as  self-referential  in  what  it 
represents: a self that is uniquely  about itself. However, this comes at a price. First, 
through the mimetic process narrative identity is separated from everyday life. Self-
interpretation is  a  (thoughtful)  mental  process  that  occurs  after the fact.  Narrative  
theory lacks a perspective on identity as an emotional, intuitive and sensory embodied 
instance that, instead of just being about the world or constituting a separate world of 
itself,  seeks to abrogate this  separation and become part  of the world, engage and 
transform the world, however unattainable. Identities are not only told in hindsight.  
They  are  also  expressed  in  the  here  and  now.  Second,  as  performances  identities  
actualize the here and now. Narrative theory, at least with Ricoeur, does not account 
for  the  deployment  of  identities  as  a  means.  How  are  identities  more  or  less  
intentionally employed in specific situations to achieve certain goals (in what has been 
called ‘life politics’ or ‘identity politics’)? And what is the balance of power between 
self-descriptions,  and  ascriptions  by  other  people  and  institutions?  Third,  narrative 
identity  obscures  how  the  mediation  itself  is  dealt  with.  The  fact  that  people  tell 
narratives is one thing. How people tell them is another. Ricoeur spends much thought 
on the medium-specific properties of narrative as the privileged mediation of time and 
identity. Yet he does not address reflexivity towards the mediation itself. What does it  
mean to  construct  our  lives  through stories?  Again,  Ricoeur  claims  that  narratives  
mediate  identities  in  the  last  instance.  I  agree  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an 
immediate experience  of  identity.  All  experience  is  already  mediated  by  previous 
experiences, one’s cultural background, and so on. But what about the first instance? 
Or the intermediate instance? In short, these three interrelated issues are: How are 
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identities  actualized  in  everyday  life?  How  is  everyday  life  itself  actualized  by 
performing identity? How is the fact of mediation itself understood? They need further 
discussion.
Narrative identity as self-interpretation via (the process of) imagination comes 
at the expense of identity as embodied performance in the ‘here and now’ of a social  
situation.  Narratives  are  largely  mental  constructs  that  operate  at  the  level  of 
imagination and thought, but not at the level of embodiment. Put simply, in narrative  
the self is constructed by thinking; in play the self is performed by doing and showing. 
This is not to say that narrative identity excludes praxis. Stories are perfectly capable of  
doing powerful things  264.  Let’s  look at an example.  Every 17th of  August Indonesia 
celebrates its independence from Dutch colonial rule. On the 62th annual Freedom Day 
tens of thousands flocked to Freedom Square in the heart of Jakarta. Young people  
from all  of  Indonesia’s  current 33 provinces were present. They wore their region’s 
ethnic costumes. As soon as the official  speeches finished,  they started posing and 
taking pictures of each other, often with their mobile phone camera. The results were  
immediately reviewed on the screen, and either met with approval or deleted, after 
which a new round of posing began. This posing, individually or as a group, was done in  
a self-conscious and joyous fashion. Now, we may understand what is  going on by  
telling a story about how this event is tied to events occurring in the past (referring to 
Indonesia’s  colonial  history  and  subsequent  struggle  to  oust  the  Dutch).  We  may 
consider the event itself as a kind of storytelling about the birth and character of a 
nation (the arranged presence of young people from all provinces in traditional attire 
represents Indonesia’s national motto ‘unity in diversity’, and the country’s orientation 
towards  the  future  while  cherishing  its  rich  traditions).  Nevertheless,  applying  the 
poetics of narrative to this event takes away the ‘weight’ of its own unique instance. It  
would subsume the event under the order of  external  reference,  or  double  it  as a 
symbolic representation standing for something else. By contrast, a performative view 
takes the event as meaningful in itself. The dress-up and photographing sessions bore  
elements  of  a  ritual  performance.  They  took  place  in  a  temporally  and  spatially 
secluded space and created an artificial world, they involved temporary transformation 
of the body and a multifaceted sensory experience, they were done for their own sake, 
and they made use of material artifacts as props (see Bell, 1997; Schechner, 2003).  
Wearing colorful costumes and playfully posing in front of photo cameras turned these  
young people into actors in a shared theatrical play. Moreover, their self-aware poses  
indicated a performance. They do their identities, they know it,  and they show this  
knowing. The playful posing actualized the shared ideals of transforming Indonesia into 
264 In his discussion of speech act theory Ricoeur refers to Austin and Searle (Ricoeur, 1992: 42). However, 
performativity with Ricoeur remains at the level of utterances and text, not in everyday situations.
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a modern nation that literally incorporates traditional regional diversity in unity. As a 
performance the event does not merely refer to or stand for this transformation, it  is 
the change 265. 
Proposition:  a  theory  of  playful  identities  foregrounds  expressive  
performances of identity in addition to its interpretation. 
Narrative addresses how identity is  mediated but not  how identity ‘works’.  Ricoeur 
pays little attention to the question why people occupy themselves with identity, other 
than  implying  that  it  is  a  psychological  need  to  maintain  temporal  coherence.  In 
humanistic vein, narrative identity foremost is an end in itself. Identity as a means to 
strive for certain outside goals remains outside of his scope 266. The mimetic pretense 
as if in narrative mediation operates on the mental level of the individual or group in 
reference to the world and others, but not in their actual embodied performance. It is  
pretense about the world but not in the world (as for instance seen in the discussion of  
gengsi in section 3.1). As a result, it  fails to account for cheating and failure in the  
performance of identities. Sure, narratives too can be debunked. Two things can go 
wrong. Either the truth of the story is disputed, or the verisimilitude of the narrative 
account (is the story told in a truthful manner?). The trouble with the first is that there 
often is no way of knowing the truth behind the story. Heavy criticism has been waged 
against the positivist view of reality as an observable order existing outside of human  
interpretation about which truth claims can be made that are subject to falsification. 
Not in the least by Ricoeur himself, in his attempt to lift identity from the causal order 
of erklären to the interpretative order of verstehen. 
At this point it is fruitful to refresh the framework of our emerging theory of  
playful identities. As we have seen Bateson identifies three types of communicative 
messages: (a)  messages that say something (“moodsigns” in animals);  (b) messages 
that  simulate  moodsigns;  (c)  frame-setting  messages  that  enable  the  receiver  to 
discriminate between a and b, messages that say “this is play” (Bateson, 1972: 146).  
Similarly,  Schechner  says  play  organizes  performance,  makes  it  comprehensible 
(Schechner, 2003: 103). Performance is not simply a doing, it is a showing of a doing. 
This  is  both  actual  and  symbolic  (ibid:  114-115).  Meta-communicative  (c)  type 
messages act as ‘frames’. They are principles of selection that enable us to distinguish 
between  (a)  and  (b)  and  judge  the  conditions  for  interpreting  communication.  In 
265 See Schechner, 2003: 127, 129, 186, about the transformative power of theater.
266 In  reflections on what  has been  called  ‘the  politics  of  identity’  the  question  is  asked  how fictional  
constructs around identities are employed in order to reach certain (political) goals, like recognition of ‘being  
black’, ‘being gay’, ‘being woman’ (Hall, 2000: 118; Heyes, 2009).
238
similar  vein,  Geertz points to various layers of  meaning in the ‘thick description’  of 
communicative messages.  He gives the example of  an eye movement. This  may be 
interpreted as twitching, winking, or parodying the winker, although to the observer 
the movement is identical (Geertz, 1975b: 6-7). Like Bateson’s three message types, 
these three levels  correspond to  doing,  doing as  if,  and  a showing of  a  doing.  As 
communication they operate in different modalities. The first is the causal order of  
establishing logical  truths (is  that about which you speak true?).  The second is  the 
interpretative order of establishing intentions and meaning (is what you tell truthful?).  
The third is  the meta-communicative conditional  order of  establishing shared codes 
that are necessary for interpretation (should I interpret what you say as truthful or  
true?) 267. Geertz notes that the eye movements can be interpreted in even more ways 
(ibid: 7). A person might stand in front of the mirror in rehearsal, attempting to control 
his  winking,  his  parodying,  or  even  his  involuntary  twitching.  Rehearsal  is  a  door 
opener into the domain Goffman calls the back region or  backstage (Goffman, 1959: 
111-114). This is the area (and moment) where playing frontstage roles - the public  
facade we keep up in ‘impression management’ - is temporarily suspended. Backstage, 
identities are rehearsed, not performed. Another important concept pair is giving and 
giving off. Giving refers to the intentional impression we try to make on other people.  
Giving off refers to the unintentional, involuntary, or even unconscious impressions we 
make on others. Taken together, these notions are part of a dramaturgical perspective 
on identity. Identity is nothing but the loose repertoire of roles we play in ‘information 
games’ (ibid: 8). As indicated in section 1.3, this leaves open the question if and how 
we forge all those different roles into some sort of whole, which is a major strength of  
narrative theory. This will be the aim of the final section, where I propose the map is a  
structure that creates coherence in play.
Armed  with  this  ammunition  we  return  to  narrative’s  referentiality  and 
representation.  In  my  view,  by  seeking  to  overcome  the  positivist  search  for 
establishing truth -  (a)  type messages - narrative gets stuck at the level of  (b) type 
messages. Narrative as reference presupposes that a story is about an external reality,  
which  exists  in  the  causal  order  of  truths.  Narrative  as  representation  posits  that  
narrative  has  become  ‘reality’  in  itself  and  only  exists  in  the  intentional  order  of 
speaking  truthfully.  Each history  is  fictional,  Ricoeur  says.  In  fact,  (b)  type fictional  
representations  are our only way of getting to (a) type messages that refer to reality 
outside the utterance. What is being told (a signified reality) is subsumed under the  
267 These three communicative modalities do not cover the whole gamut of epistemology. At one far end 
there exists the order of undisputed certainties without negation. Like water to fish, these are certainties so  
taken for granted they are beyond truth. After all truth implies that untrue things exist. The other far end  
extends infinitely into a “thick description” of complexities and contingencies.  But as argued earlier,  this  
regressive meta-communication can all be fitted into the conditional order of metaplay: “is this play?”.
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tale (the signifying discourse). Other narrative theorists stress this exact point. Barthes 
says: “[narrative] ceaselessly substitutes meaning for the  straightforward copy of the 
events recounted" (Barthes, 1977: 119, my addition in brackets). Hayden White speaks 
of  “the  artificiality of  the  notion  that  real events  could  ‘speak  themselves’  or  be 
represented as ‘telling their own story’” (White, 1980: 8). According to White “[t]he  
reality of ... events does not consist in the fact that they occurred but that, first of all, 
they were remembered and,  second,  that  they  are  capable of  finding a place in a  
chronologically ordered sequence” (White, 1980: 23). Jerome Bruner writes: 
Unlike the constructions generated by logical and scientific procedures that can 
be  weeded  out  by  falsification,  narrative  constructions  can  only  achieve 
“verisimilitude”. Narratives, then, are a version of reality whose  acceptability is  
governed  by  convention and  “narrative  necessity”  rather  than  by  empirical 
verification and logical requiredness, although ironically we have no compunction 
about calling stories true or false.
(Bruner, 1991: 4-5, my emphasis)
Narrative identity theory says we can only understand others, the world and ourselves 
by telling truthful fictions. But verisimilitude is equally troublesome. As we have seen 
section 5.4,  many people  have lost  faith not  only  in  the possibility  of  truths  about 
reality, but also in the truthfulness of its representations. Mediation and mediatization 
contribute to this disbelief in the ‘acceptability of convention’, as seen from journalist 
Luyendijk’s account of how news is made. When we are being played by the media,  
truth and verisimilitude become fictions that are subject to disbelief. A world in which  
there is  no longer a sense of  truthfulness behind the fiction becomes a delusional  
‘simulacrum’  (Baudrillard,  1994).  We  then  risk  sliding  down  the  slippery  slope  of  
relativism when our access to reality is nothing but discourse. If truth is traded in for  
verisimilitude, then what are the criteria for establishing truthfulness? Ricoeur sought a 
way  out  of  the  impasse  between  Descartes’  resort  to  truth  in  the  fundamental  
certainty  of  the  cogito,  and  Nietzsche’s  nihilist  renunciation  of  any  ‘facts’  behind 
interpretations and rhetorics. The founding principle of  ipse permanence, as we have 
seen, is  the promise. Because of his  insistence on maintaining permanence in time, 
Ricoeur  imbues  the  promise  with  the  status  of  ‘intentional  truth’.  But  isn’t  this  
verisimilitude then still founded on an ontology of true and false? I have to conclude 
that  under  the  guise  of  an  epistemology  of  truthfulness  Ricoeur  reintroduces  a 
metaphysics of truth by recourse to an ethics of being true to oneself and others. 
Storytelling  is  no  longer  an  unproblematic  activity.  Ricoeur  lumps  together 
various kinds of storytelling under the headers of literary and historical narratives. He 
disregards the importance of  how stories are told, read, and applied to the self  as  
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stories,  and under what circumstances.  Narrative  identity  does not  account  for the 
ways  people  employ  frame-setting  messages  of  type  (c)  as  a  way  to  manage  the 
conditions of what they say and do. Because narrative identity theory fails to account  
for messages of type (c), it conflates type (a) and (b) messages. I suggest that our to-
be-theory of playful identities centers on what has been italicized in Bruner’s quote 
above. We must ask: what are the conditions under which a promise is made, or a 
story in general is recounted? What are the conditions that make both narratives and 
performances acceptable to oneself and others? Under what conditions can they be 
amended, and what are the consequences? A focus on conditional (c) type messages 
sheds light on the question how people deal with the mediation of identity itself. How  
do people cope with the ‘fact’ of their narrative identity as ‘fictional truth’,  or their  
performed identity as ‘illusory reality’? Narrative theory neglects people’s orientation 
towards the mediation itself.  Ricoeur does  look  at  the distancing  relation between 
narrative voice and narrative, and irony at the level of mimesis2 268. However, he does 
not venture to analyze the dynamics of (ironic) detachment and reattachment between 
narrator and self in mimesis3. This is precisely what a playful view of identity does. As 
is expressed by the theatrum mundi metaphor, the actor is detached from his act, and 
he shows it (Sennett, 1974: 109). 
Why  do  we  need  this  view?  Identities  today  are  not  simply  referring to  or 
representing the qualities of an individual or group of people (if ever they could). No 
longer essential truths, nor truthful self-descriptions and other-ascriptions, identities 
have evolved  into  a  far  more complex  and  conditional  notion.  Identities  often are 
strategically deployed towards certain ends. Ironically, this frequently involves what has 
been called ‘strategic essentialism’. Individuals pretend as if they adhere to essentialist 
identity traits ascribed to them as members of a group. For instance, they may mimic 
stereotypical representations of gays, blacks, women. They do so in specific contexts as 
a critical or political strategy in order to demand recognition as gay, black, woman (see 
Heyes, 2009; Morton, 2003: 89). By referring to well-known stereotypes, people play 
with  identity  representations.  It  is  a  perfect  example  of  boundary  play  in  the 
conditional order. “This is not what it says it is, and you and I know it”. By overly acting 
out people play with the paradoxes between sameness and selfhood by using identity 
as a means, between individual differences and similarity as members of a group, and 
between freedom in self-descriptions and force in stereotypical  other-ascriptions.  A 
performance aims to create an effect. For that it  needs to be acceptable to others. 
Performers  are  reflexively  oriented  towards  the  conditions  of  their  performance, 
themselves as performers, and the audience for whom they perform. This ‘playing the 
performer’  entails  a  triple  reflexivity  towards  the  doing,  the  doing  as  if,  and  the  
268 For instance in his discussion of Thomas Mann’s novel The Magic Mountain (Ricoeur, 1985: 118, 118fn29).
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showing of a doing. Narrative identity can include a showing of the telling but then this 
showing is a playful performance. A theory of playful identities thus goes beyond truth 
and verisimilitude,  and foregrounds  the question how do people  communicate  the 
conditions of their identity performances? It is a coherent - not unifying! - framework  
for reflexivity towards both the interpretation and the doing of identity. In mediated 
communicative  exchanges,  and complex  societies,  identities  are  not  naturally  given 
anymore  but  negotiated.  The  conditional  (c)  type  messages  -  the  frame  setting 
messages  -  become more important.  We need  them to set  the rules  for  mutually 
intelligible communication. Only then can a story be believed while at the same time 
its mediating function is never completely forgotten. In the words of Manoni: “ je sais  
bien mais quand-même” (I know but still) (Mannoni, 1969).
Proposition: a theory of playful identity is not exclusively referential and  
representational  but  includes reflexivity towards the fact  and effect of  
identity  mediation  by  focussing  on  the  conditional  ‘play’  order  of  
communication. 
In  the  beginning  of  this  thesis  I  proposed  that  narrative  identity  should  not  be 
substituted by a theory of playful identities but instead be modified. Taking what I see 
as one of narrative theory’s strong points, its dynamical structure of the three mimetic 
levels,  we see how mobile media practices shape playful  identity  construction,  and 
how this can be combined with narrative identity. 
6.2 The story, the mobile, and the play: linking narrative and playful identities
Despite its shortcomings as a theory, I find narrative a convincing historical description 
of identity. At least from a western perspective, narrative has been a key mediation in  
looking at ourselves. With the rise, fall, and renaissance of literary culture, an ‘inner 
turn’ was set in motion that continues to influence how we conceive of ourselves as  
selves today. In  Sources of the Self Taylor shows that writing - especially the genre of 
autobiography pioneered by Michel Montaigne - stimulated an inward movement of 
disengaged  introspection  and  self-interpretation  (Taylor,  1989:  177-184).  Through 
literature we came to distance our selves from ourselves, the pillar under the modern 
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(western)  conception  of  identity.  The  question  is  whether  narrative  is  still  “the 
privileged form of mediation”? The answer to this obviously rhetorical question will  
become clear in this section. I propose we move away from Ricoeur’s universalist claim 
that narrative mediation is the sole entryway  to knowledge about the world, others, 
and ourselves. Instead narrative is but one of the  possible mediations, one that best 
covers the temporal dimension of  our existence. Digital media technologies provide 
other orientations towards life and self-understanding. The argument is that these are 
better captured in the pair of notions play/game. Temporal dimensions of existence 
recede to a less prominent position as mobile media technologies place equal (if not  
more) emphasis on spatial relations. 
In this section I rework the mimetic stages of narrative identity into an outline of  
a theory of playful identities. Ricoeur consistently speaks about a prenarrative ‘world of 
actions  and events’  in  which  we implicitly  recognize  narrative  structures  (narrative 
prefiguration, mimesis1). We create order in seemingly disparate actions and events by 
structuring them into a plot in which we are the protagonist (narrative configuration,  
mimesis2). By applying plot to ourselves we come to understand ourselves as readers 
and writers of  our life (narrative reconfiguration,  mimesis3).  By contrast, I  prefer to 
speak about interactions in our relations to the world, others and ourselves. This is not 
cosmetic  wordplay  but  central  to  the  argument  that  play  rises  to  the  fore  as  the 
mediating  force  that  connects  performing  identity  with  self-interpretation.  It  is 
therefore necessary to rename the mimetic phases to play phases:  play1,  play2, and 
play3. In  play1, the complexities of urban life and the role of mobile media induce a 
preunderstanding of the world of actions as a playful world of interactions. In play2, we 
construct and manage coherence in the world of actions through playful interactions. 
In  play3,  we  come  to  reflexively  understand  ourselves  as  interacting  players.  The 
conceptual  pair  play/game  sets  out  a  spatiotemporal  field  in  which  we  move  and 
interact.  If  plot  is  the general  underlying logic describing the temporal  direction of  
narratives  (even while  not  all  stories  have a  plot),  mapping  is  the underlying  logic  
describing  the  spatiotemporal  dynamics  of  play  (even  while  not  all  play  can  be 
captured in maps). Similar to giving an overview of a story to someone by explaining 
the plot, we would use a map to show the play. 
6.2.1 Play1: prefiguring life as play and game
Ricoeur’s first mediating moment, narrative prefiguration or mimesis1, poses that life is 
prereflexively grasped in terms of its narrative features. Narrative tradition functions as  
a  cultural  blueprint  to  recognize  in  actions  (i)  a  structure,  (ii)  symbols,  (iii)  and  a  
temporal framework. I rework this level into playful prefiguration. 
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i. Structure
According to Ricoeur,  life is  prenarratively structured since we implicitly understand 
life’s actions and events as composed of the same elements as stories are made of: a 
conceptual network of goals, motives, agents, circumstances, and interactions with- 
(Ricoeur, 1984: 57-59). First of all, stories are not the only medium composed of these  
elements. They also occur in games and play. Today, the conceptual pair play/game 
becomes more prominent as an implicit structure than narrative because we live in a 
world in which the conditions for our interactions rise to prominence. An increasing 
number  of  people  inhabit  complex,  heterogeneous,  and  mobile  (urban)  societies 
where  diverse  cultural  traditions  intersect.  Far  more  people  are  now  mobile 
themselves: in exile, in diaspora, living a ‘nomadic’ life (Peters, 1999a). Particularly in 
large cities like Jakarta, there is no longer a majority of people who share the same  
narrative blueprint for understanding life. Instead they must negotiate the conditions 
of a shared modus vivendi. Playing together, as in collaborative bergaul, or against each 
other,  as  in  competitive  gengsi (section  3.1),  have  become  main  principles  in 
interactions,  instead  of  a  common  narrative  tradition.  Further,  via  various  media 
channels  we are  exposed on a  daily  base to sometimes  conflicting stories  about  a 
multiplicity of ‘real’ or imaginary worlds elsewhere. With real-time interactive media 
we are also able to interact in and with these multiple worlds, and move between 
them,  however  incompatible  they  appear.  To  a  degree  we  must  understand  these 
worlds  as  separate  playworlds  as  a  defense against  being played (section 5.4).  The 
mobile phone in particular continually presents us with events from elsewhere. Instead 
of  being  a  singular  narrative  setting,  everyday  life  is  multiplied  by  actions  from 
elsewhere  to  which  we  must  respond.  Actions  then  become  interactions.  In 
heterogeneous urban societies the mobile phone is an ideal tool to exert control. Its 
flip  side is  the experience of  contingency  towards  life’s  actions  and events  269.  The 
mobile phone potentially interrupts our present actions at any time, and inserts wholly  
new  unexpected  events.  The  mobile  phone  accentuates  modern  life’s  oscillation 
between agôn mastery over actions and alea play of fate (Caillois, 2001: 97, 108)  270. 
Urban and mediated communicative interactions highlight spatial rather than temporal 
implicit  structures.  The  play/game  pair  is  well  equipped  as  a  structure  for  spatial 
269 According to studies some 47% to 68% experience ‘disconnect anxiety’ when for whatever reason they  
are temporally off the grid (Aducci, et al., 2008: 2; SRG, 2008: 3).
270 Not everyone necessarily deplores this loss of control. Being subjected to greater forces that rock one’s  
fate can bring an exhilarating sense of joy (a point made by Kücklich, 2004: 38-39). Katz notes that the mobile  
phone contributes to aleatory experiences of “random reinforcement” in people who pathologically sieve 
through their incoming messages to look for that one grain among the chaff (Economist, 2008). We enter the 
domain  of  enthralling  ilinx experiences,  and  exaltation  during  flow experiences  (Caillois,  2001; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).
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mobilities.  Interactions  are  coded  by  structures,  rules,  prescriptions,  and  artificial  
boundaries that guide how we can act, as in games. At the same time interactions are  
free play in a  Spielraum that opens up spaces for infinite new explorations, border 
transgressions and movements between different games. The play/game pair enable us 
to grasp life prereflexively as interacted, not narrated.
ii. Symbolic meanings
Narrative  theory  holds  that  investing  actions  with  symbolic  meanings  shapes  our 
preunderstanding of life. This makes actions ‘readable’ like texts. Heterogeneity, and 
the  lack  of  knowledge  urbanites  tend  to  have  of  each  other’s  biographies,  make 
reading symbolic meaning less relevant. And mobile media make it more difficult. Life  
among strangers  has  always been characterized by unpredictability and uncertainty. 
Everyday  interactions  mostly  develop  along  scripted  roles  instead  of  an  in-depth 
investigation  of  each  other’s  biographies.  The  theatrical  perspective  of  symbolic 
interactions is more apt to urban life than narrative. Strangers in public adopt a role of 
civil neglect. They behave inconspicuously, “to give no one a reason to have anything at 
all  to say about the matter” (Lofland, 1973: 141).  By implicit  contract the narrative  
qualities of people’s actions are attenuated. Performers agree to muffle their acting to 
avoid stimulating others into an active reading of what is going on. Reciprocally, the  
‘audience’ silently agrees not to ‘read’ the events happening around them. At most, 
this symbolic reading is like a little post-it note: “don’t bother me!” The non-reading of  
each other’s actions is a typically urban mode of symbolic interaction. Mobile media  
make actions in public space far more difficult to read. In the context of Jakarta we 
have seen how young people communicate in bahasa gaul, the youth language that is 
forever  in  flux  and  hardly  decodable  for  elderly  people.  Partial  snippets  of  mobile 
phone conversations in public settings make us reflexively aware of life as composed of  
symbolic  codes,  and  of  interactions  as  an  encoding/decoding  process.  Overhearing 
mobile  conversations  induces  reflection  on  the  rules  of  engagement  and  our  own 
standpoint  vis-a-vis  the  other.  Our  implicit  understanding  of  action  shifts  to  the 
conditional order. We must adopt an active strategy towards such situations 271. Daily 
confrontations with heterogeneous and unknown cultural codes unavoidably draws our 
symbolic preunderstanding of actions into a configurative  play2 and reflexive  play3. 
When reading  cultural  symbols  no longer  comes  ‘naturally’,  we either  engage  in  a 
playful  deciphering puzzle  or  ‘close  the circle’  by  shutting  ourselves  off.  (In  go the 
earbuds,  up  goes  the  volume.)  Furthermore,  people  in  public  situations  use  their 
mobile phones in performative ‘stage-phoning’ (sections 3.2 and 5.2). Actions are not 
271 The annoyance many feel when other people call in public has to do with the breech of the implicit non-
reading contract.
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just read but also enacted. It is not far-fetched to call the public domain itself a play 
arena  for  agonistic  struggles  about  meaning  and  ownership.  In  all  cases  actions 
become  interactions.  Symbolic  interactions  then  are  preunderstood  as  tactical 
interactive games rather than symbolic narrative reading.
iii. Framework for course of actions
Ricoeur asserts that people recognize in sequences of actions temporal  frameworks 
(plots)  that  call  for  narration.  I  hold  that  sequences  of  interactions  also  consist  of  
spatial relations that call for mapping. Locative media explicitly organize actions and 
events  on maps  (chapter 4).  As  reincarnations of  the static  map,  interactive  digital  
cartographies provide a framework to organize the world of interaction both in spatial  
and  temporal  terms  as  geotagged  ‘micro-narratives’.  With  locative  media  the  map 
clearly prevails  over the plot as a framework for event sequences. In mobile phone 
communication too recognizing a spatial  framework is  of more direct concern than 
recognizing temporal  plot.  By again taking a dramaturgical  perspective we see why. 
According  to  neoclassical  theater  rules,  a  comprehensible  performance  needs  to 
conform to three unities: unity of time (the action occurs in a limited time span), unity 
of place (the action takes place in a singular setting), and unity of action (all actions 
contribute  to  the  plot)  272.  A  single  communicative  action  quite  unproblematically 
conforms to unity of time. A real-time voice call is synchronous for both callers. They 
are sure of one thing: the interaction (talking on the phone) occurs at the same time  
for both parties 273. The speakers however are in different places. And often they do not 
know where the other is. Communicative interaction via the mobile phone lacks initial  
intelligibility  about  setting.  This  indeterminacy  foregrounds  the  need  for  spatial 
ordering. The need to assess temporal unity is pushed to the background. (Unless the 
call is redirected to voicemail. In that case the caller is acutely faced with the temporal  
uncertainties of asynchronous action.)  We have seen that  the first  question on the 
phone often is “where are you”, in order to pinpoint someone’s location and picture 
him in a locale. Preunderstanding communicative events requires not only clarity about 
its topic but also about its topos. The callers must form mental maps that connect their 
272 The three unities extend Aristotle ’s classical definition of emplotment (muthos) in tragedy. It should be 
noted however that Aristotle only distinguishes two unities: the temporal unity of action that takes place in a 
single period of time, and dramatic unity that characterizes a single action as whole and complete in itself. 
There is no unity of setting with Aristotle. And temporal unity is not even necessary in the construction of  
plot (Ricoeur, 1984: 39-40). Ricoeur’s occupation with reworking Aristotle’s muthos to include temporal unity 
in narrative may well explain his lack of attention for spatiality in narrative.
273 I am using the simple scenario of a one-to-one voice call. It is of course possible to make conference calls 
that involve multiple people.
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two physical  topoi (here and there) with a shared instance of an imagined meeting  
place. Mental maps cannot create unity of setting, but at least they establish coherence 
as a precondition for mobile conversations.
Communication  often  is  not  a  singular  event  but  part  of  a  larger  chain  of  
actions.  This  chain  can  be  composed  of  both  mediated  and  physically  co-present 
interactions. Such series of interactions may severely violate the three unities. Still they 
can be coherently prefigured through mapping. Let us again look at what Ling and Yttri 
have called ‘micro-coordination’, the practice whereby people use the mobile phone to 
coordinate  a  future  physical  meeting  in  sequences  of  increasingly  precise 
communicative  exchanges  (Ling  &  Yttri,  2002:  139,  142-146).  Micro-coordination 
involves both temporal and spatial coordination. By establishing a precise meeting time 
people work towards ‘closure’ of the chain of actions. People also browse their mental 
maps of the city to find a good meeting spot, and progressively zoom in on a specific  
place  to  meet.  In  my  view  spatial  coordination is  dominant  in  micro-coordination. 
People can wait a while but they must be sure of the meeting point. And they must  
agree that it is indeed a nice place. The implicit framework that holds a sequence of  
events together in micro-coordination is the map rather than the plot. In imagining 
ourselves moving on these maps and in collaboratively choosing a meeting place as the 
goal  we preunderstand our interactions as  moving avatars  in  games rather than as 
narrative protagonists.
6.2.2 Play2: configuring life as play and game
In narrative theory the configuration of plot brings events and actions into a structural,  
meaningful, and temporal order. To create cohesion between seemingly heterogeneous 
events and actions in life, we apply plots with a beginning, middle and end (though not 
necessarily in that order, as Jean-Luc Godard said of modern cinematic storytelling) 274. 
We submit discordant events to the unifying structure of a concordant story. We imbue 
them with meaning insofar they contribute to the whole. Plot also gives a sense of 
direction to life’s temporality, giving it a point. Narrative configuration is a mechanism 
of selection: how is the story composed, what belongs into the story (and what need 
not be in it), and what is its overarching direction and theme. The function of play in 
play2 is again elucidated along the mentioned three dramaturgical unities: (i) time, (ii) 
place, (iii) and action. Because actual  unity is hard to configure with space and time-
transcending mobile media I  shift  the focus to the question how  coherence can be 
created. 
274 Aristotle  already  said  that  the  unity  in  emplotment  does  not  necessitate  a  sequential  ordering  of 
beginning - middle - end, as long as the middle is indeed defined by succession. The logic of tragedy plots  
even is one of reversing temporal succession (Aristotle, 1907: vi, x; Ricoeur, 1984: 38-39).
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i. Coherence of time
Mobile phone conversations frequently are not organized in temporal plots with an 
opening and closure. Sure, in single instrumental (business) calls opening and closure 
remain intact. We easily fit  such instrumental calls in a sequence of communicative 
exchanges by referring to previous and future calls or meetings. The phone memory  
even aids our own by logging date and time of past calls, and reminding us of future to  
do’s. ‘Micro-coordination’ too is goal-oriented. When the goal is achieved the event 
reaches closure. However, mobile communication practices often bear the quality of an 
ongoing conversation. Mobile phone interaction is an ‘infinite game’ of gift exchanges  
(section 5.3). No goal exists besides the ‘phatic’ quality of the interaction itself. This is  
particularly  true  between  close  friends  who  communicate  in  short  and  frequent 
gestures at irregular times (Licoppe, 2003: 181)  275. Formal openings and closures by 
greeting  procedures  are  bypassed (Licoppe  & Heurtin,  2002:  106;  Ling,  2008:  120; 
Schegloff, 2002a: 284-285). A call picks up in the middle of a previous conversation and 
leaves  future  conversations  open.  There  is  no  point  at  which  they  are  made  into 
concordant events that fit a greater narrative, or discordant events that are left out. 
How  then  is  temporal  coherence  created,  and  why  is  this  play?  If  we  must apply 
narrative  terms  to such communications,  they  surely  are  not  literary  and historical 
narratives that are neatly organized in self-contained chapters. Instead, they consist of 
an episodic chain of  events,  like soaps.  Each new action provokes a reaction in an 
ongoing to-and-fro interplay. In technical terms we might say that narrative time (time 
taken to narrate,  Erzählzeit) completely subsumes  narrated time (the duration of the 
narrated event,  erzählte Zeit). If we go along with Ricoeur, who says that the relation 
between narrative time and narrated time in storytelling is a “game with time”, then 
we see all the more that mobile communication is an ‘infinite game’ (Ricoeur, 1985: 
80). Narrated time becomes narrative time in self-referential phatic talk. This is why it is 
play: interaction is imbued with meaning in the doing instead of being invested with 
narrative meaning by a telling afterwards. Further, the playful ‘micro-narratives’ that 
emerge in mobile conversations are collaboratively composed without a main narrator,  
like gossip  276. They are interactive stories to which all parties contribute as part of a 
team. The rules of  gifting create a temporal  order: one should reciprocate within a 
certain amount of  time, and one should take turns. Finally, and oddly perhaps, the 
infinity  of  gifting  itself  structures  time.  The  fundamental  uncertainty  towards  the 
275 Licoppe distinguishes two modalities of communication between friends: conversational communication, 
long and ritualized calls spread out in time, and connected communication, which is frequent, short and 
occurs at irregular intervals (Licoppe, 2003: 181-182). The first occur mostly between people who live far  
apart and the second between people who live in close proximity (Licoppe & Heurtin, 2002).
276 About gossip in mobile communication, see Fox, 2001, and Ling, 2008: 148-154.
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future is alleviated by the assurance that a present act of gifting will lead to reciprocal  
actions  to  come.  Narrative  denies  future’s  uncertainty  by  narrowing  the  potential 
course of actions through the imposition of plot. Play embraces uncertainty by opening 
up the future as a playspace for rule-based interactions, while games too narrow the  
potential course of action by imposing rules. So using the play/game pair draws this 
temporal dialectic within the identity construction itself.
Mobile  phone  practices  play  with  traditional  emplotment.  Frequently,  the 
mobile device is a means to ‘kill’  lost moments. Waiting for the train, during travel,  
being too early for an appointment in a bar: we almost automatically grab our phone 
and start to make a call or compose a text message (listen to music, surf the web, play  
a game, watch digital television, or update our online social network status). Lost in-
between moments are no longer the blank lines that separate individual events and 
actions in a unified plot. Silent transitions, normally untold, now become meaningful 
interludes:  playing  time.  Instead  of  actionless  breathing  pauses  that  allow  us  to 
recuperate, these moments are used “to the max”. This attitude of optimizing time for 
entertainment or social maintenance conjures up visions of life as a game or a contest. 
How many laps can you race in 5 minutes waiting time? How many emails can you 
answer in 15 minutes of metro travel? We are challenged to “make the most of now”, 
as the Vodafone slogan puts it (see Akker & Prins, 2008). 
ii. Coherence of place
Ricoeur neglects the role of place in narrative and ignores the issue if and how people  
configure narrative coherence in spatial terms. He unproblematically assumes narrative 
configuration to take place within a singular cultural tradition, and conflates narrative 
cultural  tradition  with  location.  Ricoeur  explicitly  limits  his  analysis  to  the  western 
narrative  tradition,  which  he  traces  back  to  Greco-Christian  origins.  In  seeking  to 
integrate Aristotle’s concepts of muthos (plot) and mimesis with Augustine’s philosophy 
of time, Ricoeur glosses over the differences between these two cultural lineages that 
together  constitute  ‘the’  western  narrative  tradition  277.  Furthermore,  Ricoeur 
understands  cultural  change  as  innovation  within  one  rule-based  cultural  tradition 
(“play  with  the  rules”).  He  ignores  cultural  change  as  the  result  of  irreconcilable 
differences by outside influences and tensions from within (“not playing according to 
the rules”).
277 By contrast, in Taylor’s genealogy of western identity, the tension between Greek and Christian origins  
and its aftermath in modern times is a dominant theme (Taylor, 1989).
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Ajit Maan criticizes Ricoeur’s implicit assumption of a unified narrative setting 
(Maan, 1999). Maan points out that identities are no longer based on a singular place. 
She argues an increasing number of people, notably migrants, move between multiple  
settings. Maan proposes a model of “internarrative identity” that mediates between 
the multiple settings of narrative identities. 
Figure 7: (Simplified) model of Maan’s ‘internarrative identity’. 
Maan changes Ricoeur’s ipse with the Sanskritic aham, and idem with idam, which highlights  
‘shared sameness’ with others (Maan, 1999: 58).
This model takes the spatial discontinuities in people's lives into account. It does not 
presuppose spatial unity. It only requires coherence in the way people tell stories (ibid: 
58). Not surprisingly, Maan’s sensitivity for the spatial qualities of identity results in a 
model  that  starts  to  look  like  a  rudimentary  mental  map.  Nevertheless,  Maan too 
assumes that the narrative ‘legs’ of internarrative identity themselves are more or less 
unified settings.  She equals  narrative tradition with  locale.  Migrants  from setting A 
move to setting B and must combine these two narrative traditions in an overarching 
internarrative  identity.  She  does  not  consider  multiplicity,  difference  and mobilities 
within a  single  setting.  Further,  she  does  not  consider  how  the  ‘meaningful  
movements’ between settings contribute to people’s identities. How much further can 
we stretch the rules of narrative theory? I prefer to be a spoilsport and step outside  
narrative identity theory, at least for the moment. 
Since ‘place’ has been mentioned a few times in this section, let us refresh our  
memories with what has been said in section 3.3. Place has multiple meanings. There is 
location (a  particular geographical position or area),  locale (social situation, setting) 
and  sense  of  place (the  subjective  experience  of  a  place)  (Agnew,  1987:  28). Each 
dimension can play a role in place-based identities. In practice, identities tend to be 
composites. Location is key to parochial identities, the idea that who you are is where 
you are from. Identities based on geographical location tend to be static closed circles 
that exclude others. Locales are central in social identities. Settings are inscribed with 
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implicit and explicit rules prescribing how to interact with others by playing social roles.  
Social identities are about ‘impression management’: how we perform roles in front of 
other people in particular social  settings  (Goffman, 1959; Hannerz,  1980).  Sense of 
place underlies cultural  and personal  identities. Sense of  place is partly narrated. It  
features  in  stories  people  tell  about  who and what they are.  These can be shared 
stories about a common actual or imaginary ancestry, origin or destination, or stories  
that express a personal connection to certain places. Sense of place is also performed, I  
add. In the case of Freedom Day in Indonesia we have seen how young people from 
different  regions  actualize the  national  motto ‘unity  in  diversity’  in  a showing of  a 
doing. On an individual level, De Certeau sees walking as a ‘tactics’ by which people 
create their own spaces out of pre-produced places. 
In traditional communal identities these three places were a unity. Location and 
locale overlapped and determined someone’s identity in the social group, which was  
expressed  through,  and sanctioned  by  a  common sense  of  place.  In  early  modern 
times, with the rise of the metropolis and new technologies, a multitude of distinct  
settings with thick boundaries were created. Workplace, home, holiday, leisure, places 
of  consumption,  public  space,  etc.  became  the  loci  of  “increasing  segregation  of  
experiential spheres” (Meyrowitz, 2003: 94). People now played more than one social  
role and broadened their horizons with multiple senses of place. Although place was 
no longer unified, at least it was still coherent. Multiple locales and senses of place 
were logically connected to locations. Mass media blurred the boundaries between 
formerly segregated experiential and social domains. Social roles were sung loose from 
physical locations, supposedly causing people to have “no sense of place” (Meyrowitz, 
1985). ‘Non-places’ became the spaces of ‘super-modernity’, and were devoid of ‘sense 
of  place’,  the  symbolic  expressions  of  identity,  relations  and  history  embedded  in 
places (Augé, 2008: 63, 70). With the rise of ‘placeless’ ICTs, the ties between place and 
identity appears to have been weakened further (see section 4.1) 278
At  first  sight,  mobile  media  technologies  indeed  appear  to  contribute  to  a 
further breakdown of unified place and its connection to identity. First, locative media 
multiply and mobilize physical locations for actions. We have seen that locative media 
allow locations to be geotagged, inscribed with micro-narratives, and travel elsewhere. 
Second, the mobile phone allows people to rapidly switch between multiple  locales. 
Definitions of the social situation where the action takes place become less clear. As we 
move  back  and  forth  between  multiple  locales  in  which  we  play  divergent  and 
278 Notions  like  Meyrowitz’  ‘global  nomads’,  Castells’  ‘space  of  flows’,  or  Bauman’s  ‘liquid  modernity’ 
rhetorically suggest that places in the digital age lack local scale, fixed anchors and boundaries (Bauman, 
2000; Castells, 1996: 378; Meyrowitz, 2003). Castells simultaneously witnesses a reaction to globalization in 
the ICT-based ‘network society’, with the revenge of parochialism rooted in ‘space of places’ (Castells, 1996:  
378; 1997: 1-11).
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sometimes conflicting roles, diversions and contradictions in our stories easily surface 
(Geser,  2004).  All  of  a sudden we find ourselves managing two very different front 
stages  (Ling,  2008).  From  the  perspective  of  bystanders,  the  definition  of  a  social  
situation  can  shift  dramatically  when  others  make  or  receive  a  call.  What  was  an 
intimate dinner in a fine restaurant may quickly turn into an embarrassing situation 
when the guy sitting at the adjoining table with a woman by the candlelight receives a 
call from a suspicious spouse and gets involved in a marital dispute 279. Whether we are 
caller or bystander, the rule-based character of locale is exposed and we find ourselves 
improvising a role to play in the changed situation. Third, the mobile phone induces 
multiplicity in  sense of place.  More than ever we have an idea of what is  going on 
elsewhere.  Again,  this  is  not  something  exclusively  brought  about  by  mobile 
technologies.  For much longer people have been able to get  a sense of  elsewhere 
through various media. Mobile media technologies are different because they combine 
elements that existed separately in older media. Information about elsewhere is easier 
and  cheaper  to  obtain,  available  in  greater  abundance,  can  be  accessed  from 
anywhere, and is available in real-time. The type of information changes too. It is multi-
medial when transmitted via more than one channel (image, sound, text; web, voice 
call, text message), and multi-sensory when it involves vision, hearing and increasingly 
touch and kinetics (the phone’s vibrating function; haptic interaction with the device,  
especially devices with an accelerometer). Information can be broadcasted from one to 
many,  or  from  many  to  many.  Most  often  it  is  two-way  and  interactive.  Through 
wireless  technologies  information  can  be  obtained  while  we  are  on  the  move, 
detached from location or locale. All this seems to lead to a splintering of place. 
At the same time mobile media technologies reinforce spatial coherence in the  
face of disunity. The mobile phone camera is used to inscribe locations with a sense of  
place, as we have seen in the case of Raoul (section 3.2) and of locative playground 
Bliin (4.3). Migrants can more easily maintain connections to their place of origin, as in 
the case of Ida (3.2). Mobile media connect people to imaginary places elsewhere and  
thus give a sense of direction to someone’s life, as in the case of Dewi (3.2). Provider 
Esia designs phones in accordance with ‘local’ identities (3.3). Mobile communication 
organizes social coherence in ‘gift circles’ (5.3). Locative media always position us in the 
center of the map, offer a multitude of services tied to locations, expose the narrative 
qualities of places, add read/write rights to place, and open up a play space for spatial 
exploration (4.3). Smart  mobs and flash mobs induce people to physically gather and 
279 Of course social situations have always had a certain potential for instability (the spouse might actually 
walk in and start a row). The fact that people are so much easier to reach from outside situations, and that  
people calling have little if any clue about another’s situation, makes an appropriate judgment of a social  
setting by all parties far more difficult. Managing social face in such circumstances can and does easily get  
awkward, sometimes as much for the audience as for the caller.
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cooperate at certain locations (mentioned in 2.3 and 5.2). The mobile device itself can  
be even considered a place, a portable home we dwell in. We store a large part of our 
lives and our relations with our friends and family as digital objects in phone memory  
and have them with us all the time. With the phone we always carry along familiar  
terrain.  In  all  cases,  the  mobile  phone  helps  us  in  spatial  orientation.  It  acts  as  a 
mapping  device  and  compass  that  assists  us  to  maintain  spatial  coherence  in  our 
interactions and navigate life. 
iii. Coherence of action
Mobile communication challenges the functional role of actions in a unified plot. Plot  
circumscribes the higher order logic, the ‘point’ of the narrative. In the plot there is no  
room for events and actions that do not have a function. The unity of narrative life is  
continuously challenged by new discordant events, which are either made concordant 
or placed outside the narrative. Narrative identity theory does not give insight in the 
conditions  under  which  events  are  made  discordant  or  concordant,  other  than 
postulating that events should fit the plot. Moreover, narrative emplotment assumes 
identity is constructed only from concordant events 280. Our theory of playful identity in 
the making focuses on the conditional order of boundary play. Seemingly discordant  
actions still contribute to identity construction. The unpredictability of an incoming call  
or message continuously threatens to disrupt the configuration of plot. It is much more 
difficult to ‘tame’ the many discordant events that intrude into our current actions, and 
to integrate them in a concordant plot. It  may seem we have given up the ideal of  
unification altogether. Mobile phone conversations have been noted for their triviality  
or even banality (for instance Bassett, 2005: 43; De Vries, 2009: 87; Haddon, 2000: 6;  
Kasesniemi & Rautiainen, 2002: 190)  281. When an unexpected event occurs we grab 
the  phone  and  call  someone  (“You  won't  believe  what  I  just  saw...”),  send  a  text 
message, post it on a micro-blogging service or social platform, or take a snapshot or or 
shoot a video with the phone camera. Instead of being silently discarded and forgotten, 
discordant events and actions are highlighted and used for renewed interactions. They 
are logged to phone memory (e.g. as funny pictures and movies) and exchanged with 
others. Such ‘micro-narratives’ (section 4.3) do not meaningfully fit in a unified plot. 
They  are  a  welcome distraction,  entertaining  and  worth  recounting  in  themselves. 
280 As Ricoeur remains silent on the how and why of the selection process, one assumes mechanisms at play  
like forgetting, repressing, or simply declaring events impossible or unimaginable.
281 Triviality  is  a  recurring  theme  in  the  perception  of  new communication  technologies.  Claude  Fisher  
recounts that as soon as rural women started socializing via the fixed telephone to overcome their isolation,  
men ridiculed the frivolity of the telephone (Fischer, 1992: 82, 231). Aronson describes how critics rapidly 
discovered the dreaded malady of ‘telephonics’ in ‘telephone fiends’ (Aronson, 1971: 157)
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Micro-narratives could hardly be farther removed from traditional fiction or historical  
narratives, where each element is carefully pieced into to a whole through rational and 
reflective  selection.  In  micro-narratives,  what  is  communicated  matters  not  for  its  
content  but  for  its  expressive  power.  Again,  what  is  said  matters  less  than  that 
something is said, and how. It is not about the action that is recounted. The recounting 
itself has become the action. A substantial amount of mobile communication operates  
on the performative level of meta-communication 282. Crucially, these messages are not 
about  that  which  they  say  they  are  about.  Rather  than  being  reference  to,  or  
representation of the recounted action, these messages are the (inter)action. 
Obtaining information from elsewhere is not a matter of choice, like flicking on 
the TV or grabbing a book. As said earlier in the context of  mobile gifting,  we are  
summoned to pick up our telephone and answer. In non-real-time space-transcending 
narrative media (books, newspapers, oral accounts), the sense of actions elsewhere 
resides in the imaginary realm of mimesis (as if one were in another place). Our sense 
of this other place matters little for what is going on here, or there. Actions elsewhere  
first  must  pass  through mimetic  cycle.  They  can easily  be  discarded as  discordant.  
Boundaries  remain  erect.  With  mobile  media  the  imaginary  elsewhere  has  actual  
consequences for actions here and now, and vice versa. A live voice from elsewhere 
requires  us  to  react.  For  example,  we  often  receive  information  that  something 
interesting is happening elsewhere. Suppose a friend calls with a voice barely audible 
above the loud background music: “Hi, I am at an awesome concert, you’d totally digg 
it! Come over quick!”. An acute sense of missing out on events happening elsewhere 
may arise. Different from being told after the fact, mobile communication requires us 
to  interact  right  now,  right  here.  Narrative  configuration  of  actions  by  a 
referential/representational medium external to the action itself makes way for playful  
configuration in which the doing structures the interactions. 
6.2.3 Play3: reconfiguring life as play and game
In the stage of mimesis3 life is reconfigured by applying narratives. The break between 
the  world  of  text  and  the  world  of  the  hearer/reader  is  restored.  We  reflect  on 
ourselves and come to understand ourselves as readers and writers of our own lives 
(Ricoeur, 1988: 246). Narrative identity mediates between character, in which idem and 
ipse identity coincide, and the promise, in which selfhood and sameness are separated. 
Narrative  character consists  of  the  more  or  less  stable  properties  that  make  an 
individual recognizable as the same person (Ricoeur, 1992: 119, 121). In self-attribution 
282 Exactly  how much  is  hard  to  ascertain.  How does  one  operationalize  instrumental  calls  and  phatic  
communication? Instrumental exchanges can have a meta-communicative ‘perlocutionary’ charge too.
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we recognize ourselves as the same person by living according to our developed habits 
and identifications with-. In other-ascription people recognize someone as a consistent 
person  with  certain  traits  (ibid:  122-128).  The  promise expresses  the  individual's 
intention to  be a  consistent  self.  How do we come to understand and reconfigure 
ourselves as playful beings?
Character’s  self-attribution  in  habits  and  identifications  with-,  and  other-
ascription  as  consistent,  are  under  pressure  from the  mobile  phone.  Former strict 
boundaries between social domains - work, private life, leisure - have become vague. 
We frequently receive work calls at non-working hours or even on vacation, and private 
calls during work time. Our boss may call in the evening to ask whether we can make a 
last-minute change to the presentation tomorrow (“oh, and by the way, can you come 
half an hour earlier?”). Such demands are hard to ignore. Often we succumb. In fact we  
are expected not to rigidly adhere to schedules anymore. Summonings through the 
phone constantly invade our life as a habitual creature. The mere potential of someone 
calling challenges our inadvertent habitual patterns into self-conscious strategies that 
we must hold up in the face of outside demands. Imagine a self-declared habit-loving 
person who likes to spend his evenings on the sofa with a good book, listening to some 
classical music, sipping a scotch. Just the thought that a friend or acquaintance might 
call - “come over to the concert!” - impels him to have a strategy at hand to ward him 
off. Can he still understand and uphold himself as a person with character defined by 
habit? Or as someone who must be ready to play pretense to maintain his own rules 
for living? Furthermore, not only is habitual life constantly challenged from the outside, 
more and more people devaluate a life of habit. In his account of the late-modern work 
ethic,  The  Corrosion  of  Character,  Richard  Sennett  describes  this  preference  for 
detachment and abhorrence of fixity by using phrases like “virtues of spontaneity” and 
“lack of long-term attachment” (Sennett, 1998: 45, 62). Similarly, in  Liquid modernity 
Zygmunt  Bauman  speaks  about  “the  differential  access  to  unpredictability”  as  the 
epitome of personal freedom (Bauman, 2000: 120). The other dimension of character, 
identifications with-, is equally under strain. We no longer unconditionally identify with 
the people we are with physically, or with the situation we are in. We willingly seek  
discordance by moving away from the social  situation present at hand. The mobile  
phone is a very handy tool to reconfigure our lives as free play, by always keeping as  
many options open as possible. There might always be a better party somewhere else 
with  cooler  people  (see  Kim,  2002:  71;  Ling  &  Yttri,  2002:  155).  Consistency  of  
character  is  seen  as  dull  and  boring,  even  suspect  as  reactionary.  Flexibility,  
adaptability  and a detached stance is  perceived by many to be a sign of individual 
freedom. Changing ringtones and colorful fronts once in while to “tell who you are”, as  
is common practice in Indonesia, seem to underline this idea of a character du jour. As 
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far as other-ascription of character goes, answering a call in the company of others  
may bring the divergent roles we play to light.  As  Geser notes  “the attribution [of  
behavior] to stable personality traits becomes more difficult because such attributions 
have to be consistent with all the divergent forms of behavior observed” (Geser, 2004:  
23, my addition in brackets). Other people acutely realize that the consistent character  
they ascribe to us is derived from the particular contexts in which they are witnesses to 
our lives. When the conditions change, we may no longer be recognizable characters to  
others. Online, the narrative notion of attribution is even further corroded. According 
to Ricoeur, utterances (as actions) are always attributable to someone, to a mine. On 
the internet anonymous commenting has become part and parcel, for better or worse. 
The  practice  has  acquired  an  almost  affectionate  name  in  online  culture:  the 
‘anonymous coward’. It is not hard to imagine that commenters would sometimes be 
very displeased if their comment were actually traceable and attributable to them. The 
other pillar under narrative identity, the promise, or ‘commitment’ with Taylor (Taylor,  
1989:  27),  is  equally  under  strain.  Many  people  seem  to  find  commitments  
burdensome and awkward.  Mobile  phone  users  constantly  readjust  their  promises. 
Commitments  are  stretched,  circumvented,  renegotiated,  adjusted according to our 
whims, flow, or feel of the moment. Because we appreciate this flexibility the mobile 
phone  offers  us,  we  display  a  remarkable  consideration  for  other  people’s  sudden 
changes  of  mind.  Again,  what  matters  is  that  the  conditions  of  such  changes  are 
communicated.
If the habitual character and promising self are no longer adequate descriptions 
of how people see themselves and others, do we indeed reconfigure life as total free 
play in which we understand ourselves as opportunistic players? The mobile phone 
certainly brings an unprecedented sense of freedom in the double sense of  freedom 
from constraints and freedom to act (Berlin, 1958). Yet as I have consistently argued, 
mobile phone communication is not entirely optional. Others apply pressure on us to 
be  available,  and  to  answer  or  call  back  within  a  certain  amount  of  time  (among 
Norwegian teens the rule of thumb is that peers must reply an SMS within 30 minutes:  
Ling & Yttri, 2002). Within the stakes set by others, we have the power to decide when 
to answer or not. We can choose to cheat on the rules by sustained non-answering, but 
this is dangerous. The paradox of freedom and force reveals itself to be an apparent  
contradiction after all. We reconfigure ourselves in a dialectic of ‘conditional liberty’ or 
‘free bondage’. In fact this  is  characteristic of the late-modern condition in general.  
Bauman  notes  that  the  early-modern  ethic  of  maximizing  individual  freedom  has 
resulted in society  becoming far  more rigid  economically  and institutionally.  In  the 
attempt to escape society’s strangling fixation, the search for individual freedom has 
produced the very thing it sought to shake off. “Rigidity of order is the artefact and 
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sediment of  the human agents’  freedom”,  Bauman writes  (Bauman, 2000: 5,  italics 
removed). By contrast, in our current age of ‘liquid modernity’ this rigidity is no longer  
challenged, Bauman says. The ‘melting of solids’, the permanent feature of modernity, 
is redirected. Now liquified are the relations between individual choices and collective  
projects and actions (ibid: 6). When the rules and codes are no longer fixed orientation 
points but become ‘mobile’, the rules themselves become exposed as man-made (as 
we have seen in section 5.4). Like spotting game in the wild they are best viewed while  
moving. Sure, we have always organized our lives according to rules. But under the  
pressure of change we become more aware of this fact, and are induced to reflect on 
the rules and on the condition of living a rule-governed life. Furthermore, for the lack 
of pre-given rules we must now set them ourselves. When the parameters to construct 
identities are underdetermined we must design our own conditions, and reapply them 
to  ourselves.  We  must  reconfigure  life  as  if  it  were  a  rule-based  game.  As  these  
conditions  are  no  longer  set  in  stone,  playing  the  parameters  becomes  a  life-long 
challenge. Paradoxically, living a rule-based life is the last vestige of self-determination. 
It is I who decides to willingly suspend disbelieve and play. It is I who is being played. By 
living life as a rule-based game we are free to play. Bounded by rules yet free to move  
we have become moving circles. 
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Replay (Nederlandstalige samenvatting)
Bewegende cirkels: mobiele media en speelse identiteiten
De centrale vraag van deze dissertatie is: hoe kan het spelbegrip ingezet worden om de rol van mobiele  
mediatechnologieën  in  identiteitsvorming  te  begrijpen?  Eén  van  de  meest  invloedrijke  opvattingen  van 
identiteit  is  de  narratieve  identiteitstheorie.  Deze  is  wijdverspreid  in  de  menswetenschappen  (filosofie, 
sociologie, antropologie) en het krachtigst geformuleerd door de Franse filosoof Paul Ricoeur. We begrijpen  
onszelf, elkaar en de wereld door middel van de verhalen die we hierover vertellen en op onszelf betrekken.  
In  deze  opvatting  is  identiteit  altijd  gemediëerd.  Dat  wil  zeggen,  we  kunnen  onszelf  nooit  rechtstreeks 
begrijpen maar hebben altijd de omweg nodig van een extern medium. Met de opkomst en het massale 
gebruik van nieuwe media technologieën zoals de mobiele telefoon rijst de vraag of het narratief nog steeds  
het ‘geprivilegieerde medium’ is, zoals Ricoeur beweert. De hypothese is dat mobiele media aanzetten tot  
een andere identiteitsmediatie en wel door middel van het spelbegrip. Het argument is dat mobiele media  
identiteiten  op  vier  ‘spelniveaus’  beïnvloeden:  spel  op,  spel  met,  spel  door,  en  bespeeld  worden  door  
mobiele media. Vanwege onze speelse interacties via de mobiele telefoon bestaat identiteit niet zozeer als  
zelfinterpretatie  na afloop van gebeurtenissen (‘after  the fact’),  maar als zelfactualisatie  door onszelf  te 
vertolken (performance). Hiermee verschuift identiteit van een narratieve representatie via zelfinterpretatie 
naar een voorwaardelijk  spel met de regels van ons repertoire aan rollen. Het gehanteerde onderscheid 
tussen  play en  game onderstreept  dat  mediatechnologieën  nieuwe  ‘speelruimtes’  scheppen  om  te 
experimenteren met identiteit en tegelijkertijd nieuwe structuren, grenzen en verplichtingen opleggen. Het 
argument is zowel  descriptief als constructief.  De relatie tussen mobiele media en identiteit  kan op een 
empirisch niveau gezien worden als speels. Tevens levert het spelbegrip als heuristische lens een vruchtbaar  
nieuw perspectief op om naar identiteitsmediatie door nieuwe technologieën te kijken. 
In  de  introductie wordt het begrip  identiteit  omschreven als  meerlaags.  Zo  heeft  persoonlijke  identiteit  
betrekking op individuen. Naast het biologische feit dat we één enkel organisme zijn, omvat persoonlijke  
identiteit ons zelfbegrip als een en dezelfde persoon (al  is ons leven aan veranderingen in tijd en ruimte 
onderhevig), alsmede het gegeven dat we onszelf begrijpen als een zelf met een zekere eigenheid. Waar in 
het  Nederland  de  woorden  hetzelfde  en  zelf  sterk  op  elkaar  lijken,  bestaat  in  het  Engels  een  mooi  
onderscheid tussen sameness en selfhood. Identiteit heeft ook betrekking op hoe groepen mensen zichzelf 
en andere groepen karakteriseren. Sociale identiteiten ontstaan tussen mensen die op regelmatige basis met 
elkaar  interacteren.  Culturele  identiteiten  verbinden  mensen  met  elkaar  op  basis  van  verbeelde 
overeenkomstigheden, ondanks dat ze elkaar niet persoonlijk kennen. Voorts wordt de notie identiteit in  
toenemende mate toegepast om kenmerkende eigenschappen van de niet-levende wereld te beschrijven. 
Plaatsen, tijdperken, dingen, en zelfs organisaties hebben een ‘identiteit’, al is dit geen identiteit zoals die van  
mensen waarin zelfbegrip een rol speelt. Dit betekent dat de externe wereld niet louter een door ons in  
vrijheid vormgegeven realiteit is, maar evenzogoed zijn eigenschappen aan ons oplegt. 
Uit deze observaties destilleren we drie dimensies van identiteit. Ten eerste, identiteit is relationeel.  
Wie en wat wij zijn bestaat uit de relaties tussen zelf en zelf, zelf en anderen en zelf en de wereld (waarbij  
‘zelf’ enkelvoud en meervoud is). Ten tweede, identiteit is reflexief. Dat wil zeggen dat het betrekking heeft 
op zichzelf. Identiteit bestaat zowel uit hoe wij onszelf begrijpen als hoe wij het concept ‘zelf’ begrijpen en 
toepassen op onszelf. Hieruit volgt dat wij altijd een medium nodig hebben om over onszelf als een zelf na te 
denken. Ten derde, identiteit is paradoxaal. Drie paradoxen die steeds naar voren komen zijn: zelfde versus  
zelf  (sameness -  selfhood),  overeenkomstigheid versus verschil  (similarity -  difference)  en vrijheid  versus 
dwang (freedom -  force).  De paradox zelfde versus zelf gaat over de vraag hoe wij  gedurende ons leven 
dezelfde persoon kunnen blijven, terwijl ons zelf aan veranderingen onderhevig is en varieert per situatie. De 
paradox overeenkomstigheid versus verschil heeft betrekking op de kwestie dat wij enerzijds uniek zijn en 
ons  anderzijds  tot  anderen  dienen  te  verhouden  als  individu  en  als  groep.  Verschillen  betekent  altijd  
verschillen  van-.  Hoe  kunnen  we  uniek  zijn  wanneer  we  ons  anders-zijn  in  overkoepelende  concepten  
uitdrukken (taal, natie, religie, grenzen, enzovoorts)? En omgekeerd, hoe kunnen we ooit zeker weten dat 
onze  gedeelde  communicatiemiddelen  (taal,  symbolen,  gedrag,  enzovoorts)  ook  daadwerkelijk  hetzelfde 
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betekenen voor een ander? De paradox vrijheid  versus dwang behelst  de  spanning  dat wij  enerzijds  de 
keuzevrijheid hebben om onszelf te kunnen vormgeven en anderzijds gestuurd worden door machten die 
buiten onze controle vallen, waaronder technologische ontwikkelingen. Deze dimensies vallen samen met 
drie modaliteiten van identiteit:  zijn,  hebben, worden. We zijn  een zelf  in  hoe we ‘geworpen’ zijn  in  de 
wereld  als  relationele  wezens,  we  hebben  een zelf  omdat  we  ons  tot  onszelf  verhouden,  en  dit  zelf  is 
voortdurend in wording. 
Met het bovenstaande is de vraag wat identiteit is toegespitst tot de kwestie wat het zelf is. Het  
begrip ‘zelf’ is geen onveranderlijk gegeven maar zelf een historisch concept. Aan de ene kant kunnen we  
een visie onderscheiden die voortkomt uit de Romantiek, waarin het zelf een diepe onveranderlijke essentie  
is die we in onszelf moeten vinden en als unieke zelfexpressie naar buiten kunnen brengen. Aan de andere 
kant bestaat de visie  waarin  het zelf  een emergente verzameling is van situatie-gebonden rollen die wij 
spelen  in  sociale  interacties  met  anderen  en  vervolgens  internaliseren.  De  narratieve  identiteitstheorie 
neemt  een  middenpositie  in.  Hierin  is  het  zelf  een  dynamische  en  artificiële  constructie  maar  wel  
georiënteerd op coherentie en permanentie in ruimte en tijd. Voorts, identiteit kan slechts ten dele begrepen 
worden als een onbepaald concept waar algemene uitspraken over te doen zijn. Het is te allen tijde ook een  
bepaalde geactualiseerde uitdrukking die betrekking heeft op specifieke individuen en groepen. Wat maakt 
mij  mij? Wat maakt ons  ons? Wat maakt anderen  hen? Tenslotte, identiteit is op verschillende manieren 
problematisch.  Hoewel  het  richting  geeft  in  het  leven,  ervaren  velen  op  een  zeker  moment  een 
identiteitscrisis. Mensen denken vaak in stereotypen over elkaar. Identiteit wordt geregeld gepolitiseerd en 
ingezet  als  middel  om  bepaalde  doelen  te  bereiken  (identiteitspolitiek).  Identiteit  geeft  aanleiding  tot 
conflicten  met  onszelf,  tussen  dominante  instituties  en  gemarginaliseerde  groepen,  en  tussen  groepen 
onderling. Bovendien zijn de drie modaliteiten van identiteit (zijn - hebben - worden) op zich al lastig. We  
kunnen geworpen zijn in lichamen, seksuele voorkeuren, omstandigheden, etc. waar we ons ongelukkig bij  
voelen. Hyper-reflexiviteit kan leiden tot extreme twijfel of sterk defensieve houdingen. Het navigeren tussen  
de  identiteitsparadoxen  kan  het  verlammende  gevoel  bewerkstelligen  dat  iedere  positiebepaling  onze 
toekomstige mogelijkheden versmalt. 
In  hoofdstuk 1 worden de belangrijkste concepten besproken: mobiele mediatechnologieën, de narratieve 
identiteitstheorie,  het  spelbegrip  en  het  gebruik  ervan  in  mediastudies.  Mobiele  media  worden 
geconceptualiseerd als platforms en interfaces voor het spelen van spellen, als materiële artefacten waarmee 
mensen spelen, als media waardoor mensen op speelse wijze  communiceren, en als onderdeel van een 
bredere  mediacultuur  die  mensen  bespeelt.  Deze  vallen  samen  met  de  vier  spelniveaus.  Een  aantal 
benaderingen van de relatie technologie en samenleving wordt besproken. Tevens wordt ingegaan op wat er 
‘mobiel’ is aan mobiele media, waarbij met name de versmelting van fysieke mobiliteit en communicatie als 
kenmerkend wordt gezien. 
In  Ricoeur’s  narratieve  identiteitstheorie  bemiddelt  het  narratief  tussen  drie  relaties:  mens  en 
zichzelf, mens en anderen en mens en de wereld. Ricoeur formuleert de identiteitskwestie als drievoudige 
vraag: hoe kunnen wij over onszelf als een zelf spreken, hoe kunnen wij permanentie en eenheid bewaren 
gedurende  ons  leven,  en  hoe  kunnen  wij  ons  tot  anderen  verhouden?  Ten  eerste,  Ricoeur  maakt  een 
onderscheid tussen twee temporele ordes in identiteit: de causale orde van idem (hetzelfde,  sameness) en 
de intentionele orde van ipse (zelf, selfhood). Wij zijn zowel wezens met een historie die zich voltrekt in de 
kosmologische tijd  (causale  orde van idem) als  wezens die  tijd  subjectief  beleven en fictionele  verhalen 
vertellen  over  onze  historie  (intentionele  orde  van  ipse).  Het  narratief  verbindt  deze.  Onze  narratieve 
identiteit is derhalve een historische fictie, of fictieve historie. Ten tweede, het narratief smeedt permanentie 
en eenheid in ons leven via drie mimetische bewegingen (mimetisch, omdat het ‘alsof’ centraal staat). In  
mimesis1 (narratieve  prefiguratie)  begrijpen  wij  de  wereld  van  acties  en  gebeurtenissen  impliciet  als 
bestaande  uit  verhalende  elementen.  In  mimesis2 (narratieve  configuratie)  scheppen  wij  in  acties  en 
gebeurtenissen  een  logische  eenheid  (concordantie)  door  middel  van  een  verhalend  plot.  In  mimesis3 
(narratieve reconfiguratie) passen we dit plot toe op ons eigen leven, zowel het verleden als de toekomst, en 
begrijpen wij onszelf als protagonisten in onze verhalen en die van anderen. Ten derde, wij verhouden ons  
wederom door middel van het narratief tot anderen. Enerzijds als herkenbare en voorspelbare karakters,  
waarbij zelf (ipse) samenvalt met dezelfde zijn (idem). Anderzijds door waarachtige beloftes te doen, waarbij 
het zelf een zuiver intentionele positie inneemt: “hier sta ik!” Met name Ricoeur’s traditionele en ethische  
opvattingen over het narratief, zijn exclusieve focus op de temporele dimensie en eenheid, de onreflexieve  
houding ten opzichte van het mediatieproces, alsmede het referentiële karakter van het verhalende zelf zijn 
discutabele punten. In aansluiting bij bestaande discussies wordt benadrukt dat niet zozeer de relatie tussen  
nieuwe media en narratologie centraal staat, als wel de toepassing van het narratief op identiteit. 
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Het begrip spel is zeer ambigue. Bij Huizinga is het spel cultuurscheppend. Bij Caillois schept het  
sociale orde. Toch benadrukken beiden het vrije niet-noodzakelijke karakter van spel, waarbij vooral Caillois 
het spel  (ten  onrechte)  ziet  als  afgesloten  van  de normale  alledaagse  wereld.  Caillois  onderscheidt  vier 
speltypen  en  twee  spelhoudingen.  De  vier  speltypen  zijn  agôn (competitie),  alea (kans),  mimicry 
(nabootsing) en  ilinx (zinsbegoocheling). De twee attitudes lopen van het spontane, ongestructureerde en 
vrije  paidea tot het regelgeleide  ludus. Deze twee termen worden in het Engels vaak vertaald als play en 
game. Anderen wijzen erop dat game niet zozeer regelgeleid als wel doelgeoriënteerd is, terwijl play gericht 
is op zijn eigen voortzetting en zodoende oneindig. Spel is een materieel object, een set regels en een actie.  
Daarnaast  kan  speels  (playful)  de  kwaliteiten  van  objecten,  acties,  ervaringen  en  mentale  houdingen 
omschrijven. In het laatste geval betreft het meta-spel: dat wat speelt met de regels en verwachtingen van 
het spel. Van hieruit maken we de stap naar communicatie. Volgens Bateson bestaan er drie communicatieve  
boodschappen: (a) boodschappen die iets zeggen; (b) boodschappen die doen alsof ze iets zeggen; (c) meta-
communicatieve  boodschappen  die  ons  in  staat  stellen  om  een  onderscheid  tussen  a  en  b  te  maken  
(bijvoorbeeld in het geval van stoeiende aapjes: “het is maar spel”). Deze ‘conditionele’ (c) boodschappen  
spelen een prominente rol in communicatie via de mobiele telefoon en andere media. De vier speltypen van 
Caillois zijn sterke metaforen voor het begrijpen van identiteit: als evolutionaire of zelfopgelegde competitie  
(agôn), als noodlot of toeval (alea), als zinsbegoochelende desillusie (ilinx), of als theater (mimicry). Vooral 
mimicry is centraal in benaderingen zoals die van Goffman, waarin identiteit niets anders is dan een masker 
(Latijnse persona) dat door middel van illusoir rollenspel in sociale interacties vormgegeven wordt. 
Ondanks, of beter juist dankzij, zijn ambiguïteit is het spel een bruikbare heuristische lens om naar  
mediapraktijken te kijken. Eerdere mediastudies suggereren dat het spel bij uitstek het subjunctieve karakter 
van  mediapraktijken  vat  als  een  spel  met  de  alledaagse  werkelijkheid.  Media  vormen zowel  aparte  als 
geïntegreerde ruimtes, ze zijn uitzonderlijk én alledaags, waar én schijn, vrij én gebonden, middel én doel op  
zich,  grenzeloos  én  kadervormend.  Tevens  vestigt  het  spelbegrip  de  aandacht  op kenmerkende  nieuwe  
media-dimensies: ze geven plezier en bieden ruimte voor humor, en het zijn leeromgevingen waarbinnen  
geëxperimenteerd wordt met identiteiten. Bovenstaande vormt het conceptuele kader van de toepassing van 
het spelbegrip op technologisch gemediëerde identiteiten: het onderscheid tussen play als vrije speelruimte 
en  game als  gecodeerde  ruimte,  vier  speltypen  en  twee  spelattitudes,  spel  als  conditionele  meta-
communicatie, identiteit als performatief ‘doen alsof’. Ten behoeve van de verdere analyse onderscheid ik 
vier spelniveaus waarop mobiele  media onze relaties  met de wereld,  anderen en onszelf  mediëren.  We 
spelen op mobiele media (play on),  we spelen met mobiele media (play with),  we spelen door mobiele 
media (play through), en we worden bespeeld door mobiele media (played by). 
Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 vormen een case-studie over de mobiele telefoon in  de stedelijke identiteiten van 
inwoners van Jakarta, Indonesië. De mobiele telefoon speelt een cruciale rol in wat het betekent om een 
‘modern’ leven te leiden, zowel als materieel artefact, als communicatiemedium en als onderdeel van een  
bredere mediacultuur.  Jakarta is historisch gezien het centrum van de moderne natie. Als stadswereld is 
Jakarta de plek waar functies en bevolkingsgroepen uit alle delen van Indonesië samenkomen; als wereldstad 
is  het  de  plek  waar  een  nieuwe  stedelijke  cultuur  is  ontstaan  met  wereldwijde  invloeden,  en  niet  
gedomineerd  wordt  door  één  traditionele  regionale  cultuur.  Na  de  onafhankelijkheid  gaf  Soekarno 
moderniteit vooral vorm door middel van nationalistische symboliek. Onder Soeharto verschoof de invulling 
van moderniteit naar economische ontwikkeling en koopkracht. De opkomst van digitale media zoals internet 
en  mobiele  telefonie  speelde  een  rol  in  de  val  van  dictator  Soeharto.  Hierdoor  werden  digitale  media  
verbonden met nieuwe ‘universele’ opvattingen van moderniteit in termen van vrijheid van meningsuiting,  
transparantie, zelfexpressie en meritocratische economische kansen. De mobiele telefoon heeft een enorme 
groei doorgemaakt. In 2009 hadden zeven van de tien Indonesiërs een mobiele telefoon (in 2000 zestien op 
1000).  Dit  komt  te  dele  door  de  gebrekkige  vaste  infrastructuur,  door  de  opkomst  van  zeer  betaalbare  
draadloze CDMA communicatie, en door de alomtegenwoordige branding van de mobiele telefoon. 
Bovenal is de mobiele telefoon een populair artefact en communicatiemedium om een moderne 
identiteit mee uit te drukken. Twee begrippen spelen hierin een rol: prestige (gengsi) en modern socialiseren 
(bergaul). Mensen gebruiken de mobiele telefoon als object om persoonlijke status en om nationaal prestige 
mee te  vertolken. Mensen gebruiken de mobiele telefoon ook om zich tot elkaar te verhouden middels  
zelfbewuste sociale interacties. Zowel in gengsi als in bergaul nemen mensen een reflexieve houding in ten 
opzichte van het medium. Mobiliteit is eveneens een kenmerk van een modern leven. Met drie inwoners van 
Jakarta als voorbeeld wordt getoond hoe de mobiele telefoon fysieke, sociaal-economische en imaginaire 
mobiliteit  ondersteunt.  Niettemin  roept  de  mobiele  telefoon  ook  spanningen  op  in  de  Indonesische 
samenleving.  Aan  de  hand  van  het  drievoudig  onderscheid  tussen  fysieke,  sociale  en  mentale  plaats 
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(location,  locale,  sense of place) wordt besproken hoe de mobiele telefoon verbonden is met ruimtelijke 
niveau’s van identificatie en met globalisering. De mobiele telefoon speelt een sleutelrol in conflicten over 
wat ‘echt Indonesisch’ is en in welke richting het land moet moderniseren. In deze twee hoofdstukken komen 
de vier speltypen reeds naar voren. Competitie is verbonden met prestige en de strijd over moderniteit. Kans  
bestaat onder andere in de praktijk van geluksnummers. Zinsbegoocheling en sensatiezucht komen voor in  
de uitwisseling van pornografie via de mobiele telefoon en de visuele overdaad aan accessoires voor de  
telefoon in  winkelcentra.  Doen  alsof  is  te  herkennen in  het vertolken van  modern-zijn  met de mobiele  
telefoon. Van de vier spelniveaus is er vooral aandacht de laatste drie: spelen met de mobiele telefoon, 
spelen  door  de  telefoon,  en  bespeeld  worden  door  de  telefoon.  Ook  komen  de  eerder  benoemde 
identiteitsparadoxen in context-specifieke gedaantes naar voren. 
In  hoofdstuk 4 staat het eerste spelniveau centraal in de analyse van locatieve media en stedelijke games. 
Het opkomende veld  van  locatieve  media  vormt een antwoord op het  ‘oude’  nieuwe  media  paradigma  
waarin plaats en afstand onbelangrijk zouden zijn geworden. Technologisch gezien bestaan locatieve media 
uit de combinatie van mobiele apparaten, draadloze netwerken en geografische positiebepaling (o.a. door 
GPS).  Tevens  richten  diverse  disciplines  zich  vanuit  hun  eigen  perspectief  op  de  integratie  van 
technologiegebruik en fysieke (stedelijke) context. Deze disciplines zijn de mediakunsten, computerstudies en 
met  name  toekomstvisies  over  ubiquitous  computing,  urbane  studies,  pervasive  gaming,  telecom 
industrieën,  alsmede  academia  zelf.  Locatieve  media  kunnen  geclassificeerd  worden  op  basis  van  het 
primaire doel waartoe ze worden ingezet: 1. voor navigatie en oriëntatie (bijvoorbeeld de weg vinden met 
TomTom); 2. metingen en visualisaties (om digitale informatie zichtbaar te maken die normaal niet te zien is, 
bijvoorbeeld  luchtverontreiniging);  3.  annotatie  (zelf  informatie  toevoegen  aan  geografische  locaties);  4. 
sociale netwerken (sociale interacties op basis van fysieke nabijheid); 5. pervasive gaming (spellen waarbij de  
fysieke omgeving het speelbord is voor computerspelletjes). In alle gevallen maken locatieve media gebruik 
van digitale cartografie, stimuleren ze een speelse houding en zetten ze aan tot hernieuwde reflecties op 
identiteit. Om de invloed van locatieve media op de drie identiteitsrelaties te begrijpen, kijken we eerst naar 
de fysieke stedelijke  context.  De stad wordt op drie manieren gedefinieerd: als fysieke concentratie  van  
functies, als sociaal gesegregeerde en heterogene plek waar vreemdelingen samenleven, en in termen van 
typisch stedelijke ervaringen en mentaliteit.  De opkomst van tijd- en ruimte-overstijgende  elektronische  
media zou de stad overbodig  maken.  Recentere  theorieën echter gaan uit  van een wederzijdse  invloed. 
Mobiele media en de integratie van locatie-gebonden technologieën zorgen ervoor dat technologie gebruikt 
wordt  in  relatie  tot  de  fysieke  context.  Mobiele  media  zijn  interfaces  voor  ‘hybride  ruimtes’.  Sociale  
processen  -  wonen,  werken,  ontmoeten,  reizen,  vrije  tijd  -  hebben  zowel  een  fysieke  als  een  digitaal  
gemediëerde component. Ter illustratie: mensen onderhandelen over een fysieke ontmoetingsplek en -tijd 
via een serie korte conversaties door de mobiele telefoon; zelfstandigen gaan met hun laptop in café’s met  
draadloos internet zitten werken; het openbaar vervoer is vaak alleen toegankelijk met een rfid chipkaart; we 
navigeren in een vreemde omgeving met de TomTom. Aan de hand van het locatieve sociale netwerk Bliin  
wordt bekeken wat dit betekent voor onze relaties tot de wereld, tot andere mensen en tot onszelf. Het 
spelelement van Bliin zit niet zozeer in een duidelijk doel (winnen) maar in een spel met grenzen: wat is het  
speelveld en wat is fysiek of digitaal aan ‘plaats’? wie zijn mijn medespelers en wat is ‘sociale nabijheid’? 
welk beeld wil ik van mijzelf laten zien en wat is zijn de grenzen van het zelf? Het is een meta-spel met de  
voorwaarden van onze relaties tot wereld, anderen en zelf. De digitale kaart ordent ruimtelijke relaties zoals  
plot dit doet voor temporele narratieven. 
In hoofdstuk 5 worden de vier spelniveaus nader geanalyseerd. Spel op mobiele media als interfaces bestaat 
naast pervasive games ook uit kleine mobiele spelletjes en het gebruik van mobiele media om muziek mee te 
maken.  In  spel  met mobiele media als  artefacten kunnen we  de vier  speltypen onderscheiden. Mensen 
gebruiken de telefoon om zich van elkaar te onderscheiden en sommigen zien het hacken van de telefoon als  
uitdaging (agôn). De telefoon introduceert onverwachte momenten in het alledaagse leven (alea). Mensen 
doen alsof ze gebeld worden en spelen met hun zelfpresentatie (mimicry). En de telefoon zorgt voor steeds 
nieuwe sensorische impulsen (ilinx). Spel door mobiele media als communicatiemedia heeft het karakter van 
traditionele giftcirkels. Mensen geven elkaar om beurten kleine ‘cadeautjes’ in de vorm van aandacht via de 
mobiele telefoon, met de verplichting om te retourneren. Dit is niet slechts een verwijzing naar, of symbool 
voor hun relatie; het actualiseert die relatie in een voortdurende circulaire beweging. Bespeeld worden door 
mobiele  media  als  onderdeel  van een bredere mediacultuur leidt tot het gevoel  geen controle  meer te  
hebben over het leven. Dit komt door de toegenomen keuzemogelijkheden en de verplichting om te kiezen;  
het gevoel dat het technologisch gemediëerde leven te snel gaat; en het idee dat zowel private als publieke 
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ruimtes aangetast worden door nieuwe media. Tevens ontstaan nieuwe technologische machtsmechanismes, 
zoals surveillance (van bovenaf door instituties) en sousveillance (burgers die elkaar op de vingers kijken en 
te schande zetten), en het verlies van controle over online zelfpresentatie. We kunnen hiermee omgaan door 
milde vormen van bedrog en door kleine leugentjes te vertellen. Zulke strategieën zetten Ricoeur’s ethische 
imperatief van waarachtigheid op losse schroeven. De aandacht verschuift hiermee van de representatie van 
identiteit naar de  condities waaronder waarachtig of juist niet over het zelf  gesproken wordt en het zelf  
geïnterpreteerd kan worden. Tenslotte, de ‘ludificatie’ van ‘serieuze zaken’ (o.a. politiek) in de media en de 
ontologische twijfel  aan mediarepresentaties zorgen voor een voortdurende spanning tussen cynisme en 
engagement. Paradoxaal genoeg dienen we de media speels te benaderen om niet zelf voortdurend bespeeld 
te worden. We moeten spelen. 
In het concluderende  hoofdstuk 6 keren we terug naar Ricoeur’s narratieve identiteitstheorie. Vanuit het 
ontwikkelde spelperspectief wordt op basis van een serie zwakke punten afstand genomen, om vervolgens 
een verzoenende beweging terug te maken, waarmee het geraamte neergezet wordt van een theorie van 
‘playful  identities’.  Hoewel  Ricoeur’s  theorie  ruimte  lijkt  te  bieden  voor  een  dynamische  mediatie  van  
identiteit, beschouwt hij het leven onontkoombaar als narratief. De concordantie van de plot privilegieert 
eenheid en stabiliteit en ziet permanentie als het hoogste streven. Er is geen uitweg voor andere vormen van  
mediatie.  Daarmee  is  de  interpretatieve  cirkel  gesloten  en  statisch.  Om  een  andere  vorm  van 
identiteitsbemiddeling te vinden, moeten we spelbreker worden en uit het narratieve kader stappen. Met de 
aanname dat het narratief wortelt in een singuliere culturele traditie negeert Ricoeur dat cultuur zelf bol  
staat van interne spanningen. Cultuur is geen gegeven maar ontstaat uit het spelen met vastgestelde regels.  
De overdracht van culturele kennis (en de toepassing ervan op identiteit) gebeurt niet alleen via verhalen  
maar  ook  middels  belichaamde  interacties,  houdingen  en  sensorische  indrukken.  Daarnaast  roept  het 
ontbreken van literaire tradities elders, bijvoorbeeld in Indonesië, de vraag op of het narratief een universele 
mediatie  is.  Door  identiteitsconstructie  uitsluitend  in  temporele  termen te  formuleren,  negeert  Ricoeur 
ruimtelijke  dimensies  die  met  toegenomen  mobiliteit  en  globalisering  steeds  prominenter  worden.  In  
heterogene dynamische urbane samenlevingen is kennis van elkaars biografie of literaire tradities minder 
relevant dan (het onderhandelen van) gedeelde vormen van interacties. Ricoeur’s nadruk op het referentiële 
en representerende karakter van narratieve identiteit als zelfinterpretatie brengt een scheiding aan met het  
alledaagse  leven.  Dit  gaat  ten  koste  van  een  perspectief  op  hoe  identiteit  geactualiseerd  wordt  door  
zelfbewuste performances, hoe deze identiteitsperformances de sociale interacties in het dagelijkse leven 
actualiseren, en hoe mensen zich reflexief verhouden tot de mediatie van identiteit zelf. Het spel verlegt de 
focus naar de condities waaronder mensen over zichzelf communiceren en waaronder dit geïnterpreteerd 
kan worden. Daartoe worden Ricoeur’s drie mimetische stappen gemodificeerd tot play1-2-3. Dit behelst een 
verschuiving van Ricoeur’s nadruk op het refereren aan- en representeren van een wereld van acties naar 
een actualisering van een wereld van interacties. In play1 begrijpen wij de structuur, symboliek and het kader 
van de wereld impliciet in ruimtelijke termen als een speelse wereld van interacties. Dit komt zowel door de  
toegenomen complexiteit van ons urbane leven als door mobiele telefoon interacties. In play2 configureren 
we onze interacties in termen van een beweging tussen play en game. De (mentale) kaart fungeert als een 
manier om coherentie - geen eenheid - aan te brengen in de wereld van tijd, ruimte en interacties. In play3 
passen we het spelbegrip toe op ons eigen leven, waarbij we onszelf begrijpen als ‘bewegende cirkels’ tussen 
free play en regelgeleide games. 
283

Curriculum vitae
Michiel de Lange (1976) studied Cultural Anthropology and Sociology of non-western 
societies at the University of Amsterdam. He wrote a master’s thesis about the role of 
the internet in Indonesian society, called “Dunia Digit@l: Internet and Modernity in  
Indonesia  2000”  (in  Dutch).  He  is  co-founder  of  The  Mobile  City,  a  think-tank  and 
knowledge  network  about  new  media  technologies  and  urban  culture 
(www.themobilecity.nl). Between 2006 - 2007 Michiel collaborated in a locative media 
art and science project, which took place in Nigeria (www.nomadicmilk.net). Between 
2001  -  2005  Michiel  worked  for  Knowledgeland,  a  Dutch  think-tank  that  aims  to 
strengthen the knowledge-based society  (www.knowledgeland.org).  He also worked 
for Cybersoek,  a computer neighborhood center in  Amsterdam, teaching people  of 
different ages and backgrounds how to use digital media (www.cybersoek.nl). Michiel 
keeps a personal weblog at http://blog.bijt.org. 
285
